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SUMMARY 
The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the 
interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary 
law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be 
perceived as involving an axiological dimension. 
Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches 
to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the 
adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory 
interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These 
leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law 
! 
and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. 
The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of 
significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so 
marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is 
disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cum-
intentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. 
The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the 
interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights 
previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary 
law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the two 
5 
sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a 
conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. 
KEY TERMS 
ADWDICATION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM; COMMON LAW AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM; CUSTOMARY LAW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM; 
HERMENEUTICS AND ADruDICATION; INTERPRETATION OF 
STATUTES; mRISPRUDENCE; LEGAL ARGUMENTATION; SOCIAL AND 
LEGAL THEORY. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
That the relevant legal issues stemming from the inauguration of a new 
constitutional order have been pertinently addressed is quite manifest. The ample 
case law, running into many volumes, attests to this unmistakably. Legal practice, 
too, exhibits a high measure of concern with constitutional imperatives. 
Theoretical issues underpinning the relationship between the Constitution and the 
regular law have not been specifically dealt with, however - at all events not to the 
same extent as those of a legal-practical nature. This is in some degree 
understandable. Jurists have ever been impatient of theory, the pressure of work 
and constraints of time tending to make everything not strictly relevant irrelevant. 
This is unfortunate. For theory holds out the possibility of pointing practice in the 
right direction. It is with the jurist's antipathy to theory in mind that a model, 
finding elaboration in Chapters VI and VII of this study, has been constructed to 
serve as a theoretical-practical device. It is presented in what, it is hoped, is a 
readily assimilable form. 
The problems arising in legal practice pose questions of a theoretical nature: This is 
a fortiori the case under a dispensation of constitutionalism. One is led to enquire 
after the manner in which the Constitution impacts upon the nature of legal 
argumentation. Questions are raised in this regard as to the adequacy of legal 
positivism as a jurisprudential orientation. What is to be made of the black-letter-
law approach and verbalism? What does the demise of legislative supremacy 
(parliamentary sovereignty) mean for everyday lawyering? What significance is to 
be attached to the "intention of the legislature"? If values are to inform legal 
7 
argument, then how is the rule of the law, understood as fidelity to law, to be 
respected? (And how is the jurist to defer to the doctrine of trias politica'?) 
Furthermore, questions arise as to the differential means of approach to statutory 
and non-statutory sources. And, in the same breath, one asks after the 
methodologies that are indicated in approaching, respectively, the common law and 
(African) customary law. These are just some of the theoretical concerns which are 
apt to present themselves in legal practice. 
In the course of this study, some light will be shed upon these and cognate issues. 
Chapter I treats of formalist hermeneutics and its contemporary relevance. 
"Hermeneutics as explication" is the theme of that chapter. Chapter II deals with 
phenomenological (ontological) hermeneutics and its present-day juridical 
significance. The theme of this chapter is "hermeneutics as understanding." In 
Chapter III, the contemporary legal relevance of critical hermeneutics is examined. 
Here, as will be seen, an approach which might be said to be grounded in solidity is 
set forth. Chapter IV is concerned with a critical analysis of the popular perception 
of adjudication, and seeks in the light thereof to render a more faithful 
representation of the process. Chapter V is a discussion of the jurisprudential 
(legal-philosophical) implications of the new Grundnorm-order for legal 
argumentation. Here we see that western law (legislation and common law) and 
customary law (indigenous law) cannot be dealt with upon an interchangeable 
basis. 
Insights from Chapters I, II, IV and V go into the making of Chapter VI. Chapter 
VI is a presentation of strategies for the interpretation of statutes. It is marked off 
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as "Conclusions (A)", and represents the first part of the model. Insights from 
Chapters II,III,IV and V enter into the composition of Chapter VII. Chapter VII 
presents a theoretical framework for the development of the common law and 
customary law. It is marked off as "Conclusions (B)", and reflects the second part 
of the model. The theory of developing the common law is set apart from the 
jurisprudential basis proferred along the lines of which customary law might be 
developed. Such a cleavage is premised upon the insight that the two bodies of law 
are not be handled on the same footing. 
The model (Chapters VI and VII) is couched in a way which, it is to be hoped, 
renders its content readily appropriable by busy practitioners, lawyers and 
academics. Some sort of response is endeavoured to be given to questions likely to 
arise in legal practice, such as were noticed earlier. The model is designed to be as 
self-contained, as self-sufficient, as possible. This will relieve the jurist of the 
burden of having to consult the rest of the study. It is nonetheless inevitable that a 
lawyer wishing to come to grips with the detail of the model will be forced to look 
to previous chapters. Copious cross-references are accordingly provided: these 
should facilitate access to relevant material. 
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I 
THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL RELEVANCE OF 
FORMALIST HERMENEUTICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of hermeneutics as it pertains to the legal process has been all but 
relegated to unimportance in this country. Kruger makes special mention of this 
point. 1 It is this neglect that is sought to be addressed, and redressed, in the course 
of this study. As the argument progresses, we shall find ourselves better equipped 
to handle legal sources. At its conclusion, the reader will have at her disposal a 
model2 suggesting a means of dealing with these sources (and upon the basis of 
which the decisions of the courts in their approach to the law might be subjected to 
analysis). 
Three hermeneutical traditions are discussed in this thesis. This chapter is 
concerned with formalist hermeneutics. As its name implies, this tradition focuses 
on the formal texture of legal documents. It seeks to discern what may be 
1 See Johan Kruger "Towards a New Interpretive Theory'' in J. Kruger and B. Currin (eds.) 
Interpreting a Bill of Rights ( 1994) 103 131. One is inclined to say that as regards any specialized 
jurisprudential hermeneutics in this cmmtry there is nothing very much to speak of, at any rate when 
the work of scholars such as Steyn, Du Plessis, Van den Bergh and Devenish is left out of account. 
2 The notion of a "model" is perllaps here deserving of some elaboration. Describing a model as 
abstract or theoretical in nature, Popper seems to contend that it may function as a heuristic device 
by reference to which matters to which it pertains may be understood. See Karl R. Popper The 
Poverty of Historicism ( 1986) 136 and 140. A model, then, is an instnunentality for the orientation 
of understanding. 
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uncovered by having regard to the sequential ordering of words on the printed 
page. 3 
In the ensuing chapter, the insights of phenomenological hermeneutics are set forth, 
and in the chapter thereafter those of critical hermeneutics. Chapter IV examines 
the deficiencies inhering in the "idealized model" of adjudication - in the light of 
the discussion - and offers by way of remedy an alternative depiction of the 
process. Chapter V, largely in the nature of a disquisition, undertakes to unveil the 
juridical relevance of our novel Grundnorm-order for law-application. With this, 
Chapter VI advances strategies for the interpretation of statutes, and Chapter VII 
theoretical guidelines for dealing with, respectively, the common law and 
customary law. Chapters VI and VII are conclusive in nature, and together 
constitute the model to which it has been adverted. 
1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS CHAPTER 
The aim of this chapter is to elicit those aspects of formalist hermeneutics which 
show themselves up as of value in the current legal setting. 4 This is, of course, to 
imply that certain features of the formalist tradition are inappropriate to present-day 
South African jurisprudence. Largely accounting for this circumstance is the fact 
that our legal-political order has undergone a paradigmatic transformation. 
3 Formalist hermeneutics may also be spoken of as philological hermeneutics or the hermeneutics of 
method. 
4 Formalism connects up very congenially with legal positivism. Dugard asserts that positivism has 
not well served this country as a basis for juridical thought. See John Dugard Human Rights and the 
South African Legal Order ( 1978) 397. I am disposed to agree with Dugard in this regard. But there 
are nevertheless features of formalist hermeneutics which hold themselves out as of substantial 
11 
Premised, until recently, on Westminster-principles, our legal system espoused the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This implied unconditional deference to the 
prescripts of the legislature. Hence the homage paid in so many judgments to the 
bald wording of statutes. Hence, also, the strenuous quest for their "plain 
meaning". 5 This was legal positivism regnant. Austin and Hart (not so much 
Kelsen, for "authentic interpretation" upon his appropriation involved an extra-
textual dimension6) would have found a very congenial setting for appraising their 
own theories in the South Africa of that time. The text - conceived of in objective 
terms 7 - was to reign supreme. Its "plain meaning" was "out there" for the taking. 
The idea of value-laden statutory construction was not a popular one. 
But the climate has changed. The doctrine of legislative sovereignty has given way 
to that of constitutional supremacy. No longer is the word of the legislature the last. 
And no longer is a statute (or any of its provisions) to be conceptualized as bearing 
an "autonomous" signification. It is to a large extent in contemplation of these 
considerations that specific facets of formalistic hermeneutics lend themselves to be 
conceived as inapposite to juridical interpretation. 
utility to the legal endeavour. These are not necessarily of positivist inspiration, and it would be 
foolish to ignore them. 
5 It is highly di~]Jutable whether there is any such thing as "plain meaning''. The later Wittgenstein, 
for one, is reported to have denied a correlation of correspondence between word and essential 
meaning. See George Pitcher The Philosophy of Wittgenstein ( 1964) 223 et passim. Instructive too, 
in this regard, is James B. White Justice as Translation ( 1990) at 35. 
6 -See Hans KelsenPure Theory of Law (1967) 354-5. See also Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law 
and State ( 1961) 146: "The individualization of a general norm by a judicial decision is always a 
determination of elements which are not yet determined by the general norm and which cannot be 
completely determined by it". See, further, Du Toit "The Problem of 'Correct' Interpretation: 
Freedom and Humanism in Interpretation" 1992 17 1RW (2) 20. 
7 Upon this conception, the interpreter is "subject", the text "object", with the former standing 
outside the constructive process. 
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In the conclusions to this chapter, those features of the tradition under discussion 
which facilitate - or at least are compatible with - the ethos of constitutionalism 
will be enumerated, together with those which do not. In so proceeding, we retain 
what is salutary, rejecting the indefensible. 
1.2 THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER INTRODUCING REMEDIAL 
NOTIONS 
The negative aspects of formalism (to be noted) point to the requirement of action 
by way ofremedy. This is provided in the following chapter. There the heterotelic 
dimension8 of legal interpretation is brought out explicitly. All this harmonizes 
with the reflection that the autotelic claims of the canon of the hermeneutical 
autonomy of the object9 are untenable. 
With this prelude, we tum to consider various strands to be discerned within the 
tradition of the hermeneutics of formalism. 
2. LITERAL HERMENEUTICS 
It would appear that the most pointed expression of the literal-hermeneutical 
position finds its formulation in Chladenius. Chladenius may in a very meaningful 
sense be regarded as the progenitor of formalist hermeneutics. He was of a 
disposition to consider that all that was necessary to resolve interpretive difficulties 
8 There is a social reality to be serviced in the course of legal interpretation. One is not concerned 
merely with statutory exegesis. 
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was to appnse oneself of the proper meamngs of words and phrases. 1° For 
Chladenius, interpretation was explication. Hirsch's thesis of the "stable 
determinacy of meaning" (with which we shall be concerned presently) seems to 
find a very able prefiguration in Chladenius. 11 
It is of interest that as early as 1689, the German jurist Von Felde proffered notions 
of a similar tenor to those to be encountered in the writings of Chladenius. 12 For 
Von Felde interpretation meant no more than the explication to someone of 
something she found difficult to understand. 13 And for Chladenius likewise: 
interpretation consisted in imparting to another those concepts which make for full 
comprehension of a speech or text. 14 
Chladenius's perceptions may be put to good use in the legal context, so long as 
their limitations are borne in mind throughout. Words which are obscure to the 
interpreter should as a matter of first recourse be taken up in the "sense" suggested 
by a comprehensive dictionary, or where appropriate, a legal or other technical 
lexicon. Adapted to the juridical setting, Chladenius may further be read as urging 
that interpretation clauses in statutes be taken seriously. These would point up the 
"sense" of words used in the legislation at hand. 
9 For a discussion of this canon, see the remarks under 4.1.1, below. 
10 Mueller-Vollmer writes that for Chladenius interpretation was simply verbal explication. See 
Kurt Mueller-Vollmer The Hermeneutics Reader(l986) 8. 
11 The reader is referred in this regard to the discussion under 4.2.1, below. 
12 See Mueller-Vollmer op cit 3: "In his 'Treatise on the Science of Interpretation' (1689), the 
German jurist Johannes von Felde attempted to establish interpretive principles which would be 
valid for all classes of text, both literary and legal. He also offered a definition of hermeneutics 
which Chladenius would incorporate into his hermeneutics. To interpret, for von Felde, meant but 
to explicate to someone that which proves difficult for him to understand" 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid 8. See, in particular, the author's citation ofChladenius. 
14 
Chladenius may most pertinently be taken up in relation to the interpretation of 
penal provisions in statutes. In the case of legal precepts to which attach criminal 
sanctions, the construction indicated is that which would place a strict interpretation 
upon their terms. 15 The "principle of legality" enjoins as much. 16 (A generous or 
liberal interpretation is to proceed in respect of any exclusion of criminal liability, 
however. 17) 
3. LITERAL-CUM-INTENTIONAL HERMENEUTICS 
This strand of hermeneutics is very prominent within the tradition under 
consideration. Droysen, Ast, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Betti and Hirsch are to be 
counted among those who espouse the literal-cum-intentional schema in one or 
other of 'its variants. Since the work of Betti and Hirsch is too sophisticated to be 
accommodated exclusively within this schema, only Droysen, Ast, Schleiermacher 
and Dilthey are here given coverage. 
Droysen advised that we ought, in seeking to make sense of inscriptions, to have 
regard not only to their semantic or "rational" significations, but also to their 
psychological, emotional and spiritual dimensions. 18 When inscriptions are 
perceived, they call forth the same inner processes as actuated their authors. 19 Ast's 
contentions are similar. Ast argued that the interpretation of the "spirit" of a text 
15 See L.M. du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 89. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 121. 
18 See Mueller-Vollmer op cit 18-19 for a discussion ofDroysen's position in this regard. 
19 See Johann,G. Droysen "History and the Historical Method" in Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (ed.) The 
Hermeneutics Reader ( 1986) 119 121: "On being perceived, the utterance, by projecting itself into 
the inner experience of the percipient, calls for the same inner process". 
15 
involves bringing out the "idea" the author had in mind or by which he [sic] was 
unconsciously animated. 20 
Schleiermacher seems to have put literal-cum-intentional hermeneutics on a very 
sturdy foundation. 21 He maintained that interpretation involves two "moments'', 
the one "grammatical", the other "psychological" (or "technical"). They enjoy an 
equal status; 22 the art of interpretation involves an appreciation of the circumstances 
in which one moment should yield to the other23 - we see, then, that categorially 
they are of equivalent ranking, but that the context may demonstrate the one or the 
other as pre-eminent in the circumstances. 
Dilthey ventured that a "life-expression" (and by this he meant an inscription) 
points back to the "lived experience" by which it was informed. 24 Interpretation is 
explained upon the basis of the formula: "experience-expression-understanding".25 
The interpreter is to "re-live" that past experience26 which finds its formulation in a 
written matrix. Here we have an affirmation of a literal-cum-intentional 
methodology. Dilthey did, however, attempt to proceed beyond this, seeking to 
20 See F. Ast "Hermeneutics" in G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift The Hermeneutic Tradition (1989) 
39 39-43. At 43, Ast claims that interpretation is in some sense "geistig". Tue source of this insight 
may be elsewhere. 
21 According to Bleicher, it was Schleiermacher's "genius" to have given the leads provided by Ast 
(and Wolf) a systematic foundation. See Josef Bleicher Contemporary Hermeneutics (1980) 13. 
22 See F.D.E. Schleiennacher "[General Hermeneutics]" in Kurt Mueller-Vollmer op cit 73 75: 
"[The] two henneneutical tasks are completely equal, and it would be incorrect to label grammatical 
interpretation the "lower" and psychological interpretation the "higher" task''. 
23 See F.D.E. Schleiennacher "Tue Aphorisms on Hermeneutics from 1805 and r809/10" in G.L. 
Ormiston and A.D. Schrift op cit 57 58. 
24 See Mueller-Vollmer op cit 25 in this regard. See also Wilhelm Dilthey "The Understanding of 
Other Persons and their Life-Expressions" in K. Mueller-Vollmer op cit 153: "What is given always 
consists of life-expressions. Occurring in the world of the senses they are manifestations of mental 
content which they enable us to know''. 
25 See, in this connection, Richard E. Palmer Hermeneutics ( 1969) at 98-123. 
26 See Mueller-Vollmer op cit 25 for further elaboration. 
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establish for the human sciences a solid epistemological foundation. 27 But that is 
another matter. And we shall not be concerned with it in this study. 
If the hermeneutics under discussion is subjected to critical scrutiny, it resolves 
itself into a brand of literalism. The "intention" of the author appears from the 
"plain meaning" of the words she chose to employ. So we see that, while laying 
claim ·to superiority of conception, literal-cum-intentional hermeneutics is simply 
literal hermeneutics by another name.28 This does not seem, however, to have 
occurred to its adherents. 
Nor, for that matter, does it seem to occur to proponents of "intentionalism" in the 
law. The "intention of the legislature'', they persistently maintain, provides the key 
to the meaning of any statutory provision. Steyn, for instance, proposed that the 
sovereign rule of legislative interpretation is to ascertain the will- or thought-
content of the promulgating organ.29 When once it has been established what it is 
that the "words" seek to express as the "true intention", Steyn continues, it remains 
only to give effect to that intention. 30 One finds oneself implicated in circular 
reasoning, however, in endorsing these prescripts. The language of a statute is to be 
construed so as to give effect to the "intention of the legislature". But how is such 
intention to be garnered'? By having resort to the language of the statute! One has 
to agree with Du Plessis that "intentionalism" as thus expounded is really a literal 
27 See Paul Ricoeur From Text to Action (1991) 59: "Dilthey undertook to endow the human 
sciences with a methodology and an epistemology that would be as respectable as those of the 
sciences of nature". 
28 Du Plessis intimates that "intentionalism" (the literal-cum-intentional approach) is little more than 
"literalism" in one of its guises. See Du Plessis op cit 31. 
29 See L.C. Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette (1981) 1-2. 
30 Ibid 2. 
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theory "in an intentional disguise". 31 Literal-cum-intentional hermeneutics in the 
law, as elsewhere, boils down in the ultimate analysis to literal hermeneutics pure 
and simple. 
THE "INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE" 
Although there are notable jurists who subscribe to "intentionalism" (Meese and 
Bork to name but two ),32 it is meant here to part ways with them. It has become 
something of a habit to invoke the "intention of the legislature" in support of one's 
interpretation, but the question arises whether such an appeal bears anything more 
than the quality of ritual. Van Heerden thinks not.33 He claims that the phrase is 
deployed as a retroactive imputation of intention (he is not suggesting 
disingenuousness though) on the basis of an interpretation of a statute in line with 
general juridical sensibilities.34 Stone's arguments are substantially similar.35 
One should not quibble with the use of the words "intention of the legislature" in 
the process of statutory construction. Judicial convention seems to be rather 
wedded to their employment. One may, however, raise an objection to any 
31 Du Plessis op cit 32. 
32 For a statement of the intentionalist programme, see among others the following sources: Edwin 
Meese "Address before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division" in S. Levinson 
and S. Mailloux Interpreting Law and Literature ( 1988) 25 at 29; and Charles Fried "Sonnet LXV 
and the 'Black Ink' of the Framers' Intention" in S. Levinson and S. Mailloux op cit 45 at 50. These 
authors write with specific reference to the interpretation of the American Constitution, but their 
comments are not the less interesting for their particulaI focus. See, among others, Paul Brest "The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding'' in S. Levinson and S. Mailloux op cit 69 at 96; 
and William J. Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification" in 
S. Levinson and S. Mailloux op cit 13 at 17-18 for an expose of anti-intentionalist sentiments. 
These also pertain specifically to the United States Constitution. 
33 See F.J. van Heerden "'n Uitlegteorie" 1989 4 SAPL (1) 29 at 44. 
34 Ibid: "Die indruk wat mens kry by die deurlees van die groot aantal sake in die verband is <lat die 
bedoelingsteorie nikS anders as 'n fiksie is nie. Die regspreker le die wet volgens sy regsgevoel uit 
en skryf <lit dan toe aan die bedoeling van die wetgewer." 
35 See Julius Stone The Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964) 33. 
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perception of the notion as an ideational reality recoverable in principle. This is so 
for the following reasons, among others - the list does not purport to be exhaustive: 
( 1) When once a written work has been created, it acquires a meaning which no 
longer depends upon its author's motives. 36 Interpretation aims to uncover 
this meaning. Put simply, we seek to unveil the "meaning of the statute", not 
the "intention of its authors" .37 
(2) To ascribe an intention to a collectivity may be indefensible. The concept of 
a group-mind poses metaphysical difficulties somewhat refractory to 
resolution. Quite apart from this, it is noted with Radin that the legislature 
cannot be deemed to have an intention with regard to provisions set forth by 
one or two draftsmen; which a considerable percentage of its members 
rejected; and with respect to which those who did approve them may have 
entertained widely differing ideas and convictions.38 Those who vote in 
favour ofa measure often do so on the basis of party-political affiliations, not 
paying much heed to its merits. 
(3) In England at any rate (Dias explains), the courts will interpret legislation 
upon the foundation of what the law in fact provided, should parliament pass 
the statute on an erroneous perception of the law.39 Here the courts do not 
36 Ibid 32. 
37 See R.W.M. Dias Jurisprudence (1976) 219 where this seems to find elaboration: "Ascertaining 
the 'intention of the legislature' .... boils down to finding the meaning of the words used - the 'intent 
of the statute' rather than of Parliament." The expression "intent of the statute" seems upon my 
apprehension to speak to a purposivism. See also Du Plessis op cit 39, as also other references to 
like effect. 
38 See Max Radin "Statutory Interpretation" in F. Schauer Law and Language (1993) 196. 
39 See Dias op cit 219. 
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seek to give effect to any intention informing the statute40 - perhaps a tacit 
judicial acknowledgment of the sterility of the quest for an "intention" in the 
substantive sense. 
(4) The majority of parliamentary representatives, perhaps, do not have any 
comprehensive training in the law. How, then, can they be expected to 
harbour any "intention" in relation to provisions for the understanding of 
which an acquaintance with legal technicality is required? 
(5) It is a commonplace that one's intentions often change in the course of 
giving content to one's efforts. In such a case, which "intention" is to be 
regarded as decisive? Similar considerations are applicable with respect to 
debate in the legislative forum. 
To sum up, one may say, with Cameron, that in no ordinary sense of the expression 
is the "intention of the legislature" a reality. 41 Stone moves, in apparent conformity 
with Van Heerden, 42 that a great deal of the invocation of legislative "intention" is 
to be taken up as of fictional or ritual significance only. 43 
4. SYSTEMATIC FORMALIST HERMENEUTICS 
This sub-heading could be misleading. It should not give the reader to think that 
the work of the theorists just discussed - Chladenius, Droysen, Ast, Schleiermacher 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Edwin Cameron "Legal Chauvinism, Executive-Mindedness and Justice - L.C. Steyn's 
Impact on South African Law'' 1982 SAL.I 38 59-60. 
42 See the first paragraph under the heading "The 'Intention of the Legislature"' above. 
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and Dilthey - is lacking in system. What is meant to be conveyed by the rubric is 
that the contributions of the hermeneuticists about to be canvassed are 
comprehensive, purportedly all-encompassing, theories of literary interpretation, 
purveyed in quasi-prescriptive, systematic terms. 
4.1 THE WORK OF EMILIO BETTI 
Emilio Betti is one of the most prominent contemporary exponents of 
methodological hermeneutics. Influenced by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Betti 
claims that "we may tentatively characterize interpretation as the procedure that 
aims for and results in understanding". 44 Objectively valid interpretations are not 
for him an elusive ideal. 
Betti considers interpretation to be a triadic process.45 The "interpreter" is 
confronted with a "meaning-full form" (a document of one sort or another) 
reflecting an "objectivated mind".46 Being the reverse of creation, interpretation 
involves a "re-cognition" (literally, knowing again) of meaning. 47 On this score, 
Betti appears to be in sympathy with the postulates of literal-cum-intentional 
hermeneutics. 
Betti's four "hermeneutical canons" should be noted for their bearing upon the 
legal-hermeneutical endeavour. Each is discussed in turn. 
43 See Stone op cit 33. 
44 See Emilio Betti "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften" in J. 
Bleicher op cit 51 56. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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4.1.1 THE CANON OF THE HERMENEUTICAL AUTONOMY OF THE 
OBJECT 
The charge that the interpreter affirm the essential hermeneutical autonomy of the 
object (the "meaning-full form" or document) imports that she should not read it 
with any extraneous purpose in mind. Meaning is to be derived from the object, not 
conferred upon it. 48 
One might observe at once that this canon is entirely inappropriate to statutory 
interpretation. It mandates a construction processed on autotelic lines. It loses 
sight altogether of the irreducibly heterotelic dimension of the interpretation of 
statutes. Legislation is invariably construed with reference to an "hors-texte" (or 
"outside"). Contextual considerations simply cannot be dismissed in so cavalier a 
fashion. 
Legal positivism would hold up this canon as exemplary of its (purported) 
methodology. Yet, if pressed to its conclusions, even positivism would be forced to 
deny the applicability of this canon, and in the process to disown certain of its 
fundamental premises. 
The following chapter provides something in the way of a corrective to the notion 
that a legal text is to be regarded as self-sufficient, as a "thing-in-itself." 
47 Ibid 57: "What occurs here ... is an inversion of the creative process: in the hermmeutical 
process the interpreter retraces the steps from the opposite direction by re-thinking them in his inner 
self." 
48 Ibid 58. 
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4.1.2 THE CANON OF THE COHERENCE OF MEANING 
This canon, otherwise referred to as the principle of totality,49 represents an 
encapsulated statement of the hermeneutical circle. Its tenor, as with the notion of 
the hermeneutical circle, is that a part should be understood with reference to the 
whole, and, likewise, that the whole is to be understood by taking into consideration 
each and all of its constituent parts.50 
Transposed to the legal-hermeneutical context, this canon would have the jurist 
seek to understand a provision in a statute by reference to that statute conceived of 
as a globular totality. The provision is cast into sharper relief when seen within its 
larger context. This is an important lesson for purposes of this study. 
4.1.3 THE CANON OF THE ACTUALITY OF UNDERSTANDING 
This canon reflects Betti's injunction, as registered earlier, that the interpreter strive 
to re-construct authorial intent.51 The notion of the "intention of the legislature" is 
one to which he would advise recourse in the interpretation of statutes. In view of 
the criticisms to which that notion is subject, it is submitted that this canon of 
Betti's has nothing of profit to offer the jurist. 
49 Ibid 59. 
so Ibid. 
51 Ibid 62. 
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4.1.4 THE CANON OF HERMENEUTICAL CORRESPONDENCE OF 
MEANING 
Also known as the canon of meaning-adequacy in understanding, or the canon of 
the harmonization of understanding, 52 this principle enjoins the interpreter to adopt 
a "broad viewpoint". 53 What Betti speaks of as "technical-morphological 
interpretation" is here of relevance. 54 The interpreter is required to place the object 
of her constructive efforts within its own particular (specialized) structural 
context.55 The object is sought to be understood "in relation to its particular logic 
and formative principle". 56 It is to be compared with other similar objects (its 
particular logic), as also situated within the context of its antecedents and 
successors (its formative principle). 57 
It is submitted that such comments as are ventured in this spirit with specific 
reference to objects of cultural interest, such as ceramic artifacts and paintings, are 
of equal p~rtinence to juridical interpretation. 58 A statutory provision may be 
rendered open to better understanding for its comparison with other documents 
prepared at roughly the same time and having a bearing upon that provision. Here 
52 Ibid 84-5. 
53 Ibid 85. See further at 85: "According to this canon, the interpreter should strive to bring his [sic] 
own lively actuality into the closest hannony with the stimulation that he receives from the o~ect in 
such a way that the one and the other resonate in a harmonious way." 
54 Ibid 87. 
55 A conversation with Mr E. Leistner of the Department of Philosophy (UNISA) clarified for me 
much that, in this regard, would strike one as impenetrable at the first sight. 
56 Betti writes that the technical-morphological moment "aims at understanding the meaning-content 
of the objective-mental world in relatioo to its particular logic and fonnative principle; it is a 
meaning that can be sensed in these creations and can be reconstructed." See Bleicher, citing Betti, 
in Bleicher op cit 40. 
57 This was brought out in the conversation referred to in n55, above. 
58 This is my submission. However, it does seem to tally with Betti's exposition. See Emilio Betti 
"Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften" in J. Bleicher op cit 51 
84ff. 
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one thinks . of memoranda (detailing suggestions to the legislature) and excerpts 
from Hansard (providing objective evidence of surrounding circumstances and 
preceding deliberations). 
Lloyd remarks that in the United States and on the Continent (otbeiwise than in the 
United Kingdom), recourse to so-called travaux preparatoires is bad in fitting 
instances to establish the "purpose" of legislation. Ministerial or committee reports 
or debates fall within the compass of admissible referential sources.59 
Also shedding light on the import of a statutory provision would be its own 
antecedents: predecessor enactments (or provisions) or statutory precursors, as they 
might othetwise be termed. 
All in all, it seems that the canon of bermeneutical correspondence of meaning bas 
much to offer the jurist. 
4.2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF ERIC DONALD HIRSCH 
Eric Hirsch may also be taken for our purposes as an exponent of systematic 
formalist hermeneutics. Hirsch is a bermeneutical realist, 60 seeking to elaborate a 
theory of literary interpretation based very narrowly upon the concept of the "text" 
itself. 
59 See Dennis Lloyd The Idea of Law (1964) 283. 
6
° For a short commentary on "henneneutical realism", the reader is referred to Steven Mailloux 
"Rhetorical Hermeneutics" in S. Levinson and S. Mailloux op cit 345 347 and 355. See also Pahner 
op cit 5-1. 
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Hirsch sets out to defend the notion of "authorial intention" as the touchstone of 
"valid" interpretations.61 He is of the view that it is in principle recoverable. 62 
Saying that problematic aspects of interpretation relate in the main to the derivation 
of "implications",63 Hirsch advances to the end of their resolution a model 
conceived on the basis of qualitative probabilities. 64 
4.2.1 MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE 
For Hirsch, "meaning' is stable, determinate.65 It bears the character of fixity. It is 
to be found in the "text", either in express terms or by implication. It is "out there" 
for the finding. 
"Significance", by contrast, "embraces a principle of change."66 It is for Hirsch 
"meaning-as-related-to-something-else". 67 Interpretation is concerned exclusively 
with the ad~uction of "meaning". "Significance", which is context-dependent, is 
outside its province.68 
61 In this regard, the reader's attention is drawn to Eric D. Hirsch The Aims of Interpretation (1976) 
passim, especially the first few chapters. 
62 This seems to constitute an implicit motif throughout his work 
63 See Eric D. Hirsch Validity in Interpretation (I 967) 61: "Most of the practical problems of 
interpretation are problems of implication." 
64 See Ibid 174: Hirsch seems to agree with J.M. Keynes that probabilities can be qualitative rather 
than quantitative. "We are content'', he says, "to judge that an event is probable, highly probable, or 
almost certain, without allotting any mnnerical values to these judgments". (Ibid.) 
65 See Hirsch The Aims of Interpretation op cit 1-2. 
66 Ibid 80. 
67 Ibid 79-80. 
68 See, apropos of these reflections, Hirsch Validity in Interpretation op cit 57. 
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These reflections tie in very comfortably with the postulates of legal positivism. 
The "plain meaning" conception of language, intrinsic to that philosophy, finds an 
harmonious.resonance in Hirsch's thesis of the "stable determinacy ofmeaning".69 
Yet, we are confronted with the circumstance that all interpretation proceeds within 
one or other context. We are already applying the text (if only in notional terms) in 
the course of its interpretation. Hence Hirsch's distinction between "meaning" and 
"significance" breaks down.70 Meaning therefore is not stable and determinate, but 
a function of context. In the next chapter the ramifications of this insight will be 
explored more fully. 
4.2.2 THE "SHARED TYPE" 
Hirsch undertakes to clarify his conception of a "type". Such an entity, for one 
thing, has categorial limitations, which are decisive as to whether any particular 
matter is included therein. For another thing, a "type" is always capable of being 
represented by more than one instance. 71 
"Verbal meaning", upon Hirsch's premises, is a ''type". It is a "shared type" which 
has been learned. 72 Familiarity with the "shared type" ("learned convention") is 
what enables the interpreter to generate "implications" without their having been 
69 See Hirsch The Aims of Interpretation op cit 1-2 for a statement as to what is imported by the 
notion of a "stable detenninacy of meaning." 
70 Heidegger and Gadainer, for instance, would not find themselves able to sustain this distinction. 
They would regard it as artificial and ontologically false. In the next chapter, this is brought ont in 
clear terms. 
71 See Hirsch Validity in Interpretation op cit 49-50. 
72 Ibid 66. 
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expressly stipulated.73 Just as a "trait" belongs to a "type", so implications belong 
to "verbal meaning". 74 The principle pertains also to strings of words (word 
sequences) and ultimately to the textual item in its entirety. 75 By virtue of her 
previous experience of texts, or fragments of texts, of a particular "type", the 
interpreter is in a position to say whether or not such-and-such a meaning is to be 
implied. 
Constructive validity pertains to legitimacy of inference as to "implications". The 
logic of guessing and validation76 proceeds on the basis of relevant justificatory 
evidence 77 to be found in the text itself. This is where judgments of probability 
come m. The derivation of "implications" is of greater defensibility, the more 
cogent the textual evidence that is adduced in its support.78 Such a statement 
appears to express the tenor of the Hirschean programme. 
It also explains Hirsch's position on rules and maxims of interpretation (legal or 
otherwise). Declaring them to be "provisional guides" or "rules of thumb", Hirsch 
advances that they express probability judgments in the light of"past experience".79 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Tiris extrapolation would appear to have its basis in the axioms of the Hirschean programme. The 
notion of an "intrinsic genre" is here of particular interest. See Ibid 121 et passim. 
76 Hirsch argues that interpretation implicates two moments - a divinatory moment, involving an 
imaginative hypothesis as to meaning ("guess"), and a critical moment, in which the results of 
intuition are subjected to a process of validation. See Hirsch Validity in Interpretation op cit 164ff. 
77 As to relevant justificatory evidence, see Hirsch Ibid 197: "Evidence must be accepted as relevant 
whenever it helps to define a class under which the o~ect of interpretation (a word or a whole text) 
can be subsumed, or whenever it adds to the instances belonging to such a class." 
78 See Ibid 176: "[The] known aspects of [an] o~ect permit us to place it in a class possessing some 
of the same traits. The more we know about the object, the narrower and more reliable we can make 
the class." (my emphasis) The "class" to which Hirsch here refers is substantially assimilable to the 
notion of a "type". 
79 Ibid 203. 
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4.2.3 RULES AND MAXIMS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
To the end of comillg to grips with Hirsch's attitude towards the rules and maxims 
of statutory interpretation, it is necessary to look to certain notable canons of 
construction. Thereafter his perceptions are subjected to critical appraisal. 
Those canons which are explicitly geared to the derivation of "implications" fmd 
expression in such maxims as "ex contrariis",80 "expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius", 81 "ex consequentibus",82 "ex accessorio eius de quo verba loquuntur",83 "a 
natura ipsius rei"84 and "ex correlativis". 85 The canon of "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" is most illustrative for purposes of the theme. It has been claimed 
to do no more than to draw attention to "a fairly obvious linguistic point": that the 
stipulation of defined issues compels the inference of the deliberate exclusion of 
other related ones. 86 It appears to be clear that this consideration, upon Hirsch's 
suppositions, would lend itself to explanation in terms of his thesis of probabilism. 
80 See Du Plessis op cit 156: "Where an enactment makes express proVIs10n for certain 
circumstances, it is inferred that for opposite circumstances the contrary will obtain." 
81 Ibid: "[EJxl>ression of one thing is the exclusion of the other." 
82 Ibid 157: A paraphrastic rendition of Du Plessis' s definition might read that where an end-result 
is prohibited or allowed, all that may by implication conduce thereto is respectively proscribed or 
rie:tt~G. Hiemstra and H.L. Gouin Trilingual Legal Dictionary (1981) 183: "If the principal 
thing is forbidden (or permitted) the accessory thing, too, is forbidden (or permitted)." 
84 Du Plessis says that this maxim implicates inherent relationship. He instances, in exemplification, 
the entailment of a power to withdraw a regulaticm within the power to make it. See Du Plessis op 
cit 157. 
85 This maxim involves mutual or reciprocal relationship. Prohibiticm of the purchase of X implies 
prohibiting its sale, for example. See Du Plessis op cit 15 7. 
86 See F. Bennion (citing Cross) in F. Bennion Statutory Interpretation (1992) 873. 
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Hirsch's notion of "class" is also integral to his probabilistic premises. As a ''trait" 
belongs to a "type", so an "instance" belongs to a "class". 87 If an "instance" is 
identifiable as partaking of the character of one or other "class", then the 
"implications" as to the unknown attributes of that "instance" are to be gathered 
with reference to the "class" identified. Hirsch contends that the assessment of 
probability is a "frequency judgment"88 based upon the interpreter's past experience 
of other "instances" which she believes to belong to the same "class" as the 
unknown "instance". 89 
Parallel considerations would appear to inform the rule of statutory interpretation 
known as the "eiusdem generis" principle (or "limited class" rule). Here, however, 
it seems that one works the other way round. Instead of undertaking to unveil the 
attributes of a particular "instance" by reference to the "class" to which one 
believes it to belong, one here starts off with the "class" (as defined by a series of 
enumerated "instances") and enquires whether the factual "instance" (as part of the 
factual dimension of the forensic enterprise) is to be subsumed within its terms. 
But the principle of probabilism is in this case quite as much applicable. The more 
extensive the enumeration of "instances" defining the "class", the more accurately 
would one be able to establish the limits or boundaries of that "class", and the more 
precise would be one's determination of whether the factual "instance" falls to be 
subsumed within its terms. (The defming feature of the "limited class", that which 
characterizes it, is adduced by the attribute or set of attributes each of the items 
catalogued have in common. 90) 
87 See Hirsch Validity in Interpretation op cit 178. 
88 Ibid 176. 
89 Ibid. 
90 See R Sullivan Driedger on the Constrnction of Statutes (1994) 205. 
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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
There is no denying that Hirsch's reflections on the standing of rules and maxims of 
interpretation have considerable merit. But they appear to be deficient in one major 
respect. 
The model purveyed is based upon the textual matter exclusively. The text is 
conceived of as a set of symbols to which "meaning" is intrinsic. 91 There is no 
reckoning with the circumstance that the "meaning" that attaches to those symbols 
may vary with the interpretive context. 
Most often, perhaps, Hirsch's model will speak the truth. But as the jurist goes 
about the business of interpreting a statute, she may find that certain maxims which 
came to mind at an earlier stage in the exercise no longer seem apposite to her task. 
By like token, other maxims, which at first sight may not have suggested 
themselves as applicable, may find themselves of eminent relevance in the final 
stages of the task. This is precisely because the constructive context may give the 
text to be understood differently in the course of the jurist's activities as these 
proceed to culmination. 
So, otherwise than Hirsch would enJOlil, the rules and maxims of statutory 
interpretation should not be regarded as measures of first recourse to be applied 
with a view to the ascertainment of linguistic "meaning". They should rather be 
91 It is Hirsch's claim that "meaning cannot exceed the semantic possibilities of the symbols used." 
See Hirsch The Aims of Interpretation op cit 87. 
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seen as devices to be registered as applicable at the end-point of the interpretive 
proceeding. 92 At that (final) stage, when contextual features have been given their 
most exhaustive coverage, those rules and maxims which at first seemed relevant, 
but which now no longer appear apposite, will be "filtered out", and those which 
did not suggest themselves initially may now demand their registration.93 
4.2.4 THE LESSONS OF THE HIRSCHEAN PROGRAMME 
Notwithstanding the criticisms to which his model is subject, Hirsch may for 
purposes of this study be harnessed to good effect in a number of respects. These 
may be enumerated as follows: 
(1) Words which are opaque to the jurist should be looked up in an appropriate 
dictionary or lexicon.94 (They are part of the "shared type".) 
(2) The interpretation clauses of the statute should be consulted.95 (These 
"establish" a "shared type", upon which the community of jurists is to draw 
for the objectives of construing that statute.) 
(3) Where idiomatic expressions are encountered, the jurist should seek out 
their meaning in an appropriate source.96 (In the case of ordinary idiom, a 
comprehensive dictionary should confer illumination. In that of legal idiom, 
92 The end-point of the interpretive exercise constitutes what is described in Chapter VI of this study 
as "effectuation". 
93 See the discussion of"effectuation" in Chapter VI, below, at IV. 
94 This is what will be referred to in Chapter VI (dealing with the interpretation of statutes) as 
"dictionary-meaning appropriation." (See the Process of Ingression at I.) 
95 In this regard, it is thought apt to speak of"legislative-definitional observance". 
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an apposite source of reference should do the same.) Hirsch would consider 
that idiomatic formulations are part of the "shared type". 
(4) Where a word is capable of bearing more than one "meaning" (i.e. is 
ambiguous), the syntactical context is to serve as a basis for disambiguation. 
The "shared type'', we find, is deployable to the end of resolving ambiguity. 
(Mayton observes that words vary in meaning according to syntactical 
context.97 The emphasis on "core-meaning" (upon essentialist assumptions) 
simply glosses over this important insight. Wittgenstein urged that words 
are not to be thought of as bearing intrinsic significations, essential 
meanings, independently of any context.98) 
(5) Since "grammar" is a "shared type" (based on convention), Hirsch would 
counsel the jurist to be grammatically responsive. Grammatical responsivity 
would entail both an appreciation of the rules of grammar and an alertness 
to deviation therefrom where this occurs. (Here one notices Hotomanus's 
conception of grammatical interpretation as of the essence of legal 
explication. 99) 
(6) The jurist should be sensitive to the structural dimensions of the sentence. 
(This follows as a corollary to (5) above.) 
96 To this one may refer as "idiomatic resolution". 
97 See W.T. Mayton "Law among the Pleanasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative 
History in Statutory Interpretation" 1992 41 Emory Law Journal 113 123-4. 
98 See, in this regard, George Pitcher The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (1964) passim. 
99 See Mueller-Vollmer op cit 3. 
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4.3 INSIGHTS OF B.C. LATEGAN 
Bell and Cohn list "pronoun reference", "repetition of important words" and 
"transitional expressions" as three important factors making for coherence and 
continuity in writing. 100 It is submitted that these factors may also be utilized in 
seeking to impose structural coherence on the subject-matter of one's reading. As 
one may say, they make for an appreciation of continuity as between sentences. 
( 1) As to sentences themselves (and further to point ( 6), above, urgmg 
sensitivity to the structural dimensions of the sentence), Lategan's insights 
have much to commend themselves. 101 Here an adapted version of his 
programme is offered. His conception of a "matrix sentence" posits a 
syntactical unit consisting of a nominal and a verbal element, which may be 
extended at various points - by a series of qualifications, sub-qualifications 
and closer defmitions. 102 In this way sentence-intrinsic structural analysis is 
able to proceed. 103 
(2) We should note, incidentally, in the treatment of Lategan that his approach 
to the statutory totality calls to mind Betti's canon of the coherence of 
meaning. A clause in a statute is to be construed within the context of the 
100 See J.K. Bell and A.A. Cohn Handbook of Grammar, Style and Usage (1981) 203ff. 
101 See B.C. Lategan "Die Uitleg van Wetgewing in Hermeneutiese Perspektief' 1980 TSAR 107-
126. 
102 Ibid 121-123. The reader's attention is directed specifically to the process of analysis illustrated 
at 122. · 
103 Examples are furnished in the course of Chapter VI of this study, at 1(5). 
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statute as a whole. 104 The structure of the statute (read as a whole) serves as 
a very cogent pointer to its "purpose". The particular clause is to be read in 
the light of this "purpose". Such is the methodology of what is understood 
by "intra-textual contextualization". 105 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In these conclusions, those features of the formalist tradition which are of a salutary 
tenor are tabulated, together with those which, it is felt, should be renounced. It 
must be emphasized that this chapter has focused on selected areas of formalist 
hermeneutics - those which evidence promise of utility within the contemporary 
legal setting - and does not purport to be a restatement of the entire tradition. It is 
considered, however, that what has been covered is of a sufficiently edifying 
character to justify registration of the following conclusions. 
A (1) Words which are obscure to the jurist should as a matter of first recourse be 
appropriated in the "sense" suggested by a comprehensive dictionary, or, 
where appropriate, a legal or other authoritative lexicon. One should stress 
the words "as a matter of first recourse", since contextual considerations 
may subsequently point to their being read in a "modified" sense. It is 
proposed to refer to this manner of proceeding (of which Chladenius would 
104 TIUs is what is known as the ex visceribus_actus approach. See Lategan op cit 120ff. 
105 For an exposition of "intra-textual contextualization" (albeit with reference to the interpretation 
of a supreme constitution and not ordinary legislation specifically), see L.M. du Plessis and J.R de 
Ville "Bill of Rights Interpretation in the South African Context (3): Comparative Perspectives and 
Future Pro!>-pccts" 1933 4 Stell LR (3) 356 367ff. Tills discussion is applicable, given the necessary 
modifications, to statutes generally. 
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have considered himself a champion) as dictionary-meaning 
. . 106 
appropnat1on. 
(2) The definition clauses (interpretation clauses) in the various statutes should 
be heeded to the extent that they are compatible with the constitutional 
design. Relevant provisions in the Interpretation Act107 are also to be 
complied with where necessary. Here we have to do with what might be 
termed legislative-definitional observance. 108 
(3) Idiomatic resolution is to proceed by reference to an appropriate source. In 
the case of ordinary conversational idiom, recourse is advised to general 
dictionaries of a comprehensive nature. In the case of legal or technical 
idiom, resort is to be had to an appropriate authoritative legal or technical 
lexicon or other like source. 109 
(4) Disambiguation is to proceed with reference to syntactical context. Thus, a 
word which, when taken in isolation, bears two or more accepted 
significations, is susceptible of being given an appropriate meaning when 
looked upon from the perspective of the sentence as a whole. 110 
106 The reader is referred to Chapter VI, at I (I). 
107 f Act 33 o 1957 (as amended). 
108 The reader is referred to Chapter VI, at I ( 1 ). 
109 Th d . ~ e rea er is re1erred to Chapter VI, at I (2). 
110 The reader is referred to Chapter VI, at I (3). 
36 
(5) Grammatical responsivity implies on the part of the jurist an appreciation of 
the rules of grammar. As a corollary, it implies also an alertness to 
deviation therefrom where this occurs. 111 
(6) Sentence-intrinsic structural analysis may profitably take its cue from 
Lategan's elaboration. A convoluted sentence refractory to ready 
assimilation should be reduced to its core - a "matrix sentence" comprised 
of a nominal and verbal element. One may extend this "matrix sentence" at 
various points by noting qualifications, sub-qualifications and closer 
definitions. A schematic representation on this basis should go some of the 
way towards dissipating confusion. 112 
B (1) The notion of the "intention of the legislature" must be regarded as a 
chimera. This is not to take issue with the use of the phrase - if members of 
the legal fraternity feel comfortable with it. It is, however, to insist that the 
notion is often hospitable to an unreflecting literalism. Literal-cum-
intentional hermeneutics is simply literal hermeneutics by another name. 
(2) Betti's canon of the actuality of understanding must be rejected. Insofar as 
it commands recourse to the "intention of the legislature" in the adduction 
of meaning, it is untenable. (See B(l) above.)113 
C(l) Betti's canon of the coherence of meaning (principle of totality) comes in 
useful as indicating the importance of statutory structure to the legal-
111 The reader is referred to Chapter VI, at I ( 4 ). 
112 Consult Chapter VI, at I (5). 
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hermeneutical endeavour. ("Structure serves to suggest sense" is a handy 
mnemonic device.) The "purpose" of a statute is often apparent from a 
perusal of its provisions in their cumulative totality. The particular provision 
with which the jurist is concerned is to be read in the light of this 
"purpose". 114 
(2) Hirsch's thesis may be taken as arguing in the same direction as Betti's 
canon of the coherence of meaning. To the extent that it would advise 
recourse to as many provisions in the statute as possible in seeking to derive 
"implications'', the Hirschean programme would sponsor an "intra-textual 
contextualization". 115 (Incidentally, the formal presumption of statutory 
inter-pretation that words and phrases in a statute bear the same meaning 
throughout116 seems to be in harmony with Hirsch's insights in this respect.) 
D(l) Betti's canon of the hermeneutical correspondence of meaning is doubly 
useful for purposes of this study. A statutory provision may be rendered 
open to better understanding for its comparison with other documents 
prepared at roughly the same time and having a bearing on the provision. 
Here one thinks of memoranda (detailing suggestions to the legislature) and 
excerpts from Hansard and other like sources (providing objective evidence 
of surrounding circumstances and preceding deliberations). This is the first 
way in which the canon in question comes in useful for our purposes, and it 
113 See Chapte~ VI, at II (2)2.2. 
114 See Chapter VI, at II (1). 
115 Consult Chapter VI, at II ( I). 
116 See Du Plessis op cit 127. 
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IS dealt with in Chapter VI of this study under the head of 
"intentionalization "117 (note, not "intentionalism"!) 
2. The second way in which Betti's canon of the hermeneutical 
correspondence of meaning comes in useful for the objectives of this thesis 
is in its implicit directive to look to the antecedents of the provision under 
consideration. This is a reference to predecessor enactments (or provisions). 
This issue is dealt with in Chapter VI of this study under the rubric of the 
"axis of statutory precursors". 118 
E(l) It Is agreed with Hirsch that the rules and maxims of (statutory) 
interpretation are to be conceived of as "provisional guides" or "rules of 
thumb". 119 Contrary to what Hirsch might contend, however, these rules 
and maxims are to find their definitive implementation at the end-point of 
the constructive enterprise, not at its inception. 
At that final stage, those rules and maxims which at first seemed relevant, 
but which now no longer appear apposite, will be "filtered out", and those 
which did not suggest themselves initially may now demand their 
registration. 120 
117 Consult Chapter VI, at II (2 ). 
118 Consult Chapter VI, at II (3)3.2. 
119 For further ilhnninat:ion, see also C.J. Botha Statutory Interpretation (1996) 2-3; E.A. Kellaway 
Principles of Interpretation of Statutes, Contracts and Wills ( 1995) 11-12; and R. W.M. Dias 
Jurisprudence (1976) 240. 
120 The reader is invited to consult Chapter VI, at IV, in this regard. 
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(2) We are given a glimpse in this chapter that the "plain meaning" conception 
of language (as purveyed under the banner of legal positivism) is untenable, 
especially within the forensic context. "Meaning" is not stable and 
determinate, but a function of context. In the next chapter this insight is 
given further substantiation. 121 
(3) Betti's canon of the hermeneutical autonomy of the object (immanence of 
the hermeneutical standard) cannot be upheld for legal-interpretive 
purposes. Treating the statutory text as a "thing-in-itself', as "self-
sufficient", it is entirely oblivious to the heterotelic dimension of legal 
interpretation. 
The "meaning" of a statute is dependent upon the context in which it is read, just as 
is the "meaning" of a concept-word therein contained (however much Hart might 
wish to sustain the distinction he draws between the "core of settled meaning" and 
the "penumbra of uncertainty"122). With this insight, the interpreter is re-introduced 
into the picture. 
And once again perceived as part of the interpretive endeavour, the jurist brings to 
bear upon her hermeneutical work the entirety of her juridical pre-understandings -
as conditioned by the Constitution. Re-introduced as an agent in the process, she is 
ever to remain mindful of the injunction to promote the spirit, purport and objects 
121 The reader's attention is drawn to Chapter II, at 3.4.7. 
122 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (1961) 121 ff et passim. I have not been able to trace the 
provenance of the term "concept-word". 
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of the Bill of Rights in the interpretation of legislation and the development of the 
common law and customary law. 123 
The circumstance that the jurist is part of the hermeneutical process, not external to 
it, is enlarged upon in the course of the following chapter. 
123 See section 39(2) of the Com.titution (Act I 08 of 1996). 
41 
II 
THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL RELEVANCE OF 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Phenomenological hermeneutics is the second tradition with which this study is concerned. In 
contrast to formalist hermeneutics, which is very "prescriptivist' in tenor, phenomenological 
hermeneutics undertakes to describe what in fact takes place in the course of the interpretive 
process. 1 It makes clear that "meaning" is something that "emerges." It is not ordinarily 
something actively solicited.2 Hence the designation of the programme: "phenomenon" is a 
reference to that which "shows itself in itself."3 Phelps and Pitts take phenomenological 
hermeneutics to be the philosophical exploration of the nature and preconditions of all 
understanding. 4 
Formalist hermeneutics does not command the resources available to the tradition under 
discussion for making provision for the "hors-texte."5 The claims of Betti's canon of the 
hermeneutical autonomy of the object, as noted in the previous chapter,6 are tantamount to a 
1 See H.G. Gadamer Truth and Method (1975) Introduction xiii. See also, in this regard, T.G. Phelps and J.A. Pitts 
"Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation" N. Singer 
Sutherland Statutory Construction(l 986) vol.3. 289 298 
2 Phenomenological hermeneutics conformably a~jures methodologies. 
3 See Martin Heidegger Being and Time (1967) 51 
4 See Phelps and Pitts op ci/_291. See also 312:"[H]ermeneutics is a quest for the characteristics of understanding 
and the requisite conditions under which all understanding occurs". 
5 The "hors-texte", if this needs reminding, refers to an "outside". See Chapter I at 4 .1.1. in this connection. 
6 Refer, once again, to Chapter I at 4.1.1. 
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denial of the heterotelic dimension of legal interpretation. Phenomenological hermeneutics 
supplies something by the way of remedy. Extra-textual contextual considerations are 
indissolubly bound up with its representation of the constructive enterprise. 
Whereas formalist hermeneutics is premised upon an assumption of the interpreter's standing 
"outside" of the interpretive process, controlling it, phenomenological hermeneutics re-
introduces her as a "participant" in the process. The interpreter is not a ''tabula rasa" (or blank 
slate), perceiving the "object" of her construction through a "neutral" mental framework. Her 
perceptions are inevitable coloured by the preconceptions and "prejudices" which constitute her 
mind-set. She is a "situated agent," a part of the "tradition" from which these preconceptions 
and "prejudices" derive. 
Transposing these insights to the realm of law, one is given to understand that the interpreter-
jurist is called upon to resolve a concrete-existential dilemma. 7 The term "existential context", 
as here sought to be employed, is a reference to the inclusive "context of social realities," of 
which the "arrangement of facts" presenting for determination is to be deemed a component. 
After all, it is the social realities and the (as yet) unprocessed "facts" which cry out with 
existential insistence for their proper handling in the juridical setting. Hence the use of the term 
"existential context" to refer to these matters. 
7 Otherwise than in the academic setting, the jurist is not concerned with legal doctrine exclusively, but is expected 
to bring to bear "practical wisdom" (acquired through experience) upon the handling of a dispute or question 
thrown up for resolution. It is a trite observation that the law is not a purely academic pursuit. 
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1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS CHAPTER 
It is the foremost purpose of this chapter to demonstrate (assuming the applicability of a rule or 
principle) how - hearing in mind the need to provide for an "existential context' (as ahove 
defined) in legal interpretation - the "responsiveness' of legal materials is to be rendered 
compatible with the desideratum of fidelity to law. It is important that the law should be 
"responsive" to social needs. But it is equally important that it should retain it "integrity" in so 
being. 
We find, as we proceed, that "purposiveness" makes for compatibility of this kind. In the case 
of statutes, the requisite "purposiveness" consists in the constitutional design as harmonized 
with the "purpose" of the statute, together with the "purpose" of servicing justice. In the case of 
the common law, the requisite "purposiveness" is to be found in the constitutional design, and 
the "purpose" of servicing justice (which "purpose" is implicitly suggested by that design). In 
dealing with customary law, the design of the Constitution is to be appropriated in the "proper 
cultural perspective," and the "purpose" of servicing justice to be taken up as a disposition to 
reconcile the parties concerned and to restore harmony in the community. 8 
In interpreting legal materials, the jurist will of necessity bring to bear upon the exercise her 
entire subliminal wellspring of preconceptions and "prejudices". These derive from her 
immersion in the legal ''tradition". What Du Plessis speaks of as a "new hermeneutical 
awareness"
9 is in point. It is in essence this wellspring of preconceptions and "prejudices" -
8 For a fuller elaboration of these points, the reader is invited to tum to the expose as set out in Chapters VI, 
III(2)(ii) and VII, 1(2)(2) and II(2)(1) of this study. 
9 See Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights_(l994) 60 - 107 passim. See 
further, in this regard, Chapter VI of this sh1dy at II 4.2. 
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from which, with reference to the Constitution, certain (negative) "prejudices" have been 
expunged, and into which certain (positive) ones have been introduced. Provided that the jurist 
is properly equipped with this "new hermeneutical awareness," which, as will emerge, 10 is 
constituted differentially according as western law or indigenous law is at issue, 
"purposiveness" should make its influence felt without much in the way of conscious effort. 
And thus would be made possible the achievement of "responsiveness'', at the same time 
securing fidelity to law. 
In the course of the following expose, these issues are enlarged upon, and related matters dealt 
with in passing. 
1.2 MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE 
In the foregoing chapter, it was adverted to Hirsch's dichotomous perception of "meaning" and 
"significance."11 That perception was criticized with reference to the observation that all 
"meaning" is context-dependent. 12 This observation was Wittgenstein's 13, and it appears also to 
have been Fuller's. 14 It finds its most telling statement in Gadamer, who, as will emerge, claims 
that "meaning" is a function of the interpreter's prejudice-horizon. 15 
10 See Chapter V of this thesis, at 3.2. (and 3.1). 
11 See Chapter 1, at 4.2.1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See George Pitcher The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (1964) passim. 
14 See Lon L. Fuller "Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart" 1958 71 Harvard Law Review 
(4) 630 at 66lff. See, in addtition, Lon L. Fuller Anatomy of the Law (1968) 58-9 for exemplification of the point 
15 J.M Connolly and T. Keutner Hermeneutics versus Science? Three German View.s-(1988) say the following at 56: 
"Gadamer regards interpretations of 'eminent' texts as 1llldecidable because each such interpretation takes place 
within the horizon of the interpreter's historically given prejudices, in the light of which the text itself is 
constituted". 
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Gadamer has it that the "meaning" which emerges upon reading a text depends upon the nature 
of the question to which that text is assumed to serve as a response. 16 When the jurist reads a 
legal text (under the new Constitution), the question she puts to it, even if only at a subconscious 
level, is: "How is 'purposiveness' to be served within the 'existential context' of the case at 
hand?" The "meaning" that emerges will be a function of this question. It will be geared to 
servicing the circumstances of the case. The artificiality of driving a wedge between "meaning" 
and "significance" should accordingly be obvious. 
Madison claims that a "text" represents the "promise" of meaning. Interpretation is the 
actualization of this "promise." 17 Gadamer's theory would give one to consider, consistently 
with Madison's point of view, that in the case of great, thought-provoking, "eminent" texts, the 
interpreter is confronted with an "overdetermination" of meaning. 18 It is this "surplus of 
meaning" which makes for an open-ended, creative interpretation, one which "confirms the text 
in its own meaning." 19 
2. AMERICAN REALISM: RESPONSIVENESS 
So much by way of introduction. It is time now to consider the contributions of a movement 
which crusaded for greater judicial responsiveness earlier in this century. American realism, 
whose protagonists were adamant that the law should be harnessed so as to cater for the 
exigencies of social life, bore in this insistence a striking resemblance to the sociological 
16 Gadamer is cited as follows in Phelps and Pitts op cit 301: "One addresses a question to the text, a question 
standing within one's own horizon .... One has reason for wanting to understand, and that reason is really a question 
put to the text". Phelps and Pitts proceed that, by dint ofthis, any interpretation will be moulded by the questioner's 
stance. (Ibid) See also Gadamer Truth and Method op cit 333. 
17 See G.B. Madison The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity (1988) 21 - 2. 
18 Ibid22. 
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jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound and the programme of the "free law" movement. It held itself 
out as opposed to formalism and conceptualism in legal reasoning. 20 
Fitzgerald, speaking in a realist spirit, adverts to the lawyer's occupational vice of formalism. 21 
This, he claims, leads to undue pre-occupation with legal rules "for their own sake."22 The 
social function of the law ought not to be sacrificed on the altar of legal form. The law is to be 
seen as a part of its social milieu. 23 
Jones purveys the pragmatic dimension of the realist thesis in his contention that there is 
invariably room for "individualization" (in case-to-case terms) in the application of the law. 24 
This is so, he maintains, irrespective of whether the law being applied is case-law precedent or 
statutory materials. 25 
Harris seems to assent to the need for looking beyond the "paper rules and principles forming 
part of the tradition of courts. "26 It appears to be his proposition that the social context of law-
application should not be ignored in the exercise. This implies a move away from legal 
autotelism. It imports that there is an "hors-texte" to be serviced. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Elizabeth Mensch "The History of Mainstream Legal Thought" in David Kairys (ed.) The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique(l'990) 13 at 26. 
21 See P.J. Fitzgerald Salmond on Jurisprudence(l 966) 4. While Fitzgerald writes in a realist temper in the 
declamation recorded, it is uncertain to the present writer whether he would qualify as a full-blooded realist. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Harry W. Jones 'The Practice of Justice" in E.A. Kent (ed.) UULaw and Philosophy: Readings in Legal 
Philosophy ( 1970) 425 429. 
25 Ibid 431. 
26 See -J.W. Harris Law and Legal Science (1979) 169. The date of publication of this work gives one to consider 
that Harris is not a realist as such. (The realists, one is reminded, flourished in the earlier part of the twentieth 
century.) Notwithstanding this, his disquisition appears compatible with realist thought. 
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Julius Stone proposes that the brand of jurisprudence of which he is an exponent should address 
itself, as before, to contending with situations which persistently and insistently arise "for 
practical handling".27 He considers "obvious conflict, distress, confusion and injustice" to 
represent the issues which are to be tackled. 28 
Stone was an illustrious exponent of American realism. He set himself the task of 
demonstrating that behind the form of legal doctrine there is much in the way of elbow-room for 
doing justice to social realities. 29 Doctrine may be manipulated to this effect and - as he 
conceives it - quite legitimately. The niceties of juridical conceptualism are downplayed in 
deference to human, social and economic considerations. Stone would say that a jurist of any 
acumen would find herself able to make provision for these considerations, upon condition that 
she abjures legal aestheticism. He puts his case thus: "There is ... a danger of forgetting that the 
adjustment to needs is primary, for the simple and orderly are very attractive in themselves."30 
Upon this conception, legal dogmatics is to be taken up for a large part as bearing the character 
of a "smokescreen". Indeed, Stone uses the word "illusory''31 to describe the nature of the 
reference of much of its terminology. Such a circumstance is for him much rather a boon than a 
mark of deficiency. 
In this spirit, he recoils from the assumptions from which the idea of codification on the 
Continent seems at this point and that to have proceeded. The theory was that a ruling on every 
27 See Julius Stone Law and the Social Sciences_(l 966) 45. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See Julius Stone The Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964) passim. 
30 Jbid_286. 
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case was to be established with reference to the relevant provisions, the judge's task being 
perceived as mechanical. 32 Stone rejects any such notions as inimical to his project.33 
Stone was but a single proponent of American realism. But his work must surely rank as a very 
clear exposition of some of its most central exhortations. Other realists have given expression to 
similar insights, though in different terms. 34 
2.1 EVALUATION 
Stone's work harks back to presuppositions entered by those who counted themselves affiliates 
of the "Freirechtsschule" ("tree-law" school). 35 These scholars went so far as to assert the 
propriety of looking for a just disposite rule for the case at hand without recourse to deduction 
from aprioristic premises. 36 This was certainly a radical proposition. 
And it is a proposition which, seriously appropriated, would threaten to undermine the "rule of 
law," conceived of as the antithesis of "arbitrary rule." The measure of "discretion" which the 
31 Stone speaks of "categories of illusory reference" in this reg.rrd See Ibid 241 ff for a discussion of these 
categories. 
32/bid 228-9. 
33 His entire argmnent in The Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings is devoted to a critique of these kinds of 
notions. 
34 See J.C. Hutcheson, Jr. "The Judgment Intuitive" in E.A. Kent op ci[ 407 418, for instance. "[W]hether or not 
the judge is able in his [sic] opinion to present reasons for his [sic] hunch which will pass jural muster, he [sic] does 
and should decide difficult and complicated cases only when he [sic] has the feeling of the decision, which accounts 
for the beauty and the fire of some, and the labored dullness of many dissenting opinions". See also Jerome N. 
Frank "Law and the Modem Mind" in E.A. Kent op cit 420 420: "[The] ... realists have but one common 
bond ... :skepticism as to some of the conventional legal theories, a skepticism stimulated by a zeal to reform, in the 
interest of justice, some court-house ways". See, additionally, the interesting article by Michael Clanchy "A 
Medieval Realist: Interpreting the Rules at Barnwell Priory, Cambridge" in E. Attwooll (ed.) Perspectives in 
Jurisprndence (1977) 176 176-7, in particular. 
35 For a discussion of this movement, see Alf Ross On Lawand Justice (1974) 141-2. 
36 See Stone The Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings op cit 227. 
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scholars in question would have accorded the judge is altogether too unbounded for comfort. 
Not only would the doctrine of the separation of powers be undercut - by reason of judicial 
legislative activity - but the law would be rendered vulnerable to political manipulation. 
American realism, taken to the extreme limit of its programme, would hold the same dangers as 
those associated with the "Freirechtslehre." In its moderate versions, realism is no doubt of 
salutary imp011. But the line between beneficient judicial creativity and judicial legislation is 
surely a fine one. 
Lasswell and McDougal of Yale proposed in the 1940s, in following through the implications of 
legal realism, that their university should dispense with the traditional law-school curriculum, 
and teach students rather how to decide questions of policy and give effect to those decisions.37 
Such a proposal was both startling and anti-democratic. 38 A sober perception of the law would 
speak against its implementation. For its implicit injunction to "openness" upon the scale 
envisaged would subvert the imperative of fidelity to law. 
In appealing to insights of the phenomenological hermeneuticists presently to be discussed, we 
are furnished with a basis for respecting the "integrity" of the law, while at the same time 
37 See Mensch op cit_29. 
38 Ibid. 
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securing its "responsiveness" to social realities. We steer clear in this fashion both of an 
"autonomous law" and a law exhibiting excess in the direction of "openness." 
3. PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKERS OF IDGH EMINENCE 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, phenomenological hermeneutics has as its mission 
the description of what comes over us when we are about the business of understanding texts (or 
anything else, for that matter). It does not purport to be anything in the nature of a checklist of 
prescriptions, or methodology. 
It is to be noticed that Dilthey implicitly urged the interpreter to transpose herself into the 
historical milieu of which inscription to be deciphered is a part.39 He placed special emphasis 
on the notion of "lived experience"40 in his "philosophy of life,"41 and this was to point 
hermeneutics in the direction of phenomenology. Dilthey's labours find something of a parallel 
in the work of Edmund Husserl. 
3.1 EDMUND HUSSERL 
Husserl considered that the interpretive process is very much an active one, that to "understand" 
something requires affirmative input on the part of the construing agent. In order to be quite 
39 At any rate, this is what I have been given to lUlderstand. 
40 Erlebnis in Dilthey's terminology. 
41 See, for instance, Wilhelm Dilthey "The Understanding of other Persons and their Life-Expresisions" in Kurt 
Mueller-Vollmer The Hermeneutics Reader (1986) 152 153. See, also, Mueller-Vollmer op cit_25 in elaboration of 
Dilthey's contentions. The reader is further referred to G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Scbrift The Hermeneutic Tradition 
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clear as to the meaning of an inscription, one is to "construct" a "corresponding intuition."42 
What that inscription "really means" is to be perceived in that "intuition."43 Where meanings 
shade imperceptibly into one another, with boundaries essential to proper apprehension losing 
their clarity, elucidation proceeds with reference to "intuition. "44 Explicating Husserl generally, 
Ricoeur writes that in order to bring elucidation to completeness some "corresponding intuition" 
requires to be supplied.45 (This is not necessarily Ricoeur's view though.) 
It is to be seen from this that Husserl has not yet bridged the subject-object dichotomy as 
endorsed by Dilthey. 46 The interpreting "subject" in conferring meaning is disjoined from the 
"object" of construction. This is a thesis Heidegger and Gadamer would not endorse.47 For all 
this, Heidegger and Gadamer are considerably indebted to Husserl for their respective analyses. 
3.2 ROMAN INGARDEN 
Husserl's thought finds an harmonious resonance in the writings of Roman Ingarden. Ingarden, 
who is very notable in the context of literary theory, distinguishes two types of reading: (i) 
passive or receptive reading; and (ii) active reading. It is in the second type of reading - active 
(1989)14. One's attention is also directed to Richard E. Palmer Hermeneutics_(1969) 20 - 3. Consult, generally, 
Wilhehn Dilthey "The Rise of Hermeneutics" in Ormiston and Schrift op cit 101-114. 
42 See Ednnmd Husserl "Towards a Characterization of the Acts which confer Meaning" in Mueller-Volhner op cit 
177 183. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Husserl as cited in modified terms in Paul Ricoeur From Text to Action (1991) 45. 
45 Ibid 44. 
46 Gadamer speaks of "Dilthey' s entanglement in the aporias of historicism". See, in this regard Kathleen Wright 
Festivals of Interpretation (1990) 38. See also Table of Contents in Gadamer Troth and Method. 
47 Heidegger and Gadamer, as will be seen shortly, advance that the subject-object schema does not afford an 
appropriate basis for conceptualizing the interpretive process. 
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reading - that the reader, he says, becomes a "co-creator" of the literary work in apprehending 
its meaning upon an intuitive basis. 48 
Ingarden claims that active reading involves us in apprehending with "a peculiar originality" the 
meaning of the text.49 He says: "We project ourselves in a co-creative attitude into the realm of 
the objects determined by the sentence meanings."50 One discerns here a clear affinity with 
Husserl. 
Ingarden's perceptions carry the implication that understanding is in an important sense under 
the guidance or control of the interpreter. As this notion, like Husserl's, betrays an endorsement 
of the subject-object dichotomy, it is one to which it would not be open to Heidegger and 
Gadamer to accede. 
3.3 MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
The "Lebenswelt" (or life-world), which is foundational to Heidegger's philosophy, appears to 
have had its conceptual genesis in Husserl. 51 Otherwise than in Husserl, however, the 
"Lebenswelt" is for Heidegger ontologically antecedent to the bifurcation of the "subject" and 
the "object" of her construal. 52 
48 See Roman In.garden "On the Cognition of the Literary Work of Art" in Mueller-Vollmer op cit 187 at 208, in 
particular. See this essay generally. 
49 Ibid 208. 
50 Ibid. 
51 As also, perhaps, in Dilthey. 
52 See Paul Ricoeur From Text Action op cit_ 14-15 for an elaboration of this point. 
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Heidegger's conception of "worldhood" rejects the Cartesian duality of "ego cogito" and "res 
corporea."53 It is a "level of experience anterior to the subject-object relation," upon Ricoeur's 
restatement.54 The bipartite (mis)perception of "self' and "not-self' is subordinated to "Being-
in-the-world," to existence. 
The notion of "Being-in-the-world" is crucial to Heidegger. "Understanding," for him, is 
integrally a part of what it means to "exist"; it is a mode of "Being-in-the-world."55 Heidegger 
grounds the notion of "understanding" in ontology, not in intellectual cognition. It is a process 
by which "phenomena" make themselves manifest. 56 It is no longer conceived, as it was in 
Husserl, on the basis of transcendental "subjects" in interaction with external "objects."57 It is 
for Heidegger a matter of revelation or disclosure. Indeed, he advances that disclosure or 
''unconcealment" simply "occurs"; it is not by an act of rape, of robbery, that things are rent 
from their concealment. 58 
Cognitive manipulation is not at all implicated in the process of "understanding." 59 Heidegger, 
writes Gadamer, "pursued the intrinsic and indissoluble interinvolvement of authenticity and 
53 See Martin Heidegger Being and Time (1967) 122- 3. 
54 See Paul Ricoeur "Existence and Hermeneutics" in Josef Bleicher Contemporary Hermeneutics ( 1980) 236 241. 
55 See Martin Heidegger "Being-there as Understanding" iin Mueller-Volhner op cit 215 217: "As a disclosure, 
understanding always pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world''. Consult Palmer op cit 124-139 for 
an illustrative exposition in this regard. 
56 See Palmer loc cit. 
57 For Kant, knowledge was founded upon suqjectivity. See, in this regard, J.N. Mohanty "Transcendental 
Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness" in G. Shapiro and A. Sica (eds.) Hermeneutics: 
Question and Prospects ( 1984) 96 96. 
58 See, in this connection, H.G. Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics (1976) 225-7. Gadamer explains 
Heidegger's essential point as follows: "Revealment and hiddenness are an event of being itself'. (Ibid_226) The 
words in my text are conceivably from Palmer. 
59 Consult Gadamer op cit 227, in this regard See also Palmer. 
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inauthenticity, of truth and error, and the concealment that is essential to and accompanies every 
disclosure and that intrinsically contradicts the idea of total objectivity."60 
In rendering the observation that "concealment" is essential to disclosure, Heidegger gives us an 
inkling of his fundamental thesis, which is that no understanding is "presuppositionless."61 
Understanding, as revelation, occurs when presuppositions "break down" as events take their 
course.
62 Accordingly, "presuppositions" are both a limiting factor, in that they conceal, and a 
necessary precondition of any understanding at all. Heidegger writes as follows: "Whenever 
something is interpreted as something the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-
having, fore-sight and fore-conception. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless 
apprehending of something presented to us. "63 
It is interesting to reflect that Heidegger is to some significant degree foreshadowed in his 
elaborations in the writings of Humboldt. Humboldt contends that "[c]omprehension is by no 
means merely a developing out of the subject, nor a drawing from the object, but rather both at 
once, for it always consists of the application of a previously present general idea to a new 
particular instance."64 Equally Heideggerian is Humboldt's statement that "[l]anguage is the 
formative organ ofthought."65 Without language, an image cannot emerge as a concept, nor can 
thought attain "distinctness. "66 
60 Ibid 203. 
61 See Palmer op cit 124- 139. 
62 Ibid 140. , 
63 See Heidegger Being and Time op cit 191 - 2. 
64 See Wilhelm von Humboldt "On the Task of the Historian" in Mueller-Vollmer op cit_l05 112. 
65 See Wilhelm von Humboldt "The Nature and Conformation of Language" in Mueller-Vollmer op cit_ 99 100. 
66 /bide 
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"Language" figured as an important concern for the later Heidegger. 67 "Discoursing or talking", 
he says, "is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-
world."68 There is "no being without language and no language without being."69 Language, 
for him, bears a non-instrumental character.70 It does not function as a communicative tooI.71 
Since the interpreter's "presuppositions" are constituted in language, it functions as both a 
limiting factor and a prerequisite of all understanding. In these contentions, he seems to 
anticipate Gadamer, for whom every understanding is linguistically conditioned.72 
It is clear from this discussion that Heidegger's conception of "understanding" departs 
materially from that of his predecessors. And its divergence from the corresponding conception 
implicit within the formalist tradition - as represented by Betti and Hirsch most notably- is still 
more marked. His manner of conceptualizing "meaning-apprehension" is therefore commonly 
regarded as revolutionary. 
Yet it finds a parallel in the work of Popper. Popper's thesis is that all observation is "theory-
laden". 73 All "observations" are conditioned by an "horizon of expectations," a "frame of 
reference."74 By these latter terms Popper means to signify much the same thing as the set of 
"presuppositions" making for "understanding" on the Heideggerian schema. Both Popper and 
67 See Palmer op cit 152. 
68 See Martin Heidegger "Being-there and Discourse: Language" in Mueller-Vollmer op cit 233 234. 
69 See Palmer op cit 153 in this regard. These words maybe Gadamer's. 
70 See Dennis J. Schmidt "Poetry and the Political: Gadamer, Plato and Heidegger on the Politics of Language" in 
Kathleen Wright (ed.) Festivals of lnterpretation_(l990) 209 221. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See the discussion of Gadamer lID.der 3 .4., below. 
73 See Karl R. Popper Conjectures and Refatations(l 989) 47: "(O]bservations ... [presuppose] ... a frame of 
reference: a frame of expectations: a frame of theories". See also P.J. Thomas "Wetenskapsfilosofie en die 
Regswetenskap" 1995 58 THRHR (!) 31 37. Additionally, see E.H. Gombrich "The Evidence of Images" in 
Charles S. Singleton (ed) Interpretation Theory and Practice (1969) 35 43. 
74 See Popper op cit 47. 
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Heidegger would urge that these are constituted by "history", by "tradition." It is the "tradition" 
in which the interpreter is immersed which informs her "presuppositions". From this it follows 
that our "understandings" are historically conditioned. 
3.4 HANS-GEORG GADAMER 
Gadamer, Heidegger's pupil, was greatly influenced by his teacher. Indeed, his expose shows 
up this influence at a myriad of points. Like Heidegger, Gadamer is interested in expounding 
the phenomenology of "understanding", not in elaborating any prescriptive methodologies. And 
like his teacher, he looks to the notion of the "Lebenswelt" as the basis for this analysis. 
3.4.1. THE "LEBENSWEL T" 
Gadamer suggests that the "Lebenswelt" is prior to the subject-object relation as normally 
conceived.75 This appears from his reflection that "[t]he genuine reality of the hermeneutical 
process seems ... to encompass the self-understanding of the interpreter as well as what is 
interpreted". 76 Gadamer draws upon his famous metaphor of "play" in order to illustrate that 
the "subject" is embroiled in that process, is part of it, not its autonomous guiding agent from an 
external vantage point. 
Hark his words: "According to all that we have observed concerning the nature of play, this 
subjective distinction between oneself and the play which is what acting a part is, is not the true 
75 On this point, Gadamer seems to be entirely at one with Heidegger. 
76 See Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics op cit 58. 
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nature ofplay."77 And again: "The mode of being of play does not allow the player to behave 
towards play as if it were an object."78 
3.4.2. ABJURATION OF METHOD 
Gadamer's metaphor of the "game" leads him to subordinate epistemology to ontology.79 
Interpretation and understanding find their elucidation not in terms of the former discipline, but 
with reference to the latter. Method is accordingly to be abjured. 
Phelps and Pitts undertake to explicate Gadamer in this regard. They proffer that a method 
would yield only such an understanding as is implicitly directed by that particular method. 8° For 
this reason, interpretation is to proceed on the "games" analogy, on a dialectical as opposed to a 
methodical basis. 81 
Any given methodology cordons off all meaning-possibilities incompatible with the 
methodology itself True interpretation imports the setting aside of method the better to remain 
receptive to the textual meaning. 82 
Now, it is agreed with Gadamer that interpretation involves a dialectic. And this goes for legal 
interpretation (including statutory interpretation) as well. But his thesis cannot be sustained for 
purposes of this study insofar as it would tell against the deployment of methodological devices 
in the construction of the law. In Chapters VI and VII of this dissertation, in which a model is 
.. 
77 See H.G. Gadamer Truth and Method_(l975) 100. 
78/bid 92. 
79 See, in this regard, Palmer op cit passimc 
80 See Phelps and Pitts op cit 298. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Jbid~313. 
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set forth, it will be observed that, at this point and that, vanous methodologies announce 
themselves as appropriate to the legal-hermeneutical process. With Ricoeur, it is agreed that 
interpretation implicates two pillars - that of "Verstehen" (understanding) and that of "Erklaren" 
(method), and that they complement each other. More on this later. 
While on the subject of method, we should pause briefly to reflect upon the standing of the rules 
of statutory interpretation as discussed in textbooks and court decisions. As will be seen, the 
opinion is expressed in this thesis that the canons of statutory interpretation find their definitive 
relevance in the last phase of the undertaking - in the process of effectuation. Throughout the 
course of constructive exercise, certain canons come to mind as provisionally pertinent, some of 
them later to be displaced by others. By the time the end-point of the exercise has been reached, 
those canons that are of affirmative applicability show themselves up clearly (the others being 
"filtered out"). 83 84 
It is in the process of effectuation that the application of pertinent canons and maxims is 
registered - whether it be in mental consciousness, in speech or in writing. 85 With this, it cannot 
be entirely agreed with Devenish in his assertion that they function as "mechanical devices" in 
respect of "certain verbal configurations. "86 
83 See for future reference Paul Ricoeur "Existence and Hermeneutics" in Bleicher op cit 236 243. 
84 The phenomenological process of "concealment' and "revelation", and the enlightenment sponsored by that 
process, seems particularly apt as a description of the manner in which the maxims and canons of statutory 
construction flit before the eyes of the interpreter in the course of the exercise, at the end thereof giving themselves 
to be be understood as applicable or otherwise. 
85 See in this regard, Chapter VI of this study under IV (dealing with the process of effectuation). 
86 See G.E. Devenish Interpretation o(Statutes_(l 992) 18. 
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The canons and maxims of statutory interpretation, as it 1s agreed with Botha, are not 
susceptible to deployment in the manner of an algorithm. 87 
3.4.3. THE "INTENTIONAL FALLA CY" 
Gadamer considers that the author's "intention" is irrelevant to the constructive enterprise. He 
argues that the central task of hermeneutics is to be identified in the application of the meaning 
of the text to present circumstances. 88 Schleiermacher, Betti and Hirsch, among others who set 
store by "authorial intent" in the construction of documents, fall victim to the "intentional 
fallacy. "89 One agrees with Hoy in this regard that a major problem with "intentionalism" is 
that it is blind to what Gadamer refers to as "effective-historical consciousness."90 
In consideration of what has been said in the previous chapter, one quite agrees with Gadamer in 
these claims as they may be taken to pertain to legislative construction. The "intention of the 
legislature," as seen in that chapter, is not a viable means to the elicitation of meaning - for the 
reasons there set out. "Intentionalism" has no real place in the law. 
One may say that a statute is to be conceived as a formalized expression of one or more of any 
number of legislative policies. The "intentions" of its framers in promulgating it -and one may 
legitimately ask whether anyone is in a position to say what they were as a retrodiction - are, 
strictly speaking, irrelevant to these "policies." It is therefore not the "intention of the 
87 See, generally, in the regard, C.J. Botha Statutory Interpretation ( 1996) 2 - 3. 
88 The reader is invited to consult, in this regard, Palmer op cit 246 - 247; and 185. See, fiuther, Ibid 87, where the 
importance of application in the interpretive process is highlighted. 
89 Refer to the references inn 88, above. 
90 See D.C. Hoy "Dworkin's Constructive Optimism versus Deconstructive Legal Nihilism" 1987 6 Law and 
Philosophy 321 327-328. 
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legislature" that we are to adduce as the guiding principle in the interpretation of a statute. It is 
the goals or objectives finding their immanence in the legislative product which are to serve as 
this principle. 91 Hence the quest for the purpose of the statute (or of its sub-statutory 
components). 
It seems as if the thrust of these perceptions has been anticipated for quite some time in the 
original formulations of the so-called "mischief rule. "92 This rule represents an early "purpose-
oriented" approach.93 
All this is not, however, to deny the fruitfulness of "intentionalization" (an entirely different 
matter) in the interpretation of statutes. Sponsored by Betti's canon of the hermeneutical 
correspondence of meaning, "intentionalization," as we have seen, speaks to the clarification of 
statutory meaning by comparative recourse to other documents prepared at roughly the same 
time as the provision at hand, and having a bearing on that provision.94 
3.4.4. THE FORE-STRUCTURE OF INTERPRETATION 
Like his teacher, Heidegger, Gadamer considers interpretation (understanding) to be mode of 
"Being-in-the-world." It is integral to existence itself. To be is to apprehend meaning. 
Ontology is the basis of comprehension. The interpreter is part of a "game" in which, as for 
Heidegger, "disclosure" or ''unconcealment" simply "occurs." 
91 Sec Ruth Sullivan_Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (1994) 35 in this regard. 
92 Sullivan says the following:"Historically, purposive analyisis is associated with the so-called mischief rule or the 
rule in Heydon 's Case. Although this rule did not originate in Heydon 's Case, it was there it received its most 
famous and influential formulation .. . "(Jhid_36). 
93 See R W.M. Dias Jurisprudence (1976) 231: "The approach laid down [in Heydon's case] clearly contemplates a 
wide inquiry into the policy and pwpose behind the ~tatute". (emphasis added) 
94 See Chapter I under 4.1.4. and SD (I). 
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The relationship between interpreter and text Gadamer conceives to be one of "partner and 
"partner", not "subject" and "object."95 This relationship is conceptualized along the lines of a 
conversation or dialectic. The interpreter does not superintend the process. She merely garners 
"meaning" in the course of a "disclosure." 
Yet presuppositions or "prejudices" are indispensable antecedents of any "disclosure." The 
stock of presuppositions the interpreter brings to bear upon the construction of any given text 
constitutes the means of its understanding. So we arrive at the conception of the fore-structure 
of interpretation. 
Gadamer expounds the phenomenology of textual interpretation as follows: "A person who is 
trying to understand a text is always performing an act of projecting. He [sic] projects before 
himself [sic] a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the 
text. Again, the latter emerges only because he [sic] is reading the text with particular 
expectations in regard to a certain meaning. The working out of this fore-project, which is 
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he [sic] penetrates into the meaning, is 
understanding what is there." 96 The influence of Heidegger is clearly apparent. 
3.4.5. THE TRADITION AND THE "FUSION OF HORIZONS" 
Tradition is the source of the presuppositions or "prejudices" which are constitutive of the 
interpreter's mind-set, and which she brings to bear upon textual understanding. Tradition 
95 See Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics op cit 18 - 42. 
96 See Gadamer Trnth and Method op cit 236. "1bis constant process of new projection is the movement of 
understanding and interpretation". (Jbidl 
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(ideology in the non-pejorative sense) and authority are rehabilitated in Gadamer.97 He 
contends that there is no "unconditional antithesis between tradition and reason. "98 
Presuppositions informed by the tradition are accordingly reasonable. 
Gadamer enquires after the manner in which the interpreter's horizon and the historical horizon 
inhabited by the text99 are rendered capable of merger. He proposes that it is "the tradition'', and 
the link which it forges between past and present, which makes for such a fusion ofhorizons."100 
The interpreter's "effective-historical consciousness" or wirkungsgeschicht/iches Bewusstsein 
(which is in essence her structure of presuppositions) makes for the possibility of dialectical 
interaction or "conversation" between interpreter and text. 101 
Gadamer rejects the idea that temporal distance is something to be bridged. It is to be regarded, 
rather, as the vehicle of tradition, the supportive basis of "present understanding."102 
He reflects that "language" and "tradition" are bound up with each other inextricably. 103 He 
claims, in the Heideggerian spirit, that "linguisticality" is the basis upon which the "transmitted 
text and the interpreter can meet."104 Postulating that "the fusion of horizons that takes place in 
97 Ibid 245. 
98 Ibid 250. The "essence of authority", Gadamer says, is to be fmmd in "recognition and knowledge". Authority 
has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge". (Ibid_248) 
99 I take the words "historical horizon inhabited by the text" from Palmer op cit_25. 
100 
"Tradition" as noted in nlOl below, is considered by Gadamer to constitute the supportive basis of 
understanding. 
101 In this regard, Bruns in instructive. See G.L. Bruns "The Problem of Figuration in Antiquity" in G.Shapiro and 
A.Sica (eds.)Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects (1984) 147 159: Gadamer's position is explained to be "that 
the prior appropriation of a text within a particular tradition of understanding is something that must necessarily 
take place if there is to be any understanding of the text at all". Ricoeur translates wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewusstsein as "consciousness exposed to the effects of history". See Bleicher op cit_228. 
102 See H.G. GadaJner "On the Circle of Understanding" in Connolly and Keutner op cit 68 76. 
103 See Gadamer Truth and Method op cit 400. 
I 
04 !bid 207. 
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understanding is the proper achievement of language,"105 he says that "what is said has a claim 
over one."106 And herewith, we are furnished with a formulation of the thesis of the non-
instrumentality of language. 107 This means that understandings are linguistically conditioned -
because presuppositions or "prejudices" are constituted in language. 
3.4.6. THE CENTRALITY OF THE "QUESTION" 
Gadamer's contentions pertaining to the nature of inquiry read as follows: "All questioning and 
desire to know presuppose a knowledge that one does not know so much so indeed that is a 
particular lack of knowledge that leads to a particular question." 108 In construing a text, the 
interpreter is ineluctably involved in putting a "question" thereto, inasmuch as there would 
otherwise not be any "motive" for reading it in the first place. 
Bultmann proposes that the "question" put to the text arises "out of the claim of the now, out of 
the problem that is given in the now."109 This existential dilemma, this "problem that is given in 
the now," is bound to raise a "question" for resolution. 
Now, Gadamer claims that " ... the meaning of a [textual extract] is relative to the question to 
which it is a reply." 110 The meaning that emerges will hence be a function of that question, and 
hence a function of the "problem that is given in the now."111 Meaning, then, "reaches far 
105 Ibid 340. 
106 Ibid 401. See also, generally, Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics op cit 95 - 104. 
107See Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics op cit_62. See also Ibid 68. See, additionally, Gadamer Truth and 
Method op cit 496. 
108 See Gadamer Truth and Method op ci/_329. 
109 See Rudolph Bultmann "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?" in Mueller-Vollmer op cit 242 246. 
110 See Gadamer Truth and Method op cit 333. 
111 Bultmann's wording. (see above) 
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beyond what [the] author originally intended." 112 This is an unambiguous affirmation of the 
context-dependence of meaning. 
3.4. 7. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MEANING-SIGNIFICANCE DISTINCTION 
The context-dependence of "meaning" puts paid to Hirsch's attempt to erect a distinction 
between "meaning" and "significance." One recalls that Hirsch conceived "meaning" to be 
stable and determinate. 113 But if it varies with context, then it embraces what he understands by 
"significance. "114 Hence it is submitted that the disjunctive conceptualization of "meaning" and 
"significance" is untenable. 
For these reasons, Gadamer dismisses out of hand any notion of a "uniquely correct 
interpretation." 115 Interpretation inevitably proceeds with reference to the present, and the 
"now" does not partake of the attribute of permanence or fixity. 116 Accordingly, "the discovery 
of the true meaning of a text... is never finished; it is in fact an infinite process."117 We are 
always situated within a context, and the task of shedding light upon aspects of our predicament 
never ceases to embroil our interpretive efforts. 118 Gadamer meets Hirsch's objection that 
perceptions such as these are propitious to "hermeneutical pluralism" with the retort that the fact 
that interpretations are "relative" does not mean that they are "arbitrary."119 With this, he rejects 
112 See Gadamer Troth and Method op cit 335 ri277. 
113 See Chapter 1 of this study, llllder 4 .2.1. 
114 Why this is so should emerge plainly upon a reading of what bas been said llllder 4.2.1. of Chapter 1. 
115 See Gadamer Troth and Method op cit_ 107. 
116 See Palmer op cit 183 (expounding this insight of Gadamer's) 
117 See Troth and Method op cit 265. 
118 Ibid 269. 
t19 J G din th. . ean ron notes 1s pmnt. See Jean Grondin "Hermeneutics and Relativism" in Wright Festivals of 
Interpretation op cit_42 48. 
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out of hand Hirsch's claim that his contentions are likely to sponsor a "Babel of 
interpretations." 120 
3.4.8. THE "UNDECIDABILITY" THESIS 
Gadamer's "undecidability" thesis (referred to also as the thesis of the "openness of the text") 
implies that the "meaning" of a given text is not susceptible of valid ascertainment, once and for 
all. 121 The thesis follows from the discussion under 3.4.6. and 3.4.7., above. Couched in a 
different formulation, it postulates that the validity of a particular interpretation does not 
preclude the validity of other, differing interpretations. 122 
It may be of interest to note that claims reminiscent of the "undecidability" thesis are to be 
found in the writings of Nietzsche, 123Kristeva, 124Frank, 125Hamacher, 126Blondel, 127Derrida128 and 
Nancy, 129 for instance. 
120 Ibid 45. See also 42 - 59 passim~ This description (wording) is apparently Grondin 's. 
121 See Connolly and Keutner op cit 2. 
122 See Connolly and Keutner op cit_ 2. 
123 See, for example, F. Nietzche "Interpretation" in G.L. Onniston and A.D Schrift (eds.) Transforming the 
Hermeneutic Context ( 1990) 43 - 57 passim. 
124 See J. Kristeva "Psychoanalysis and the Polis" in G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift op cit 89 - 105 passim 
125 See M. Frank "The Interpretation of a Text" in G.L. Onniston and A.D. Schrift op cit 145 - 175 passim. 
126 See W. Hamacher "Hermeneutic Ellipses: Writing the Henneneutical Circle in Schleiennacher" in G.L. 
Ormiston and A.D. Schrift op cit 177 - 210 passim. 
127 See E.Blondel "Interpreting Texts with and without Nietzsche" in G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift op cit 69 - 88 
passim. 
128 See J. Derrida "Sending: On Representation" in G.L. Onniston and A.D. Schrift op cit_ 107 - 138 passim~ 
129 J.-L. Nancy "Sharing Voices" in G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift op cit_21 l - 259 passim. 
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3.4.9. LEGAL HERMENEUTICS AS EXEMPLARY FOR GADAMER 
Gadamer argues that the specific case of legal hermeneutics holds out much in the way of 
promise for his project of a general hermeneutics. His contentions proceed from the way in 
which judges on the Continent have taken to the construction of the various codifications. 
As a matter of theory, these codifications were designed to describe compendiously the law in 
force in the respective countries, so that speculation as to the state of the law would be obviated 
for all intents and purposes. It was proposed in drafting the codes to lay down the law in precise 
and definitive terms, and thereby to avert uncertainty. Seeing that everything was to receive 
exact formulation, it was intended to displace precedent entirely as a source of law. But these 
objectives were nofin the event to materialize. 
As a matter of practice, judges on the Continent did not disown cases previously decided under 
the various codes as sources of reference in disposing of novel cases. The "intervening history 
of interpretation" (Wirkungsgeschichte) took on the quality of high persuasive authority. This 
"tradition" of interpretation impressed itself on the minds of the legal fraternity, becoming a part 
of their "effective-historical consciousness" (wirkungsgeschichtliches Be-wusstsein). This was 
the foundation of the presuppositions or "prejudices" in the light of which the law began to be 
understood. 
In virtue of the "prejudice-horizon", as thus constituted, the ex1genc1es of the "time and 
situation" ("existential context") of the specific case could be catered for in the interpretation of 
the codes. Gadamer's "undecidability" thesis was herewith rendered of relevance to 
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dispositions in terms of these codes as a matter of unplanned, evolutionary development. Such a 
thesis is one which the codifiers would not have been able to abide. Still, the interests of justice 
are better served thereby than might have been the case had the codifiers' own perceptions been 
allowed to prevail. 
Gadamer tenders these observations from legal hermeneutics in support of his general-
hermeneutical project. We proceed in an opposite direction, searching for what may be learned 
from general hermeneutics for legal-hermeneutical purposes. Gadamer's reflections as 
registered here are nothing the less of edification for this circumstance. 
3.4.10.a THE "WORLD" OPENED UP BY THE TEXT 
The interpreter's wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (effective-historical consciousness) and 
the presuppositions or "prejudices" it informs are themselves open to re-evaluation in the light 
of the "world" disclosed by the text. "Legitimate" as well as "negative" presuppositions are 
revealed as such in the course of textual meaning-apprehension. 
These cryptic observations call for elaboration. Connolly and Keutner explicate Gadamer's 
position as follows. The interpreter's "negative" presuppositions are "separated out" from her 
"legitimate" ones when her anticipation of perfection, her expectation of coherence and 
correctness in what she reads, is frustrated. 130 Her inappropriate presuppositions will give 
130 See Connolly and Keutner op cit_30 - 33 
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themselves to be understood as such in this event. And these presuppositions will require to be 
suspended if textual comprehension is to proceed. 131 
This means that in her efforts to interpret the text, the construing agent will be compelled to 
confront her own subliminal preconceptions with regard to the subject-matter of that text. 132 In 
this regard, Ricoeur writes of "[t ]he power of the text to open a dimension of reality. " 133 And 
such an observation is equally of application in the legal milieu. 
3.4.10.b THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS "WORLD" 
Transposed to the current South African juridical environment, these insights bear pertinently on 
the way in which constitutionalism is to be conceptualized. In this regard, one should look upon 
the ''text" of the Constitution as embodying a wealth of values to be identified in the last 
analysis by reference to the emerging standards of the universal "communis opinio populi". 134 
The jurist's "sense of justice" (her "effective-historical consciousness"), as informed by the 
"tradition" in which she is immersed, is made up of innumerable presuppositions or 
"prejudices". The vast majority of these "prejudices'', probably, are legitimate. The few that 
are not, the negative "prejudices", are principally such as derive from the repressive agencies of 
colonialism and apartheid. The "world" opened up by the ''text" of the Constitution provides a 
basis for expunging from the jurist's "sense of justice" these negative "prejudices". 
131 Ibid32 - 3. 
132 lbii33. 
133 See Paul Ricoem From Text to Action (1991) 300. 
134 It is submitted that the emerging consensus of international values may be taken as an "index" of natural-law 
standards. 
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But that is not all. Certain features of the constitutional enterprise will requrre to be 
incorporated into her "sense of justice" as new presuppositions or "prejudices." The jurist's 
renovated "sense of justice'', from which certain "prejudices" have been expunged, and into 
which other, novel, ones have been incorporated, is what Du Plessis would speak of as a ''new 
hermeneutical awareness". 135 
This "new hermeneutical awareness" is constantly to be re-invigorated. It should not be allowed 
to stagnate. Discussions with fellow-jurists, probing of grass-roots perceptions, and recourse to 
international public opinion would, it is submitted, make for its dynamism. 
The "new hermeneutical consciousness" the jurist brings to bear upon her task in the 
indigenous-law context, is, as will appear from a reading of the model (Chapter VII),136 of a 
somewhat different complexion. 
3.4.11. GADAMER'S POSITION ON THE "CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGIES" 
Since all our preconceptions, and hence all our understandings, are conditioned by "tradition" 
("ideology"), there is no room on Gadamer's view for any critique of ideologies. 137 His 
opponents' contentions are canvassed in some detail in the following chapter. 138 
135 See L.M du Plessis and H. Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 60- 107, 
especially the last few pages, for an exposition of the "new henneneutical disposition". 
136 See Chapter VII, II(2)(1 ). In addition, consult Chapter V, at 3.2. (and 3.1.). 
137 Dieter Misgeld "Poetry, Dialogue and Negotiation: Liberal Culture and Conservative Politics in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's Thought" in Wright op cit 161 at 171 claims that critical social theory is incompatible with Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. 
13 8 In Chapter III we deal with the work of Habennas, as also with that of other thinkers of the same disposition. 
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3.5. PAUL RICOEUR 
Ricoeur is the last phenomenological thinker of high eminence with whose work this chapter is 
concerned. For purposes of this thesis, Ricoeur's reflections on the complementarity of 
"explanation" and "understanding" are the most significant aspects of his work. 
Ricoeur proclaims his commitment to "method", maintaining that "understanding" should not be 
sought to be severed therefrom. 139 Exegesis and meaning-apprehension are to proceed on a 
basis of complementarity. 
The "hermeneutic arch" (arc hermeneutique) is supported by two pillars: "structural analysis" 
and "hermeneutic appropriation". 140 The former relates to the linguistic decipherment of a text 
on the basis of its internal structure, its internal relationships. 141 The latter "restore[ s] to the 
[text] its ability to project itself outside itself ... "142 It should be obvious that "explanation" is 
what is denoted by the former, and "understanding" by the latter. They interpenetrate each 
other.143 Explanation "develops" understanding analytically; 144 understanding "envelops" 
explanation. 145 The construct of the "hermeneutic arch", as thus appropriated, gives one to 
regard the dimensions of "Erklaren"146 and "Verstehen"147 as reciprocally interactive. 
139 See Paul Ricoeur "Existence and Hermeneutics" in Bleicher op cit 236 243:"[W]e will continue to keep in 
contact with the disciplines which seek to practice interpretation in a methodical manner, and we will resist the 
temptation to separate troth, characteristic of llllderstanding, form the method put into operation by disciplines 
which have spfllllg from exegesis". (Ricoeur's emphasis) 
140 See Bleicher op cit 229 - 32. 
141 See Ricoeur From Text to Action op cit) 13. 
142 Ibid 18. This may be the Editor's Introduction. 
143Ibid 129 and 156. Ricoeur speaks of this internal dialectic as a Gestalt. (Ibid 163) He proclaims 
further:"Ultimately, the correlation between explanation and llllderstanding, between understanding and 
exvlanation, is the hermeneutic circle"'. (Ibid 16 7) 
144 Ibid 142. 
145 Ibid 131 and 142. 
146 Or "explanation". 
147 Or '"underst;mding". 
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Thus one is given to see that it is neither active methodological effort alone nor passive 
meaning-apprehension exclusively that marks the activity of (statutory) interpretation. It is 
rather both functioning more or less simultaneously, with one concededly predominating at any 
particular time, perhaps, which renders a proper accounting of that activity. 
In the interpretation of statutes, these insights come in handy. The various components of 
legislative construction show at many points the complementarity of "Erklaren" and 
"Verstehen". Ricoeur' s notion of the "hermeneutic arch" does much in the way of pointing to 
the ultimately holistic character of the undertaking. In the elaboration of the theoretical 
framework for the interpretation of statutes to be found in Chapter VI of this study, 148 the 
relevance of this observation will be made explicit. 
4. THE LEGAL THEORY OF RONALD DWORKIN 
Dworkin' s legal theory evidences a number of parallels with the thrust of the work of the 
theorists just considered. For this reason it is expounded here in outline. Where necessary it is 
subjected to critical analysis. 
Marmor describes Dworkin's theory as positing that the legal system is not exhaustively defined 
in terms of "source-based law". 149 It comprises also those norms and standards which are 
"consistent in principle with the bulk of source-based law." 150 Dworkin takes issue with 
148 See, in particular, Chapter VI llllder section IV (dealing with the process of effectuation). 
149 See A. Marmor Interpretation and Legal Theory (1992) 103. 
150 Ibid. 
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"global internal scepticism". This is a view denying the conceivability of a coherent and unified 
construction of legal practice. 151 
Dworkin does not regard "rules" as exhaustive of the content of the law. For him, the 
"principles" immanent in the legal order are also to be accounted for - even for want of their 
explicit formulation - if the system is to be described precisely. 152 Rules either apply or they do 
not. Principles, by contrast, are weighted, and pull the decision one way or the other.153 It is 
through the interpretation of the law in its entirety that such principles are rendered open to 
identification. 154 
Confronted with a "hard case", a Hercules 155 would establish its "uniquely correct answer" 156 by 
bringing out and applying the principles latent in the entire juridical order as interpreted all in a 
single sweep. This is no mean feat, and no human being would be the equal of its 
accomplishment. Hence the need to postulate a Hercules. 
The real judge, it seems, is to imitate Hercules as best she can. She is to proceed much as if she 
were a chain-novelist somewhere in the middle of the composition of the story. This would 
151 See Allan C. Hutchinson "Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire" 1987 96 Yale Law Journal 637 657. 
152 See Ronald M.Dworkin Taking Rights Serious~v (1977) passim. Furtl1er consult R.M. Dworkin A Matter of 
Principle (1986) passim and R.M. Dworikin Law's Empire_ (1986) passim. 
153 See R.M. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) passim. 
154 See the works referred to in nl 52, above. See also, in describing Dworkin's model, Etienne Mureinik "Security 
and Integrity" 1987 Acta Juridica 197 200: Judges are to "interpret the record in the way which makes it as 
coherent as possible. That requires them to interpret it as flowing from - as justified by - the set of principles 
which makes it as coherent as possible". 
155 Hercules, as is well known, is Dworkin 's name for that hypothetical judge of superlluman juridical ability, who 
would be in a position to perform feats of legal construction the accomplishment of which it would not be within 
the compass of the abilities of a human judge to secure. 
156 Dworkin argues that almost every controversial problem in law admits of a "mriquely correct answer". This is 
his personal riposte to the clainis of global internal scepticism. 
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imply that everything she does would have to "cohere" with what has gone before. 157 And she 
would seek to read all that has preceded in its best light. 158 Considerations of "fit" and "political 
morality" would, on this analogy, point in the direction of a "single right answer" 159 in the 
interpretation of the law - which bears a resemblance to, even if it diverges from, a chain-novel-
enterprise. In short, the judge would seek to project the history of the law (as represented by 
countless "decisions, structures, conventions and practices") into the future "through what [she] 
does on the day". 160 
As there is a "single right answer" to (virtually) every legal problem, the notion of propositional 
truth in law is for Dworkin not one destitute of sense. When lawyers disagree on legal matters 
they are disagreeing not merely over what it is best to do, but indeed over what is in fact the 
case. 
161 Such is the purport of the single-right-answer thesis. 
4.1. CRITICISM OF THE SlNGLE-RIGHT-ANSWER THESIS 
In making the above claims, Dworkin reveals himself as in some measure a positivist. The 
interpreter looks upon the law "out there", as it were, from some external vantage point. 162 It is 
from the law "in itself' and its principles "in themselves" that she is to come by the uniquely 
157 See R.M. A Matter of Principle ( 1986) 160. 
iss Ibid. 
159Ibid_l43. The judge must render an interpretation of what has taken place previously which satisfies a test of two 
dimensions: "it must both fit [legal practice] and show its point or value". (Ibid 160) 
160 Ibid 159. 
161 Ibid 142. Dworkin argues that propositions of law may be "true". This is to say that disagreement on legal 
construction is "speculative" and not merely "practical". Speculative disagreement relates to what is in fact the 
case. Practical disagreement relates to what is in fact the case. Practical disagreement, on the other hand, pertains 
to what it is best to do (from a pragmatic point of view). MacCormick maintains, contrary to Dworkin, that 
disagreement in the legal-hermeneutical context is "practical". See D. Neil MacCormick Legal Reasoning and 
Legal 'Theory (1978) 248. 
162 In this respect, Dworkin seems to cling to the subject-object schema. 
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correct dispositive solution to the problem at hand. 163 (Upon these premises, as Fish points out, 
the law and its principles constrain their own interpretation. 164) 
Fish undertakes to explain the garnering of textual meaning as a function of the practices165 of 
the "interpretive community". The subject-object dichotomy he seeks to dismiss as a basis for 
this undertaking. 
Interpretation is not "objective". The text is not a raw datum, a thing-in-itself, constraining its 
own construction. But, then, neither is interpretation "subjective" - because the individual point 
of view is always social or institutional. 166 
What Wittgenstein called a "form of life", 167 the context of human discourse and activity within 
which interpretation takes place, is determinative of the nature of any particular interpretation. 
Fish's parallel notion is that of an "interpretive community." 168 The nature of any particular 
construction may equally justifiably be said to be determined by the practices of the 
"interpretive community". 169 
163 See the preceding discussion. 
164 See Stanley Fish "Interpretation and Pluralist Vision" 1982 60 Texas Law Review 495 495. See also, generally, 
Stanley Fish "Wrong Again" 1983 62 Texas Law Review 299 - 316. 
165 I encounter word "practices" in R. W. Benson "The Semiotics oflnternational Law: Interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty" in F. Schauer (ed.) Law and Language 1993 495 496, where Stanley Fish is said to refer to the 
"institutional practices of the interpretive community". (emphasis mine) 
166 See Stanley Fish Is there a Text in this Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) 335 - 6. 
167 See Benson loc cit. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
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Cotterrell expounds Fish's perception as follows. The factors limiting interpretive possibilities 
are not to be found in the subject-matter of interpretation. 170 They are rather to be discerned in 
''the conventions, expectations, shared understandings and structure" of the interpretive 
community. 171 
Fish's view accordingly diverges somewhat from Dworkin's. Upon the latter's appropriation, 
the law - the subject-matter of construction - contains within it limitations as to its constructive 
possibilities. Such is Dworkin' s proposition. 
As we have seen, however, the construing agent is part of the interpretive process. Her 
perception of the law and its principles is coloured by her "prejudice-horizon". She finds herself 
within a particular setting. And this gives meaning to the principles of the law. Such principles 
do not somehow speak their own meaning. This imports for purposes of this study the 
transmutation of the single-right-answer thesis into that of the most-appropn"ate-answer-in-the-
circumstances as such "emerges" (note the connotation of passivity) in the "fusion of horizons". 
The reason why principles seem to speak their own meanmg 1s that the "interpretive 
community" of jurists tends to a stable uniformity of outlook. Interpretive communities are, 
however, not entirely static entities. And constitutionalism seems indeed to command the 
coming into being of a "legal interpretive community of self-reflection" (to coin a phrase). This 
is borne out by the discussion of the "new hermeneutical awareness". Hence the dubious 
propriety of Dworkin's directive to conceive of an immutably and eternally correct answer to 
every legal problem. 
170 See Roger Cotterrell The Politics of Jurisprndence (1989) 179. 
171 Ibid. 
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4.2 PRINCIPLE VERSUS POLICY 
Let us call to mind any one of sundry principles of law embodying the notion of 
"reasonableness" for purposes ofthis discussion. Wittgenstein drew attention to the ill-founded 
programme of seeking to pin down an "essence" to which each word is to be taken to 
correspond. 172 It would be idle upon his conception, then, to attempt to uncover the essential 
meaning of the word "reasonableness". 
Yet the word does seem to have taken on a specifically defmed meaning in legal discourse, a 
meaning which appears to persist autonomously of any context. Wittgenstein would explain this 
perception as consequential upon participation in a "form of life" - in the life of juridical 
argumentation. Such a "form of life" is constituted of the shared enculturative patterns and 
assumptions of the judicial "interpretive community". It is not the case that the word 
"reasonableness" bears a meaning "in itself'. It is rather the case that stability in the character 
of the judicial "interpretive community" makes for its semantic determinacy. Such, at any rate, 
would be the purport of Wittgenstein's protestations. 
In Fish, as in Gadamer, the subject-object distinction is transcended. 173 It is neither the 
interpreter-jurist nor the principle embodying the notion of "reasonableness" that would be 
decisive of the "meaning" that is appropriated. It is rather the tradition informing the rules and 
practices of the legal "interpretive community" of which the jurist is a member that would give 
172 See, once again, Pitcher op cit passim. 
173 See Stanley Fish Is there a Text in this Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) 336. 
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her to apprehend the "generally accepted" meaning. On this score, Wittgenstein's and Fish's 
understandings are substantially concurrent. 
Now, the judicial "interpretive community" is widely regarded as conservative, and, some 
would say, representative of an atypical spectrum of values. Its interpretation of the principle 
embodying the notion of "reasonableness" would, according to exponents of critical legal 
scholarship, tend in the direction of policy-oriented decision-making. The disposition of the 
case at issue would be dictated by considerations of ideology, of policy. Kerruish considers 
Dworkin's theory of law to be exemplary as a case of ideology174 - in accord with these 
reflections, as it seems. 
Accordingly, if critical legal scholars are to be believed, Dworkin's divide between principle 
and policy cannot be sustained. Principle, Dworkin considers, pertains to the moral rights of 
individuals, policy to the promotion of general welfare, to leading society in a particular 
direction. 175 Arguments of principle rather than those of policy, so he claims, are to guide 
decision-making. 176 But if the two cannot be distinguished, as seems to be the claim of such 
scholars as Goodrich, Bell and Griffith, 177 then the jurist who proposes to act along Dworkinian 
lines would give herself to replicate ideology, political ideology in its pejorative sense. In the 
next chapter, these issues are dealt with more comprehensively. 
174 See V. Kerruish "Coherence, Integrity and Equality in 'Law's Empire': A Dialectical Review of Ronald 
Dworkill" 1988 16 International Journal of Sociology of Law 51 51. 
175 See Dworkill A Matter of Principle op cit 69 and 375. 
176 Ibid. 375: "[S]ometimes principle and policy argue in opposite directions". In this event, policy must yield to 
principle (Ibid 375 - 6) See also, Lane's exposition ofDworkill's views in this regard: Jessica Lane "The Poetics of 
Legal Interpretation" in S.Levinson and S. Mailloux (eds.) Interpreting Law and Literature (1988) 269 270. 
177 The work of these scholars is touched upon in the next chapter. 
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It is enough for the moment to observe that the mood of critical legal scholarship seems to be 
altogether too defeatist. If principles of law are interpreted in line with the postulates of our 
model (Chapter VII of this study in particular178), there is no good reason why they should 
figure as vehicles for the reinforcement of ideology. (Concededly, some would need to be 
jettisoned as incompatible with the constitutional dispensation. This, too, is dealt with in 
Chapter VII. 179) Jurists no doubt will continue to rely on principles oflaw (insofar as salutary) 
in their professional work, and to this extent one feels justified in assenting to Dworkin's 
conception of interpretive "fit". 
5. FIDELITY TO LAW AND RESPONSIVENESS 
Van der Walt explains that the "generality" of legal rules implies their "inherent openness" .180 
Their application constitutes the final phase of their integration: application is indispensable to 
the integrity of these rules. 181 This tallies with Gadamer's insight that responsiveness is 
essential to integrity. 182 Van der Walt concludes, with this, that "openness" is not inimical to 
"integrity". In fact, "openness" makes for "integrity". 183 
Van der Walt expounds Ricoeur's "rule of metaphor" as postulating the "dynamic integration of 
the familiar and the unfamiliar [in which] the integrity of the former is preserved in the latter''184 
Ricoeur claims "that [i]n the metaphorical statement ... contextual action creates a new meaning 
178 See Chapter Vll, I( 1) and 1(2), in particular. 
179 See Chapter VII, 1(4), in particular. 
180 See J.W.G. van der Walt "Squaring Up to the Difficulty of Life: Hermeneutic and Deconstructive 
Considerations concerning Positivism and the Rule of Law in a Future South Africa" 1992 3 Stell LR (2) 231 238. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibii 
184 Ibid)36 (Van der Walt's emphasis) 
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which is indeed an event, since it exists only in this particular context; but at the same time it 
can be repeated and hence identified as the same." 18s And with this, one has an inkling as to 
how to sustain fidelity to law in judicial responsiveness, deferring in this way to the doctrine of 
the separation of powers. 186 
In this regard, let us note Ricoeur's contention that it is the nature of a literary work to 
"transcend its own psycho-sociological conditions of production", 187 and in that way to render 
itself open to any number of possible readings "themselves situated in socio-cultural contexts 
which are always different". 188 In a word, says Ricoeur, one bas to do with decontextua/ization 
and differential recontextualization. 189 
Dallmayr conveys, with reference to Gadamer, that "rule-governance" and "concrete-contextual 
interpretation" are intimately related, 190 their interconnection not being merely extrinsic. 191 
Nonet and Selznick maintain that "[t]here is indeed a tension between openness andfidelity to 
law, and that tension poses the central problem of legal development". 192 The authors go on to 
observe that this "dilemma" is not peculiar to law. All institutions are therewith confronted. 193 
A combination of "integrity" and "openness" is possible, Nonet and Selznick advance, when an 
institution is truly purposive194 And this would apply equally with respect to the law. 
185 See Paul Ricoem Hermeneutics and Human Sciences op cit 170 (my emphasis) 
186 Thus has the writer of this thesis been led to conceive of things. 
187 See Ricoem Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences op cit_91. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. (Ricoem's emphasis, which would correspond to mine.) 
190 See Fred Dallinayr "Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law" in G. Leyh (ed.) Legal Hermeneutics (1991) 3 13. 
191 Ibid. 
192 See P. Nonet and P. Selznick Law and Society in Transition (1978) 76. (emphasis added) 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid 77. 
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Purposiveness, then, provides the key to the resolution of the apparent impasse suggested by the 
terms appearing in the head of this section. Purposiveness, then, makes for the reconciliation of 
the concepts denoted, allowing one to steer clear both of an "autonomous law" and of a legal 
system whose propositions are deployed largely as window dressing. Purposiveness, in a word, 
makes for a proper and adequate "fusion of horizons". 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
A (I) Ricoeur's conception of the "hermeneutic arch" demonstrates an interplay of active 
methodological effort and passive meaning-apprehension to mark the character of 
statutory interpretation. "Erklaren" and "Verstehen" are complementary rather than 
opposed. 195 
(2) From this it follows that, with each component of the constructive endeavour partaking 
of both these dimensions and each component thereby being linked with every other, the 
quality of "holism" characterizes the legislative-interpretive undertaking. 196 
(3) Throughout the various phases in the interpretation of a statute, certain maxims and 
canons will have come to consciousness as potentially applicable to the matter at hand. 
In the course of the last phase - that of effectuation (as it has been elected to designate it) 
- those which are inappropriate to the case will have been "filtered out", as Gadamer 
195 See, in this regard, Chapter VI, more particularly the paragraphs introducing the discussion of a framework for 
the interpretation of statutes. 
196 Consult Chapter VI, more particularly the paragraphs introducing the discussion of a framework for the 
interpretation of statutes. 
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might say. Since there is no hierarchy with respect to these maxims and canons, 197 and 
since so many point in opposite directions, 198 it seems that to look upon them thus is 
most faithfully representative of their function. 199 
B (1) We go along with Gadamer in abjuring "intentionalism", understood in its narrow sense 
as mandating some sort of search for the subjective intentions of the lawmakers. As 
pointed out in the previous chapter, we do not endorse Betti's canon of the actuality of 
understanding,200 (which has as its objective the reconstruction of authorial intent). In 
the case of statutory interpretation, the "intention of the legislature'', invoked as a matter 
of ingrained habit, is not a substantial ideational reality upon which the interpreter might 
draw with a view to proper construction. 201 
(2) As observed in the foregoing chapter, however, we find in what it has been elected to 
speak of as "intentionalization" (as contrasted with "intentionalism") a fruitful means of 
statutory elucidation.202 In this respect, we part company with Gadamer. Subscribing to 
Betti's canon of the hermeneutical correspondence of meaning, we applaud efforts to 
come by pertinent objective manifestations of the various actuating forces ultimately 
culminating in legislative formulation. As seen, a statutory provision may be rendered 
open to better understanding for its comparison with other documents prepared at 
roughly the same time and having a bearing upon that provision. Memoranda (detailing 
suggestions to the legislature) and excerpts from Hansard and other like sources 
197 See John Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (l 978) 370. 
198 See MacConnick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory op cit 207. 
199 See Chapter VI, at JV. 
200 See Chapter I, lillder S (Conclusions), at SB (I) - (2) 
201 See Chapter VI, at II (2)2.2. 
202 See Chapter I, lillder S (Conclusions), at SD (I). 
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(providing objective evidence of surrounding circumstances and preceding deliberations) 
may be of great value in this regard.203 
C (I) We have seen in the course of this chapter that the interpreter's "effective-historical 
consciousness" or wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein makes for the possibility of 
dialectical interaction or "conversation" between interpreter and text. 
(2) The "effective history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) of any given statute may be taken as a 
reference to the case law decided under that statute. Such case law orients the jurist's 
understanding of the statute in relation to the concrete-existential dilemma with which 
she is confronted. In a word, her consciousness of the intervening history of 
interpretation of the statute allows of the possibility of illuminating its purpose. 
(Needless to say, precedential authority may have to be overruled where the intervening 
history of a statute is clearly incompatible with constitutionalism.) In treating of the 
"axis of effective history" in Chapter VI of this study2°4 we elaborate these issues. 
D ( 1) In the course of this chapter, we have encountered the notion of a "new hermeneutical 
consciousness". It represents the novel mind-set with which the law is to be approached. 
The jurist's subliminal sense of justice is subject to re-evaluation in the light of the 
"world" opened up by the "text" of the Constitution and its inherent value-system. 
(2) The jurist's "sense of justice" (her "effective-historical consciousness") as informed by 
the "tradition" in which she is immersed, is made up of innumerable presuppositions or 
203 Consult Chapter VI, at II (2). 
204 See Chapter VI, lillder II (3)3.1. (dealing with the axis of effective history). 
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"prejudices". The vast majority of these "prejudices", probably, are legitimate. The 
"world' opened up by the "text" of the Constitution is to secure both the expungement of 
those "prejudices" the jurist harbours which are lacking in legitimacy and the 
incorporation into her "sense of justice" of certain, novel, "prejudices". And thus we are 
1 d h . f h . 1 . " 205 e to t e notion o a "new ermeneut1ca consc10usness . 
(3) The "new hermeneutical consciousness" ought not to be allowed to vitrify or stagnate. 
Discussions with fellow-jurists, probing of grass-roots perceptions and recourse to 
international public opinion should ensure that it remains vibrant. 
(4) "Prejudices" deriving from this "new hermeneutical consciousness" would condition the 
character of the interpretation of legal materials. 
(5) The "new hermeneutical consciousness" the jurist brings to bear upon her task in the 
indigenous-law context, is, as will appear from a reading of the model (Chapter VIl),206 
of a somewhat different complexion. 
E (1) "Purposiveness" ensures that the disposition reflect the ideal of fidelity to law, on the 
one hand, and make for responsiveness to social needs, on the other. 
(2) The interpreter's purpose for reading the text, it would appear to be Greenstein's 
suggestion, determines the meaning of that text in the circumstances. 207 
205 See Chapter Vl, at II (4)4.2. 
206 See Chapter Vll, at II (2)(1). 
207 See RK. Greenstein "Text as Tool: Why We Read the Law" 1995 52 Washington and Lee Law Review I 05 118. 
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(3) The purpose in reading legal texts in present-day South Africa - which by the very 
nature of things involves providing for an existential context (the inclusive '.'context of 
social realities", and the "arrangement of facts" it subtends) - should be to uphold the 
values immanent in constitutionalism, to do justice and, where a statute is at issue, to 
give effect to its purpose in addition. 
(4) The meaning to be garnered (upon seeking to implement "purpose"), so far as the tenor 
of phenomenological hermeneutics gives one to understand, is more something that 
"emerges" than is actively solicited. What will "emerge" - upon bringing to bear upon 
one's reading the necessary "purpose" - is the "most appropriate answer in the 
circumstances". This contradicts Dworkin's thesis to the extent that the latter would 
press for a "single right answer" for all time. 
Christopher Stone reminds us that the "potential for legitimate ambiguity" is intrinsic to 
interpretation208 as things are. That more than one construction may be "satisfactory'', he 
proceeds, does not mean that any interpretation is as worthy as any other,209 however. 
The most appropriate answer in the circumstances, I submit, is that which "emerges" in 
the "fusion ofhorizons".210 
(5) The "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction blinkers itself to the 
circumstance that "purpose" and " existential context" condition "meaning" in the way 
208 See Christopher D. Stone "Introduction: Interpreting the Symposimn" 1985 58 Southern California Law Review 
(I) I 3. 
209 Ibid. 
210 For the relevance of the matter under E., consult Chapter VI, at III (1), and Chapter VII, at I (1) and II (1)1.1. 
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outlined here. To look upon a concatenation of words in a statute in their purely "literal" 
signification is to blind oneself to the possibility of their being invested with a new 
semantic complexion. 211 
F (1) Dworkin's model suggests that "hard cases" are to be resolved by having regard to those 
"principles" which derive from the legal order as construed in its entirety. Such a 
construction, as undertaken by a Hercules, would yield a "single right answer" in respect 
of all such cases. 212 
(2) Let us suppose Hercules to have completed his task. The "principle" upon which he 
might have seized as resolutive of a particular dilemma may be perfectly consonant with 
the record of the community (and thus perfectly legitimate from the Dworkinian 
perspective). But it may yet fail to comport with the values immanent in our 
constitutional enterprise. In this event, Hercules would have misdirected himself in 
latching onto the principle at issue. 
(3) The "principles" of our legal system are, in all probability, salutary for the 
overwhelmingly greater part of their enumeration. But there are "principles" here and 
there, perhaps, which simply do not tally with the inherent value-order of our 
constitutional dispensation. Insofar as Dworkin's model overlooks this important 
concern, it fails to carry outright conviction. 
211 See Chapter VI, at III (7) in this regard. 
212 See the discussion ooder 4, above. 
(4) If a particular "principle" of law is deemed ineligible for perpetuation by reason of 
incompatibility with the constitutional design, a substitute will require to be fashioned. 
And in the following chapter this issue is dealt with in detail. 
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III 
THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL 
HERMENEUTICS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapter it was learned that there was no room on Gadamer' s 
postulates for ideological critique. 1 All our understandings are ideologically and 
linguistically conditioned, such that we cannot transcend the dialogue that we are.2 
Upon these premises, our situatedness precludes any productive critical appraisal of 
our predicament. 
These considerations lead to Gadamer's legitimation of "tradition" and 
"authority".3 In the milieu of law, this imports the sacrosanctity of legal-historical 
originative sources. No critical legal theory is sustainable, just as any critique of 
ideology is misconceived. 
Critical hermeneutics is distrustful of these claims. Habermas opposes himself to 
Gadamer' s thesis. He proposes that the assumptions of that thesis are impeachable 
- particularly the assumption that "legitimating acknowledgement" and the 
"consensus" upon which "authority" is based are achieved without coercion. 4 
1 See Chapter II, wider 3.4.11. 
2 See, in this regard, H.G. Gadamer "Reply to My Critics" in G.L. Onniston and A.D. Schrift (eds.) 
The Hermeneutic Tradition ( 1989) 273 292. 
3 See Gadamer Truth and Method op cit 248-50. 
4 See Jtirgen Habermas "On Hermeneutic's Claim to Universality" in K. Mueller-Vollmer (ed) The 
Hermeneutics Reader (1986) 294 316. 
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Habermas advances that such a statement simply fails to reckon with the 
phenomenon of "systematically distorted communication".5 Arguing that force is 
sustained "through precisely the . . . illusion of freedom from force which 
characterizes a pseudo-communicative agreement",6 he urges that in the absence of 
a proviso, in principle, of "universal and dominance-free agreement",7 it is 
impossible to set apart "dogmatic acknowledgement" from "true consensus".8 And, 
as will be seen, Habermas discerns in his conception of the "ideal speech situation"9 
an instrumentality through which communicative distortions are to find some 
measure of resolution. 
As noted, Gadamer recoils from the idea of a critical hermeneutics. It is to be 
noticed, too, that a strand of Marxist-oriented thought would have no difficulty in 
relegating to the status of "bourgeois ideology" the very notion of a hermeneutics of 
critique. 10 The "regulative idea" of "communication free of domination" would be 
taken up from this perspective as a "no-where", 11 a "utopia" in the pejorative sense. 
In what follows, it is endeavoured to establish what in the way of utility is to be 
culled from the critical-hermeneutical tradition for purposes of contemporary legal 
argumentation. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 We discuss the notion of the "ideal speech situation" llllder 4.1.3., below. 
10 See Josef Bleicher in Bleicher op cit 165. 
11 Ibid. 
89 
1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS CHAPTER 
The term "ideology" may be used to denote simply the framework of reigning ideas 
of the day, upon which our thought-patterns are premised. Employed thus, it is not 
necessarily pejorative in connotation. Yet, the conception of "ideology" is often of 
a more specific denotation as conjuring up ideational distortion through the 
mechanism of authoritarian power-relationships. The programme of the critique of 
ideology is committed to unveiling such distortion, with a view to human 
"emancipation". 
Colonialism, apartheid and (possibly) capitalism, in its more materialistic forms, 
have conduced to distortion in our legal order. Furthermore, forces of greater 
subtlety may conceivably have worked to the same effect - on an imperceptible 
level. Critical legal theory addresses itself to the examination of these and related 
issues. 12 
12 The liternture of critical legal scholarship is of immense breadth and quite ponderous. Much 
pertains to "deconstruction", a way of doing things associated with the French intellectual. Jacques 
Derrida. In this regard, sec J.M. Balkin "Dcconstructivc Practice and Legal Theory'' in F. Schauer 
Law and Lunguage ( 1993) 385 403 and 406 et passim. See also, for instance, Clare Dalton "An 
Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine" in S. Levinson and S. Mailloux (eds.) 
Interpreting Law and Literature(l 988) 285; C. Douzinas and R. Warrington "On the 
Deconstruction of Jurisprudence: Fin(n)is Philosophiae" in P. Fitzpatrick and A. Hunt (eds.) 
Critical Legal Studies (1987) 33; Emily F. Hartigan "Derridoz Law Written in Our Heart/Land: 
'The Powers Retained by the People' " 1993 67 Tulane Law Review 1133; Mark Poster 
"Interpreting Texts: Some New Directions" 1985 58 Southern California Law Review 15 16-17. 
See, in general, on critical legal theory, also the following sources: Robert W. Gordon ''New 
Developments in Legal Theory'' in David Kairys (ed.) The Politics of Law (1990) 413; Hugh 
Collins "Roberto Unger and the Critical Legal Studies Movement" 1987 14 Journal of Law and 
Society (4) 387; David Nelken "Critical Criminal Law" in Fitzpatrick and Hunt op cit 105; P. 
Ireland, I. Grigg-Spall and D. Kelly "The Conceptual Foundations of Modem Company Law" Ibid 
149; Francis Snyder "New Directions in European Community Law" Ibid 167; Nikolas Rose 
"Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family" Ibid. 61; Hugh Collins "The 
Decline of Privacy in Private Law'' Ibid 91; Peter Fitzpatrick "Racism and the Innocepce of Law'' 
Ibid 119. 
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Van Blerk describes critical legal theory as envisaging a ''wholesale political assault 
on legal liberalism and its institutions."13 It seeks, she says, to unmask the ideology 
sustaining domination and exploitation within the juridical order, so as to show up a 
possible alternative. 14 
Kennedy, bringing critique to bear upon the law, ventures comments on legal 
education that are anything but complimentary. It is submitted that his trenchant 
criticisms go rather too far, 15 however. 
Curzon claims that critical legal scholarship emphasizes "the very close links 
between law and politics". 16 Such scholarship dismisses the notion of legal 
"neutrality". 17 Speaking in this vein, it seems that Davis is of a disposition to 
regard Dworkin' s schema as conducive, in greater or lesser measure, to the 
entrenchment of political ideology. 18 
It is submitted, then, with due regard to these sentiments, that legal interpretation 
requires the jurist to remain alert to the impact of our ignominious political history 
on the law. It will be attempted in concluding this chapter to expound, with 
reference to the material here to be considered, a means of approach to aspects of 
the South African legal tradition bearing the taint of ignominy - with a view to 
remedial action in their respect. Accordingly, it is sought to deal with the 
13 See A.E. van Blerk "Critical Legal Studies in South Africa" 1996 (113) SAL.I (1) 86 89. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Kennedy's animadversioos upon legal education are particularly astringent. See Dtmcan Kennedy 
"Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in Kairys op cit 3 8 40-41. 
16 See L.B. Curzon Jurisprudence (1979) 263. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See D.M. Davis "Integrity and Ideology: Towards a Critical Theory of the Judicial Functioo" 
1995112SAL./(1)104127. 
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identification of the features of the law in question, and thereafter to disinter what 
may be done to the end of making good their shortcomings. 
This brings out the essential tenor of our project - conceived as a two-stage process. 
The first stage involves the identification of legal-ideological distortion. In this 
stage, we adopt an approach parting ways to some extent with Habermas (we 
deploy the notion of a "new hermeneutical awareness", not that of "communicative 
rationality" in the strict sense). The second stage is to be seen as the deployment of 
a variant of the Habermasian model with the objective of dealing with the raw 
material out of which a novel legal proposition might be fashioned to take the place 
of that deemed to embody ideological distortion. The first stage is discussed under 
3. below, the second under 4. and 5. following thereupon. 
Before embarking upon the subject-matter of this chapter, it may be instructive to 
apprise oneself of certain perceptions embodying a tangible element of critique. 
We turn now to consider them. 
2. THE VIEW OF LAW AS IDEOLOGY IN ESSENCE 
Goodrich, Bell and Griffith are amongst those theorists whose conceptions of law 
as geared to the propagation of ideology (using the term pejoratively) are most 
notable. A short account of their respective views follows. 
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2.1. PETER GOODRICH 
Goodrich inveighs against structuralism in law, against the perception that the law 
is an internally consistent whole. 19 He proposes that it should not be looked upon 
as a "self-sufficient object of study".20 Very robust and forthright in his claims, he 
argues that legal language is auto-referential, 21 and that the denotation of its 
categories is illusory. 22 In the latter contention, he is anticipated in the writings of 
Julius Stone (for a synopsis of which the reader is referred to the discussion of 
American realism in the preceding chapter).23 Unlike Stone, however, Goodrich 
maintains that the categories in question make for the implementation of political 
choices intimately associated with a very narrowly defined, uniform and 
homogeneous grouping - the legal profession itself 24 
With this, he advances that the law should be studied upon an interdisciplinary 
basis. 25 Goodrich makes out a case for deconstruction,26 urging that any adequate 
legal philosophy should reckon with the social and political values encoded in "the 
syntactic and discursive processes of the law".27 
19 See Peter Goodrich Legal Discourse ( 1987) 4. See, also, in particular, Peter Goodrich Reading 
the Law (1986) 117-8. 
20 See Goodrich Legal Discourse op cit 128. 
21 See Goodrich Reading the Law op cit 151. 
22 Ibid 150 and 153. 
23 See Chapter II, under 2. 
24 See Goodrich Reading the Law op cit 219. 
25 Ibid See also Goodrich Legal Discourse op cit 207. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Goodrich Legal Discourse op cit 81. 
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2.2. JOHN BELL 
Bell puts forward the contention that the "interstitial legislator model" most 
satisfactorily explains the nature of adjudication in hard cases.28 Dworkin's "rights 
model", with its accent on arguments of principle, Bell dismisses as a misleading 
representation of the judicial function. 29 It is arguments of policy not qualitatively 
dissimilar to those that give shape to decisions taken by legislators, at various levels 
(and by certain executive officials), which go into the making of the judicial 
determination. 30 Or so, at any rate, Bell contends. 
In short, Bell contests the claim that a sharp divide exists between adjudication and 
other state activities.31 
With these reflections, he maintains that judges are ''very much political actors",32 
in that they give direction to society through the medium of their choices.33 
2.3. JOHN GRIFFITH 
Like Bell, Griffith is of the view that judges are political actors. He is very strident 
and polemical in his assertions, which helps to explain the broadside issued at him 
28 See John Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions ( 1983) passim. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 247. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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by Lord Denning. 34 "[ J]udges in the United Kingdom", Griffith says, "cannot be 
politically neutral .... "35 
It is Griffith's complaint that the senior judiciary (he is writing with the English 
legal system in mind) frequently fails to give a sensible interpretation of the "public 
interest". 36 
He argues that the formative and enculturative experience of the senior judiciary in 
the United Kingdom has impressed upon them "a strikingly homogeneous 
collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, which to them represent the public 
interest". 37 Indeed, Griffith goes so far as to say that among the considerations that 
for them are embraced by the notion of the "public interest" are certain political 
views that would normally be "associated with the Conservative Party". 38 
Individuals with a common group experience, Tuckett advances, tend to "share 
common subjective definitions of the situation". 39 A scholar in the mould of a 
Goodrich, a Bell or a Griffith would translocate this general sociological postulate 
to the judicial arena specifically. She would consider a very narrowly defmed 
compendium of values to inform the interpretation of statutory, case-law and other 
materials. 
34 See Lord Denning' s demmciation of Griffith on the leaf preceding the subject-matter of Griffith's 
thesis in J.A.G. Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (1991). 
35 Ibid 225. 
36 Ibid preface (no page cited). 
37 Ibid 198. 
38 Ibid199. 
39 See David Tuckett (ed.) An Introduction to Medical Sociology (1976) 21. 
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2.4. A SHORT COMMENT ON THE VIEWS DISCUSSED 
The view of law as ideology in essence (ideology here taken up in the pejorative 
sense) strikes one as altogether too negative, too defeatist, too pessimistic. It 
assuredly does not make for enthusiasm in the treatment of authoritative sources. 
More than this, it blinds one to the fact that (as conveyed in the foregoing chapter) 
one is able to come by a proper dispositive solution to the problem at hand by 
eliciting the "most appropriate answer in the circumstances" as it "emerges" in the 
"fusion of horizons". 40 As has been seen, the "meaning" oflegal-textual materials 
is dependent upon the "purpose" the interpreter has in mind in reading them. 41 It is 
agreed with Williams that legal dogmatics does not constrain conclusions, but 
rather defines the ambit of the juristic debate, so that the law is deployable in the 
interests of axiological adequacy. 42 This is a much more positive demeanour. 
But these remarks are not to deny that the law has lent itself, at this point and that, 
to the encodement of distortion. And it is to critical hermeneutics and its resources 
that we turn in contemplation of this circumstance. 
For a first thing, it is turned to the means of identifying distortion. 
40 See Chapter II, llllder 6 (Conclusions), more particularly at E. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Joan C. Williams "Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the 
New Langdells" 1987 62 New York University Law Review 429 495. 
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3. THE "NEW HERMENEUTICAL AWARENESS" AND LEGAL-
IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE: THE NOTION OF "DISSONANCE" 
In the preceding chapter, we came upon the notion of a "new hermeneutical 
awareness".43 It was explained that it refers to the jurist's "sense of justice", from 
which certain presuppositions or "prejudices" have been expunged, and into which 
other, novel, ones have been incorporated - all this with reference to the 
constitutional enterprise. 44 The "new hermeneutical awareness" is this "sense of 
justice" - swept clean and refurbished. 
It was further noted in the previous chapter that the "new hermeneutical awareness" 
partakes of an element of dynamism. It should on no account be allowed to 
stagnate or vitrify. 4 ~ In order to ensure its vigour and vibrancy, the jurist should 
involve herself in discussions ("dialogue"/"speech"/"communication") with fellow-
jurists. Also indicated would be ongoing "probing" of grass-roots perceptions as 
well as international public opinion, and the consultation of public-international-
law materials.46 Recourse to the last-named materials (and international public 
opinion) is of considerable importance, seeing that constitutional values are to be 
identified in the ultimate analysis by reference to the emerging standards of the 
universal "communis opinio populi" of civilized nations.47 
43 See Chapter II, lDlder 3.4.1 O.a and b, and lDlder 6.(Conclusions), more particularly at D. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See, generally, Ibid. 
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It follows from this that the "new hermeneutical awareness" has a natural-law-type 
constituency. 48 The jurists' s perceptual framework is of a natural-law orientation. 
If a rule or principle of law offends against the jurist's implicit natural-law 
orientation, we have to do with what it has been elected to refer to as "dissonance". 
It goes without saying that "dissonance" should not be inferred upon any frivolous 
basis. One may say that it is in those instances where the "new hermeneutical 
awareness" the jurist brings to bear upon her perception of a rule or principle meets 
with opposition that one has to do with "dissonance". Diagnostic of "dissonance", 
then, is the malalignment of the "new hermeneutical awareness" and the rule or 
principle. 
Upon the basis sketched, it would not be difficult to elude the temptation to deal 
with precedent and legal dogmatics in a high-handed, cavalier fashion. Precedent 
and legal dogmatics are to be respected. Perelman's principle of inertia stipulates 
as much. 49 It is in instances of "dissonance" alone that a rule or principle of law 
may be jettisoned. 
With this we see that the "new hermeneutical awareness" provides a basis for legal-
ideological critique - for eliding a rule or principle where necessary. But it does 
41 See section 39 (I )(b) of the final Constitution (Act I 08 of 1996), which reads as follows: "When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court ... must consider international law". It is submitted that this 
subsection supports the inference as registered in the text. 
48 It is submitted that the emerging consensus of values of the "communis opinio populi" of civilized 
nations may be taken as an "index" of natural-law standards. 
49 See Robert Alexy A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 267-8, in discussing the "stabilization 
function" of legal dogmatics, where he says the following: "The reasons for [a] new solution must 
be sufficiently strong as to justify not only the new solution but also the break with tradition. 
Perelman's principle of inertia therefore holds. Whoever puts forward a new solution canies the 
burden of proof'. 
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not on its own account command the resources for argumg and finding an 
appropriate legal proposition to take its place. 
Thus, "dissonance" signals the elision of an aspect of our legal tradition. But it is a 
cue for something else as well - for critical-argumentative deployment in the law. 
We have to look to critical argumentation as a means of fmding an apt dispositive 
solution. 
Under 4., below, it is treated of the method of filling the lacuna left by the elision of 
a rule or principle, and under 5., below, of the material of which the dispositive 
norm is to fmd its crafting. 
4. THE RESOURCES OF CRITICAL ARGUMENTATION 
Under this head we are interested principally in matters of procedure. Under the 
following head (5), the focus is more on substance. Critical hermeneutics claims to 
furnish a procedural rationality for the justification of norms. One has to do, 
therefore, with norms for the justification of norms - second-order norms or "meta-
norms". 
Among the foremost exponents of critical hermeneutics is the German philosopher, 
Jiirgen Habermas. He is in substantial accord with Gadamer in relation to many 
issues, 50 but he believes that the latter is too trustful of the beneficence of 
50 Habermas' s agreement with Gadamer seems to pertain most notably to their shared conviction that 
meaning-apprehension has a "fore-structuration". For a discussion of the fore-structure of 
interpretation, see Chapter II, llllder 3.4.4. 
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"tradition". We have seen that for Gadamer there is no place for any critique of 
ideologies. 51 
From the discussion under 3., above, it is clear that we already have a basis (in the 
"new hermeneutical awareness") for the criticism of extant legal manifestations. 
Our deployment of critical hermeneutics and its resources is therefore to the end not 
of passing judgment on ideology (we already have a basis for this), but of filling the 
lacuna left by the rule or principle of law it has been seen fit to jettison. The 
question to arise, then, is, "What sort of dispositive norm is to fill the lacuna left by 
the elision ofthis rule or principle?" 
Our deployment of Habermas is therefore in the interests of establishing a 
normative standard for the justification of just such a dispositive norm. This 
standard he considers to reside in his conception of the "ideal speech situation".52 
4.1 JURGEN HABERMAS 
As emerges from the above two paragraphs, we are not interested for purposes of 
this chapter in Habermas's critique of ideologies as such. As it is, we have a 
criteriological filter capable of being harnessed to this end - finding its immanence 
in the "new hermeneutical awareness". The thought of Habermas cannot, however, 
be properly understood in the absence of a consideration of his position on 
ideological critique. It is necessary, therefore, in order to gain insight into his 
notion of the "ideal speech situation", to go into his contentions in that regard. 
51 s . Ch ee, once agam, apter II, llllder 3.4.11. 
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4.1.1 A CRITICAL APPROACH TO TRADITION 
Held furnishes us with comments suggesting the objectives of the Habermasian 
programme. This project undertakes to formulate a social theory having as its 
objective "the self-emancipation of people from domination". 53 
Dreyfus explains that the "hermeneutics of suspicion" undertakes to emancipate the 
participants in social life by unveiling the "deep meaning the everyday practices 
serve to suppress .... "54 Gadamer comments that this programme is pursued in the 
"critique of ideology". 55 
Habermas tells us that a consensus, apparently effectuated through ''rational" 
means, "may ... well be the product of pseudocommunication".56 Depth 
hermeneutics, he says, teaches us that "the dogmatism of the traditional context is 
the vehicle ... for the repressiveness of a power relationship which deforms the 
intersubjectivity of understanding as such and systematically distorts colloquial 
communication". 57 His hermeneutics of suspicion therefore postulates that "every 
consensus in which interpretation terminates" must be regarded as conceivably 
having been "pseudocommunicatively compelled". 58 
52 For an elaboration of the concept of the "ideal speech situation'', the reader is invited to tum to 
4.1.3., below. 
53 See David Held Introduction to Critical Theory ( 1989) 250. 
54 See Hubert Dreyfus "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault 
in G. Shapiro and A. Sica (eds.) Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects (1984) 66 80-81. 
55 See H.-G. Gadamer "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion" in G. Shapiro and A. Sica op cit 54 58. 
Needless to repeat, Gadamer does not espouse ideological critique. 
56 See Jiirgen Habennas "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality" in K. Mueller-Vollmer op cit 
294 314. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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It is Gadamer's "uncritical acceptance of tradition"59 that constitutes the subject-
matter of Habermas 's objections.<'0 Because Habermas thinks of language as an 
ideological instrumentality, it is his view that the anticipatory structure of 
prejudices making for understanding should itself emerge as an object of critical 
appraisal. 61 
4.1.2 REFLEXIVITY 
Yet, critical theorists of the Frankfurt school acknowledge that their programme is 
conceived as a part of the tradition it undertakes to subject to scrutiny.62 The words 
of Ricoeur are most apt in this regard: "[U]pon what will [the critique of ideology] 
concretely support the reawakening of communicative action if not upon the 
creative renewal of cultural heritage?"63 
Habermas's contentions speak in conformity with these perceptions. The following 
quotation here seems in point: "Communicative action can be understood as a 
circular process in which the actor is two things in one: an initiator who masters 
situations through actions for which he is accountable and a product of the 
traditions surrounding him, of groups whose cohesion is based on solidarity to 
59 The citation is from Ormiston and Schrift in G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift The Hermeneutic 
Tradition (1989) 21. 
60 Ibid. 
61 This is Habermas's standpoint as set out in Ormiston and Schrift lac cit. 
62 See Alan How The Habermas-Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social (1995) 14: "Critical 
Theory has always been 'reflexive' in acknowledging that it is a part of the same social historical 
processes which it seeks to analyse." Incidentally, How opposes the idea of a critical hermeneutics. 
63 See Paul Ricoeur From Text to Action (I 991) 306. 
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which he belongs, and of processes of socialization in which he is reared".64 
Another observation suggesting a parallel insight, as it is submitted, reads as 
follows: 'The shared lifeworld offers a storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens 
from which those participating in communication draw agreed-upon patterns of 
interpretation for use in their interpretive efforts".65 And, in a similar vein thus: 
"[A]greement in the communicative practice of everyday life rests simultaneously 
on intersubjectively shared propositional knowledge, on normative accord, and on 
mutual trust".66 
4.1.3 THE "IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION" 
These remarks on ''communicative action" lead us to a consideration of Habermas's 
key concept of the "ideal speech situation". In this counterfactual set-up, all 
impediments to proper discursive procession - whether internal or external - have 
been resolved.67 A "rational consensus", that is, a consensus achieved under these 
conditions, is for Habermas the singular touchstone of veracity or of normative 
correctness. 68 
As Alexy notes, a maJor objection raised to the concept of the "ideal speech 
situation" pertains to its counterfactuality. 69 Habermas is fully aware of this 
objection, yet it does not lay him low. 
64 See Jiirgen Habennas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) 135 (Habermas's 
emphasis). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 136. 
67 See Held op cit 343-4. 
68 Ibid. 
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Habermas claims that the "ideal speech situation" is "neither an empirical 
phenomenon nor a pure construct, but rather an inescapable underpinning for 
discourse reciprocally assumed by the parties".70 He proceeds that "[t]he structure 
of possible speech is such that in performing a speech act we counterfactually 
behave as though the ideal speech situation were not a mere fiction but rather a 
present reality; this is just what is meant by an 'underpinning'." 71 Alexy writes 
that this version of the conception of the "ideal speech situation" eludes the 
reproach of unrealizability: 72 "It is definitely possible to pursue an ideal that can 
never be realized". 73 
Upon Habermasian postulates, then, the "ideal speech situation" is no pure 
construct but something actually presupposed in "every empirical linguistic 
utterance aimed at serious discourse".74 
In this regard, Habermas speaks in these terms: "Argumentation is a reflective 
form of communicative action and the structures of action oriented toward reaching 
understanding always already presuppose those very relationships of reciprocity 
and mutual recognition around which all moral ideas revolve in everyday life no 
less than in philosophical ethics."75 And in like terms the following: "[T]he 
proponents of discourse ethics rely on a type of argument that draws attention to the 
69 See Alexy op cit 121-2. 
70 Haberrnas as quoted in Alexy foe cit. 
71 Habennas Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid (per Alexy). 
74 Quotation from Haberrnas in J.W.G. van der Walt "The Relation between Law and Politics: A 
Communitarian Perspective" 1994 III SALJ (I) 152 154. 
75 See Haberrnas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action op cit 130 (Habermas's 
emphasis). 
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inescapability of the general presuppositions that always already underlie the 
communicative practice of everyday life and that cannot be picked or chosen .... "76 
Illustrating the tenor of his remarks, Habermas proposes: "In the attitude oriented 
toward reaching understanding, the speaker raises with every intelligible utterance 
the claim that the utterance in question is true (or that the existential 
presuppositions of the propositional content hold true), that the speech act is right in 
terms of a given normative context (or that the normative context that it satisfies is 
itself legitimate), and that the speaker's manifest intentions are meant in the way 
they are expressed". 77 
Habermas's conception of "communicative rationality" is that of a process at once 
pertaining to a particular context and transcending it.78 It is, however, anti-
foundationalist. His arguments in this regard should be registered in his own 
words: "[D]iscourse or argumentation is a more exacting type of communication, 
going beyond any particular form of life. Discourse generalizes, abstracts, and 
stretches the presuppositions of context-bound communicative actions by extending 
their range to include competent subjects beyond the provincial limits of their own 
particular form of life". 79 
Alexy suggests that Habermas's consensus attained under ideal-speech conditions is 
the equivalent of the agreement of Perelman's auditoire universe/ (universal 
76 Ibid (Habennas's emphasis). 
77 Ibid. 136-7 (Habennas's emphasis). 
78 See J.W.G. van der Walt "The Relation between Law and Politics: A Commmritarian Perspective" 
1994 III SALJ(I) 152 158-9. 
79 See Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action op cit 202. 
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audience). 80 The universal audience is defined as the entirety of humanity in a 
situation of argumentational competence. 81 Assent on the part of the auditoire 
universe! is the touchstone of rationality in argumentation. 82 
Habermas's conception of rationality finds something of a parallel in Popper's 
critical rationalism. 83 Embodied in the latter conception is the notion of argument. 
Also embodied in it is the notion of mutual criticism and intersubjectivity. 84 These 
features are in some sense reminiscent of the concept of an "ideal speech situation". 
They seem to be epitomized in the spirit of concession as expressed by Popper in 
these terms: "I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we may get 
nearer to the truth". 85 Popper concludes that rationalism depends upon social 
institutions designed to protect the freedom of criticism. 86 
Merleau-Ponty's conception of "reasonableness"87 is akin in many respects to 
Habermas's. 88 What it entails is an endeavour to come by uncoerced agreement 
with others.through the medium of unrestricted dialogue.89 
80 Alexy op cit 163: "Perelman's agreement of the mriversal audience is Habennas's consensus 
arrived at llllder ideal conditions." 
81 Ibid: "The mriversal audience may ... be defined as the totality of human beings in the state in 
which they would find themselves if they were to develop their argumentational capabilities." 
82 Ibid160. 
83 See Karl R. Popper The Open Society and its Enemies (Vol In (1962) 225-38 et passim. 
84 Ibid 226-7 (Conceptual emphasis registered in text mine.) 
85 Ibid 238. 
86 Ibid. 
87 For an exposition of this conception, consult G.B. Madison The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity 
(1988)72. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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Apel purveys the notion of an "ideal communicative community".90 It is a 
presupposition of every act of communication. Yet its reference is to an ideal to 
which it is but possible to aspire. 91 
4.1.4 DISCOURSE ETHICS 
Habermas's principle of discourse ethics and the related principle of 
universalization express a procedural foundation for the justification of norms. 
They therefore function as "meta-norms". According to the principle of discourse 
ethics, "[ e ]very valid norm would meet with the approval of all concerned if they 
could take part in a practical discourse".92 The principle of universalization 
Habermas formulates in the following terms: "For a norm to be valid, the 
consequences and side effects that its general observance can be expected to have 
for the satisfaction of the particular interests of each person affected must be such 
that all affected can accept them freely". 93 At a subsequent point in his 
disquisition, he phrases the principle thus: "For a norm to be valid, the 
consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each 
person's particular interests must be acceptable to all".94 
Making clear that discourse ethics is of a procedural character and does not set up 
substantive claims, Habermas says: "Discourse ethics does not set up substantive 
orientations. Instead, it establishes a procedure based on presuppositions and 
90 Josef Bleicher notices this. See Bleicher op cit 151 . 
91 Ibid. For an interesting perspective on the critique of ideology as involving both "explanatory'' and 
"meaning-apprehending" components, one may refer to K.-0. Apel "Scientistics, Hermeneutics, 
Critique of Ideology: An Outline of a Theory of Science from an Epistomological-Anthropological 
Point of View" in Mueller-Vollmer op cit 321-345 passim, and, in particular, 338-341. 
92 See Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action op cit 121. 
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designed to guarantee the impartiality of the process of judging".95 He continues 
that the "procedure of discursive will formation" is to be distinguished from the 
"substantive content of argumentation. 96 Discourse ethics is thus a "procedure of 
moral argumentation". 97 It undertakes to ground moral norms in communication.98 
Habermas says of "practical discourse" that argumentation secures that "all 
concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a co-operative search for 
truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument. "99 He 
goes on to argue that practical discourse is a "warrant" of the correctness or fairness 
of normative agreement: 100 "Discourse can play this role because its idealized, 
partly counterfactual presuppositions are precisely those that participants in 
argumentation do in fact make." 101 
4.1.5 THE INTERNAL FORUM 
It seems that Habermas means his rationality to apply also to internal (private) 
cogitation. He accepts nevertheless that there are limitations to its appropriability 
in this respect: "Arguments played out in 'the internal forum' [i.e. set in the 'inner 
life of the psyche']... are not equivalents for real discourses that have not been 
carried out .... "102 Such arguments are "merely virtual events" which "in specific 
93 Ibid 120 (The emphasis is Habennas's). 
94 Ibid 197. 
95 Ibid 122 (emphasis Habermas's). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid 197 (my emphasis). 
98 Ibid195. 
99 Ibid 198 (emphasis mine). 
Ioo Ibid. 
IOI Ibid. 
102 See Jiirgen Habermas "Justice and Solidarity" in Milton Fisk (ed.) Justice (1993) 89 95 (The 
words "inner life of the psyche" are to be found at 94.) 
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. . 1 d h be . d " 103 Th. d crrcumstances, can sllllu ate a proce ure t at cannot came out . 1s oes 
not pose an insurmountable objection to their acceptability, he claims, when it is 
considered that actually occurring discourses themselves proceed "under limitations 
of time and space and social conditions that permit only an approximate fulfillment 
of the presuppositions, usually made counterfactuall y, of argumentation". 104 
4.2. ROBERT ALEXY 
A number of scholars have sought to build on Habermas's work. Thompson, for 
instance, lends some interesting perspectives to the programme as outlined.105 
Alexy, however, is of pre-eminent significance for us in this regard - since his 
labours are specifically geared to the formulation of a theory of legal 
argumentation. 
4.2.1 NORMS FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF NORMS 
Harnessing insights culled from much notable antecedent theorizing, Alexy arrives 
in the end at a detailed set of "meta-norms" for the orientation of discourse. In the 
frrst place, he sets out an enumeration of (advocated) conditions of "general 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 See John B. Thompson Critical Hermeneutics (1981) 173. 
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practical discourse". 106 Proceeding from this, he seeks to elicit an ensemble of 
procedural principles appropriate to the "special case" of "legal discourse" .107 
The "meta-norms" of the special case of legal discourse have a different 
formulation from that which they have in the case of general practical discourse. 
An important reason for this, one is given to consider, resides in the fact that law 
and legal dogmatics narrow down the range of application of practical discourse in 
legal reasoning. 108 
THE INTERNAL FORUM 109 
To the extent that legal justification is premised upon discourse and consensus of a 
hypothetical character, it implicates, for Alexy, a measure of uncertainty. 110 Yet it 
seems that he does not consider this to vitiate the utility of the "meta-norms" of 
discourse theory in the legal context. 111 It appears, upon his conception, that they 
do not cease for this reason to apply as criteria for the justification of first-order 
normative statements in law. 112 
106 For the "meta-nom1s" of "general practical discomse" as formulated by Alexy, consult Alexy op 
cit 297-300 (appendix). 
107 For the "meta-norms" of "legal discourse" as formulated by Alexy, see Alexy op cit 300-302 
}~~Al diX). b th 1 al di A~.W. fr al . al di . th . . exy o serves at eg scourse Ulllers om gener practtc scourse m e tmportant 
respect that is proceeds within the confines of the legal system. See Alexy op cit 212, 220 and 272. 
109 The term "internal fonnn" as used to designate the inner locus of private (mental) cogitation, as 
appears from the foregoing discussion, has been taken from Habennas. Once again, see Habermas 
"Justice and Solidarity" in Fisk op cit 89 95. See also 4.1.5., above. 
110 See Alexy op cit 294. 
111 Ibid. 
i 12 Ibid. 
110 
4.3. EVALUATION 
It requires no great insight to appreciate that the conception of the "ideal speech 
situation" may prove problematic of deployment in day-to-day legal argumentation. 
It is simply fraught with too many imponderables, representing, however otherwise 
Habermas may see it, a "detached" procedural-rational utility (at any rate for legal 
purposes). In colloquial discourse, actual or soWoquized, there are almost 
invariably factors operating to preclude an uncoerced consensus. External and 
internal discursive inhibitions as well as strategic manipulation of the 
communicational process113 by participants intent upon having their way speak very 
much against the possibility of dissipating distortions in communication. (The 
same remarks would seem to apply with respect to parallel notions advanced by 
Alexy.) 
But this much is not to argue that no variant on the Habermasian theme is deserving 
of consideration for our purposes. What we have to do in order to avoid an appeal 
to the will-o '-the-wisps of his design is to bring Habermas very much closer to the 
ground. We have to furnish him with a more tangible instrumentation. 
4.3.1 For the objectives of expiscating a substitute for a rule or principle no 
longer deemed worth of continued existence in the common-law context, the 
instrumentation in question is provided by translating Habermas's ideal of 
"communication free from domination" into the paradigm of "rational forensic 
113 See in this regard Habennas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action passim. 
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deliberation". 114 This paradigm represents a procedural rationality that is both 
contextualized and situated. 
For, after all, it is this mode of argumentation (the procedural rationality of the 
courtroom) in which the jurist has been nurtured. She appeals to its norms and 
standards by the very nature of things. We may say, then, that "rational forensic 
deliberation" represents an internalized legal-discursive model. 
The internalized structure of "rational forensic deliberation" relieves the jurist of 
having to appeal to the vague and indeterminate meta-norms of the "ideal speech 
situation". The point is that she already has a presuppositional basis for rule- or 
principle-selection. 
4.3.2 Where a rule or principle of customary law (in one or other of its mangled 
versions) speaks for a replacement, matters are otherwise. Since an entirely 
different cultural context is at issue, and since its worldview is so fundamentally at 
odds with the western equivalent, 115 it is submitted that there can be nothing to 
supplant "actual deliberation" among traditional experts and non-expert 
community assessors (sitting together with the judicial officer) as a means to 
finding a substitute rule or principle. Actual deliberation is not to be conceived as a 
construct. It is a reference to an actually occurring discourse. 
We see, then, that in the customary-law context, the variant on the Habermasian 
design presenting for appropriation is actual deliberation, real dialogue. It is 
114 This is a reference to the manner of arguing cases in court. "Rational forensic deliberation", 
miderstood thus, is a variant on the Habennasian theme, gromided in solidity. 
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important to note that where cherished organizational arrangements are at issue, it 
may not be indicated to follow Habermas in his intimation that a discourse should 
seek to detach itself from its localized particularity in quest of generalizability. For 
if a culture constitutes the locus of the self-identity of its members, it may be wise 
not to seek to disrupt its wholesome features in order merely to implement some 
more "generalized" norm or principle. 
It is submitted, therefore, that actual deliberation should be tied very closely to the 
localized particularity of the setting of legal adjudication in the indigenous-law 
context. 
With this exposition of critical argumentation, 116 we turn to consider the nature of 
the raw material upon which it is to work in the interests of adducing an apt rule- or 
principle-substitute. 
5. THE MATTER OF CONTENT 
Whereas the previous head (4) was concerned with procedure, what claims our 
attention here is substance. Our focus is shifted to the nature of the raw material 
from which a new rule or principle might be fashioned to take the place of the old. 
115 We deal with this matter in greater detail in Chapter V of this study, more particularly at 3. 
116 It may be of interest to note that Jackson ha<> sought to bring to bear upon the theory of 
argmnentation in law his particular version of Greimasian structuralist semiotics. For a 
controversial thesis, one might consult Bernard S. Jackson Semiotics and Legal Theory (1985) 
passim. Jackson's more recent thinking finds expression in Bernard S. Jackson's Making Sense in 
Law ( 1995 ), and Bernard S. Jackson Making Sense in Jurisprndence ( 1996). 
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Although Unger probably did not intend his work to be appropriated in quite the 
way it is in what follows, it is proposed to tap his insights to profit in relation to the 
issue as identified. Let us hear what he has to say. 
5.1 ROBERTO UNGER AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 
Unger conceives his version of critical legal scholarship as a means to the 
"disentrenchment" of the "formative contexts" of social life, such that these 
contexts will ever remain open to self-revision. 117 For him, "formative contexts" 
represent "frozen politics", 118 and the notions of "disentrenchment" and "negative 
capability" point the way to continued self-correction. 119 Disentrenched contexts 
are not so much weaker structures as frameworks embodying resources for their 
own differential reproduction. 120 
Unger considers conventional legal practice simply to confirm a given "formative 
context" in its own entrenchment. 121 He therefore ventures that an "expanded 
doctrine" ("enlarged doctrine") is essential to his project of an "empowered 
democracy". 122 This expanded or enlarged doctrine is continuous with 
conventional sources, but proceeds outwards ultimately in defiance of them. 123 
117 See R.M. Unger "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" 1983 96 Harvard Law Review (3) 563 
648-651. See also, incidentally, R. M. Unger Social Theory ( 1987) 156. 
118 See R. M. Unger "The Critical Legal Studies Movement'' 1983 96 Harvard Law Review (3) 563 
649. 
119 Ibid 650: "Disentrenchment means not permanent instability, but the making of structures that 
tum the occasions for their reproduction into opportmrities for their correction." As to the notion of 
"negative capability", see Ibid: "Negative capability is the practical and spiritual, individual and 
collective empowerment made possible by the disentrenchment of formative structures." 
120 See Ibid 651. 
121 This seems to be the tenor of the first part ofhis article. Ibid 563-586. 
122 Ibid 576ff. On p 592 is !>]>Oken of an "empowered democracy." 
123 Ibid 577-8 et passim. See, especially, 602ff. 
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What he speaks of as "deviationist doctrine" is here at issue. 124 Unger proposes that 
deviationist doctrine illustrates the "contentious internal development" of received 
doctrine and arrangements. 125 
Unger, as seen, speaks of an "enlarged" or "expanded" doctrine. As a proponent of 
critical legal scholarship, he seeks to broaden the ambit of "legitimate doctrinal 
activities". 126 He would therefore take "extant authoritative materials" as points of 
departure for an elaboration of the proposed "deviationist doctrine". 127 
"Deviationist doctrine" is thus predicated upon "internal development" .128 It 
premises itself upon what there is already. Aspects of the legal tradition which are 
partially submerged may be used as starting points for the construction of an 
alternative doctrine. 129 Thus is brought out Unger's disillusionment with 
mainstream legal scholarship. 
5.2. A NEW TWIST TO UNGER: "READY-MADE DEVIATIONIST DOCTRINE" 
Unger's conception of "deviationist doctrine" apparently embraces academic 
doctrinal elaborations taking as their premises those aspects of conventional legal 
doctrine which are normally submerged. It is avowedly "anti-utopian", in that it 
claims extant materials to constitute its supportive matrix, but it is nonetheless 
rarefied and rather indeterminate of denotation. For this reason, it is submitted that 
124 S . I ee artlc e, passim. 
125 Ibid 673. 
126 Ibid 577. 
127 Ibid 577 ff. 
128 Ibid 580 and 582. See in particular the discussion at 582. 
129 Ibid 618: "Though the counterprinciples may be seen as mere restraints upon the principles, they 
may also serve as points of departure for a different organizing conception of [a] whole area of law." 
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"deviationist doctrine", upon the Ungerian appropriation, represents too indistinct a 
source of reference to be employable upon a ready and easily defensible basis by 
the practising jurist. 
I have coined the term "ready-made deviationist doctrine" to signify something 
other than what Unger has in mind. By virtue of its semantic denotation 
exclusively (and not by reason of the specific meaning he attaches thereto), the term 
"deviationist doctrine" sounds as a fitting appellation by which to designate 
doctrinal replacements or substitutes. The circumstance that the term emanates 
from Unger is in some sense contingent: the simple fact is that it has the right ring. 
"Ready-made deviationist doctrine", as the phrase is used in this thesis, is to be 
appropriated as a reference to already existing doctrinal sources (even if such 
existence be but implicit) which provide the raw material for the fashioning of 
replacements or substitutes for legal rules or principles deemed unworthy of 
perpetuation. Our legal heritage, explicit and implicit, the norms of public 
international law, and comparable foreign materials count as among these sources. 
The "living" indigenous law, and the jural postulates underlying that law, are also 
to be ranked as "ready-made deviationist doctrine" (where the case implicates an 
indigenous-law context). 
The norms and standards of "ready-made deviationist doctrine" reqmre to be 
consistent with the "new hermeneutical awareness" (as actualized by the 
constitutional dispensation) if they are to serve as dispositive principles in the legal 
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forum. 130 Accordingly, only those which are imbued with a natural-law-type 
constituency131 should, I submit, be eligible for application. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
A (l) The "new hermeneutical awareness" provides a basis for legal-
ideological critique. It has a natural-law-type constituency. When 
this "awareness", which the jurist brings to bear upon her perception 
of a rule or principle, meets with opposition, one has to do with 
"dissonance" Elision of the rule or principle in question may then be 
indicated. 132 
(2) If the "new hermeneutical awareness" is properly honed, it should be 
capable of giving one to be able to discern whether an ostensibly 
innocuous rule or principle (one that is not "obdurate" on the face of 
it) should be jettisoned. An example is provided in the model. 133 
(3) The "new hermeneutical awareness" should further be capable of 
assessing whether a particular dispensation for which the law 
apparently does not make provision is in need of remedy. Two 
hypothetical cases are discussed in the model. 134 
130 It will be remembered that it is inconsistency with the "new henneneutical awareness" that 
prompts the rejection of a particular rule or principle. It should be obvious that it is to be required 
that a potential substitute be in conformity with this "awareness". 
131 The "new hermeneutical awareness", as explained under 3., above, has a natural-law-type 
constituency. 
132 See the exposition under 3. above. For the relevance of the matter under A( I) for our purposes, 
see Chapter VII, at I (4), in particular. 
133 In this regard, the reader is referred to Chapter VII of this study, under I (4)4.5. 
134 See, in this connection, Chapter VII of this thesis, under I (3)3.1. 
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B (1) The "new hermeneutical awareness" to be brought to bear upon the 
construction of indigenous-law sources is capable of full realization 
only from within the framework of reference of the autochthonous 
world-view. 135 (This explains why it is recommended that there be 
"community participation" in the taking of decisions.) 
This "new hermeneutical awareness" is called into being by the 
Constitution and its values - but as these are interpreted in their 
"proper cultural perspective" and in line with indigenous jural 
postulates. 136 The norms of public international law also go into the 
making of this "awareness". 137 These norms, however, are to be 
construed within the indigenous cultural context, 138 as it is 
submitted. 
(2) The "new hermeneutical awareness" to be brought to bear upon 
indigenous-law sources is, as it follows, 139 of a somewhat different 
complexion from that operative in dealing with common law (or 
statutes). 
135 This aspect is explored more fully in Chapter V ofthis study, wider 3. Consult Chapter VII, at II 
(2)(1). 
13 In Chapter V of this study, it is sought to substantiate this insight (wider 3.). 
137 Or so, at any rate, I would submit. This is because the value-order immanent in the Bill of Rights 
is defined to some extent with reference to the norms of public international law. See, again, section 
39(l)(b) of the Constitution. Consult Chapter VII, at II (2)(1). 
138 This submission imports that their appropriation should be context-sensitive. Consult Chapter 
VII, at II (2)( I). 
139 F rom B(I ), above. 
118 
(3) If this "awareness" (of an indigenous-law complexion) meets with 
opposition (in the form, say, of a distorted, text-book formulation of 
the law), one has to do with "dissonance". It may then be indicated 
to jettison the rule or principle in question. 
c (1) If a rule or principle of our law has been elided, something may 
require to be done in order to secure a replacement. 140 
(2) It should be endeavoured in eliciting such a replacement to establish 
some sort of "continuity" with our legal tradition. Recourse should 
therefore be had to what is already immanent in our legal tradition -
even if it does not fmd express formulation. 141 Seeking "continuity" 
on this basis speaks to approximately the same concerns as does 
Perelman's "principle of inertia". 
(3) The procedures implicit in "rational forensic deliberation"142 are to 
be deployed in order to identify an appropriate element of "ready-
made deviationist doctrine"143 to serve as a replacement. The 
doctrine latched upon would require to comport with the "new 
hermeneutical awareness" (and its implicit natural law). 144 What is 
said here (at C (3)) applies to the common law. 145 
140 See the discussion in the text, nnder 3., above. 
141 See the discussion of the cases in Chapter VII at I (4)4.4 in this regard. 
142 s th . . . th ee e exposition m e text, nnder 4.3.1., above. 
143 Refer to the text, mider 5.2., above. 
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(4) In the indigenous-law context, what is denoted by "actual 
deliberation" 146 is to be deployed to the end of identifying an 
appropriate element of "ready-made deviationist doctrine" to serve 
as a replacement. In this context, the "ready-made deviationist 
doctrine" to be seized upon is constituted of an appropriate amalgam 
of "living law" and indigenous jural postulates147 as established by 
means of "actual deliberation". 148 The dispositive precept would 
require to comport with the "new hermeneutical awareness" (of a 
somewhat different complexion from that operative in the common 
law). This differently constituted "awareness" is equally imbued 
with a natural-law-type constituency, however. 
D ln instances of "dissonance", it is more than likely that some sort of 
overruling of precedent cases will be necessary. In South Africa, as 
in England, 149 overruling is of retrospective effect. Lloyd and 
Freeman explain that retrospectivity implies that a prior decision 
found to be manifestly unjust or absurd is declared not merely to 
have been bad law, but not to have been the law at all. 150 
Prospectivity, on the other hand, refers (in its most straightforward 
sense) to the applicability of the rule to be jettisoned to the case at 
144 The jettisoned element of the legal tradition was expllllged by reason of its incompatibility with 
the "new hermeneutical awareness". It should not require stating that the element elected to serve as 
a substitute is to measure up to compatibility in this regard 
145 Consult Chapter VII, at I (4)4.2 (and 4.2.1) in this regard. 
146 s th . . . th ee e expositJ.on m e text, llllder 4.3.2., above. 
147 This aspect will be enlarged upon in Chapter VII of this study, at IL 
148 See Chapter VII, at II (I) 1.2 (and 1.2.1) in this connection. 
149 See D. Lloyd and M.D.A. Freeman Introduction to Jurisprudence (1979) 856. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid 857-9. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
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hand - with the substitute rule of novel conception declared as 
applicable to future instances of the same type. 151 Prospective 
ovenuling on this basis, Lloyd and Freeman observe, is not without 
· d 1s~ its raw backs, however. · ~ With this, one may note that certain 
variants on the theme have been proposed. 153 
There may be something to be said for the "prospective ovenuling" 
of precedent in one or other of its variants in a particular instance of 
"dissonance".154 Propriety in this regard is to be adjudged with 
reference to all the relevant circumstances. 
154 Consult Chapter VII, at I ( 4 )4. I in this regard. 
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IV 
THE "IDEALIZED MODEL" OF ADJUDICATION: AN APPRAISAL OF 
ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
David Kairys speaks of the "idealized model" of law-application. 1 Such a model presupposes, 
for one thing, that "the law on a particular issue is pre-existing, clear, predictable and available 
to anyone with reasonable legal skill". 2 For another thing, it assumes that ''the facts relevant to 
the disposition of a case are ascertained by objective hearing and evidentiary rules that would 
reasonably ensure that the truth will emerge".3 All that requires to be done in order to determine 
the outcome of the particular case is to apply the self-evident proposition of law to the facts as 
incontrovertibly established.4 Any reasonably competent and fair judge will arrive at the correct 
decision. 5 
The "idealized model" of adjudication evokes the image of the judge as an automaton. Upon its 
conception, she is to proceed much as might a properly programmed computer fed with all 
appropriate information. Yet, Kairys notes, it is this model (perhaps in a "softer" form to allow 
1 See David Kairys The Politics of Law ( 1982) 2. 
2 Ibid 1-2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid: "[T]he result in a particular case is determined by a rather routine application of the law to the :tacts .... " 
5Ibid: "[E]xcept for the occasional bad judge, any reasonably competent and fair judge will reach the 'correct' 
decision". It is of importance to note that Kairys himself opposes the assmnptions of the 'idealized model" of 
judging. 
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for the humanness of the judge6) which commands the general public perception.7 It is a 
comforting representation; for it depicts the judicial function as in alignment with the 
desideratum of fidelity to law in a manner most readily assimilable to popular appreciation. 
1.1. OBJECTNES OF THIS CHAPTER 
It is a proposed in the pages that follow to subject the "idealized model" of adjudication to 
analysis, and in that process to bring out its shortcomings. Such deficiencies as are identified as 
intrinsic to the conception are sought to be addressed with reference to what actually occurs in 
practice. 
In the light of insights pointed up by these practicalities, a more faithful portrayal of 
adjudication is provided. 8 This is done with a view to its incorporation in the theoretical 
disquisition furnished in Chapters VI and VII ofthis study. 
2. THE "IDEALIZED MODEL" CLOSELY EXAMINED 
It would be as well in introducing the discussion to look at the structure of the syllogism as 
suggestive of a hypothetico-deductive methodology of law-application. 
We may turn initially to consider the "aletheic syllogism": 
6 The observation enclosed in parentheses is mine. 
Allx are Y. 
x
1 is an x. 
x
1 is Y 
This is the major premise. 
This is the minor premise. 
(Conclusion) 
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This is the basic format of the Aristotelian syllogism. 9 It will be noticed that Hirsch's class-
instance model is very much in point. 10 In the above example, "x" represents a "class". Y is 
denotative of an attribute of that "class". The term "x1" stands for an "instance" of the "class" 
represented by "x". And from this we able to deduce (infer) that the quality denoted by Y 
inheres in x1. 
The major premise is established by way of induction. This means that in the light of the 
entirety of our prior experience 11 no instance of x has been found which does not bear the 
quality of Y. 
The minor premise is established by way of observation. It is an embodiment of a proposition 
which is considered to be self-evident. By virtue of one's familiarity with the class denoted by 
"x", one is in a position to claim that "x1'', is an instance of that class. 12 (This represents the 
process of subsumption.) 
7 See Kairys op cit 2. 
8 See under 3., below (Conclusions to this chapter). 
9 The Aristotelian syllogism is often exemplified as follows: All men are mortal (major premise) Socrates is a man 
(minor premise) Therefore: Socrates is mortal (conclusion). If xis taken to represent the class ''men'', Y the 
attribute of mortality, and xl Socrates, the symbolic format in the text is translatable into the above syllogism. 
10 See Chapter I, lUlder 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. for details. 
11 Of course, an exceptional instance may be chanced upon in our subsequent experience. Even a single exception 
would show the major premise to be false. Popper's work is important in this regard. See the writings of Popper as 
listed in the bibliography, and his scholarship generally. 
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The conclusion is established by way of deduction. Assuming the validity of the major and 
minor premises, it follows automatically that the instance "x 1" bears the attribute ofY. 
It is considered that Aristotle would have confmed the applicability of the "aletheic syllogism" 
to the natural world. Let us turn our attention to the variant of the syllogism that may be taken 
as applicable in the legal setting. 
If p then q (Major premise) 
p (Minor premise) 
:. q (Conclusion) 
This is what is spoken of as the "normative syllogism". For purposes of this discussion, the 
major premise represents a proposition of law, and the minor premise one of fact. 
To establish the major premise, one has merely to find the appropriate rule or principle of law in 
the authoritative sources, or, if necessary, to distil such from case-law precedents by way of 
induction. 
In our example, the major premise, "If p then q", is the pertinent proposition oflaw. The term 
"p" stands for the operative facts, and the term "q" for the legal consequences. Such is the 
structure of the majority of legal rules or principles: if such and such are the facts (p), then the 
legal consequences will be thus and so (q). (Such a formulation, it must be noted, captures 
12 Seeing that one has been exposed to many books (the "class"), one is able to say that this particular "object' is an 
"instance' of the "class", that is, is a book. 
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"prescriptive" legal rules and principles, not their "descriptive" counterparts. A rule to the 
effect that "a minor is a person under age x", for instance, is not capable of being 
accommodated within its symbolic schematic.) 
The minor premise, being a proposition of fact, is elicited by way of techniques and methods 
sanctioned by the law of evidence. 
Deduction is at issue where it is found that the minor premise, in the example above, is indeed 
represented by "p". In that event, it would mean that the designated legal consequences (q) are 
to be implemented. 
It is observed that the "idealized model" of adjudication partakes very much of the character of 
what might be termed the "rigid normative syllogism" .13 (Some scholars contend, however, that 
the greater part of legal reasoning proceeds along the lines of the "enthymeme" or ''rhetorical 
syllogism". 14 This means that the operative reasoning is non-syllogistic, 15 but is merely 
subsequently forced into the semblance of a syllogism.) 
As will be seen in the course of this essay, we elect to abide with notions of the "normative 
syllogism" and "subsumption". But the "rigid normative syllogism" is rejected out of hand. 
The latter construct is incapable of accommodating the evaluative dimension of legal 
argumentation. 
13 This is my coinage. 
14 In some such vein as this, Farrar proposes that legal reasoning is in its essence practical reasoning. See John H. 
Farrar Introduction to Legal Method ( 1977) 51 - 2. 
126 
2.1. THE NEED FOR INTERPRETATION 
Thus far, the discussion under 2. has assumed the brute givenness of legal propositions and 
operative facts 16 . This has been done for the sake of simplifying the argument at its outset. In 
order to bring the exposition more into line with the actualities of adjudication, it is necessary to 
suggest certain corrective qualifications. These relate most notably to the question of 
interpretation. 
Suppose that we have a legal rule, "If p then q". Such a rule does not exist in uninterpreted 
form. It requires construction. By the same token, the facts brought to light in terms of the law 
of evidence are not uninterpreted data. It is only when both the law and the facts have been 
properly construed that the "normative syllogism" is amenable to activation (or inactivation), 
and the process of subsumption set in motion (or stultified). This will become clearer in due 
course. 17 
Chapter IT of this study has shown that the normative text (in which the legal precept 
expressible as "If p then q" is embodied) does not bear a determinate meaning which is forever 
stable. 18 The positivist presuppositions of any such idea falter when it is considered that the 
"meaning" of that text is dependent upon the interpreters's "prejudice-horizon" and the 
15 See, in this regard, William Zelermyer Legal Reasoning (1960) 4: "[l]f logic enters the picture it comes in 
incidentally and not deliberately''. Note, further, the classic dictmn of Oliver Wendell Holmes as cited in Richard 
A. Wasserstrom The Judicial Decision (1961) 16: "[T]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience". 
16 See, in particular, the conclusicms to this chapter, ooder 3., below, at A for criticism of this view. 
17 The conclusions, ooder 3., below, are once again indicated for consultation, particularly at C (1)-(4). 
18 See Chapter II of this study, especially, ooder 3.4.8., dealing with the "IDldecidabilitythesis". 
127 
"question" she puts to the text out of "claim of the now", out of the problem with which her 
resources are confronted. 19 In different contexts, the same normative text would "mean" 
different things. (We have seen how this implies that the distinction between "meaning" and 
"significance" breaks down.20) 
The "meaning" that emerges in the hermeneutical process is not something actively pursued. It 
is rather a matter thrusting itself upon the interpreter, so to speak. She is confronted with a 
"meaning" which is a function of her "pre-understanding" and the "question" she must 
inevitably put to the text by reason of the problem pressing for its resolution.21 (Endowed with a 
"pre-understanding" of a different constitution, or faced with a problem of a different order, the 
interpreter would be confronted with a different "meaning".) 
That the "meaning" of the normative text cannot be fixed once and for all is implied in 
Gadamer' s "undecidability" thesis. 22 The text does not have a meaning "in itself' independently 
of any interpretive context.23 The Hirschean programme loses much of its force when 
confronted with this consideration. That is why the conception of a pre-existing legal precept to 
be found "out there", somehow, in a pre-interpretive form, which Hirsch's model would seem to 
sponsor, does not appear well-founded. 
19 See Chapter II, generally. 
20 See, in this regard,, Chapter II, under 3 .4. 7., settmg out a rejection of the dichotomous perception of "meanmg" 
and "significance". See, further, 3.4.8., describing the "undecidability" thesis. 
21 For an exposition of these issues, see Chapter II passim. 
22 On . ce agam, refer to Chapter II, under 3.4.8. 
23 It is Hirsch's view that "meanmg" somehow resides "in" the text. He is therefore to be classified as a 
hermen~ut:ical realist. It will be recalled that, for Hirsch, "meanmg" cannot transcend the semantic possibilities of 
the symbols employed. See E.D. Hirsch The Aims of Interpretation ( 1976) 87. Ccmsult, further, the discussion in 
Chapter II of this study, under 4.2. 
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It is for this reason that the normative syllogism resists deployment along mechanical lines. The 
major premise is not "out there", patiently awaiting the jurist's appropriation thereof. Nor, for 
that matter, is the minor premise a recalcitrant, brute datum. What are to count as the "facts" is 
a matter of interpretation no less than the question as to what is to be accounted the legal 
precept. It is the selfsame pre-understanding which informs the understanding of the normative 
text that is involved in the processing of the "facts". The "facts" are understood as such in 
virtue ofthis pre-understanding. 
2.2 PERCEPTIONS IN TIDS VEIN AS REGISTERED BY LEGAL SCHOLARS 
Just in case the insights as expressed above seem eccentric or counterintuitive, it is necessary to 
record the views of scholars of eminent standing tending to their confirmation. The "idealized 
model" of adjudication bolsters public confidence in the administration of justice, seeing that it 
is popularly considered that is on the strength of its underlying assumptions that the rule of law, 
understood as fidelity to legal precept, is upheld.24 It has been seen, however, in the course of 
Chapter II of this study, that fidelity to law does not imply automaticity, and that it is most 
sensibly conceptualized in terms of the notion of "purposiveness".25 This point will receive 
further clarification in the course of the present chapter.26 
For the moment, it is sought to be content with an exposition of the perspectives of legal 
scholars having a bearing upon the discussion under 2. and 2.1, above. 
24 See this chapter, llllder I., above (the introduction). 
25 See Chapter II, llllder 5 (treating of fidelity to law and responsiveness). 
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Varga argues that the "ideal of logical deducibility" is at a remove from the reality of judicial 
decision-making. 27 Holmes 's dictum to the effect that the life of the law has not been logic so 
much as experience, she reflects, militates against the relegation of the administration of justice 
to an exercise of a mere mechanical order.28 Herz claims, in keeping with this, that the 
proposition that "the greater includes the lesser", though sounding right, is in law only 
sometimes true.29 That evaluative elements enter into the constitution of the judicial decision 
over and above stringent ones seems to be implicit in Herz' s repudiation of the formula as a 
magic solvent of difficulties. 30 
Alexy cites Larenz to the effect that one can no longer seriously maintain that law-application is 
simply an exercise of subsumption "under abstractly formulated major premises". 31 
Kelsen, likewise, is astute enough to perceive the vacuity of any version of the 'idealized 
model" of law-application: "the individualization of a general norm by a judicial decision is 
always a determination of elements which are not yet determined by the general norm and 
which cannot be completely determined by it".32 This is a tacit disavowal of the possibility of 
reasoning in the legal forum from antecedently available premises. 
26 See the present chapter passim, and particularly llllder 3., the conclusions. 
27 See Csaba Varga "Heterogeneity and Validity of Law: Outlines of an Ontological Reconstruction" in 
C.Varga(ed.) Law and Philosophy (1994) 209 213. 
28 See Csaba Varga "Macrosociological Theories of Law: A Survey and Appraisal" in C.Varga op cit 43 54. 
29 See Michael Herz "Justice Byron White and the Arglllllent that the Greater includes the Lesser" 1994 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 227 227. 
30 Ibid passim. 
31 See Robert Alexy A Theory of Legal Argumentation ( 1989) 1. Ibid: "This observation by Karl Larenz marks 
one of the few points of agreement in contemporary discussions of legal methodology". 
32 See Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law and State ( 1961) 146. 
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Tur states Kelsen's position to be that a "general norm" laid down by the legislature is 
"incomplete".33 It is brought to refinement and completion in its application to specific 
situations. 34 
Bentham espoused the "idealized model" of adjudication. On Berger's account, Bentham 
considered that legal problems would automatically find their resolution upon application of the 
provisions of the law, if set out in the definitive language of codification. 35 This was Bentham 
the legal positivist. 
Berger relates that history has demonstrated the falsity of Bentham's assumptions.36 The French 
experience gives the lie to any belief that judges can read off solutions to problematic instances 
without creative involvement.37 Judicial evaluation is integral to the legal-hermeneutical 
enterprise, something which apparently eluded Bentham. 
Fuller presses the argument that no statute emanates from the legislature in a fully "made" 
form. 38 A rule of law prohibiting vehicles in the park, for example, stands in need of 
interpretation. 39 Evaluation is necessary. For the jurist is not to be guided simply by the 
33 See Richard Tur "Positivism, Principles and Rules" in Elspeth Attwooll(ed.) Perspectives in Jurisprudence 
(1977) 42 64. 
34 Ibid: "In its application to the fact-situations of concrete cases [the general norm] is refined and completed". 
35 See Michael Berger "Codification" in Attwooll op cit 142 144 -5. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid: "[T]he experi~ce of the French codes, and particularly that of the French civil code, shows that their 
success owes a greater deal to the continuing creativity of the judges entrusted with the interpretation of their 
provisions". 
38 See Lon L. Fuller Anatomy of the Law (1968) 59 et passim. 
39 Ibid 58. 
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wording. 40 She must have regard, too, to some notion of "what is fit and proper to come into a 
park".41 
Nerhot points to the inadequacies of the "idealized model" a flaw-application when he dismisses 
as na'ive the notion that legal rule and fact "are supposed to be presented, fully elaborated, to an 
interpreter, who has only to fit them together in order to be able to lay down the law".42 
Alf Ross suggests that it is apparently a "universal phenomenon to pretend" that law-application 
is a matter oflogical deduction from juridical precepts pure and simple.43 Evaluation on the part 
of the judge is implicated.44 Dias is to the same effect: ''Nothing could be further from the truth 
than the belief that judges simply apply laws".45Evaluative considerations are operative in the 
adjudicative proce~s.46 
It is when one begins to consider the pervasiveness of reasoning by analogy47 in the law that the 
"idealized model" of adjudication first threatens to falter. The model at issue is premised on 
inductive and deductive reasoning exclusively. But these types of reasoning avowedly ignore 
the role of evaluation in the legal process. It is in analogical reasoning that evaluation in law 
poses itself as a force ofmoment.48 
40 Ibid 59. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Patrick Nerhot 'The Law and its Reality" in P. Nerhot (ed.) Law, Interpretation and Reality (1990) 50 52. 
43 See AlfRoss On Law and Justice (1974) 154. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See R W.M. Dias Jurisprudence (1976) 293. 
46 Ibid: "The very nature of the process imports choice and discretion which are guided by values". 
47 See Peter Goodrich Reading the Law ( 1986) 77: "Analogy ... plays a pervasive ... role in legal reasoning and legal 
justificatory argument." 
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Hahlo and Kahn describe analogical reasoning as "an imperfect form of induction from one 
particular to an adjacent one".49 It involves, says Goodrich, the "predication of a relevant 
similarity between the precedent and instant cases". 50 He continues that evaluation is essential 
to the drawing of analogies. 51 
Cairns claims that it is only very exceptionally that the solution to a juridical dilemma would 
hinge upon a purely logical argument. 52 Devenish notices consistently herewith that juridical 
reasoning involves a "deontic element".53 This implicates evaluation in the ethical and moral 
sense. 
54 
Cockrell draws attention to Dugard's critique of the judiciary under the old order;55 judges 
conceived their interpretive function in very narrow terms. 56 This was a "mechanical" or 
"phonographic" conception,57 downplaying the role of legal values in interpretation.58 
Cowen in the same spirit registers his agreement with Dugard that statutory interpretation 
cannot proceed on the lines of an algorithm. 59 
48 Ibid. 
49 See H.R Hahlo and E.Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background ( 1968) 308. 
~ . 
See Peter Goodrich Reading the Law (1986) 77. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See Hlllltington Cairns Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (1967) 14- 15. 
53 See G .E. Devenish "The Nature of Legal Reasoning involved in the lnteipretation of Statutes" 1991 Stell LR(2) 
224 235. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Alfred Cockrell "Rainbow Jurisprudence" 1996 12 SAJHR (I) 7-8. 
56 Ibid 8. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See D.V. Cowen "The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of 'The Intention of the Legislature"' Casebook 
for the Interpretation of Statutes (Unisa) ( 1986) 100 115. 
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With this we may note with Dlamini that legal positivism has helped to sustain the myth that the 
courts function mechanically (especially in the enterprise of statutory interpretation). 60 
These reflections, it is submitted, are enough to support the contentions raised earlier bearing 
adversely on the representative accuracy and quality of the "idealized model" of judging. What 
has perhaps not been brought to the fore in quite the requisite degree, however, is the negation 
of a categorical disunion of "law" and "facts" that is implied in the repudiation of the "idealized 
model". It is to this matter, then, that we now turn. 
2.2.1. THE DISJUNCTION OF "LAW" AND "FACTS" RELATIVIZED 
Zaccaria speaks of the relativization of the distinction commonly erected as between the 
"quaestio iuris" and the "quaestio facti". 61 Rigaux similarly contends it to be misguided to 
conceive of an absolute disjunction of "pure normativity" from "the reassuring coarseness of 
facts". 62 
Kaufmann's conception oflaw-application is instructive in this regard. In practical lawyering, 
what is required is, on the one hand, a "construction of the case'', and, on the other, an 
"interpretation of the norm". 63 In the "construction of the case", the essentials of the case are 
worked out in the light of the norm. In this way is produced a Sachverhalt, a "legally relevant 
60 See A.M. Dlam:ini "Is there a Literal Interpretation in Law?" 1991 6 SAPL ( 1) 16 30. 
61 See G.Zaccaria "Henneneutics and Narrative Comprehension" in P.Nerhot (ed.) Law, Interpretation and Reality 
(1990) 251 272. 
62 See. F. Rigaux "The Concept of Fact in Legal Science" in Nerhot op cit 38 39. At 46, Rigaux exclaims that "the 
fact is inseparable from the single legal description that necessarily belongs with it. Accordingly, the distinction 
between fact and law must be judged as artificial .... " 
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case". 64 In the "interpretation of the norm", what is required is its concretization in the light of 
the case at hand. The product is a Tatbestand, a "normative framework that can accommodate 
reality". 65 
It is of importance to note that, for Kaufmann, the "construction of the case" and the 
"interpretation of the norm" are not consecutive in point of time. 66 They "coincide in a relation 
of mutual conditioning".67 What is accomplished is a "correspondence" of case and norm 
speaking to a Sachverhalt and a Tatbestand. 68 
Nerhot asserts in this vein that "the assignment of meaning to a legal text and its application to a 
specific case" constitute a "unitary process".69 
Varga proposes conformably that legal reasoning does not proceed in essentials from "some 
formally ambiguous deductive subsumption" (emphasis added).70 The "decisive moment" is 
represented rather by the formulation of the major and minor premises (propositions 
respectively of "law" and "fact") in the "concrete-sociological-situation of law-application"71 
(that is, I submit, the concrete-existential context). 
-------~-··------------~----·· ----
63 See Arthur Kaufinann "Preliminary Remarks on a Legal Logic and Ontology of Relations" in Nerhot op cit 104 
111. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See Patrick Nerhot "Interpretation in Legal Science: The Notion of Narrative Coherence" in Nerhot op cit 193 
214. 
10 See Csaba Varga "Law as a Social Issue" in C. Varga Law and Philosophy (1994) 459 463 - 4. 
71 Ibid. 
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Let us tie together these thoughts with the insight of phenomenological hermeneutics that 
application is integral to the interpretation of a legal rule or principle. Goodrich claims it to be 
"meaningless" to speak of the sense of a rnle or principle in abstraction from "the moment and 
situation of its application" in a court judgment. 72 
2.2.2. THE "PRE-UNDERSTANDING" AS MAKING FOR NORM-FACT COINCIDENTATION 
The substance of Chapter II of this study was devoted in a very large measure to the analysis of 
the fore-structuration of understanding. 73 In order to understand something, it is necessary that 
one be equipped with a "frame of reference" by which such understanding may be oriented. 
Simply put, meaning-apprehension requires some prior appropriation of the subject-matter at 
issue, in a word, a "pre-understanding". 
The ''tradition" of appropriation of any given subject-matter constitutes the source of those ''pre-
understandings" which make possible, and condition the quality of, meaning-apprehension 
within a specific context.74 Implied in this observation is the fact that "pre-understandings" are 
socially conditioned. In the sphere of law, the academic and practical training of the jurist, as 
also her experience as a participant in social life, go into the making of her juridical "pre-
understandings". 
72 See Goodrich Reading the Law op cit 159 - 60. 
73 See Chapter II, generally, and, in particular, the discussion under 3.4.4. 
74 See Chapter II, lillder 3.4.5., especially. 
136 
In reading a legal provision, the jurist is already conceptualizing concrete situations to which it 
apparently is of application. And this she does on the basis of a "preliminary understanding" of 
that provision - a "pre-understanding". 
The "pre-understanding" in question makes possible a sort of "pattern-matching" of the 
hypothetical concrete situations the jurist has in mind and any real concrete situations with 
which she may be confronted. The "ought" (the norm) and the "is" (the facts), which, by reason 
of their functioning at different levels, would otherwise be entirely incommensurable, lend 
themselves to "coincidentation"75 upon the strength of a socially-conditioned "pre-
understanding". 
2.2.3. "NARRATIVE MODELS" OF TYPIFICATIONS OF ACTION, LOADED 
WITH TACIT SOCIAL EVALUATIONS 
Nerhot claims that to understand a legal text is to represent situations to oneself upon the basis 
of its reading.76 A "quasi-identification" with the "facts" as presented is possible by virtue of 
this representation of situations. 77 
75 I take the term "coincidentation" from Arthur Kaufinann "Preliminary Remarks on a Legal Logic and Ontology 
of Relations" in Nerhot op cit I 04 111 - 2. 
76 See Patrick Nerhot "Interpretation in Legal Science: The Notion of Narrative Coherence" in Nerhot op cit 193 
220. 
77 Ibid 222. It is possible that Nerhot takes the tenn "quasi-identificatioo" from Ricoeur. Nerhot continues (at 
222): "Understanding a text, interpreting, is bound up with the representation of reality; a mimetic activity, as 
Ricoeur says, insofar as it produces something, namely specifically the arrangement of facts through their being 
fitted into the plot". 
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Jackson proposes, in substantially the same vem, that the understanding of abstract legal 
propositions and conceptions proceeds by way of subconscious narrative models of typifications 
of action and our reactions to them. 78 The particular explicit narrative of the minor premise is 
subsumed within the legal proposition at hand by virtue of a perception of sufficiency of 
similarity. 79 Jackson advances herewith that "the narrative construction of fact [in the 
courtroom] is compared with the narrative model underlying the (often conceptually expressed) 
rule of law to be applied". 80 (emphasis added) 
It is to be considered, in the light of these reflections, that the conception of a ''pre-
understanding" (alternatively, a ''prejudice-horizon") may be taken as synonymous in principle 
with what Jackson refers to as a "narrative model of typifications of action, loaded with tacit 
social evaluations". 
2.2.4 THE "NORMATIVE SYLLOGISM" AND "PURPOSIVENESS" 
So we see that underlying any legal proposition of a prescriptive sort is a "narrative model" of 
typifications of action, loaded with tacit social evaluations. This is more or less what Gadamer 
would refer to as a ''pre-understanding". It informs the jurist's perception of the "norm" and 
the "arrangement of facts", 81 organizing them into a stable configu,ration (Gestalt) of "legal 
78 See Bernard S. Jackson "The Normative Syllogism and the Problem of Reference" in Nerhot op cit 379 396. 
79 Ibid 397. 
80 Ibid 399. 
81 I take the conception of an "arrangement of facts" from P. Nerhot "Interpretation in Legal Science: the Notion of 
Narrative Coherence" in Patrick Nerhot (ed.) Law, Interpretation and Reality (1990) 193 222. My appropriation of 
this conception seems to be somewhat at odds with Nerhot's use of the term. 
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norm" and "legal facts". 82 It is on the basis of this Gestalt that the "normative syllogism' is 
activated, alternatively inactivated. 
Now, read with the proper "purpose", and looked upon in the light of the "context of social 
realities" (to which context such "purpose" subsumes a commitment), the legal proposition 
concerned may be rendered open to conceptualization from an "adjusted prejudice-horizon" (to 
perception by way of a novel ''pre-understanding"). This may give the evaluative dimension of 
the "narrative model "83 underlying the proposition to undergo an adjustment. In this event, the 
"norm" and the "arrangement of facts" would be organized into a new stable configuration 
(Gestalt/4 of "legal norm" and "legal facts". This is as much as to say that subsumption may 
variously take its course or be precluded where the converse was the position formerly. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
A (1) The "idealized model" of adjudication found an esteemed exponent in the persona of 
Pollock. Pollock registered the assumption that the "same decision always happens on 
the same facts". 85 Goodhart, in explicating Pollock's standpoint, spoke of the 
determination of a dispute in a way that might have been predicted in advance. The law 
reports, so it was contended, provide the material for such prediction. 86 
82 I have come by the notion of a "stable configuration" or "Gestalt" as here employed on the basis of Jackson's 
exposition of the work ofJ.B. Best in B.S. Jackson Making Sense in Jurisprodence ( 1996) 154. 
83 We have seen that Jackson speaks of a "narrative model of typifications of action, loaded with tacit social 
evaluations". By reason of this qualitative ladenness, it appears to me legitimate to write of the "evaluative 
dimension" of such a "narrative model". 
84 See n82, above. 
85 See Sir Frederick Pollock 'Tue Science of Case Law" in F. Pollock and A.L. Goodhart (ed.) Jurisprudence and 
Legal Essays (1963) 169 171. 
86 See A.L. Goodhart in Pollock and Goodhart op cit xxxii (Introduction) 
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It has been made plain in the course of this chapter that the sort of "slot-machine 
jurisprudence" which these views tend to suggest is not, and cannot be, reflective of the 
judicial function. Levi, for one, imports that the idea that the law is a system of 
antecedently available rules which are applied by a court is a "pretence". 87 The rules, he 
proceeds, undergo modification with their application. 88 
Jensen, for another, proposes that legal reasoning, though cast in the mould of inference, 
scarcely ever partakes in essence of inferential processes.89 
(2) With this it is proposed90 that syllogistic subsumption under known rules along 
mechanical lines fails to capture the kernel of law-application. Lubowski implicitly 
impugns the credentials of this way oflooking at things - as expressed in the "idealized 
model" of adjudication.91 
B One should add, perhaps, that the "idealized model" also fails to reckon with the 
contingency of the absence of a clear and unmistakably self-evident rule or principle to 
govern the case. In such an instance, the major premise of the normative syllogism 
being a matter for discovery, second-order justification would be required.92 
87 See E.H. Levi An Introduction to Legal Reasoning ( 1949) 3 - 4. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See O.C. Jensen The Nature of Legal Argument (1957) 1. 
90 B th . that. y e present wnter, is. 
91 See A.Lubowski "Democracy and the Judiciary'' in H. Corder (ed.) Democracy and the Judiciary (1989) 13 14. 
92 See D. Neil MacCormickLegal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 101 ff. 
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C ( 1) The "pre-understanding" the jurist brings to bear upon her perception of a legal provision 
is the operative factor in making for the activation, alternatively the inactivation, of the 
normative syllogism. Spoken of also as a "prejudice-horizon" or a "narrative model" (of 
typifications of action, loaded with tacit social evaluations), it informs the jurist's 
understanding both of the "norm" and of the "arrangement of facts" presenting for 
disposition. 93 
(2) "Pre-understandings" are socially conditioned. In the sphere of law, the academic and 
practical training of the jurist, as also her experience as a participant in social life, go into 
the making of her juridical "pre-understandings". One may say, then, that ''pre-
understandings"94 have an evaluative dimension. 
(3) In informing the jurist's perception of the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts", the 
"pre-understanding" organizes them into a stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal 
norm" and "legal facts". It is on the basis of this Gestalt that the "normative syllogism" 
is activated, alternatively inactivated.95 
( 4) Now, if the legal provision is read with the right "purpose" (as informed, among other 
things, by the spirit of the Constitution), and looked upon in the light of the "context of 
social realities" (to which context that "purpose" subsumes a commitment), the 
provision in question may be rendered open to conceptualization from an "adjusted 
93 s th dis . ee e cuss1on nnder 2.2.2., above. 94 See the discussion under 2.2.2., above. 
91 s th di . 
· ee e scuss10n under 2.2.4., above. 
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prejudice-horizon" - or, otherwise stated, to perception by way of a novel "pre-
understanding". We have seen, under C(2), above, that "pre-understandings" have an 
evaluative dimension. Accordingly, the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" 
underlying the provision would undergo adjustment. In such a case, the "norm" and the 
"arrangement of facts" would organize themselves into a new stable configuration 
(Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal facts". And subsumption would occur where 
previously it did not - or would be precluded where formerly it took its course.96 
D It is now appropriate to embrace the opportunity of exemplifying these insights. Let us 
assume the existence of a prohibition reading that dogs are not to be brought into the 
park.97 To it we shall refer as the "norm". Suppose, further, a tame cheetah to be left 
prowling in the park, whether or not on a leash. To this we shall refer as the 
"arrangement of facts" (or the ''unprocessed facts"). 
It is obvious that the application of the "rigid normative syllogism" would preclude 
subsumption. A cheetah is simply not a dog. The bye-law, upon this conception, would 
be inapplicable to the case at hand. 
But this would be a disposition suitable only to a mechanical jurisprudence. The "pre-
understanding" brought to bear upon the perception of the "norm" in the event of 
acceding to this sort of logomachy would be that of a socially-conditioned literalism. 
96 For the relevance of the discussion mider C (I) - ( 4) for our purposes, the reader is referred to Chapter VI, at III 
(2) and Chapter VII, at I (2)(5) - (7). 
97 This is an adapted version of an illustration furnished in G.E. Devenish "The Nature of Legal Reasoning involved 
in the Interpretation of Statutes" 1991 Stell LR (2) 224 227. 
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If approached with the appropriate sort of "purpose" - which is sensitive to the "context 
of social realities" - the bye-law would lend the evaluative dimension of the "narrative 
model" underlying it to undergo an "adjustment". This would mean that the evaluative 
dimension of the "pre-understanding" which the jurist brings to bear upon her perception 
of the "norm" takes on a new character. 
The novel "pre-understanding" ("narrative model") would organize the "norm" and the 
"arrangement of facts" (unprocessed "facts") into a new stable configuration (Gestalt) 
of "legal norm" and "legal facts", such that the normative syllogism would be 
activated and subsumption given to take its course. The person allowing the cheetah to 
prowl in the park will be convicted of transgressing the bye-law. 
It is to be observed that, in accordance with this axiologically more satisfactory 
approach, the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" are interpreted in a one-step 
operation. There is no brain-racking work to be performed concerning the meaning of 
the word "dog" in the major premise (the "norm") or the taxonomic status of a "cheetah" 
in the minot premise (the "arrangement of facts"). 
In the following chapter, we are specifically concerned with what axiological adequacy 
commands in virtue of the Grundnorm-order established by the Constitution. Among the 
matters discussed is the quality of the "purpose" which the jurist is to bring to bear upon her 
perception of a legal provision. This is most decidedly an issue about which the Constitution 
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has something to say. And we shall also see how the "context of social realities" (to which 
"purpose" is committed) is to be conceptualized in the light of constitutionalism. 
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v 
THE NEW GRUNDNORM-ORDER: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Thus baldly stated, the title of this chapter is likely to sound presumptuous. The 
ramifications into forensic argument of the new Grundnorm-order are probably so many, 
so great a horde, that any attempt to define them within the compass of a single chapter in 
an academic treatise would be susceptible to a response of bemused sympathy for a 
pathetic naivete. In defence of the undertaking, it is noted that what is here sought to be set 
forth are the specifically jurisprudential, or legal-philosophical, implications of the new 
Grundnorm-order for legal argumentation, and nothing of the detail or particulars. 
In this chapter we are principally interested in illuminating the influence of the 
Constitution on the "purpose" which the jurist brings to bear upon her perception of the 
law. And since that "purpose" subsumes a commitment to the "context of social realities", 1 
we are at the same time interested in discerning the lines along which the latter context is 
to be conceptualized. The insights acquired in pursuance of these objectives find their 
enumeration in the conclusions to this chapter.2 
1 For a prefigurative account of "purpose" as committed to the "context of social realities'', see Chapter IV of 
this study under 2.2.4. and 3. (the latter being the conclusions to the chapter). See also Chapter II, llllder 6.E. 
(of the conclusions). 
2 See the conclusions at 4., below. 
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In view of the consideration that western law and indigenous law go out from entirely 
different premises,3 it seems fitting to discuss the subject-matter of this chapter as it 
pertains to their respective spheres under different heads. Concordantly, the concluding 
observations registered in this chapter bear a different complexion in accordance with 
whether they treat of western law or indigenous law.4 
2. THE SPHERE OF WESTERN LAW 
Here one is concerned with legislation and with the Roman-Dutch and English constituents 
of our legal heritage, as amplified by case-law authority. The jurisprudential implications 
of the new Grundnorm-order for legal argumentation in this sphere now serve for 
discussion. 
2.1 THE GRUNDNORM 
Kruger identified as the Grundnorm of Chapter III of the Interim Constitution the notion of 
a "democracy based on freedom and equality". 5 The parallel notion of an "open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" suggests itself as the 
Grundnorm of the legal dispensation ushered in by the Final Constitution.6 
3 See, in this regard, G.J. van Niekerk The Interaction of Indigenous Law and Western Law in South Africa: 
A Historical and Comparative Perspective (tmpublished LL.D. thesis) (1995) 168: "Indigenous laws are 
underscored by wholly different jural postulates. Indigenous starting points for legal reasoning are different 
and this makes the conceptions of law and justice in an indigenous context very different to the Western 
conceptions". 
4 See the conclusions under 4., below. 
5 Chapter III of the Interim Constitution was the Bill of Rights. For an exposition of the Grundnorm of 
Chapter III as Johan Kruger perceived it to be, see J. Kruger "Is Interpretation a Question of Common Sense? 
Some Reflections on Value Judgments and Section 35" 1995 28 CILSA (1) I l 5ff. 
6 Tiris is my own observation, based on Kruger's exposition. 
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Constitutional interpretation, it seems, is at bottom concerned with making choices on the 
basis of those express and implicit values which are integral to this notion. These values 
lend themselves to sharper definition (and perhaps amplification) when seen in the light of 
the nonns of public international law, which the court is obliged to consider in interpreting 
the Bill of Rights. 7 It may accordingly be ventured that the new Grundnorm has been 
defined to some extent with reference to international-law standards. 
Since these standards are assumed to reflect a more or less universal acceptation, they 
constitute, or may be deemed to constitute, a type of natural law. Recourse to comparable 
foreign law, on the authority of the permissive stipulation contained in section 39(1)(c),8 
may render this natural law easier of appropriation in some degree. The universal 
"communis opinio populi", so far as ascertainable, may be taken as a criterion of 
axiological adequacy in the law. 
Seeing that all law is to comport with the Grundnorm, every legal precept is in principle 
measurable for compliance with the postulates of the natural law described. 
2.2 THE GRUNDNORM AND NATURAL LAW 
Botha advances that the notion of the material Rechtsstaat refers to a political order 
committed to a "system of fundamental values". 9 This is substantially what the 
Constitution is designed to implement10 - as with written constitutions the world over. 
7 See section 39 (1 )(b) of the Final Constitution (Act l 08of1996). 
: See this stipulation in Act 108 of 1996 (the Final Constitution). 
See C.J. Botha Statutory Interpretation (1996) 14. 
10 Together with an infrasbuctme providing for the separation of powers, checks and balances, and the 
principle oflegality, among other things perhaps. See Botha lac cit. 
147 
Boulle, Hoexter and Harris write that in the American constitutional amendments of 1787, 
the "natural rights of moral philosophy" found formulation as foundational positive-law 
equivalents. 11 
Brown writes that American constitutional theory resonates with the idea of natural-law 
philosophy. 12 The doctrine of "judicial supremacy", he says, is illustrative in this regard. 13 
Brown contends that "historical evidence" demonstrates both the American Constitution 
(with its Bill of Rights) and the Magna Carta to have been renderings of natural law. 14 
Lloyd proposes that the [United States] Constitution is, at bottom, a "natural-law 
document". 15 It allows for the assimilation to the corpus of the law of "natural rights", 
providing for their "recognition and enforcement as legal rights" .16 
Erasmus says th.at the notion of the "constitutional state" imports that governmental power 
is subject to "higher constitutional values". 17 Such power should be exercised so as to 
promote these values18 - values of a natural-law description. 19 
One might observe, tangentially, that the presumptions of statutory interpretation have at 
times been regarded as a common-law surrogate for a Bill of Rights.20 Devenish asserts 
11 See L.J. Boulle, C. Hoexter and B. Harris Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) 29~ 
12 See B.F. Brown "Nat.ural Law: Dynamic Basis of Law and Morals in the Twentieth Century" in Mark R. 
MacGuigan Jurisprudence (1966) 310 315. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Dennis Lloyd The Idea of Law (1964) 84. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Gerhard Erasmus "Limitation and Suspension" in D. van Wyk. B. de Villiers, J. de Waal and D. Davis 
Rights and Constitutionalism (1994) 629 635. 
18 Ibid. 
19 That they are of a natural-law description is my own reflection. not Erasmus's. 
20 See L.M. du Plessis and J.R de Ville "Bill of Rights lnterpretatioo in the South Afiican Context (3): 
Comparative Perspectives and Future Prospects" 1993 4 Stell LR (3) 356 361. 
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that they reflect a natural-law jurisprudence.21 If this is so, one may consider the 
fundamental-rights provisions, which assimilate the purport of these presumptions, 22 to be 
declaratory of iusnaturalist assumptions. 
The natural law in contemplation is one which may be described as "reasonably 
objectively ascertainable". 23 It may be identified as the emerging "communis opinio 
populi" of civilized nations, determinable to some extent by recourse to the norms of 
public international law, and ascertained with greater facility, perhaps, by reference to 
judgments of foreign jurisdictions. 
Cockrell suggests that the new constitutional dispensation holds out the invitation to 
embrace substantive as opposed to merely formal reasoning in law.24 He raises in this 
regard the notion of moral and political reasoning.25 This conception should, it is 
submitted, be informed by emerging trends in international human-rights law - in order to 
establish alignment with the purport of natural law. 
2.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES 
Cockrell expressly states that reasoning on the basis of a fundamental-rights document is 
not likely to proceed without difficulty.26 There are specific issues which are liable to 
bring numerous problems in their wake in this regard. It is necessary o expound these 
21 See G.E. Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 221. 
22 That the fundamental-rights provisions assimilate the purport of the presmnptions is registered implicitly in 
C.J. Botha Statutory Interpretation (1996) 52. 
23 M din yown wor g. 
24 See A. Cockrell "Rainbow Jurisprudence" 1996 12 SAJHR ( 1) 1 passim, esp. at 8. 
25 Ibid IO. 
26 Ibid 12, where Cockrell claims that constitutional adjudication is all about hard choices. 
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instances of special complexity in order the better to come by a faithful understanding of 
what the "new hermeneutical awareness"27 involves. The first of these issues is 
represented by the liberty-equality dialectic. 
2.3.1 THE LIBERTY-EQUALITY DIALECTIC 
Du Plessis and Corder write that neither an invariably "freedom-centred" nor an invariably 
"equality-centred" reading of the provisions of the Bill of Rights is to be indicated in 
constitutional interpretation.28 They propose that "[i]instead a hermeneutical equilibrium 
will somehow have to be achieved". 29 
MacCormick points to the "standing tension" between liberty and equality:30 "Individual 
freedom in a market economy can and does result in great inequalities of material well-
being". 31 The "good society", he proffers, is one which seeks to hold in balance the ideals 
of "liberty'' and "material equality". 32 
It is interesting to note in this regard that Currin and Kruger propose that "liberty" and 
"equality" should be "mutually complementary".33 
MacCormick advances that a legal order maximizing the freedom of property-owners (with 
regard to their property) and encouraging the most extensive freedom of "market 
27 To be discussed subsequently under 2.4., below. 
28 See L.M. du Plessis and H. Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 140. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See D. Neil MacConnick Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982), preface v. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See B. Cuning and J. Kruger "The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1993: A BriefContextualizaticm" in J. Kruger and B. Cunin (eds.) Interpreting a Bill of Rights 
(1994) 132 136. 
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transactions" would arguably defeat the objective of substantive equality.34 Restrictions on 
the liberty of property-owners and market liberties, he proposes, may therefore be justified 
in order to secure fairness in economic terms. 35 
For all this, he contends it to be a "bogus argument" to suggest that "bourgeois liberties" 
such as "freedom of speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, freedom of religion, 
conscience, and opinion, freedom to come and go in public places as one chooses, political 
rights of participation"36 and the like militate against "a fair distribution of economic 
goods".37 These liberties are essentially "neutral" insofar as the "distribution and 
allocation of economic goods" is concerned.38 
Having taken these points, we acquiesce in the following observations as registered by 
their respective authors: 
(1) Davis, Chaskalson and De Waal write that the principles immanent in the 
constitutional text may constitute a warrant for the development, where necessary, of 
positive n·ghts (as distinct from exclusively "negative defensive rights") securing for 
all South Africans equal participation in the shaping of their political destiny.39 
34 See MacConnick op cit 148-9. 
35 Ibid: "(TJhere is good gronnd for arguing that liberty of property-owners and market liberties ought to be 
restricted to whatever extent is necessary to secure other no less basic rights to individuals". 
36 Ibid 149-50. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See D.M. Davis, M. Chaskalson and J. de Waal "Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of 
Constitutional Interpretation" in D. van Wyk, B. de Villiers, J. de Waal and D. Davis Rights and 
Constitutionalism (1994) I 126 (my emphasis). 
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With this, the authors contend that we should not be held to a merely formal 
conception of "equality". 40 The status of the millions of poverty-stricken South 
Africans should decidedly not be left out of account.41 
Davis states that we have much to learn from the experience of the Indian Supreme 
Court for purposes of our own constitutional enterprise. The post-Emergency Court 
demonstrated its commitment to egalitarianism in its interpretation of the Indian 
Constitution. 42 Davis cites the court in this regard to the effect that "equality must 
not remain a mere idle incantation but must become a living reality for the large 
masses of people".43 
(2) Du Plessis writes that second-generation rights are capable of being harnessed so as 
to render more meaningful the liberal-democratic rights of the first-generation 
categorisation.44 Instancing the right to a fair trial as a fundamental first-generation 
right, he claims that it is diminished in significance if a party to a law-suit is unable 
to afford legal representation.45 However, should the state be required by reason of 
"second-generation impulsion"46 to provide such representation, the right to a fair 
trail would acquire more substantial meaning. 47 
40 Ibid 129. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Dennis Davis "Equality and Equal Protection" in Van Wyk, De Villiers, De Waal and Davis op cit 196 
204. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See L.M. du Plessis "Conceptualising 'Law' and 'Justice'(2): Just Legal Institutions in an Optimally Just 
Society" 1992 3 Stell LR 357 369. 
45 Ibid. 
46 
"Second-generation impulsion" is my own coinage. 
47 See Du Plessis op cit 369: "[The right to a fair trial] can be fully and 'richly' restored if the state can - in a 
'second-generation fashion' - be compelled to act positively and provide the ... party with a legal 
representative". 
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(3) Hawthorne contends that parties to contracts seldom transact upon a footing of true 
equality. The author further maintains that many contracts are concluded from 
necessity. 48 
With this, she subjects the theory of the matter to critical examination. "Freedom of 
contract" presupposes the possession of equal resources by the bargaining parties. 
The actual resources of the contracting parties should be taken into account by the 
law by reason of inequality in fact. The "equality" provision in the Constitution, 
Hawthorne urges, may be harnessed in the interests of incorporating the doctrine of 
inequality into the law of contract.49 
2.3.2 PERSONHOOD AND THE COMMUNITY 
Another issue of special complexity speaks to the relationship between the "self' and the 
community, and the role of the law in its mediation. This is an issue to which the ongoing 
debate between liberals50 and communitarians is very much addressed. It goes to the 
matter of personal identity. 
In MacCormick's assertion that "human individuality presupposes social existence"51and 
in Popper's argument from the "autonomy of sociology",52 one is able to discern an 
48 See L. Hawthorne "The Principle of Equality in the Law of Contract" 1995 58 THRHR (2) 157 163. 
49 Ibid 176. 
50 See John Rawls A Theory of Justice ( 1972) for an elegantly written, very comprehensive and even moving 
expose of the liberal position. It was intended to serve as a riposte to utilitarian views which at the time of its 
writing were gaining politico-theoretical ground The book, in its tum, elicited a response from those who 
considered liberalism to be inadequately attuned to the significance of "community" for social existence. 
Theorists who took up this position were to become known as "commun.itarians". 
51 See MacConnick Legal Right and Social Democracy op cit 251. 
52 See Karl R. Popper The Open Society and its Enemies (Vol II) Chapter 14. Popper's thesis ~s that 
sociology is not reducible to psychology (Ibid 89). It is rather the case that psychology should be interpreted 
in the light of sociology (Ibid 93). 
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affirmation of antiatomism. 53 This means that personal identity does not predate 
participation in social life. There can be very few indeed who, today, would accede to 
atomism in its stark claims. 
Plato and Aristotle appear to be the archetypal communitarians in western political theory. 
Cairns explicates Plato's attitude as opposed to the individual interest as such.54 Van 
Eikema Hommes reveals Aristotle's ethics to argue along the same lines.55 
It is important to observe that both Plato and Aristotle identified the "community" with the 
polis, the city-state of Greek conception. State and community are thought of 
synonymously. The political organization was the community. 
Avineri and De-Shalit observe that it is not quite true to say that communitarians all 
propagate the interests of the political community. 56 Concededly, some do, notably 
Walzer, who identifies the community with one's country. 57 Others, however, see the 
community in non-political terms. 
2.3.2.1 With the above by way of introductory orientation, it is now turned to consider 
briefly some historical perspectives bearing upon the contemporary debate as 
between liberals and communitarians. 
53 See Stephen A. Gardbaum "Law, Politics and the Claims of Community" 1992 90 Michigan Law Review 
685 733fffor an acc01mt of the position going by the name of"antiatomism". 
54 See Huntington Ca1ms Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (1967) 41. 
55 See H.J. van Eikema Romm.es Major Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy (1979) 29. 
56 See S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit (eds.) Communitarianism and Individualism (1992) 8. 
57 Ibid. 
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Cairns writes that upon the Kantian paradigm that type of society which assured 
the highest degree of liberty was to be regarded as the best.58 Right signified the 
conditions under which the actions of one person could be harmonized with those 
of every other in terms of a "universal law of freedom". 59 
Kant, taking the position of extreme subjectivism, proposes that "autonomy .... is 
the basis of the dignity of human .... nature".60 Such a view presupposes that 
"personality" is temporally prior to communal experience. To that extent it must 
be rejected. 
Hegel provides something in the way of a corrective to Kantian subjectivism. He 
writes that ''the particular person is essentially so related to other particular 
persons that each establishes himself [sic] and fmds satisfaction by means of the 
others .... "61 
Individual interest is dependent upon the "community" or "communities" in which 
"personhood" is sourced. The welfare of such "community" or "communities" 
therefore constitutes a bulwark against alienation or anomie. Hegel is here in 
point: "Particularity by itself, given free rein in every direction to satisfy its 
needs, accidental caprices, and subjective desires, destroys itself and its 
substantive concept in this process of gratification". 62 It is paradoxical, though 
58 See Cairns op cit 395. 
59 Ibid 396. 
60 See Immanuel Kant "Flllldamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics" in J.W.G. van der Walt 
(compiler) Reader for LWE406L, LWE407-M andMSRGLW-3 (1991) 124 162. 
61 See G.W.F. Hegel "Philosophy of Right" in Van der Walt op cit 170 170-1. 
62 Ibid 171. 
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nonetheless apparently true, that individual interest and the interest of the 
"community" or "communities" at issue may at some point concur. 
2.3.2.2 So much by way of historical orientation. A fleeting reconnaissance of 
contemporary thought is now in order. 
Daniel Bell puts forward the communitarian thesis as telling against central 
premises of liberal-political theory. Liberalism does not, upon its postulates, 
account adequately for the importance of community "for personal identity, moral 
and political thinking, and judgements about our well-being in the contemporary 
world".63 
Mulhall and Swift point out that a major plank in the communitarian critique of 
liberalism is represented by the claim that the latter misconceives the degree to 
which the communal sphere defines personal identity and shapes values. 64 
Communitarians believe that liberalism is unable to accommodate the dimension 
of "commitment". Their charge is that it downplays the significance of those 
obligations which are constitutive of personal identity.65 Personal autonomy, as 
conceived upon classical-liberal premises, it is claimed, is chimerical as a 
characterization of what "personhood" implies.66 
63 See Daniel Bell Communitarianism and its Critics (1993) 4. 
64 See Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift Liberals and Communitarians ( 1992) 13. 
65 See Allen E. Buchanan "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" 1989 Ethics 852 852-3, for 
a potted summary of some of the more significant themes in commmiitarian thought. Buchanan, it is to be 
noted, does not subscribe to communitarianism as conventionally portrayed: "I will argue that liberal society 
affords impressive resources for ma.king and sustaining commitments, resources that communitarians have 
underestimated." (Ibid 867) 
66 Communitarians in any meaningful sense of that designation would assent to this thesis. For substantiation 
of the thesis, see S. Woolman and D. Davis "The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v. De Klerk, Classical Liberalism. 
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2.3.2.3 It is not proposed in this study to equate the notion of ''the polity'' with that of 
"community". Any such equation would lose sight of the fact of cultural diversity 
within the South African society. There are many and various "communities" in 
our "polity" - communities which make for the flourishing of "personhood". It is 
not inconceivable that a subject's personal identity may fmd its anchorage in more 
than a single "community". Ethnic communities, vocational communities, 
religious communities - these and others may constitute the loci of an individual's 
self-identity, making her what she is. And we must not neglect to mention 
"communities of choice" (as contrasted with "communities of origin") as possible 
sources of identity. No doubt the fact of being-a-South-African-citizen (or a 
person subject to South Africa's legal jurisdiction) may also, through her 
subjection to the state's laws, operate to some extent in constituting the person 
who she is. But that the polity should alone determine an individual's self-identity 
is a perception that simply glosses over the role in this regard of constituent 
communal configurations. 
One has to guard against the error of the "communitarian shuffle": the facile 
equation of "polity" and "community".67 The "polity" is to be taken, it is 
submitted, as synonymous with the overarching "political community", embracing 
numerous, diverse, sometimes but not invariably overlapping "communities".68 
Creole Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights llllder the Interim and the Final Constitutions" 
1996 12 SAJHR (3) 361 386ff. 
67 See Woolman and Davis op cit 388 n 86. 
68 I have been unable to trace the source of this insight, but it is probable that it is Charles Taylor's. 
Woolman and Davis op cit 387 n 86 speak of "linguistic, religious, social, class, racial, ethnic, gender, 
national and political groupings which may overlap, but which are never identical, and which often conflict 
with one another". 
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The terms "polity" and "community" should therefore be employed carefully, 
with due regard to their distinctive denotations. 
The polity (or state) should additionally be distinguished sharply from the notion 
of "civil society''. 69 The latter may be taken as a reference to the interlocking 
network of relationships among people generally. The version of 
communitarianism adopted in this study is within a "delimited zone" (as 
suggested by real, genuinely (and not merely presumed) convergent interest) 
sensitive to the interests of civil "society'' as thus defined. In the adjudicative 
forum, this would translate into promoting socio-economic equality and 
suppressing violent and appropriative crime, among other things. 
But the version of communitarianism we adopt (in addition to looking to the 
interests of civil "society" within the "delimited zone" as described) speaks far 
more pertinently to the interests of the various constituent "communities" within 
the larger "society". Insofar as individuals find their self-identity and 
"personhood" in virtue of their immersion in any one or more of these 
"communities", it would seem necessary that the interests of such communal 
configurations be protected. It is submitted that an autochthonous "community" 
would serve as a case in point (assuming always that it is benign and non-
oppressive). 
In the light of this discussion, it is possible to conceive of the "public interest" as 
bearing a dual reference. On the one hand, it may be taken to connote the interests 
69 Totalitarian states apparently do not observe any such distinction. See J.L. Brierly Law and Government 
(date of publication llllspecified) 30. 
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of the society in its larger conception (within the "delimited zone"). On the other, 
it is to be appropriated as denoting the interests of the particular community or 
communities at issue in the case. When the jurist undertakes to serve the "public 
interest", she should seek to ensure - where this is necessary - that both categories 
of interests are catered for, and the context of the case will determine where the 
emphasis is to reside in the circumstances. 
One is impressed with the idea that the Constitution implicitly mandates a concern 
for the public interest in both of its references. The Constitution displays quite 
unambiguously a solicitude for the dignity and worth of the individual.70 But if 
the dignity and worth of the individual is to receive proper consideration, the 
interests of the community or communities in which her "personhood" is sourced 
should be adequately accommodated within the juristic evaluation. The public 
interest as it pertains to the "community" of "communities" at issue is therefore 
implicitly purveyed in the Constitution. 
Furthermore, the public interest as it pertains to the larger civil "society'' seems to 
be vouched for in the scheme and structure of the Constitution in both explicit and 
implicit terms. 71 
2.3.3 JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A third issue of special concern pertains to the inherence of aspirations of substantive 
justice in the constitutional ordering itself. 
70 The entirety of the Bill of Rights (Chapter II of the Constitution) ~-peaks in this vein. 
71 The preamble, the founding provisions and the Bill of Rights are most telling in this regard. 
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It is here to be noted that one must not lose sight of its 'justice" -objectives in reading the 
Constitution. The solemn commitment to "social justice" in the preamble is telling in this 
regard. Furthermore, the Grundnorm we have identified as an "open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" 72 implicitly suggests a balancing of 
interests with a view to actualizing these aspirations. What Cornell refers to as a 
"synchronization of interests"73 is here in point. 
At many points in the Constitution is a balancing of interests more or less explicitly 
conveyed. Here one thinks of the general limitation clause74 and the various internal 
limitations. 75 
With these reflections in mind, one would not be unjustified in asserting that it is integrally 
a part of the design of the Constitution that the interests of 'justice" should be serviced. Its 
scheme and structure implicitly mandates the "doing of justice". 
(When reading the Constitution in an indigenous-law context, the notion of 'justice" 
should be taken up in a manner in keeping with indigenous-law conceptions. This imports 
an accent not on the equilibration of conflicting rights, but on the reconciliation of the 
72 See the discussion lIDder 2.1., above. 
73 See Drucilla Cornell "Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for 
Transfonnative Legal Interpretation" 1988 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1135 1211. 
Synchronization speaks to "competing rights situations and real conflicts between the individual and the 
commlIDity". (Ibid) 
74 See section 36 (1) ofthe Constitution. 
75 An instance of an internal limitation is to be folIDd in section 16 (2) of the Constitution, which provides 
express derogation from the right to freedom of expression (as set out in section 16 (1)). Another is to be 
found in section 22, which, after ~tipulating that every citizen has the right to choose her trade, occupation or 
profession freely, goes on to provide that the practice thereof may be regulated by law. 
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parties to the dispute, and the restoration of harmony in the community. More on this 
later.)76 
In an article published prior to the advent of constitutionalism, Van der Vyver proposed 
that as much "justice" be read into the law as the words would permit. 77 This proposal was 
meant to apply not only to legislation (original and delegated) but also to case-law 
precedents and the common law. 78 It is submitted that Van der Vyver's point would be a 
fortiori of relevance under the present dispensation. 
2.3.4 THE APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTRENCHED RIGHTS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIONSHIPS APPARENTLY UNREGULATED BY 
RULES OF LAW79 
Something must be said of this matter at this point. The operation of fundamental-rights 
provisions in the context of relationships ostensibly ungoverned by rules of law has been a 
controversial issue. Such operation has been opposed upon the apparent assumption that, 
in Woolman's words, "judicial review [ofthis area of social life] poses a significant threat 
to personal and group autonomy in this country". 80 
The conception of autonomy reflected in this assumption is that purveyed by classical 
liberalism. It is a notion of formal autonomy. If one is prepared to endorse a more 
substantive notion of personal autonomy (in which the socially-constructed nature of the 
76 See the discussion lID.der 3.1., below. 
77 See J.D. van der Vyver "The Jural Credo: Justice as the Essence of Legal Ethics and a Component of 
Positive Law" 1989 52 THRHR (2) 157 179. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Woohnan and Davis op cit 401-3 n 119 for a discussion of this matter. 
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personality is recognized), the objection to the application of constitutionally-entrenched 
rights to relationships of the type described falls away. 81 
2.3.5 DRITTWIRKUNG: CONSTITUTIONAL PENETRANCE 
It is proposed to touch briefly upon this issue here. The doctrine of "irradiation" derives 
from the experience of German constitutional law. "Drittwirkung", as it is otherwise 
know, implies that all rules of the ordinary law are to be construed and applied in the light 
of the supreme law.82 
"Drittwirkung" is of two types - direct and indirect. The direct version posits the extension 
of fundamental-rights provisions to cover the relationships between legal subjects on a 
horizontal basis. 83 The indirect version, on the other hand, is simply an injunction to the 
courts to ensure that the fragrance of those provisions be allowed to permeate the 
interpretation of all legal norms. 84 In Germany, it is "indirect Drittwirkung" that is 
generally accepted. 85 
Both direct and indirect Drittwirkung seem to be stipulated for in our Constitution. That 
direct horizontality is contemplated appears to admit of no doubt.86 Yet this circumstance 
does not preclude "mittelbare Drittwirkung" where such is indicated. 
80 See S. Woohnan "Defamation, Application and the Interim Constitution: An Unqualified and Direct 
Analysis ofHolomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd." 1996 113 SAL.I (3) 428 448. 
81 See Woolman and Davis op cit 401-3 n 119 in this regard 
82 See Davis, Chaskalson and De Waal op cit 89. 
83 Ibid92. 
84 This is also known as "mittelbare Drittwirkung". 
85 See Davis, Chaskalson and De Waal op cit 92. 
86 Sections 8 (2) and (3) bear this out very amply. 
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In Chapter II, mention was made of the so-called "categories of illusory reference" in the 
law. Stone was seen there to urge that these allow for judicial responsiveness in the 
appropriate degree. 87 
In Chapter III, it was noticed that certain proponents of critical legal scholarship have 
contended that these selfsame "categories" allow for the infusion into the law of judicial 
ideology in the pejorative sense. 88 
"Mittelbare Drittwirkung" on the basis of the Constitution would permit the jurist to clear 
the hurdle of excessive "openness" in the law as well as that represented by the defeatism 
of authors such as Goodrich. Sensitivity to "purpose" and the "existential context" would 
make for "mittelbare Drittwirkung" in what, it is submitted, is the most appropriate 
fashion. 89 
2.4 THE "NEW HERMENEUTICAL AWARENESS" 
This matter was broached at length in Chapter II of this study.90 It refers to the jurist's 
"sense of justice", from which certain presuppositions or "prejudices" have been expunged, 
and into which other, novel, ones have been incorporated - all this with reference to the 
constitutional enterprise.91 
87 See Chapter II of this study, llllder 2. (dealing with American.realism and responsiveness). 
88 See Chapter III of this study, under 2. (especially the discussion of Goodrich's standpoint, llllder 2.1.). 
89 See Chapter IV of this study, llllder 3. (the conclusions), especially at C(4), where the significance of 
"purpose" and the "context of social realities" is brought out. (Note that the "existential context" is 
synonymous with the inclusive "context of social realities".) 
90 See Chapter II of this study, llllder 3.4.10.a. and 3.4.10.b. 
91 See also Chapter III of this study, llllder 3., for a short exposition of the "newhenneneutical awareness". 
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In the course of the present chapter, we have expounded the relevance of the new 
Grundnorm-order and the natural law it has imported.92 The "new hermeneutical 
awareness", correspondingly, would partake of such a natural-law constituency. 
In addition, we have in the course of this chapter dealt with specific issues93 which are 
liable to throw up problems of a legal-political character. The "new hermeneutical 
awareness" should display a committed sensitivity to these issues - the liberty-equality 
dialectic, personhood and the community, justice and the Constitution, fundamental-rights 
application in the context of relationships ostensibly ungoverned by rules of law, and the 
matter of constitutional penetrance. 94 
It seems as if there is something going for Davis's insight that constitutionalism is about 
contestation.95 Davis maintains in the same breath that fixation upon "ordinary language" 
speaks to "political closure". 96 The "new hermeneutical awareness" should accordingly be 
re-invigorated where necessary- by way of debate, dialogue and reference to the emerging 
consensus of values of the "communis opinio populi". 
2.5 THE "NEW HERMENEUTICAL AWARENESS", "PURPOSE" AND THE 
"CONTEXT OF SOCIAL REALITIES" 
( 1) Suffused with the "new hermeneutical awareness", the jurist would bring the 
appropriate "purpose" to bear upon the "context of social realities" for which her 
92 See 2.1. and 2.2. of this chapter. 
93 For a discussion of these specific issues, see 2.3., as also the sub-paragraphs, 2.3.1., 2.3.2., 2.3.3., 2.3.4. 
and2.3.5. 
94 See the cross-references noted llllder n93, above. 
95 See Dennis Davis "The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans: Please Sir May I have some More 
Literalism!" 1996 12 SAJHR (3) 504 508. 
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determination is to provide. We see, then, that "purpose" subsumes a commitment 
to the "context of social realities" by the very nature of things. 
(2) "Purpose" is informed by the constitutional design. Since, as we have seen, it is 
integrally a part of that design that the objectives of 'justice"97 should be serviced, 
"purpose" is further informed by those objectives. "Justice" implies a 
"synchronization" of interests98 - public and private, as well as competing private, 
interests. Whatever the nature of the dispute, public interest should be taken into 
account - insofar, at least, as it relates to the "community" or "communities" 
sourcing personal identity.99 
(3) The "context of social realities" (of which the "facts" of the case constitute a 
component) pertains most notably to such issues as: 
(i) the importance of transparency100 in the course of political and public activity; 
(ii) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the determination; 101 
(iii) a concern for the "community" or "communities" which constitute a source of 
"personhood"; 102 
(iv) the exigencies oflife in, and the welfare of, the larger "society";103 
(v) a concern for human dignity104 and substantive equality;105 and 
(vi) a concern for liberty (in its proper conception). 106 
96 Ibid. 
97 See the discussion under 2.3.3. of this chapter. 
98 See the discussion under 2.3.3. of this chapter. 
99 For an exposition of this matter, see the discussion under 2.3.2. of this chapter. 
100 See section 1 ( d) of the Constitution, where the importance of the values of "accountability, responsiveness 
and openness" is registered. 
101 See Baloro v. University of Bophuthatswana 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (B) at 1065C. 
102 See the discussion under 2.3.2. of this chapter. 
103 See 2.3.2.3. of this chapter. 
104 Human dignity (in its comprehensive conception) may be regarded as the basis of all human rights. 
105 See the discussion under 2.3. 1 ., above. 
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It follows from the above that the jurist's construction of a statutory provision or her 
interpretation of a common-law rule or principle would be influenced by her mind-set as 
thus constituted. 
In the event of "dissonance" - where a common-law rule or principle and her "new 
hermeneutical awareness" meet with opposition - the jurist should seek a replacement that 
would comport both with "purpose" and with the "context of social realities". This she 
might do by appealing to the notion of "rational forensic deliberation". 107 
3. THE SPHERE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 
Neethling advances that we shall be required to pay "serious and urgent attention" to the 
status of indigenous law in South Africa. 108 It would no longer be acceptable to relegate it 
to mere marginal significance. 109 Van Niekerk's perceptions are of like tenor. It is her 
suggestion that in order to uphold the legitimacy of the South African legal system in the 
sight of those still living by traditional institutions, it is necessary to accord indigenous law 
its rightful place in that system. 110 With this by way of preface, the jurisprudential 
implications of the new Grundnorm-order for legal argumentation in the sphere of 
indigenous law now serve for discussion. 
106 It is spoken here of liberty "in its proper conception'', since it is qualified by considerations of communal 
interaction. See the discussion llllder 2.3.2., above. 
107 See, in this regard, Chapter III, llllder 6 (the conclusions), more particularly at C. 
108 See J. Neethling "A Vision of South African Private Law - Independent Co-existence or Reconciliatory 
Synthesis?" 1993 34 Codicil/us (2) 60 65. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Van Niekerk writes: "Indigenous law should receive full recognition and enjoy the same status as 
Western law." (Van Niekerk (LL.D. thesis) op cit summary, as annexed). Ibid 327: ''This system of law 
should exist alongside the Western component of South African law. If the South African legal system is to 
be legitimised it should be brought closer to reality and closer to the needs of the community. In short, effect 
should be fiven to the norms, the processes and the values of both systems oflaw". 
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3.1 THE GRUNDNORM 
The values integral to the Grundnorm, as identified above, as well as the norms of public 
international law - which would impart a natural-law fragrance to the construction of 
indigenous law - should be interpreted in line with traditional indigenous jural postulates 
and in their proper cultural perspective. 
Let us notice what Van Niekerk has to say in this regard. Van Niekerk proposes that South 
African society affirms a "common nucleus of core values". m She goes on to claim that 
different cultures within the society nevertheless have different conceptions of these 
values. 112 
Suggesting that in indigenous law, human dignity, equality and freedom should be read 
with the communitarian basis of the social structure in mind, she claims that to understand 
these ideals in purely individual-human-rights terms would be to misread in some degree 
the indigenous-law position. 113 
A concern for human dignity is very much in evidence in indigenous culture. While 
individualism is not apparent, individualization most certainly is. 114 Bennett states that 
"the African social and legal system assured human dignity in all material respects". 115 
111 See Van Niekerk (LL.D. thesis) op cit smnmary (as annexed). 
112 Ibid. 
113 lbid312. 
114 lbid261-2. 
115 See T.W. Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law ( 1995) 5. 
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Van Niekerk's proposition is that the analysis of traditional indigenous law and its 
underlying jural postulates demonstrates that gender inequality is a feature not so much of 
the traditional law as of the distorted manifestations of that law. 116 Bennett proposes that 
prior to colonialism, the standing of indigenous women was probably better than it is 
today. Capitalism and codification of customary law by white officialdom, he urges, 
greatly facilitated a decline in their status. 117 Bennett further notes that anthropologists 
have been able to confirm that in some societies women had considerable power and 
autonomy - in the days before colonialism and capitalism. 118 
We must note with Van Niekerk that it would be difficult, and sometimes inappropriate, to 
apply the western concept of "freedom" in an indigenous-law context. 119 
As to the notion of "justice" itself, David and Brierley are in point. The authors reflect 
that "native justice" [sic] aims at a reconciliation of the parties, and the restoration of 
harmony in the community. 120 It seeks to establish peace, not to effect "the strict 
enforcement oflaw". 121 Elias claims that the African judge is a peace-maker, his objective 
being to reconcile the disputants with each other.122 Van Niekerk contends that indigenous 
decision-making is directed towards the elimination of conflict through the medium of 
community participation. Transparency, she argues, is emphasized in communal 
interaction. 123 
116 See Van Niekerk op cit 11. 
117 See Bennett op cit 83-4. 
118 See T.W. Bennett A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) 305. 
119 See Van Niekerk op cit 308-9. 
120 See R David and J.E.C. Brierley Major Legal Systems in the World Today (1978) 508. 
121 Ibid. 
122 See T.O. Elias "The Nature of African Customary Law" in J.C. Smith and D.N. Weisstub (eds.) The 
Western Idea of Law (1983) 88 89-90. 
123 Van Niekerk op cit 252-3. 
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The obligations of each person are heavily weighted, there being little room on the African 
conception of the social order for the notion of individual rights in the western 
appropriation. 124 David and Brierley draw attention, in this spirit, to the fact that African 
justice is accordingly not geared to the enforcement of "rights" or to the attribution to each 
her due. 125 Bennett registers that the indigenous normative system placed emphasis upon 
an individual's duties. Her rights did not receive the same accent. To have stood by one's 
rights would have been regarded as anti-social. 126 One was "expected to compromise one's 
interests for the good of all". 127 
This philosophy of "ubuntu" is an expression of autochthonous African comm.unitarianism. 
It is in essence a philosophy of "care" and "concern", in accordance with which it is not 
simply the needs of the community as a whole that are looked after, but those of each 
member of the community individually. 128 The individual personality is a reflection of her 
community, and, correlatively, the community derives its existence from the individuals 
who constitute it. 129 
Van Niekerk cites Otite to the effect that "African socialism" reflects a humanistic, 
equalitarian communitarianism. 130 Fraternity, familyhood, benevolence and 
interdependence rank as among its features. rn 
124 See David and Brierley op cit 507. 
125 Ibid 508. 
126 See Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law op cit 5. 
121 Ibid. 
128 s . thi' d v . k ee, m s regar , an Nie erk op cit 250-4. 
129 Ibid 252: "Although man [sic] is at the centre of things, man [sic] can be defined only in relation to other 
men [sic]. But the community can likewise be defined only with reference to its individual members .... " 
Further: "The common good must always be seen in relation to the individual as an inextricable component 
of that community". (Ibid 254) 
130 Ibid 254. 
131 Ibid. 
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3.2 THE "NEW HERMENEUTICAL AWARENESS" AS TAILORED TO THE 
INDIGENOUS-LAW CONTEXT 
All the above (under 3.1) tends to suggest a "new hermeneutical awareness" of a somewhat 
different complexion from that appropriable in the sphere of western law. Human dignity, 
equality and freedom - as well as the notion of ''justice" itself - bear a different 
connotation in the indigenous-law context. 
It is suggested that the "new hermeneutical awareness" of this somewhat different 
composition is capable of full realization only from within the indigenous-law perspective. 
It is on this basis that it is recommended that there be community participation in decision-
making, and that the "outsider" judge not undertake the exercise in the absence of such 
involvement. 
3.3 THE "NEW HERMENEUTICAL AWARENESS", "PURPOSE" AND THE 
"CONTEXT OF SOCIAL REALITIES" 
(1) It is submitted that upon appropriation of the "new hermeneutical awareness" as 
tailored to the indigenous-law sphere, the proper "purpose" would be brought to 
bear upon the "context of social realities" for which the determination is to provide. 
(As in the western-law sphere, we see that "purpose" subsumes a commitment to 
the "context of social realities" by the very nature of things.)132 
132 s th di . ee e scuss1on under 2.5., above, for purposes of comparison. 
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(2) "Purpose" is informed by the values entrenched in the Bill of Rights as interpreted 
in their proper cultural perspective133 (and with a view to bringing the law in step 
with its own jural postulates ). 134 The "justice" -objectives of the Constitution - also 
conditioning the quality of the "purpose" under discussion - are to be conceived as 
involving the reconciliation of the disputant parties as well as the restoration of 
harmony in the community. 135 
(3) The "context of social realities" (of which the "facts" serving for decision are a 
component) pertains most notably to such issues as: 
(i) transparency in the course of public dealings; 136 
(ii) a concern for "community" (''ubuntu");137 
(iii) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the determination;138 
(iv) the high importance of human dignity139 (and substantive equality);140 and 
(v) liberty as understood in indigenous law. 141 
(4) Bennett claims that the "living law" (of the indigenous people) is pervaded by 
generalized norms embodying a requirement of reasonable behaviour. 142 "Purpose" 
133 It would be Van Niekerk's suggestion that the values entrenched in the Bill of Rights should be 
''interpreted in their proper cultural perspective where cirClllllstances so demand". (Van Niekerk op cit 
SUillIIl3.l)', as annexed). 
134 These are the "basic axioms" or starting-points for legal reasoning in indigenous law. See Van Niekerk op 
cit 160 and 168. 
135 See discussion under 3.1., above. 
136 Transparency is also of high importance in indigenous law. See 3.1., above, where it is registered that 
transparency is emphasized in communal interaction. 
137 Again, see discussion under 3.1., above. 
138 As with western law, it seems that these factors are also of consequence in indigenous adjudication. 
139 As registered above, under 3.1., human dignity is of high importance in indigenous law. 
140 The concepticm of equality, however, may have to be understood in indigenous-law terms. (Again, see 
3.1., above). 
141 That is to say, not in its western conception. (See 3.1., above) 
142 Mokgoro J., in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 735 1-J, n 9, cites Bennett as stating this 
much. 
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as committed to the "context of social realities" would allow for the irradiation of 
these norms through the "reasonableness" -requirement. 143 Thus are they to be 
brought into line with the values in the Bill of Rights as construed within their 
proper cultural perspective. This is done with a view to bringing the law into 
harmony with its own jural postulates. 
(5) Van Niekerk urges that government documents, textbooks, and "fossilised law 
reports" frequently convey a distorted image of the true indigenous-law position.144 
Explaining this observation, she asserts that where indigenous-law application was 
entrusted to white officialdom, operating on the basis of the precedent system, the 
versions of the law that emerged were out of keeping with social reality and 
inconsistent with indigenous jural postulates. 145 In short, they represent an 
"adulterated" indigenous law. 146 
Bennett comments on the "isolation" of customary law in the purely formal sense. 
He urges that legal positivism has worked towards its decontextualization, 
disjoining it from "its social and moral/ethical background". 147 Few, if any, texts 
dealing with customary law, he says, are "direct, personal accounts ?!5~­
...practiee1~. 148 
143 The citation lac cit reads as follows: "[Customary law] is pervaded by generalized norms, usually 
characterized by a requirement for reasonable behaviour, which provide a starting point for the introduction 
of ftmdamental rights"A Professor Bennett explained to me that the customary law in question is that which 
obtains in the community (the "living law''), and not that which finds expression in written or codified form. 
144 See G.J. van Niekerk "Indigenous Law in South Afiica- A Historical and Comparative Perspective" 1990 
31 Codicillus (I) 34 42. 
145 See Van Niekerk (LL.D. thesis) op cit 153. 
146 Ibid. 
147 See T.W. Bennett A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) preface v. 
148 Ibid I. 
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Reflecting that there is inevitably a "discrepancy between legal theory and social 
reality", he goes on to say that in the case of customary law this discrepa,ncy has 
taken on the quality of a "serious disjunction". Bennett asserts that this is largely to 
be accounted for by the "one-sided political process". 149 
In the event that one is up against a textbook-formulation of indigenous law, it is 
very conceivable that the rule or principle concerned and one's "new hermeneutical 
awareness" (as tailored to the indigenous-law sphere) will meet with opposition. 
"Dissonance" describes this situation. A replacement may require to be sought 
which would comport both with ''purpose" and with the "context of social 
realities'.'. Actual dialogue among members of the community may be required in 
the interests of its ascertainment. 150 The substitute dispositive precept, as will be 
seen in Chapter VII of this study, finds its raw material in the "living law" of the 
indigenous peoples and the underlyingjural postulates of that law. 151 
Van Niekerk suggests that dispute-resolution in indigenous law should avail itself 
of the input of "community participation". 152 She proposes the institution of 
dispute-resolution structures "in which the community may participate collectively 
and openly". 153 
149 Ibid preface v. 
150 See Chapter VII of this study, wder II 1.2. 
151 s c ee hapter VII, lIDder II 1.2. 
152 Van Niekerk (LL.D. thesis) op cit 328. 
153 Ibid. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 In the sphere of western law, the insights of this chapter are useful in the following 
respects: 
(i) "Purpose" is to be informed by constitutional design. 154 
(ii) Seeing that it is taken up in the spirit of the Constitution, 'justice" is to inform the 
notion of "purpose". 155 
(iii) "Justice" (in the western context) implies the "synchronization of interests"156 -
public and private, as well as competing private, interests. 157 
(iv) Whatever the nature of the dispute, public interest should be taken into account -
insofar, at least, as it relates to the "community" or "communities" sourcing 
personal identity. 158 ' 
It is upon this basis that "purpose", as it is conditioned by the Constitution, might be 
conceived. 159 
Where a statute is at issue, the "statutory purpose" is to be harmonized with the "purpose" 
as thus expounded. 160 
154 s 2 ee .5., above, at (2). 
155 s 2 ee .5., above, at (2). 
156 See 2.5., above, at (2). 
157 See 2.5., above, at (2). See, again, Cornell op cit 1211. 
158 See the discussion llllder 2.3.2., above. 
159 See in this regard Chapter VI, at III (2), and Chapter VII, at I (2). 
160 In this regard, see the discussion in Chapter VI, llllder II (4.), dealing with what has been styled the 
''hannonizztion of designs". 
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In the very nature of things, "purpose" subsumes a commitment to the "context of social 
realities" 161 (of which the "facts" of the case constitute a component). The "context of 
social realities" pertains most notably to such issues as: 
(i) the importance of transparency in the course of political and public activity; 
(ii) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the determination; 
(iii) concem_foL~ommunity" or "communities" which constitute a source of 
- ........ _.__,,.~• '·'~._,,,,_, ___ ___. __ _..,,,..-..----._.' 
"p~d"; 
(iv) the exigencies oflife in, and the welfare of, the larger "society"; 
(v) a concern for human dignity and substantive equality; and 
(vi) a concern for liberty (in its proper conception). 162 
Read with the right "purpose" (as committed to the "context of social realities") the 
evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying the legal provision in point may 
undergo an "adjustment". The result is that the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" may 
organize themselves into a novel stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal 
facts". And subsumption would take its course where previously it did not - or would be 
precluded where the normative syllogism would formerly have been activated. 163 
4.2 In the sphere of indigenous law, the insights of this chapter are useful in the 
following respects: 
161 See the discussion lllder 2.5., above, at (1). 
162 See the discussion lillder 2.5., above, at (3). I have repeated myself verbatim here by reason of the 
significance of these reflections. Consult, in this regard, Chapter VI, at III (2) and Chapter VII, at I (2). 
163 In order to refresh her memory on these issues, the reader is referred to Chapter IV, lillder 2.2.4. 
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(i) "Purpose", as ever, is committed to the "context of social realities" .164 
(ii) "Purpose" is informed by the values entrenched in the Bill of Rights as interpreted 
in their proper cultural perspective (and with a view to bringing the law in step 
with its ownjural postulates). 165 The "justice"-objectives of the Constitution- also 
conditioning the quality of the "purpose" under discussion- are to be conceived as 
involving the reconciliation of the disputant parties as well as the restoration of 
harmony in the community. 166 
(iii) The "context of social realities" (of which the "facts" serving for decision are a 
component) pertains most notably to such issues as: 
(a) transparency in the course of public dealings; 
(b) a concern for "community" ("ubuntu"); 
( c) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the determination; 
(d) the high importance of human dignity (and substantive equality); and 
( e) liberty as understood in indigenous law. 167 
(iv) The "living law" (of the indigenous peoples) is pervaded by generalized norms 
embodying a requirement of reasonable behaviour. 168 "Purpose" as committed to 
the "context of social realities" would allow for the irradiation of these norms 
through the "reasonableness" -requirement.169 Thus are they to be brought into line 
with the values in the Bill of Rights as construed within their proper cultural 
164 s th di. . d ee e scuss1on llll er 3.3., above, at (I). 
165 See the discussion under 3.3., above, at (2). 
166 s th di. . ee e scuss1on under 3.3., above at (2). Consult Chapter VII, at II (2). 
167 See the discussion llllder 3.3., above, at (3). I have repeated myself verbatim here by reason of the 
si~cance of these reflections. Consult in this regard Chapter VII, at II (2). 
16 See the discussion llllder 3.3., above, at (4). 
169 See the discussion wder 3.3., above, at (4). Consult Chapter VII, at II (3). 
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perspective. This is done with a view to bringing the law into harmony with its 
own jural postulates. 170 
(v) In explanation of (iv) above, the following should be noted. The "norm" and the 
"arrangement of facts" are more intimately interrelated than is the case with 
western law. A "narrative model" of typifications of action, loaded with tacit social 
evaluations, links the two - making, if you will, for subsumption or non-
subsumption, as the case may be. (The words "if you will" are used advisedly, 
because the autochthonous administration of justice does not conceive of the 
application of a rule known in advance to the facts of the case as typically a part of 
the enterprise.) 171 
Now, "purpose" (as committed to the "context of social realities") may make for 
the "adjustment" of the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying 
the norm. This is as much as to say that the norm in question may be irradiated 
through the "reasonableness" -requirement. 172 And "subsumption" (if one is so 
inclined to speak of it}173 may possibly proceed where previously it did not - and 
conversely. 
(vi) When we speak of the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" and the 
"adjustment" it may undergo, we are alluding to conceptions intrinsic to the culture 
concerned. Homologues of such conceptions, if entertained by the "outsider" 
170 s th dis . 3 ee e cussion llllder .3., above, at (4). 
171 See Chapter VII at II (2)(4). 
172 s th dis . ee e cussion llllder 3.3., above, at (4). 
173 One is tempted in this context to speak of "subsmnption in metaphorical terms". This is because 
indigenous law is a non-specialized legal system, and a strict separation of "norm" and "proposition of fact" -
artificial even in western terms - is likely to appear all the more artificial in this context. 
177 
judge, may prove misleading. Communal participation in the decision accordingly 
seems to be essential. 174 
4.3 In the event of "dissonance", the manner of filling the lacuna is to proceed in 
accordance with the insights set forth in Chapter III of this study. 175 The method of 
approach would vary with whether the common law or the indigenous law is at issue. 176 In 
Chapter VII of this study, the processes involved in filling the lacuna in each of these 
spheres are illustrated in comprehensive terms. 177 
174 See, in this regard, Chapter VII of this study, at II (2)(6). 
175 See Chapter III, especially at 6 (the conclusions). 
176 See Chapter III, especially at 6 (the conclusions). 
177 s c ee hapter VII, mider I (4) 4.2. and 4.4. and II (2)(7) and II (4). 
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7.2 Extensive Interpretation 
7 .2.1 Analogical Interpretation 
7.2.2 Interpretation by Implication 
7.3 Modificative Interpretation 
IV. The Process of Effectuation 
GENERAL 
It is not the purpose of this model to expound the "law of interpretation" (of 
statutes or otherwise). Such may be found in any good textbook on the subject. In 
what follows, an encompassing theory is set out in order to bring together 
stratagems employed by lawyers in their daily interpretive activities. The 
elaboration of such a theory appears to be something of a desideratum, and this the 
more so with the coming into being of a new constitutional dispensation. 1 
Understanding what one does , rather than merely doing it, affords a basis for 
doing it more proficiently. And this understanding should be acquired the better to 
give effect to the ideals to which our fledgling democracy professes to aspire. 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that every court, tribunal or forum is to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the construction of 
legislation, and in the development of the common law and customary law.2 The 
aspirations defined by the notion of an "open and democratic society based on 
1 Act 200 of 1993 inaugurated an interim (or transitional) Constitution. It represented a framework 
within which a final Constitution, ultimately finding its formulation in Act I 08 of l 996, could 
be negotiated. 
2 Section 39(2) reads: "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and o~ects of the 
Bill of Rights." 
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human dignity, equality and freedom"3 encapsulate what this subsection indicates 
as requiring promotion in the tasks it identifies. 4 International law and foreign law 
(properly deployed) make for a more concrete perception of the type of society 
envisaged. 5 
It is entered that international law - and more particularly the standards of 
humanity, human dignity, and respect for the person it lays down - is of especial 
importance as a compendium of guidelines for the attainment of the society in 
contemplation.6 It is from the premises of international law that substantive moral 
argumentation may proceed in the legal-hermeneutical context. Since these 
premises are "reasonably objectively ascertainable", we are not confronted with 
anything like indeterminacy in the extreme sense. The natural-law flavour of these 
norms should be permitted to permeate every aspect of legal interpretation.7 Of 
course, the context of the matter may demand adjustment. In the case of 
customary law, for example, the indigenous cultural milieu would still necessitate 
an appeal to these natural-law elements - but in a different appropriation. 8 
3 The preamble to the Constitution speaks of a "democratic and open society." The first of the 
founding provisions, section 1, registers the values of hmnan dignity, equality and freedom 
(s.(l )(a), and in its sub-section (d) the value of "openness". Further, there is affinnation of these 
values in section 7(1), the subsection introducing the Bill of Rights, and in section 36(1), the 
limitations clause. Jn Chapter V of this thesis, the notion of an "open and democratic society based 
on hmnan dignity, equality and freedom" was identified as the Gnmdnorm of our new legal order. 
See Chapter V, 2.1, and 3.1. 
4 The "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" (section 39(2)) gives itself to be understood 
as the value-compendimn intrinsic to the notion in question. This is so because section 39(1 )(a) 
provides: "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values 
that underlie an open and democratic society based on hwnan dignity, equality and freedom." 
5 See, in this regard, subsections 39(l)(b) and (c). 
6 Recourse to international law is peremptory in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights (s.39(1)(b)). 
7 The emerging communis opinio populi of civilized nations may be taken as an 'mdex" of natural-
law standards. 
8 International-law norms should be regarded as every bit as applicable in the construction of 
customary law as elsewhere - but in an appropriation sensitive to the commmritarian concerns of 
the culture in question and its distinctive features. Jn this connection, assistance may be derived 
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1. AN OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY BASED ON HUMAN 
DIGNITY, EQUALITY AND FREEDOM 
It would be in place, before proceeding further, to summarize what our study has 
pointed up as essential to an adequate and practicable grasp ofthis concept. 
1.1 AN OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
A society of this description is unconditionally opposed to totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism. It is a society which values transparency9 in the course of 
political and public activity. Both as between government and citizenry (the 
"vertical"dimension) and as between citizens themselves (the "horizontal" 
dimension) there should be transparent intercourse. Such a society places a 
premium on debate and dialogue. 10 
An "open society" would, additionally, allow for the flourishing of its constituent 
"communities" - for that of its various, heterogeneous, sometimes, albeit not 
necessarily, overlapping communal configurations. In a communitarian spirit, the 
jurist should seek to uphold the ideals of these constituent "communities" - in 
which the "self' is sourced , and from which it derives meaning and value. An 
from the provisions of the African Charter of Human and People's Rights of 1981 (the Banjul 
Charter). 
9 The importance of"accountability" and "responsiveness" is registered ins. (l)(d) of the 
Constitution. 
10 See the remarks of Davis A.J. in Rivett-Carnac v. Wiggins 1997( 4) BCLR 562 (C) at 571 J-572A 
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"open society," upon this appropriation, would be sensitive to the question of 
"personhood". 11 
1.2 HUMAN DIGNITY AND EQUALITY 
In this country, the disparities between the haves and the have-nots being what 
they are, the actualization of substantive human dignity and equality is of 
fundamental importance. In the absence of concern for these values in their 
substantive sense, the var10us "freedom" rights would find themselves 
considerably depreciated. 12 
There is no doubt a standing tension between "liberty" and "equality."13 It is to be 
observed, nonetheless, that'cfreedom of speech , freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
seizure, freedom of religion, conscience, and opinion, freedom to come and go in 
public places as one chooses, and rights to participate in the political procesJ) are, 
in general "neutral as between different systems of distribution and allocation of 
economic goods." 14 It is therefore a "bogus" argument to suggest that these 
"bourgeois liberties" militate against a fair distribution of economic goods.15 
1.3 FREEDOM 
As for "freedom" itself, quite independently of its relationship to "equality'', one 
might observe that it should embrace the notion of interdependence, without 
11 See Chapter V, 2.3.2. 
12 Those who are poverty-stricken, for example, are far more interested in obtaining adequate 
nourishment and shelter than in parading about a particular, abstractly-defined freedom-right. 
13 See MacCormick Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982) v. 
14 Ibid 149-50. 
15 Ibid. See also, Chapter V, 2.3.1. 
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denying the value of individual autonomy. 16 The conception of an "unencumbered 
self', flowing from the premises of classical liberalism, simply fails to capture the 
meaning of "freedom". 
1.4 "JUSTICE" AND THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERESTS 
The Constitution is concerned with "justice". This is reflected, for one thing, in 
the preamble, in which "social justice" is registered as a solemn aspiration. For 
another thing, and bearing in mind that "justice" imports an equilibration of 
interests, one finds at many points in the Bill of Rights an implicit recognition of 
potentially conflicting interests . The general limitation clause, 17 the internal 
limitations, 18 and the scheme and structure of the Bill show this up very clearly. 
And the commitment to an "open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom" impliedly suggests the balancing of interests in a way that 
would best express that commitment. 
It is submitted that as "justice" is imported thereby, the notion of the 
synchronization of interests" is apposite to the workings of a modem legal 
system19 . (Such is imported by the conception of justice.) "Public interest" is to 
be synchronized with "private interest". So too, is one "private interest" with 
another . In the former case, public law will generally be at issue, in the latter, 
16 See O'Regan J. 's comments in Bernstein and Others v. Bester NO and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 
449 (CC) at 512 D-F. 
17 Section 36(1 ). 
18 Such as are to be found, for example, in section 16(2 ), which derogates from the right to freedom 
of expression in delimited instances, and in section 22, which qualifies the right to freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession by providing that the practice of such may be regulated by law. 
19 
"Synchronization of interests" is a conception purveyed by Cornell. She claims synchronization 
to be the goal of a modem legal system. See Cornell "Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective 
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private law. Even in the latter instance, where ostensibly only private interests are 
in question, and contrary to what Dworkin might tell us, 20 the "public interest" 
should feature in the evaluation. This is so at least to the extent that it pertains to 
the "community" or "communities" in which "selves" are sourced, and from which 
they derive meaning and value in life. 
As for the "public interest", it is important to note that it has a twofold reference: 
to the interests of the "community" or "communities" involved; and to the 
interests of the "society" as a whole. Both should be taken into account m 
resolving a dispute, and the case will decide where the emphasis is to reside. 
One should not lose sight of the fact that it is integrally a part of the design of the 
Constitution that the purpose of "justice" should be serviced. So, when one 
conceives of the import of the Bill of Rights, one should not be blinded to its 
"justice" - objectives. 
2. A SIDFT OF MIND-SET 
The first three paragraphs of this chapter and the discussion under 1.1 to 1.4, 
above, point to a juristic shift of mind-set. It is with "new spectacles" that the 
lawyer reads the law. This aspect will be enlarged upon in canvassing what Du 
Plessis refers to as a "new hermeneutical consciousness". 21 
Imagination and the Potential for Transfonnative Legal Interpretation" 1988 Univ. of Pennsylvania 
LR 1135 1211 ff. See, generally, Chapter V, 2.3.3. 
20 For Dworkin, justice is a matter of individual right. See Dworkin A Matter of Principle 32. So 
liberal a stance as this does not adequately accommodate the concerns of community. 
21 See Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 1994 60 60 
- I 07, especially towards the end where the term "new henneneutical disposition" is introduced. 
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The shift of mind-set would require us to proceed differently according as the 
matter of our concern is the interpretation of statutes, the development of the 
common law, or the development of customary law. Statutes are qualitatively 
divergent from unwritten law, for the objectives of this discussion, in that they 
embody policies not generally to be discerned in the latter sources. Further, 
common law and customary law are to be treated differently, inasmuch as the 
former is premised on western individualistic premises, and the latter on 
communalistic, African ones. 
Consistently with these reflections, the presentation will focus, firstly, on the 
interpretation of statutes, secondly, on the common law, and, lastly, on customary 
law. And, that said, we launch upon this task without more ado. 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 
In what follows, we deal with ordinary statutes. The interpretation of the 
Constitution itself may require to proceed by way of specialized approaches of its 
own. These are not discussed here. Other works should be consulted by interested 
readers in this regard. And so - back to ordinary statutes. 
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It would be useful to conceptualize the exercise of statutory interpretation as 
involving four distinct, albeit very much interrelated, processes. To each of these 
processes specific hermeneutical strategies are appropriate. In this section these 
strategies are dealt with comprehensively. 
To introduce the discussion, one may remark that Ricoeur's notion of the 
"hermeneutic arch"22 comes in handy as pointing to the ultimately holistic 
character of statutory construction. The two pillars of the "hermeneutic arch" -
that of "Verstehen" (understanding) and that of "Erklaren" (explanation)23 are 
bridged by their mutual interpenetration. 24 Just as "understanding" (the existential 
moment) envelops "explanation",25 so "explanation" (the objective moment) 
develops "understanding" along analytical lines. 26 "Verstehen" is identified in the 
capacity of the text to project itself outside itself 27 "Erklaren", by contrast, is 
exemplified in clarifying the internal structure of the text itself28 . The interplay of 
understanding and explanation tells in favour of a measure of interdependence of 
the four processes in the interpretation of statutes. 
The processes in question are the following: 
22 See, in this regard, Ricoeur Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981) 161. See also 
Bleicher Contemporary Hermeneutics (1980) 229 - 32. See, generally, on the significance of the 
"hermeneutic arch" for our purposes, Chapter II, 3.5 and 6.A(l ), (2) and (3). 
23 See Bleicher op cit 229 - 32. 
24 See Ricoeur From Text to Action (1991) 129 and 156. Ricoeur speaks of this internal dialectic as 
a "Gestalt" (Ibid 163). Further: "Ultimately, the correlation between explanation and 
understanding, between Wlderstanding and explanation, is the hemeneutic circle". (Ibid 167). See 
also Ricoeur Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981) 161. 
25 See Ricoeur From Text to Action (1991) 131and142. 
26 Ibid 142. 
27 Ibid 18. 
187 
( l) The Process of Ingression; 
(2) The Process of Purposive-Definition; 
(3) Axiological Performance; and 
(4) The Process of Effectuation. 
The process of ingression represents an effort to "break the ice", as it were. It 
involves the jurist in seeking to make sense of the provision(s) for the moment 
indicated as pertinent to her concerns by the situation she confronts. It implicates 
for the most part the pillar of "Erklaren". Yet, to the extent that what is meant to 
be deciphered is sought to be related to an "outside" (or "hors-texte"), the pillar of 
"Verstehen" also is involved. 
The process of purposive-definition represents the means whereby the jurist 
undertakes to clarify the "purpose" in the light of which the problem at hand is to 
find its resolution. Once again, the pillar of "Erklaren" predominates. But that of 
"Verstehen" is nonetheless evident - insofar as the jurist proceeds with an eye to 
the resolution of a problem. 
Axiological performance aims at an intuitive perception of the proper disposition 
of the case in line with constitutionalism. That being so, the pillar of "Verstehen" 
is here most conspicuous. However, since this phase presupposes activities 
intrinsic to the processes of ingression and purposive-definition - which are 
mainly concerned with "Erklaren" - the latter pillar is also partly constitutive 
thereof. The inference from this of processual interrelatedness is strengthened by 
28 Ibid 113. 
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the observation that the elements of "Verstehen" discernible in ingression and 
purposive-definition are seemingly taken up in the dimension of "Verstehen" 
elemental to axiological performance. 
The process of effectuation, the final phase in the interpretation of statutes, 
consists in the articulation of conclusions, whether such be in mental 
consciousness, in speech, or in writing. As such, it is concerned primarily with 
"Erklaren". However, since it is premised on proper axiological performance, it 
partakes also very substantially of the dimension of "Verstehen". 
The notion of the "hermeneutic arch" thus demonstrates a high measure of 
interdependence of the four processes in the interpretation of statutes. 
With this we launch ourselves upon a discussion of the strategies appropriate to 
each of the processes described. 
I. THE PROCESS OF INGRESSION 
This process is concerned with elucidation. It seeks to bring out the "sense" of 
the statutory provision(s) at hand. Yet the astute reader will observe that some 
perception of the "facts" of the problem is necessary merely to identify those 
provision(s) as relevant. (In due course, other provisions may be identified as 
pertinent as further "facts" emerge.) This "fact-dependence" of provision-
identification underscores the heterotelic character of legislative construction. 
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Being preponderantly of an "Erklaren" nature, however, the process of ingression 
is amenable to representation along the following axes: 
( l) Dictionary-meaning appropriation and legislative-definitional 
observance; 
(2) Idiomatic resolution; 
(3) Disambiguation; 
( 4) Grammatical responsivity; and 
(5) Sentence-intrinsic structural analysis. 
These axes are treated of seriatim: 
(1) DICTIONARY-MEANING APPROPRIATION AND LEGISLATIVE-
DEFINITIONAL OBSERVANCE 
Dictionary-meaning appropriation is a reference to the mode of coming by the 
"meaning" of words. It is what Chladenius would have advised as among the 
sovereign tools of statutory interpretation.29 It is considered with Du Plessis, 
however, that such a tool is useful no more than the extent to which it enables one 
to "get under the skin" of an enactment, to establish a "point of entry" into the 
meaning of the statute.30 But to that extent it is valuable. One might say that 
dictionaries, legal and otherwise, lexicons, general and specialized, and other 
legitimate aids in seeking out the "meanings" of words, constitute the "open 
sesame" of the portals of sense. 
29 See the discussion of Chladenius in Chapter I of this study, section 2. See also Chapter I, 5.A(l ). 
30 See, in this regard, the discussion in Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 50. 
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Needless to say, where words (and phrases) bear a legal-technical sense, they 
should be appropriated in that sense. 31 
Legislative-definitional observance is to be understood as compliance with the 
norms of statutory interpretation as they find expression in statutory form. 32 
These are indisputably "legal" rules, in contrast to other rules of interpretation the 
status of which as such is debatable.33 Coming to mind in this connection is the 
Interpretation Act, 33of1957 (as amended), as also the definition clauses34 which 
are to be found in multitudinous statutes. To the extent to which these legislative-
definitional imperatives are consistent with the Constitution, they require 
observance; their observance must proceed in such a way, however, as to 
"promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." It is considered 
that "fuzziness" of meaning - of both words and phrases - may dissipate upon the 
correct application of these rules. 
One's attention is drawn to the definition clause in the (recently promulgated) 
Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Act, 46 of 1998, for 
purposes of illustration. The word "agency" is defined to mean the "Road Traffic 
Infringement Agency" as established by the Act.35 Further, the "Director-
General" means the "Director-General of the national Department of 
31 Words such as "negligence", and phrases such as "reasonable person" and ''undue preference", 
would suggest a legal-technical appropriation. 
32 See Chapter I, 4:2.4.(2) and 5A(2). 
33 As regards the latter category of rules, it is submitted that they should be regarded primarily as of 
ex post facto application, fimctioning mainly as "rules of thumb". A perception of them as such is 
reflected in the discussion of the process of effectuation. 
34 Or. . la mterpretat10n c uses. 
35 See section (I )(ii) of Act 46 of 1998. 
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Transport,"36 and the "Minister", the "Minister of Transport" .37 It is self-evident 
that these (among the others embodied in the clause) are "legal" stipulations: they 
hold, as is typically provided, "unless the context otherwise indicates."38 It 
should be needless to remark that they make for a sharper perception of 
"meaning". 
(2) IDIOMATIC RESOLUTION 
A second axis comes into consideration where a concatenation of two or more 
words (as, for example, a phrase) is encountered which has a "meaning" which is 
not reducible to a synthesis of the meanings of each of the words taken in 
isolation. 39 In this event, one has to do with idiom, with conventionalized speech-
behaviour such as has acquired subtle nuances of signification through usage. The 
first thing to do in this case is to recognize the collocation of words as "idiom", 
that is, to identify them as such. One may have to do with ordinary idiom or 
specialized legal idiom. In the case of the former, one would probably find its 
"meaning" in a comprehensive dictionary, for example, Webster,40 and in the case 
of the latter, in an inclusive legal lexicon. 
Two examples may help to illustrate this point: 
(i) In ordinary conversational idiom, "greener pastures" has a significance 
which is not reducible to a synthesis of that of its two constituent 
components. When reading statutes, one should be alert to identify "as 
36 See section (l)(viii) of the above Act. 
37 See section (!)(xvii) ofthe Act. 
38 lbis proviso is embodied in the opening statement of section I of the Act. 
39 See Chapter I, 4.2.4(3) and 5A(3). 
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idiomatic" a phrase such as this. The problem is then half-solved: one 
finds its "meaning" in a comprehensive dictionary. 
(ii) In legal idiom, "judicial notice" has a legal meaning not reducible to a 
synthesis of that of its two constituent components. The first step is to 
identify the phrase "as idiomatic'', the second to recognize its character as 
"legal" idiom. The matter is two-thirds-solved: one finds its "meaning" in 
a legal lexicon. 
Elaborating further, one may take section 3(1) of the Administrative Adjudication 
of Road Traffic Offences Act, which institutes the Road Traffic Infringement 
Agency as a "juristic person".41 It goes without saying that the identity of the 
agency has been defined in terms of legal idiom. A legal lexicon, then, would be 
the indicated source of reference in pointing to the nature of the institution. 
As for what may be termed "technical idiom", one's attention is drawn to section 
14( 1) of the same Act. The provision embodies a behest directed to the Road 
Traffic Infringement Agency to maintain accounting records reflecting its affairs 
and business in accordance with "generally accepted accounting practice."42 The 
phrase in inverted commas may fairly be said to have taken on the quality of 
40 Or ooe or other version of the Oxford English Dictionary 
41 Section 3(1) of Act 46 of 1998 reads: "The Road Traffic Infringement Agency is hereby 
established as a juristic person responsible to the Minister." 
42 Section 14( 1) of the Act provides: "The agency must, in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting practice, keep such accmmting and related records as are necessary to represent fairly 
the state of affairs and business of the agency and to explain its transactions and financial position." 
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technical idiom, and its meaning is to be established by recourse to an appropriate 
authoritative lexicon. 
(3) DISAMBIGUATION 
Disambiguation is necessary m circumstances where a word or phrase in a 
syntactical unit is capable of bearing more than one meaning.43 In this event, 
syntactical context would afford a basis for "proper meaning-attribution". (We 
see, then, that even at this early stage there is a need for "contextualization'', 
albeit only at the level of the sentence. When we come to consider the process of 
purposive-defmition, the matter of "contextualization", will loom larger on the 
agenda, and be observed to transcend the confines of syntactical units.) 
At the same time, one may note that the very recognition of the need for 
disambiguation in certain instances is a tacit acknowledgement that linguistic 
"essentialism", as conceived on the "excision" approach, and as sustained on the 
"pointer theory'' of language, is a misconceived basis upon which to approach the 
texts of the law. Wittgenstein, as we have seen,44 advanced that it is an error to 
maintain that there is an "essence" to which each word may be said to correspond. 
We must look to the entire context of the sentence if we are to interpret correctly. 
Of some relevance are the remarks of Lord Greene in Re Bidie45 , as cited by 
Schreiner J.A. in his dissenting judgment in Jaga v. Donges.46 
43 See Chapter I, 4.2.4(4) and 5A(4). 
44 See Chapter II, 1.2. for an oblique prefiguration of this point. 
45 1949, Ch. 121 at 129. It is to be observed that Lord Greene advised recomse both to the 
immediate context in which the word occms and to the general context of the Act in ascertaining 
the meaning of that word. It is the former context with which we are presently concerned. (Cited 
in report at 663H - 664B). 
46 See Jaga v. Donges 1950 (4) SA653(A), in particular the judgment of Schreiner J.A. (minority 
judgment) at 662ff. 
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(4) GRAMMATICAL RESPONSIVITY 
Grammatical responsivity has a twofold prescriptive significance. In the first 
place, it directs one to have regard to conventional grammatical rules and 
principles in seeking to decipher the import of syntactical units. The jurist is aware 
of most of these, but in the event of uncertainty resort to a handy source of 
reference is obviously indicated.47 In the second place, grammatical responsivity 
commands the correction of errors of syntactical formulation, assuming the 
incontestability of what was proposed to be conveyed, and the patent marring 
thereof by want of compliance with conventional rules oflanguage.48 
One could extend the principle underlying grammatical responsivity to cover 
instances where it is not an error of the above description that is at issue, but 
instead one of inappropriate wording. Where it is certain what was proposed, but 
the legislature used a word or phrase incorrectly so that the formulation does not 
tally with the proposition, then, it is submitted, it would be entirely in order to 
correct the mistake. 
(5) SENTENCE-INTRINSIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
Intra-provisional structural analysis relates to the elucidation of a statutory 
provision. A provision may consist of a number of syntactical units. It should in 
the ordinary course of events be easy enough to discern linkages among these 
47 In this regard, Fowler immediately springs to mind. 
48 In this event, the jurist is to be certain in her mind as to the purport of the provision at hand See, 
generally, as regards grammatical responsivity, Chapter I, 4.2.4 (5) and 5A(5). 
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syntactical units, so as to impose upon them some conceptual coherence. 49 What 
may present itself as difficult is the task of unravelling the import of a long, 
convoluted sentence, something not rarely encountered in legislative materials. In 
this event, recourse to sentence-intrinsic structural analysis may be indicated. 
Sentence-intrinsic structural analysis is deserving of some elaboration. Lategan 
discusses the issue in depth,50 and here an adapted version of his insights is 
provided. One may, it is suggested, when confronted with a long and complicated 
sentence in a statute, undertake to make sense of it by reducing it to what might be 
called its "mandatum"51 (or, if need be, in the case of an extremely complex 
sentence with more than one "mandatum", its "mandata"). The "mandatum" is a 
reference to the essential "prohibition", "command", "permission" or 
"empowerment"52 sought to be conveyed by the language. Sueh a "mandatum" 
should be assimilable to the format of a "matrix sentence". The "matrix sentence" 
in turn is comprised of a "nominal element" and a "verbal element". 53 It 
constitutes the core-message54 of the sentence, to the nominal and verbal elements 
of which "qualifications'', "sub-qualifications" and "closer definitions" may be 
49 Vigilance as to "pronmm reference", the "repetition of important words'', and "transitional 
expressions" would go a long way towards achieving a perception of continuity. See Bell and 
Cohn Handbook of Grammar, Style and Usage ( 1981) 203 - 212. 
50 See Lategan "Die Uitleg van Wetgewing in Hermeneutiese Perspektief' 1980 TSAR 107. See 
Chapter I, 4.3 for a discussion ofLategan's work. See also 5A(6) of the same chapter. 
51 The term "mandatum" is here appropriated in a somewhat eccentric sense as denoting a statutory 
imperative, irrespective of whether it be positive in tenor, negative or facilitative. Facilitatives are 
regarded as imperatives for pmposes of this discussion inasmuch as they presuppose the 
conceivability of their revocation, with the latter implying a reinstatement of a positive or negative 
statutory imperative. 
52 
"Permissions" or "empowerments" are the facilitatives referred to in n.46 above. 
53 See Lategan op cit 121 . 
54 Lategan's perceptions are adapted to our purposes in this exposition. 
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added. 55 (It is suggested, further, that if a complex sentence found in a statute 
embodies no "mandatum", that is, "prohibition", "command'', "permission" or 
"empowerment", and has a purely descriptive import, one may proceed by analogy 
with this approach, seeking to discern its core-message in its most irreducibly 
elemental form, as opposed to any "mandatum". This core-message may then be 
taken as a "matrix sentence".) Upon this basis, it may be possible to acquire a 
certain clarity as to the meaning-content of otherwise intractable language. 
These observations call for exemplification. A few examples of sentence-intrinsic 
structural analysis are therefore provided. 
Take section 28 of the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Act56 
(providing for the reduction of demerit points): 
28. If demerit points have been incurred by any person, the 
issuing authority contemplated in section 26(2) must reduce 
the total number of points recorded in the national 
contraventions register against that person with one point for 
every three months, or such other number of points or period 
as may be prescribed, during which no demerit points were 
incurred by that person, except for the time the court found 
that the court process had been deliberately delayed by that 
person to obtain a reduction in points. 
The initial step is to educe from this provision its "mandatum". That "mandatum" 
should be taken up as a "matrix sentence", comprised of a nominal element (NE) 
and a verbal element (VE). Analysis would then proceed as follows, shedding 
light in this way on the import of the section: 
55 See Lategan op cit 123: "Sowel die nominale gedeelte ... as die verbale gedeelte ... [kan] deur 'n 
hele reeks kwalifikasies en subkwalifikasies en nadere omskrywinge uitgebrei [word] .... " 
56 Act 46 of 1998. 
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Discerning the "mandatum" (Matrix sentence= NE+ VE): 
I The issuing authority I must reduce the total number of points recorded in the 
NE national contraventions register against [any] person. 
VE (predicate) 
CD: contemplated in section 26(2) 
CD: if demerit points have been incurred by [that] person 
Q: with one point for every three months ... during which no demerit points were 
incurred by that person 
I 
SQ1: or such other number of points or period as may be prescribed--------t 
SQ2: except for the time the court found that the court process had been 
deliberately delayed by that person to obtain a reduction in points. 
(CD= closer definition; Q =qualification; SQ= sulrqualification) 
We may take as a further example section 31 (I) of the same Act. 
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Section 31 ( 1 )57, pertaining to penalties, is in the following terms: 
31. (I) The penalty prescribed under section 29(b) for 
each infringement must, despite any other Jaw, be imposed 
administratively in terms of Chapter III, subject to the 
discount contemplated in section 17(l)(d). 
Discerning the "mandatum": 
I The penalty I must be imposed administratively in terms of Chap. III 
NE VE (predicate) 
r 
CD: prescribed under section 29(b) for each infringement 
r----------·----
Qi: despite any other law 
Q2: subject to the discount contemplated in section l 7(1)(d). 
Let us take section 33(1) of the Act58 (pertaining to access to information) as yet a 
further example: 
33. (1) Any person may, upon payment of the prescribed 
fee, ascertain his or her demerit points position from the 
national contraventions register at the office of any issuing 
authority, registering authority or driving licence testing 
centre. 
Discerning the "mandatum" (in this instance, in the nature of a "permission" or 
"empowerment", that is, a "facilitative"59): 
57 Of Act 46 of 1998. 
58 Act 46 of 1998. 
59 For "facilitatives", see n.46, above. 
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I Any person I .__m_a_y_a_s_c_ert_ai_n_h_i_s_o_r_h_e_r+--d_e_m_e_ri_ts_p_01_· n_ts_p_o_si_ti_o_n,, 
NE VE (predicate) 
I 
Q: upon payment of the prescribed fee 
CD: from the national contraventions register at the office of any issuing 
authority, registering authority or driving licence testing centre. 
Section 36(1 )6° may be taken as a provision of purely descriptive import (unless 
we are prepared to discern therein a vague "empowerment"). The same methods 
of sentence-intrinsic structural analysis as fmd application with respect to a 
normative proposition are applicable by analogy. 
36. (I) This Act is called the Administrative Adjudication of 
Road Traffic Offences Act, 1998, and comes into operation on a 
date determined by the President by proclamation in the Gazette. 
Discerning the "semantic core": 
I This Act 
NE 
Ii> called the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences 
Act, 1998 
VE (predicate) 
CD1: and comes into operation on a date determined by the President 
CD2: by proclamation in the Gazette. 
---------------
60 Of Act 46 of 1998. 
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The principles illustrated in these few, very mundane, instances are capable of 
extrapolation, given enterprise and ingenuity, to much more complex syntactical 
structures. It is hoped that their general thrust has been brought to the fore in these 
analyses in a way that may inform sentence-intrinsic structural analysis generally. 
Having observed the directives implied in the five axes of the process of 
ingression, the uncompromising positivist would contend that her task is done for 
all intents and purposes. She would respond that the meaning-content of the 
section(s) at hand has been elicited, and that all that remains to complete her 
labours is to apply, in mechanical fashion, the semantic content as "established" to 
the "brute data" of the matter in question. 
The trouble with this approach, which seems to reflect the unarticulated theoretical 
premises held by a good many South African lawyers of an earlier time, is that it is 
disdainful of any value-commitment. It is entirely oblivious to issues of justice. 
Under a dispensation of constitutionalism, particularly, it falls miserably short of 
what is demanded of the juristic mien. 
The process of ingression is the first phase of statutory interpretation. But it is 
only the first phase. The second phase - the process of purposive-definition -
mirrors a demeanour of value-commitment, and augments the first to the extent of 
its deficiencies. 
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As the term implies, purposive-definition is concerned with bringing out as clearly 
and as comprehensively as possible the "purpose" in the light of which the 
constructive process is to take its course. This phase is now considered at length. 
II. THE PROCESS OF PURPOSIVE-DEFINITION 
For purposes of this exposition, we discuss the process of purposive-definition in 
terms of the following methodologies: 
I) Intra-textual contextualization; 
2) "Intentionalization"; 
3) Statutory "historicization"; and the 
4) Harmonization of designs. 
Intra-textual contextualization, "intentionalization" and statutory "historicization" 
are geared to the derivation of the purpose of the statute, alternatively the purpose 
of the assemblage of sections or subsections of which the provision(s) at issue 
is( are) a part. 
The methodology of the "harmonization of designs" involves the assimilation of· 
the "purpose" of the statute (alternatively, the "purpose" of the assemblage of 
sections or subsections of which the provision(s) at issue is( are) a part) as thus 
derived to the "purposes" (design) of the Constitution.61 When the provisions and 
61 For the relevance of the "hannonization of designs" in this regard, see Chapter V, 4.1. 
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the "facts" to which they relate are revisited in the light of this "harmonized 
design" (we might term this recurrence a "reversion to particularity"), they render 
themselves open to possible "reconceptualisation ". Hence the poverty of relying 
upon ingression exclusively. 
With that by way of preface, each of the four stated methodologies will be 
canvassed in tum. 
(1) INTRA-TEXTUAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
Betti and Hirsch are very much in point in a discussion of this step in purposive-
definition. Betti's canon of the coherence of meaning is as a matter of fact 
synonymous with intra-textual contextualization.62 One is to look to the globular 
totality of a statute in order to discern its purpose. By the same token, if the 
purpose of the sections or subsections of which the pertinent provision forms a part 
is at issue, one is to have regard to their schematic entirety as a means of its 
ascertainment. 63 
Hirsch's probabilism64 embodies the same import as Betti's principle of totality.65 
Hirsch may be read as conveying that the construction of a statutory provision 
entails the examination of as many circumjacent provisions as practicable, and 
ideally the statute as a whole. This would ensure the highest degree of accuracy in 
drawing implications as to "meaning". (Consistently herewith, and bearing on the 
62 See the discussion of Betti in Chapter I of this study, 4 .1.2. See also 5C(l) of the same chapter. 
63 This seems to follow as a corollary. 
64 See the discussion of Hirsch in Chapter I of this study, and 4 .2. 
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subject of implications, Du Plessis expressly observes that they are inferable from 
other provisions in the statute.66 The formal presumption that a word or phrase 
bears the same meaning throughout an enactment67 is also attuned to this sort of 
inference.) 
The jurist would do well at least to read those sections in the vicinity of the 
provision at hand, assuming that she considers that it is unnecessary in the 
circumstances to peruse the statute in its every stipulation. She would do well, too, 
in order to acquire an impression of its general tenor, to take note of the preamble 
to the statute, the "objects" clause, 68 the long title, the various headings, marginal 
notes and schedules. Even an "impressionistic" perception of the statute may go 
some of the way towards sensitizing the interpreter to its configurational purport. 
Where the Afrikaans version of the statute is extant, it too tnay be used for 
purposes of intra-textual contextualization. 69 (The other-language version is treated 
as part of the "text" in the interests of servicing this approach.70) 
These observations ventured, it tnay be as well to register L.C. Steyn's admonition 
that "[a]l is 'n bepaling op sigselwe ook hoe duidelik, durf die uitlegger van 'n wet, 
65 As his canon of the coherence of meaning is othexwise known. (See Chapter I of this study). See 
also, in this regard, 5C(2) of Chapter I. 
66 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes ( 1986) 156. 
67 Ibid 127: Du Plessis writes that this preswnption showd "be regarded as a valuable means 
towards intra-textual contextualization .... " (emphasis added) 
68 An "objects clause" is to be folllld in section 2 of Act 46 of 1998. As it is an explicit statement of 
pmpose, no interpretation should proceed in the absence of a corumltation of its every provision. 
69 See, generally, Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes ( 1996) 122 - 3. 
70 Ibid. 
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wat sy taak oo.k maar emgsms na behore wil verng, geen betekenis daaraan 
toeskryf alvorens hy nie die hele wet nagesien het nie."71 
1.1 Intra-textual Contextualization in Illustration 
Some of the most edifying exemplifications of theory-deployment are to be found 
in the decisions of our courts. It is, furthermore, the propositions they enunciate 
which are authoritative, for the time being at all events. It is therefore fitting to 
consider the approach of our courts to intra-textual contextualization. 
I.I.I Minority Judgment of Schreiner J.A. in Jaga v. Donges72 
In this case, Schreiner J.A. was called upon to give meaning to the words "has 
been sentenced to imprisonment" in section 22 of the Immigration Regulation Act, 
22 of 1913 (substituted by Act 15 of 1931 ).73 The question arose whether the 
terms of the language were such as to bring suspended sentences of imprisonment 
within their reference. 74 
Schreiner J.A. observed at the outset of his judgment that the "context" within 
which the words were to be construed embraced both the language of the rest of 
the statute "throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted" and, 
more importantly, "the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, 
within limits, its background."75 The judge in the result concluded that suspended 
sentences did not come within the meaning of sentences contemplated by section 
71 See SteynDie Uitleg van Wette (1981) 137. 
72 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 662 ff. 
73 s . d ee JU gment at 662 E - F. 
74 See 665 E - 667 H. 
75 See 662 H. 
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22 of the Act76, intimating that the "context" did not permit of such a 
construction. 77 
What the court did in essence was to have regard to the scheme of the Act as a 
whole in seeking to establish the meaning of the words "has been sentenced to 
imprisonment" in section 22. The preamble bore very pertinently upon the 
elucidation of that scheme. From its configuration, the purpose and policy of the 
Act could be educed. (This is why Schreiner J.A. 's modus operandi might be 
termed "teleological".78) Now that the "purpose" had been laid bare, it was 
possible to revisit the language in contention in the section in the light of this 
"purpose'', and thereby to uncover its meaning. (Such a recurrence has been 
alluded to as a r~ersion to particularity.79) 
Had this case presented for decision today, it would not have been sufficient 
merely to have had regard to the "purpose" and policy of the Act in ascribing 
meaning to the contentious wording. It would have been necessary, in addition, to 
utilize the purposes and values inherent in the Constitution itself in doing so, 
harmonizing those purposes and values with the statutory "purpose". 80 
76 Act 667 H. 
77 Act 667 H. 
78 The epithet "teleogical" imports end- or goal-orientation. The Greek word "telos" is 
etymologically significant. 79 See the third paragraph m1.der II, above. 
80 These matters will receive appropriate attention in due course. 
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' ~1 1.1.2 Prokureur-Generaal, Vrystaat v. Ramokhos1 
This case provides a graphic illustration of intra-textual contextualization within 
the contemporary setting. The respondent had been arrested in connection with an 
alleged burglary. Having been denied bail in the regional court, and successfully 
having appealed such refusal, he was confronted with the attorney-general's 
attempt to neutralize his good fortune.(The attorney-general applied in this 
instance for leave to appeal to the (then) Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court.)82 In the course of his judgment, Edeling J. set out his reasons for favouring 
the respondent's case, but in view of his conclusion that there were reasonable 
prospects that another court would disagree with his view of the law, he allowed 
the attorney-general's application to appeal. 83 
Let us take a look at the substance of the decision. The case hinged on the 
interpretation of section 60(11) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (as 
amended). This anomalous subsection provided that "where an accused is charged 
with an offence referred to (a) in Schedule 5; or (b) in Schedule 1, which was 
allegedly committed whilst he or she was released on bail in respect of a Schedule 
I offence, the Court shall order that the accused be detained in custody ... unless 
the accused ... satisfies the Court that the interests of justice do not require his or 
her detention in custody. "84 The court expressed its doubts as to the 
constitutionality of this subsection,85 but for purposes of its decision went out from 
81 1996 (11) BCLR 1514 (0). 
82 The facts of the case find formulation most pertinently at 1517 A - D of the judgment. (See also 
headnote, at 1514 - 1516.) 
83 See 1543 F - H of the judgment. 
84 Section 60 ( 11) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (as amended). 
85 See 1529 F - H. 
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the premise that it was not unconstitutional. 86 (The doubts in question owed their 
origin to the provisions pertaining to release on bail as embodied in section 
25(2)( d) of the Interim Constitution. 87) 
Edeling J. examined a number of neighbouring subsections, notably subsections 
60(l)(c), 60(2)(b), 60(2)(c), 60(3) and 60(10), emphasizing as he did so the 
inquisitorial nature of bail proceedings and the duty of the court to ensure that such 
information be placed before it as would enable it to determine whether it was in 
the interests of justice that an accused be released on bail. 88 The fact that 
subsection 60( 11) placed the onus on the accused to satisfy the court of the 
circumstances it stipulates (that is, that the interests of justice do not require his or 
her detention in custody) does not, the judge held, vitiate the inquisitorial character 
of bail applications, or derogate from the tenor of subsections 60(3) and 60(10) to 
that effect. 89 
Accordingly, it transpires that in this case intra-textual contextualization went to 
the purport of circumjacent subsections (and not to that of the Act in its entirety). 
Section 60(11) was to be construed having proper regard especially to subsections 
60(3) and 60(10).90 
86 At1530 A. 
87 At 1529 F - H. 
88 See judgment at 1526 G- 1527 B. 
89 See, in particular, 1528 Hof the judgment. 
90 Ibid. 
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But that is not all. In contrast to the circumstances of Jaga v. Donges,91 the matter 
under discussion was to be determined within the value-framework of a supreme 
constitution. The judge emphasized at the outset that the point of departure in 
applications for bail, in accordance with section 25(2)(d) of the Interim 
Constitution, was that an accused is pn·ma facie entitled to be released on bail; it 
was only where the interests of justice require otherwise that such a grant ts 
impermissible. 92 The interests of justice is the dominant consideration.93 It was 
with these concerns in mind that section 60( 11) was to be approached. 
Reverting specifically to section 60(11 ), apparently in the light of these 
considerations, the judge held that as it placed an onus on the accused, the 
provision was to be strictly interpreted.94 This, it is to be observed, is consistent 
with the constitutional ethos. 95 As the word "charged" as used in the subsection 
was to be given its strict legal sense, as opposed to its popular meaning,96 the 
accused, not having been "charged" as thus defined, could not be brought within 
the terms of the subsection, which was accordingly not applicable. 97 He was 
therefore not saddled with any onus,98 and even supposing that he had been, he 
would have discharged it.99 
91 Supra. 
92 See judgment at 1523 F - G. 
93 Judgment at 1525 F. 
94 See judgment at 1532 D. 
95 The constitutiooal purport would tell in favom of a restrictive construction of provisions 
imposing burdens. 
96 Judgment at 1532 D - E. 
97 Judgment at 1535 J. 
98 Judgment at 1536 A. 
99 Judgment at 1536 D. 
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1.1.3 Magano v. The District Magistrate of Johannesburg 100 
This judgment provides a very elementary, though nonetheless instructive, 
example of intra-textual contextualization. The facts of the case are simple 
enough. Because the prosecution believed that there was evidence linking the 
applicants to more serious offences, the magistrate was persuaded to grant a 
postponement of the bail application. 101 Van Blerk A.J., relying upon section 
25(2)(d) of the Interim Constitution, held that the right of an arrested person to be 
released from detention "unless" the interests of justice require otherwise is such 
as to cast upon the state the onus of establishing disentitlement on that basis. 102 
The judge considered that a statement alleging the possible complicity of one or 
both applicants in more serious crimes was insufficient to discharge that onus. 103 
The postponement should accordingly not have been granted. 104 
During the course of the proceedings, counsel for the respondents argued that the 
grounds upon which the magistrate's decision could be reviewed were limited to 
those enumerated in section 24 of the Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959, none of 
which was present in the instant case. 105 Van Blerk A.J. turned his attention to 
section 7(4)(a) of the Interim Constitution, reading to the effect that a competent 
court may be approached for relief in the event of a fundamental right having been 
100 1994 (2) BCLR 125 (W). 
101 At 127 C - D, Van Blerk A.J. writes: "It is not clear what the precise reasons for the grant of the 
postponement were, but it would appear that the [magistrate] granted it on the basis that it was in 
the interests of justice that the State be afforded a postponement of a day and a half to conduct. .. 
ballistic tests and for fiuther investigations." 
102 Judgment at 128 E-G. 
103 Judgment at 133 F - G. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Judgment at 130 B. 
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infringed or threatened. 106 Did the court have any option but to have section 24 of 
the Supreme Court Act declared unconstitutional 107 - if the correctness of 
counsel's arguments was conceded? The answer is apparently 'no'. If counsel's 
arguments were correct, the section could not pass constitutional muster. 
Section 24(1) provides as follows: "The grounds upon which the proceedings of 
any inferior court may be brought under review before a provincial division are -
(a) absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court; 
(b) interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on the part of the presiding 
officer; 
(c) gross irregularity in the proceedings; 
(d) the admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the rejection of 
admissible or competent evidence." 108 
Plainly, one can discern nothing in this subsection entitling the applicants to 
approach the Supreme Court (as it was then known) for relief. Yet section 24(1) 
must be read together with section 24(2). It was the defect of counsel's argument 
that it did not reckon with the possibility of simple intra-textual contextualization. 
Section 24(2) reads that "[n ]othing in this section shall affect the provisions of 
106 See judgment at 131 F - I. 
107 Under the 1993 Coostitution, it was only exceptionally that the (then) Supreme Court would 
have had jurisdiction to pronounce upon the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament. (See Park-
Ross v. The Director, OSEO 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) at 202 D - F.) However, as it seems to me, 
the court upon suspecting unconstitutionality would ever have been in a position to trigger the 
sequence of events culminating in an order to that effect. (In terms of the current dispensation, the 
superior courts may make an order concerning the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament - but 
until confirmed by the Constitutional Court an order of invalidity is without force - see section 172 
(2)(a) of the Constitution). 
108 Section 24(1) of the Supreme Court Act, 59of1959. 
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any other law relating to the review of proceedings in inferior courts."109 Of 
course, the Constitution was a "law" within the meaning of the words "any other 
law," 110 and so counsel's contentions were not sustainable. Not only was it a 
foregone conclusion that the court could be approached for relief (by reason of 
constitution fiat), but section 24 did not require to be declared invalid! rn 
The appropriate modus operandi may be summed up as follows: Section 24(1) is 
to be read in the light of the purpose suggested by section 24(2), which by its 
language conveys that the former subsection does not purport to be exhaustive in 
its terms. This purpose is then to be assimilated to the "purposes" of the 
Constitution, so as to achieve a "harmonized design". In the light of this 
"harmonized design", the power to review proceedings in the lower courts on the 
basis mentioned finds its affirmative substantiation. 
1.1.4 The Dissenting Judgment ofO'Linn J. in DTA of Namibia v. Prime Minister of 
the Republic ofNamibia112 
More will be said about this judgment subsequently. For the moment, we are 
concerned with it only to the extent that it discloses aspects of intra-textual 
contextualization. 
The prov1s1on at issue was section 93(4) of the Electoral Act, 24 of 1992 
(Namibia). O'Linn J. held that marginal notes bear some weight in determining 
109 See section 24(2) of the Supreme Comt Act, 59of1959. 
110 s . d ee JU gment at 132 F. 
1 1 1 
"Declared invalid" - in the ultimate culmination of events, that is! See n I 0 I. 
112 1996(3) BCLR 310 (NmH) at 32 lff. 
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the "intention of the legislature."113 (It would perhaps be pedantic to quibble with 
the judge's use of this phrase. Although one would be more inclined to speak of 
the "purpose" of the legislation, judicial convention seems to be rather wedded to 
expressing itself in these terms.) The judge moreover had resort to other 
provlSlons in the Act in order to shed light on the meaning of the disputed 
section. 114 
One is forced to concede that the above exercise did not reflect an instance of 
"purely" intra-textual contextualization. It was inextricably interwoven with 
elements of historical contextualization. The latter issue is covered under the rubric 
of statutory "historicization." 115 
(2) "INTENTION ALIZA TION"116 
Also apposite to the elucidation of the purpose of an enactment is the methodology 
of "intentionalization." As was implied two paragraphs previously, 117 the 
enterprise of statutory interpretation does not seek to unveil anything in the nature 
of the "intention of the legislature." "Intentionalization" is not a reference to any 
such undertaking. While concededly pertaining to the genesis of a statute,118 it 
113 See judgment at 327 E-F. At G, the judge observes, too, that a heading in the enactment and the 
marginal notes converge in bringing out the "intention of the legislatme" (statutory "purpose" as 
we should be more inclined to speak of it). 
114 Most notably section 94 of Act 24 of 1992 (Namibia). See the judgment, in this regard, at 323 
C-F. 
115 See (3) below, and more particularly 3.2, which broaches issues relevant to the axis of statutory 
precursors. 
116 
"Intentionalization" must here by understood as denoting an effort to come by objective 
manifestations of the various actuating forces ultimately culminatin_g in legislative formulation. It 
does not refer to an attempt to ascertain the subjective intentions of the lawmakers. Hence the 
inverted commas! (The word is used in a metaphorical sense.) 
117 In the discussion under 1.1.4, above. 
118 This methodology maybe ta.ken to partake of what is spoken of as "genetic interpretation". (Du 
Plessis's personal communication) 
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looks upon the subjective dispositions of the lawmakers as irrelevant to the 
interpretive process. It would disown Betti's canon of the actuality of 
understanding (which has as its object the reconstruction of authorial intent).119 
"lntentionalization" would nonetheless affirm as reflective of its essential thrust 
his canon of the hermeneutical correspondence of meaning120 - with its emphasis 
on the "particular logic and formative principle" of the statute or its sub-statutory 
components. As pointers to meaning-adequacy, 121 factors such as the 
circumstances surrounding the passing of a statute and deliberations preceding its 
promulgation122 might require investigation if there is to be compliance with this 
canon.
123 
It must be emphasized that "intentionalization" is a mode of contextualization. It 
seeks to relate the provision( s) at issue to the historical circumstances in which it 
(they) was (were) conceived. Rand Bank Ltd. V De Jager124 affords an apt 
illustration of this methodology. 
2.1 Rand Bank (Ltd) v. De Jager 125 
The decision in this case concerned the interpretation of the Prescription Act, 68 of 
1969 within the context of the law of suretyship. 126 Baker J. observed that the Act 
119 See the discussion of Betti in Chapter I of this study, 4 .1.3. See also SB( 1) and (2) of the same 
chapter. 
120 See the discussion of Betti in Chapter I of this study, at 4.1.4. See also SD(l) of the same 
chapter. 
121 The canon at hand is also known as that of "meaning-adequacy in llllderstanding". See Chapter 
I of this study, at 4.1.4. 
122 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 133-4. 
123 The canon, it will be remembered, dictates reference to the particular logic and formative 
principle of the matter in question. 
124 1982(3) SA 4 l 8(C). 
125 Supra. 
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was largely the work of the late Professor J.C. de Wet, and deemed it meet to 
consult the latter's memorandum (together with a supplementary memorandum) 
with the object of shedding light on its import.127 (The court assumed that it was 
entitled to do so. 128) The extent of the judge's reliance on the two memoranda is 
clearly apparent from even a cursory reading of the report. Baker J. did note that 
Parliament may not have implemented each and every one of the professor's 
suggestions: "Whatever Prof De Wet may have written in his memoranda, it does 
not follow that Parliament intended to do exactly as he had suggested". 129 This, 
however, did not detract from the obvious value the court attached to these 
sources. It was from the tenor and substance of these documents that the judge 
sought to establish the purpose of the statute.130 
It is suggested, conformably with the approach of the court in this case, that there 
is no good reason in principle why materials of this sort should not be deemed 
valuable and admissible sources of reference in illuminating the purport of a 
statute in appropriate instances. Devenish seems to be correct in advancing that 
the inauguration of the constitutional state portends a climate hospitable to an 
unrestricted contextual methodology131 in the construction oflegislation. 
2.2 Fully conscious of repeating ourselves, it is to be underscored that, despite 
any confusion that may result from similarities of nomenclature, 
126 See 4 l 9ff of the judgment. (See also headnote, at 418.) 
127 For the judge's citation of the supplementary memorandum, see judgment at 425B. 
128 At 443E. 
129 At 443B. 
130 
"Intentionalization" is therefore (as a methodology) an important means to purposive-definition. 
131 See Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 288-93 passim. 
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"intentionalization" has nothing whatever to do with making sense of any 
presumed "intention" harboured by the framers of a statute. A good part of this 
thesis has been devoted to a critque of any approach to interpretation that would 
premise itself upon the notion of the "intention of the legislature". 132 And this is as 
well. For even as distinguished a writer as Steyn failed to appreciate that it is its 
purpose we are after, and not the subjective volitions of its makers, when we wish 
to make sense of an enactment. 133 (Cowen and Du Plessis note the ''unbridged 
gap" in Steyn, a coinage intended to convey the latter's facile and erroneous 
equation of his own literalist-cum-intentionalist approach and the purposive 
approach of Roman-Dutch law as expressed by Everhardus, for instance. 134) 
It is of interest that in the recent case of Fedsure Life Ass. v. Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council, 135 the court acknowledged the poverty of the 
"intention" approach: "I cannot be expected to divine all the workings of [the 
lawmaker's] mind." 136 Unfortunately the court (per Goldstein J.) regressed a step 
further, however: "I must ... give effect to the ordinary meaning of the language 
of the lawmaker. ... "137 Cowen comments rather sardonically on the attempt to 
maintain a divide between "intentionalism" and "literalism." He quotes a foreign 
judge (Coleridge J.) as having posited that the sole legitimate enquiry pertains to 
132 This is why Betti's canon of the actuality of understanding and Hirsch's statement to a similar 
effect are not sustainable. See, in particular, Chapter I, section 3, for an elaboration of these issues. 
See also Chapter II, 3.4.3. 
133 See, in this regard, Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette ( 1981) 2. 
134 Cowen "The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of 'The Intention of the legislature' " 
1980 (43) THRHR I 00 at 118 writes of the ''unbridged gap" in Steyn. At the outset of this article, 
Cowen records the principle of Roman-Dutch law expressed by Everhardus as ex ratione /egis 
colligitur mens legis (at 101). The maxim conveys "purposivism", not any intentionalist 
programme. See also Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 36. 
135 1997(5) BCLR 657 (W). 
136 See judgment at 663D. 
216 
the intention to be found in the words of the statute. In another case, the same 
judge ventured the remarkable statement that the expressed meaning is equivalent 
to the intention. 138 With this, one should observe that it is neither the "ordinary 
meaning of the language" (as presupposed by literalism) nor, as the 
"intentionalists" might claim, the intention as expressed thereby, that should be 
allowed to guide the interpretive process. It is the value-system underpinning the 
Constitution together with the purpose of the statute or its substatutory components 
that should give direction to the endeavour. 
(3) STATUTORY "IDSTORICIZATION" 
The purpose of a statute is also, in appropriate instances, to be garnered along the 
two principal axes of statutory "historicization" - that of effective history, and that 
of statutory precursors. These are discussed in turn. 
3.1 The Axis of Effective History 
Du Plessis writes of "custom" as part of the historical context of a statute. 139 On 
account of the fact that previous decisions are of great importance in the 
interpretation of legislation, I am inclined to view the case-law as decided under 
any item of legislation ("specific judicial custom" as one might speak of it) as 
intrinsic to the notion of "custom" in this sense. 140 
137 At 6630. 
138 See Cowen op cit 109. 
139 See Du Plessis T7Je lntetpretation of Statutes ( 1986) 134. 
140 Du Plessis would disagree (Ibid 135). 
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Precedential authority pertaining to the construction of a given statute is, as we 
have seen, what Gadamer would call its effective history ( Wirkungsgeschichte). 141 
It is the intervening history of the interpretation of that statute. 142 It provides the 
basis, on Gadamer's thesis, upon which the "fusion" of the historical horizon 
inhabited by the statutory text and the. interpreter's own horizon may be 
effectuated. 143 Such "effective history" orients the interpreter's understanding of 
the statute. The greater her immersion therein, that is, the more complete her 
"effective-historical consciousness," the more adequate will be her construction of 
the text with regard to the concrete-existential dilemma confronting her. 144 
In South Africa the doctrine of stare decisis obtains. Precedents are generally 
binding, and this goes as well for judgments bearing on the meaning of statutes. 
This circumstance warrants celebration, since previous decisions hold out the 
possibility of illuminating the purpose of the statute at hand. 
A caveat should be entered, however. The Wirkungsgeschichte of the statute may 
require re-evaluation, seeing that the era of constitutionalism has dawned. 145 Such 
"effective history" may have been dictated by authoritarian and repressive 
ideology. Or, it may simply no longer square with the value-system inaugurated 
141 See the discussion of Gadamer in Chapter II of this study, at 3.4.5, 3.4.9, and 6C(I) and (2). 
142 The terms "effective history'' and "intervening history of interpretation" appear to be 
synonymous. 
143 For a discussion of the "fusion of horizons" as set out in Gadamer, see Chapter II of this study, 
at 3.4.5. The words "historical horizon inhabited by the text" emanate from Palmer op cit 25. 
144 Gadamer renders the notion of "effective-historical consciousness" as wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewusstsein. See, once again, Chapter II of this study, at 3.4.5. 
145 In such a case, a departure from the tenor of previous judgments would seem to be indicated. 
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by the Constitution. 146 In either case it would be futile - indeed counter-productive 
- to seek to derive intimations as to purpose from precedent. 
3.2 The Axis of Statutory Precursors 
An often invaluable aid to the inference of "purpose" may be found along the axis 
of statutory precursors. "Predecessor enactments" may shed light on the 
interpretation of language refractory to analysis on linguistic lines. 147 
It is to be observed that, as with "intentionalization" (dealt with under (2) above), 
Betti's canon of the hermeneutical correspondence of meaning is implicated along 
the axis of statutory precursors.148 The canon of meaning-adequacy in 
understanding (or of the harmonization of understanding), as it is also known, 
involves what Betti terms a "technical-morphological" method or strategy. 149 Such 
a strategy is geared to the comprehension of ''the meaning-content of the objective 
mental world in relation to its particular logic and formative principle." 150 Upon 
the present apprehension, it enjoins the interpreter to have regard to the specialized 
field of concern of which the matter to be construed is part and parcel. 151 It would 
also mandate an examination of the identifiable antecedents of the particular 
146 One might, for instance, conceive the Constitution to place more emphasis on "equality" (in 
relation to "unencmnbered liberty'') than was previously the case. Precedential authority would 
then require re-assessment. 
147 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 132-3 for a brief discussion of this matter. 
148 This canon is otherwise known as the canon of meaning-adequacy in ooderstanding. See 
Chapter I of this study, at 4.1.4. 
149 See Bleicher's discussion in Bleicher Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, 
Philosophy and Critique (1980) 40. 
150 These are Betti's words as cited in Bleicher Ibid. 
151 A discussion with Mr E. Leistner of the Departnlent of Philosophy (Unisa) was illuminating in 
this regard 
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matter. 152 In both cases the interpreter would be called upon to undertake fairly 
extensive historical research. 153 When we broached the methodology of 
"intentionalization" in elaborating the approach of the court in Rand Bank (Ltd) v. 
De Jager, 154 it was observed that the judge had recourse to memoranda throwing 
light upon the meaning to be ascribed to the Prescription Act. Those memoranda 
formed part of the "particular logic and formative principle" of that Act. It must 
be said that in the Rand Bank case the court also undertook an analysis along the 
axis of statutory precursors (when it conducted research into the antecedents of the 
provision in question - also part of its "particular logic and formative 
principle." 155) 
3.2.1 The assistance furnished by an approach premised on the methodology 
under discussion is evident from a reading of the judgment in SANTAM Insurance 
Ltd. v. Taylor. 156 There the court was confronted with a provision of great 
prolixity and convolution - in the form of section 22(1) of the Compulsory Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Act, 56 of 1972 (as substituted by section 2(a) of Act 23 of 
1980). Botha J.A. maintained that "[s]earching for the intention of the Legislature 
on the question at issue merely by studying the words used in the section is to my 
mind an unrewarding, unedifying and finally abortive exercise."157 No useful 
purpose would be served, the judge continued, by seeking to subject that section to 
linguistic or grammatical analysis. 158 
152 lbis was also brought out in the discussion referred to inn 151, above. 
153 See nnl51and152 above. 
154 Supra. 
155 Or, at any rate, as I have been given to mider~tand 
156 1985(1) SA 514(A). 
157 See judgment at 524C. 
158 At 524E. 
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Something was to be gained by looking at the historical background of the 
legislation, however. The statute in question was for many years a part of the 
corpus of our legislation, and on several occasions had been the subject-matter of 
amendment. 159 The court reflected that the policy of the legislature until 1980 had 
been consistent throughout; 160 it was only then, when section 22(1) of the Act had 
been amended by section 2(a) of Act 23 of 1980, that a change in legislative policy 
was registered. 161 Such a retrospect of the life of the statute seems to have left the 
court in no doubt whatever as to the purpose and objects of that section. 162 
3.2.2 Minority Judgment in DTA of Namibia v. Prime Minister of the Republic 
,/" 1\T •b• 163 OJ nami ia. 
With this, one may revert to the above judgment insofar as it pertains to historical 
contextualization along the axis of statutory precursors. O'Linn J. took a broad 
view of the matter, 164 as Betti might have put it: the judge endeavoured to 
interpret the Electoral Act, 24 of 1992 (Namibia) in relation to its "particular logic 
and formative principle". This entailed his concern with parallel South African 
legislation - "precursor enactments". 165 Such researches elicited for him the 
inference that section 93(4) of the Act was a product of poor statutory 
draftsmanship, and that its omission to confer upon the court the power to order 
159 See judgment at 527ff. 
160 At 528F. 
161 At 529D-E. 
162 See 530B-53 l D. 
163 1996(3) BCLR 310 (NmH) at 32 l:ff. 
164 As commanded by the canon of meaning-adequacy in lUlderstanding. 
165 See judgment at 327:ff. 
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inspection of sealed election material (in the absence of such being required for the 
purposes of instituting or maintaining a prosecution for any offence in relation to 
the election in question) was an oversight. 166 Upon this observation, O'Linn 
proceeded to supply the omission - with reference to the provisions of the 
Constitution. 167 Not being the majority judgment, however, the decision obviously 
did not bear dispositive force. 
In fine, it is noted that recourse to the two axes of statutory "historicization" with a 
view to the disclosure of statutory or sub-statutory purpose was already implicitly 
enjoined in Schreiner J.A. 's comments in Jaga v. Donges. 168 
(4) HARMONIZATION OF DESIGNS 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to the process of purposive-defmition, the 
methodology of the harmonization of designs involves dove-tailing the purpose of 
the statute (or that of certain of its provisions) with the design of the 
Constitution. 169 The methodologies of intra-textual contextualization, 
"intentionalization" and statutory "historicization" embody mechanisms for the 
elucidation of statutory or sub-statutory purpose. When once that purpose has 
been brought to light, the jurist should ensure its alignment with the design of the 
Constitution in a way that accords full meaning to the mandates and inherent 
value-system of the latter. 170 It is suggested that congruence-realization along 
166 s . d ee JU ginent at 327B (See also headnote at 310 - 313.) 
167 Judginent at 3291, 331 F, 332D, 333F and 335G-H. 
168 It will be recalled that Schreiner J.A. argued that its "background" is to some extent part of the 
"context" of a statute. See, again, Jaga v. Donges 1950(4) SA 653(A) at 662H. 
169 See the introductory paragraphs under II, above. See Chapter V, at 4.1, additionally. 
170 The injunction embodied in section 39(2) of the Constitution is to this effect. 
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these lines would frequently implicate her in imputing a purpose to the statute (or 
its sub-statutory components) in the light of constitutionalism. This conferment it 
has been deemed appropriate to speak of as an "attribution of purpose" .171 
(Should harmonization in the event prove impossible of accomplishment, it would 
be necessary to consider that the statute or one or more of its provisions may be 
incompatible with the Constitution, and on that basis liable to invalidation.) 
4.1 Excursus: The Presumptions of Statutory Interpretation 
One may say something at this juncture respecting the presumptions of statutory in 
interpretation. Du Plessis and De Ville remark that theirs is the value-regulative 
function normally associated with a Bill of Rights. 172 The design of the 
Constitution has absorbed the purport of the presumptions for the most part. But 
this does not perforce imply that they are now superfluous for all purposes. 173 
Those presumptions which amplify and reinforce the spirit and objectives of the 
Bill hold out the potential of far more meaningful application than they would 
within a dispensation of parliamentary supremacy. 174 It does not follow from the 
fact that its spirit is taken up in the Constitution (section 233 entrenches 
"reasonableness" as a criterion in the interpretation of statutes) that the 
presumption that enactments are not aimed at achieving unjust or inequitable 
results, for instance, goes by the board. 175 Du Plessis and De Ville write that the 
presumption may still be used as an exhortation to preferential reliance upon the 
171 I take the notion of the "attribution of purpose" from Devenish "Teleological Evaluation: A 
Theory and Modus Operandi of Statutory Interpretation in South Africa" 1991 SAPL 62 81. 
172 See Du Plessis and De Ville "Bill of Rights Interpretation in the South African Context (3): 
Comparative Perspectives and Future Prospects" (1993) 3 Stell LR 356 361. 
113 Ibid. 
174 Ibid 363. 
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most just and equitable meanmg of an ambiguous provision. 176 The same 
presumption (and section 233 itself) may be harnessed to the end of construing 
penal provisions restrictively. 177 
The harmonization of designs would involve the application of the presumptions to 
the extent to which they still obtain. Particularly would it imply the pressing into 
service of those which enhance the spirit and objects of the Bill ofRights.178 
4.1.1 Matinkinca v. Council of State, Ciskei 179 
This case is important as indicating the essential function of the presumptions of 
statutory interpretation. The issue raised concerned the constitutionality of a 
Special Indemnity Decree, 7of1993. The statute provided for the indemnification 
of government officials in respect of certain offences committed on a particular 
day. On that day, a number of people were shot and killed, and others injured, 
near Bisho stadium. 180 The court in the result declared the Special Decree null and 
void as being incompatible with the Ciskei Constitution (Ciskei Constitution 
Decree, 45 of 1990).181 
175 Ibid 362. 
176 Ibid. 
177 It is submitted that it would generally be most just and equitable to construe penal provisions 
along restrictive lines. 
178 Such as the presumption just discussed (that enactments are not aimed at achieving unjust or 
inequitable results). See, also, Du Plessis and De Ville op cit 362 (la!.1 sentence on page). 
179 1994(1) BCLR 17 (Ck). 
180 See judgment at I 9D-G. 
181 Judgment at 39 I. 
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In the course of its judgment, the court had fairly extensive recourse to the writings 
of Professor T.J. Kruger. 182 The latter's claim that a statute is to be interpreted in 
the light of the spirit and objectives of the Constitution was given full 
endorsement. 183 Likewise were approved certain other of his insights, most 
notably for our purposes the following: 
(i) A value-judgment approach, as opposed to one premised on positivist 
assumptions, is appropriate to the interpretation of statutes within a 
fundamental-rights dispensation. 184 
(ii) The need for the application of the presumptions under such a dispensation 
for the most part lapses. 185 In shedding light upon this observation, Kruger 
is cited as contending that the "spirit and objectives" of the Constitution 
obtain as the supreme and most comprehensive value-system in a human-
rights dispensation. Of particular importance in this regard is the 
"unwritten constitution", that is, those values underpinning, and implicit 
in, the highest law. 186 
One may take these remarks to bear upon the essential function of the 
presumptions. Their value-regulative thrust is largely sustained by the written 
and unwritten Constitution. This is not however to imply their redundancy; it is 
agreed with Du Plessis and De Ville that those which retain a residual 
182 Judgment at 25-6. 
183 At 251. 
184 At 26A. 
185 At26C. 
186 At 26D. 
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independent justice-servicing potential may yet be deployed to good effect. Such 
deployment would be intrinsic to the harmonization of designs. 
4.2 The Notion of a "New Hermeneutical Consciousness" 187 
On the relationship between the statute at hand and the Constitution, the Hirschean 
programme furnishes certain interesting perspectives. As regards both the statute 
and the Constitution, Hirsch would say that their "meanings" cannot transcend the 
semantic possibilities of the language of which they are comprised. The jurist 
stands beyond them as a neutral, theory-independent tribunal in judging of the 
"significance" of each when compared with the other. To the extent that the 
statute shows up deficiencies when juxtaposed to the Constitution, she brings to 
bear upon the former a critical disposition. This leads her to make good the 
shortcomings of the statute, thereby bringing it into line with constitutionalism. Or 
so Hirsch, at any rate, would be inclined to tell us. 188 
This is a very mechanistic way of looking at things. It does not serve the interests 
of value-laden adjudication. Gadamer's model furnishes much that may be 
harnessed by way of remedy. His conception of the "separating out" of prejudices 
is particularly relevant to the discussion. Gadamer would say that the jurist's 
187 The term appears to be Professor L.M. du Plessis's coinage. See Du Plessis and Corder 
Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 60-107 passim. The "new 
henneneutical disposition" involves more than mere assimilation of new skills. It points to an 
attitudinal investment, an understanding of the new political dispensation and the demands of 
human-rights protection in the domestic as well as the international context. (Ibid, towards the end 
of the discussion). 
188 See Chapter I of this study, at 4.2. 
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subliminal sense of justice is subject to re-evaluation in the light of the ''world" 
opened up by the "text" of the Constitution and its inherent value-system. Her 
inappropriate prejudices are to find their expungement from ("separation out" of), 
and certain novel appropriate ones their incorporation into, her subconscious 
perceptual framework. She will undoubtedly have to refresh her appreciation of 
the value-compendium intrinsic to the new legal order every so often, and from 
time to time her new subliminal sense of justice will require to be brought to 
consciousness. 
Popper is well-known for his thesis that all observation is theory-laden. 189 
Translated into the juridical setting, this means that the quality of the jurists's 
perception of a statute (for instance) is conditioned by her subliminal sense of 
justice and her prior acquaintance with the law. Given what has been said in the 
foregoing paragraph about the influence of constitutionalism on the jurist's mind-
set, one may be justified in asserting that the quality of her perception of a statute 
in current circumstances would be essentially a function of her new subliminal 
sense of justice. 
And so we arrive at the notion of a "new hermeneutical consciousness" .190 It is 
constituted of "prejudices" many and varied, which are preconditions of the 
understanding of the law, and account for the character of that understanding in 
any given instance. For the most part, these "prejudices" may be expected to 
operate below the threshold of consciousness. But every so often it will be 
189 See Popper Conjectures and Refatations (1989) 47: "[O]bservations ... [presuppose] .... A 
frame of expectations: a frame of theories". (emphasis added). 
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necessary for the jurist to renew their vitality, to invigorate them. It would be a 
salutary habit every once in a while to "externalize" them, to debate them among 
colleagues, and where necessary to give them a fresh tum in the light of changed 
circumstances. The "new hermeneutical consciousness" ought not to be allowed to 
vitrify or stagnate. 
One's "prejudices" lend co lour to one's interpretation. It would thus be 
inadvisable to concede any "stable determinacy of meaning". The distinction 
between "meaning" and "significance" breaks down. There is no duality of 
meaning-apprehension and evaluation. Evaluation is intn·nsic to meaning-
apprehension. Hirsch's model loses sight of these important considerations. 191 
4.3 The "New Hermeneutical Consciousness" and the Harmonization of Designs 
Evaluation being integral to meaning-apprehension, the methodology of the 
harmonization of designs should ordinarily occur as a one-step process. Only in 
particularly difficult cases, with which we shall be concerned in due course,192 
would it be necessary to consider the matter on an intellectual level, and undertake 
a conscious evaluation. Provided that the "prejudices" one brings to bear upon 
one's understanding of the law remain vibrant and vigorous, the harmonization of 
designs should occur virtually automatically. 
190 See Chapter II, 3.4.10.a and 3.4. I O.b. See also 6D( I) - (5) of the same chapter. 
191 See Chapter I of this study at 4.2.1, where Hirsch is observed to drive a wedge between 
"meaning" and "significance'', urging the invariance of the former and the context-dependence of 
the latter. 
192 See the discussion under the head of III( 4 ), below: value-competition making for difficulty in 
harmonizing designs. See also the discussion of the case of Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd. v. 
NUMSA 1997( 11) BCLR 1624 (LAC) under III(5), below. 
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4.3.1. A Case Illustrating the Harmtmization of Designs 
Hlatshwayo v. Hein 193 provides an apt illustration of the manner in which the 
purpose of a statute is to be harmonized with the design of the Constitution, so as 
to give full effect to the value-system the latter represents. Summary judgment 
had been granted in the magistrate's court for the eviction of the appellants from 
the respondent's farm. 194 The issue in dispute was whether the Land Claims Court 
(in which this matter was heard) had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against this 
judgment. Both judges held that it did not. 195 
The subsidiary issue, that of an appropriate costs order in the circumstances, is 
more pertinent to our objectives under this head. The general principle advanced 
in the superior courts is that costs should follow the result. The court held that in 
the interpretation of section 33(1 )(f) of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 3 
of 1996, which was the basis of the Land Claims Court's power to award costs, 
regard had to be had to the public-interest nature of the litigation before it, and that 
it should not be bound to adhere to the usual approach of the superior courts in 
exercising its powers in this respect. 196 
The purpose of the Act was to redress large-scale breaches of human rights which 
had occurred in the past. 197 Section 22 of the Interim Constitution (Section 34 of 
the Final Constitution) entrenched the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a 
193 1998( I) BCLR 123 (LCC). 
194 See judgment at 125H-I. 
195 Judgment at 126 A- B. (See also headnote, at 124 E.) 
196 Seejudgmentat134D-135A. (See also headnote, at 125A-G.) 
197 See headnote (at 125F). 
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court or other forum. 198 The Land Claims Court held that if, in its interpretation of 
the provisions regulating its powers in relation to costs awards, it were to follow 
the general principle as mentioned, and make an adverse costs order, it might deter 
legitimate litigants from coming to court, thereby undermining the entire object of 
the Act.199 The court took judicial notice of the fact that most rural black people 
were prevented from accumulating substantial wealth, and maintained that 
potential litigants in raising their rightful claims might risk losing what few capital 
assets they have (such as livestock and farming equipment, which may be their 
sole means of pursuing a livelihood) if an order entitling the successful party to his 
or her costs were to issue as a matter of course. 200 Where matters of public interest 
arose, it would frequently be appropriate to deprive the successful party of his or 
her costs.201 In the circumstances of the case at hand, it was decided that no order 
as to the costs of the proceedings in the Land Claims Court would be made.202 
Several comments suggest themselves. The court's disposition was plainly 
sensitive to the interests protected by the Constitution. It was likewise actuated by 
the objects of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act. The harmonization of these 
interests and objects appears to have proceeded in the absence of grappling with 
any complex or refractory conceptual difficulties. Furthermore, it is possible to 
discern an "attribution of purpose" to the statute in the light of the Constitution: in 
interpreting section 33(1 )(f) of the Act, the court looked upon its import with the 
198 See the respective sections in the Interim and the Final Constitutions. 
199 At 136G. 
200 See judgment at 136 G-H. 
201 At 1380. 
202 At 1381 - I 39A. 
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"purpose" of doing justice to section 22 of the Interim Constitution (section 34 of 
the Final Constitution). 
Ill. AXIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 
Axiological performance is directed towards an intuitive perception of the proper 
disposition of the case at hand in line with the ideals of constitutionalism. As 
such, and as its name implies, it is concerned with the implementation of values. 
It has to do with giving them meaning and substance within a specific context -
with concrete-existentialization. It is accordingly action-oriented in a larger 
measure than the processes of ingression and purposive-definition. 
Proper axiological performance demands an accounting of all pertinent social 
realities. American realism (as exemplified in the work of Stone) holds out much 
that may be harnessed to good effect in this regard. Its commitment to the human, 
social and economic aspects of the administration of justice, which do not find 
expression in abstract legal formulation, is to be commended. 203 
Transposed to contemporary South Africa, American realism would command the 
pursuit of "social justice", as such is registered in the constitutional preamble.204 
It would require that the liberty-equality dialectic be addressed, and the dictates of 
"substantive equality".205 And it would urge that the interests of the "community" 
203 For a discussion of relevant aspects of American realism, see Chapter II at 2. of this study 
(dealing with the contemporary legal pertinence of existential hermeneutics). 
204 See the preamble to the Constitution in this regard. 
205 See Chapter V of this study at 2.3.1. for an exposition of these issues. 
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or "communities" which are implicated in the case at hand be serviced - as well 
as those of the larger "society".206 
The elasticity of language (including statutory language) makes for the possibility 
of implementation of these considerations. Du Plessis advances that it would be 
myopic to conceive of "the inherent flexibility of the ordinary or popular meaning 
of language" as purely an impediment to proper construction. He contends that 
such a feature "very often serves the cause of justice with remarkable effect."207 
Baloro v. University of Bophuthatswana 208 
This judgment expressly approved the principal tenets of American realism. The 
applicants were "expatriate" members of staff of the respondent university. There 
were demonstrations against these "foreign nationals", and a moratorium was 
placed on their promotion while locals were elevated to higher ranks. 209 Section 
8(2) of the Interim Constitution (the "equality" clause) was in point. The court 
held that it was not in keeping with one's expectations of an institution oflearning 
propagating the credo of "academic freedom" that it should discriminate, or be 
party to discrimination, against anyone, still less members of its staff, on the basis 
of social or ethnic origin. 21° Friedman J.P. concluded that the university and its co-
respondents had acted in gross violation of section 8(2); it was a clear case of 
206 See Chapter V of this study at 2.3.2. The inquiry into the nature of"personhood" is particularly 
in point here. 
207 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes ( 1986) I 05. 
208 1995 (8) BCLR I 018 (B). 
209 For the issues raised in this case, see I 0231 - I 03 I I. (See also headnote at I 0 I 9 - I 023.) 
210 At I 066E - F. 
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unfair discrimination. In the result, the judge confirmed the rule nisi granting the 
applicants specified relief. 211 
In the course of his reasons, the judge advanced conformably with the intimation 
above, 212 that the insights of the American realists are apposite to the functions of 
the courts in terms of section 35 of the (Interim) Constitution.213 In order to 
"promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality", the judges, he said, were to act as "social engineers" and 
"social and legal philosophers". 214 Section 35 required the courts to engage in the 
creative activity of generating new law where necessary. 215 That section, 
furthermore, vested them with "an almost plenipotentiary judicial authority to 
decide according to a sense of natural justice; 'equity', 'ius naturale', 'aequitas' all 
being enshrined in the Constitution. "216 And in the application of that section they 
were entitled to have regard, among other things, to the human, social and 
economic aspects relevant to their decisions.217 
Friedman J.P. 's observations as here set out warrant a critical appraisal. One quite 
agrees with the judge that the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the 
court's decision are admissible in coming thereby. But his arguments to the effect 
of the courts' being vested with some "plenipotentiary judicial authority" are 
difficult to sustain. These contentions do scant justice to the doctrine of the 
211 At10671-J. 
212 At the commencement of the discussion of this judgment. 
213 See judgment at 1063C-D. 
214 At I 063H. 
215 At I 064B. 
216 At I 064C. 
217 At !065C. 
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separation of powers, and the notion of fidelity to law218 as an indispensable 
juridical imperative. 
It is the merit of American realism that it stresses the need for a responsive law. 
Yet, it should ever be borne in mind that a legal system that is excessively "open" 
(in Nonet and Selznick's sense)219 runs the risk of capitulating in the end to 
political opportunism. This was pointed out in expounding the tenets of the Free-
Law school. 220 The expansion of judicial power of a kind with that of Friedman 
J.P. 's description is not something one would readily be inclined to concede in the 
absence of considerable circumspection. 
(1) THE "FUSION OF HORIZONS": A BASIS FOR FIDELITY TO LAW 
Legal positivism is liable to promote a system of law functioning autonomously of 
its social context.221 American realism taken to the outer limits of its programme 
would tend to the sort of expansion of judicial power berated in the foregoing 
paragraph. One's task, then, is to steer clear both oflegal positivism and of undue 
"openness" (in Nonet and Selznick's sense). 
218 It has been considered appropriate to refer to the notion in question as that of "fidelity to law". 
It is very frequently rendered as the "rule of law". The latter designation, however, has acquired 
mnnerous subtle overtones of meaning, so much so that a debate as to one or other of its features is 
liable to involve the participants in argument at cross-purposes. "Rule of law" is perhaps best 
reserved for employment when used synonymously with "constitutionalism". Fidelity to law 
demands that adjudication proceed in accordance with law, and not upon any arbitrary basis. 
219 Openness" in this sense signifies responsiveness, the quality of accommodation. See also in this 
regard Nonet and Selmick law and Societv in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (1978) 76-77. 
220 See Chapter II (at 2) of this study for a brief exposition of the thought of the exponents of this 
school. 
221 See in this regard Nonet and Selznick op cit 95. See also Van der Walt squaring up to the 
Di1Iiculty of life: Hermeneutic and Deconstructive Considerations concerning Positivism and the 
Rule of Law in a Future South Africa" 1992 3 Stell LR (2) 231 232. 
234 
An approach which Van der Walt contends may work towards securingfidelity to 
law, at the same time allowing an adequate measure of responsiveness is that 
premised on the notion of the rule of law as "rule of metaphor" .222 It is proposed 
to consider likewise. 
Van der Walt elaborates on the "rule of metaphor" as importing a dynamic 
integration of the "familiar" and the "unfamiliar", in which the integrity of the 
former is preserved in the latter. 223 Within the juridical setting, the "rule of 
metaphor" postulates the application of a legal text in an "unfamiliar" context in a 
way that sustains both its integrity and its resilience in the face of novel 
circumstances. Its purport is therefore conceptually synonymous with Gadamer's 
"fusion of horizons". 224 Concrete-existential application of the text involves a 
merger of the historical "horizon" it inhabits and the interpreter's own "prejudice-
horizon". In the process, justice is done both to the text and to the circumstances 
for which it may have to provide. 
Purposiveness, Nonet and Selznick claim, is the particular quality of an institution 
making for a balance between its integrity and responsiveness.225 Translocated to 
the domain of legal-textual construction, this insight commends "purpose" as the 
guiding principle in concrete-existentialization. If approached with the right sort 
of "purpose", statutory application would neither derogate from the integrity of the 
222 See Van dcr Walt "Squaring up to the Difficulty of Life" ( 1992) 2 Stell LR 23 l 234-6. 
223 Ibid 236. 
224 Ibid. 
225 See Non et and Selmick Law and Society in Transition ( 1978) 77. 
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text nor compromise its resilience in catering for the problem at hand. In a word, 
such "purpose" would allow of a proper "fusion of horizons". 226 
The "fusion of horizons" (as thus facilitated through the notion of "purpose") 
implies a mutability of signification. Such is Gadamer's "undecidability" thesis.227 
Meaning is context-relative. Upon this assumption, the jurist would be precluded 
from seeking to uphold an unjust or inequitable construction by alleging an 
obduracy of legal-textual import, a "stable determinacy of meaning". 228 
What this comes down to is that the potential for legitimate ambiguity is a 
necessary element in interpretation. 229 This does not mean, though, that any 
interpretation is as good as any other.23° Consistently with the thrust of Hoy's 
hermeneutical pluralism,231 the jurist should strive for the most apposite decision 
in the circumstances - as it emerges in the "fusion of horizons". And thus is 
"fidelity to law" to be accomplished. 
(2) A MODEL OF AXIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE: METATHEORY 
(i) Two terms are involved in the mediation of axiological performance: 
"purpose and "existential context". 
226 See Chapter II at 5. See also 6E(l )- (5) of the same chapter. 
227 See Chapter II of this study at 3.4.8 and 3.4.9 for details concerning Gadamer's "undecidability" 
thesis. 
228 Legal positivi~m, which would subscribe to the "stable determinacy of meaning" thesis, is 
therefore to be abjured. 
229 See C.D. Stone "Introduction: Interpreting the Symposium" 1985 58 Southern California LR (I) 
I 3. 
210 !hid. 
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(ii) The process of purposive-definition brings out the first of these terms. The 
methodology of the "harmonization of designs" reconciles statutory or 
sub-statutory purpose with the design of the Constitution. One remembers, 
moreover, from the discussion under 1.4, above,232 that the constitutional 
scheme contemplates the "synchronization of interests": public and 
private, as well as competing private, interests. Accordingly, it is integrally 
a part of the constitutional design that the purpose of 'justice" should be 
serviced. It follows from this that 
(i) the purpose of the statute or its sub-statutory components; 
(ii) the constitutional design; and 
(iii) the purpose of "justice" 
constitute a single, composite, threefold "purpose". 
(iii) "Existential context" is a reference to the broad "context of social realities" 
(of which the "arrangement of facts" serving for determination must be 
deemed a component). The "context of social realities" pertains most 
notably to such issues as: 
(i) the importance of transparency in the course of political and public 
activity;233 
231 See Hoy "Dworkin's Constructive Optimism versus Deconstructive Legal NihiliSllll" 1987 6 
Law and Philosophy (3) 321 356. 
232 See 1.4 at the beginning of this chapter. 
233 See 5.1 (d) of the Constitution (Act 108of1996). 
237 
(ii) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the 
determination;234 
(iii) a concern for the "community" or "communities" which constitute a 
source of "personhood" ;235 
(iv) the exigencies oflife in, and the welfare of, the larger "society";236 
(v) · a concern for human dignity and substantive equality; and 
(vi) a concern for liberty (in its proper conception).237 
(iv) "Purpose" subsumes a commitment to the broad "context of social 
realities." The issues itemized under (iii) (i) - (vi), above, figure as matters 
to which, as seen under 1.1 - 1.4 supra238 (where the ideals of an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom were 
canvassed), the design of the Constitution is most emphatically committed. 
(v) Underlying the specific statutory norm (dealt with in the process of 
ingression) is a "narrative model" of typifications of action, loaded vvith 
tacit social evaluations.239 This is what Gadamer would speak of as a "pre-
234 The American realists would have emphasized these considerations in law-application. See 
Chapter II at 2 of this study for details. 
235 See Chapter V (at 2.3.2) ofthis study insofar as it bears upon the relationship between 
community and selfhood. 
236 The larger "society" is conceptually to be distinguished from the notion of the community. 
Those who conflate these concepts render themselves open to reproof as being party to the solecism 
referred to as the "communitarian shuffle". See Woobnan and Davis "The Last Laugh: Du Plessis 
v. De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Applicaticm of Fundamental Rights 
under the Interim and the Final Constitutions" 1996 12 SAJHR (3) 361 387-8 n86. 
237 See, in this regard, Chapter V, 2.5(3) and 4.1. 
238 See 1.1-1.4. at the beginning of this chapter. 
239 See Jackson Making Sense in Law: Linguistic, Psychological and Semiotic Perspectives (1995) 
152-4. The "narrative model" and the "representation (to oneself) of situaticms" are synonymous. 
Both may be taken to reflect the "pre-understanding" orienting meaning-apprehension. See the 
discussion in Chapter IV at 2.2.2. and 2.2.3. 
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understanding". 240 It informs the jurist's perception of the "norm" and the 
"arrangement of facts", organizing them into a stable configuration 
(Gestalt) of legal norm and legal facts. 241 Subsumption or non-
subsumption proceeds on the basis of this Gestalt. 242 
(vi) The threefold "purpose" (noted in (ii) above) - which, as mentioned in 
(iv), is committed to the "context of social realities" - may make for an 
"adjusted prejudice-horizon", a new "pre-understanding". In a word, the 
evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" (see (v) above) would 
undergo adjustment.243 And so the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" 
would be organized into a new stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal 
norm" and "legal facts". Subsumption may now be observed to take place 
where previously it did not - and conversely. 244 
(vii) Since the "context of social realities"245 is one to which the threefold 
"purpose" has subsumed a commitment, (see (iv) and (vi) above), it would 
lend its force to the activation, alternatively the inactivation, of the 
normative syllogism. The "context of social realities" may make for an 
adjustment to the evaluative dimension of the "narrative moder'. The 
240 See the discussion ofGadamer's conception of"prejudice" or "pre-understanding" in Chapter II 
of this study, at 3.4. 
241 The reader is invited to consult Chapter IV, 2.2.4 in this regard, as also 3C(l) - (3) of the same 
chapter. See the references to Kaufmann, Rigaux, Nethot, Zaccaria and others in Chapter IV of this 
study (in this regard). The "narrative model" of Jackson's conception makes for this 
configurational organization. 
242 On the notion of Gestalt, Jackson cites the insights of J.B. Best. See Jackson Making Sense in 
Jurisprudence (1996) 154. See also Chapter IV, 2.2.4 and 3C(3) in this connection. 
243 The "narrative model'', as seen, is loaded with tacit social evaluations. When it is said that the 
evaluative dimensi<m of the "narrative model" undergoes adjustment, it is meant that these 
evaluations take on a new complexion. 
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"norm" and the "arrangement of facts" would then be organized into a 
novel stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal facts". And 
where formerly it did not occur, subsumption may be seen to proceed - and 
conversely. 
(3) DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT WHERE NECESSARY 
In the discussion of statutory "historicization", it was said that the "intervening 
history of interpretation" of a statute, its Wirkungsgeschichte, may prove of value 
in its construction.246 Axiological performance may, however, necessitate a re-
evaluation of the case law decided under the statute, or any of its provisions. 
Where it appears that ideological distortions have conduced to a particular 
construction - upheld in the case law - the jurist would do well to consider, 
consistently with Gadamer's thesis of the openness of the text, that there may be 
room for another interpretation. 247 Bell, Goodrich and Griffith consider that what 
Stone refers to as "categories of illusory reference"248 - concepts such as 
"reasonableness", "duty of care" and "public interest" - are eminently liable to 
acquire a political complexion in the course of years of judicial interpretation.249 
This sort of consideration is one the jurist would do well to bear in mind. In a 
244 See Chapter IV, 3C( 4) in this regard. 
245 See Chapter IV, at 3C(4). 
246 See, in particular, the discussion of the axis of effective history (nndcr II (3)3.1 above ). 
247 Gadamer' s thesis of the "opt-•tmess of the text" is otherwise known as his "undecidability" thesis. 
(See Chapter II of this study, at 3.4.8.) 
248 See the discussion of Stone in Chapter II, at 2. 
249 See Chapter III, and in particular the discussion of the work of these writers at 2. 
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deserving case, axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and 
"existential context", should be permitted to dictate a different outcome. 
Even where ideological considerations (in the pejorative sense) are not at issue (or 
not distinctly so), a divergent result may be dictated on this basis. The following is 
an instance pointing this up. 
Prokureur-Generaal, Vrystaat v. Ramokhos/50 
This case has already been discussed. What is meant to be portrayed here is how 
concrete-existentialization, as informed by "axiological peiformance", may 
necessitate a re-evaluation of the "intervening history of interpretation" of a 
particular statutory provision, and a departure from precedent in consequence. 
It will be remembered that the court held in this case that the provisions of section 
60(11) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 ofl 977 (as amended) did not alter the 
inquisitorial character of bail proceedings.251 In a previously decided case, S. v. 
Mbele,252 it was asserted that the subsection precluded the judicial officer from 
acting inquisitorially or investigatively. 253 Edeling J. in the course of his judgment 
in Ramokhosi departed from Mbele to this extent.254 
2so Supra. 
251 See the discussion llllder 1.1.2, above. 
252 1996 (I) SACR 2 l 2ry./). 
253 See judgment at l 527ff. 
254 At 1534 C - D. (See also headnote at l 5 l 6E.) 
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(In the event, as it will be recalled, it was held in the course of this judgment that 
section 60( I I) did not fall to be applied at all, inasmuch as the accused was not 
"charged" within the meaning of the subsection.255 One might look upon the 
reasoning process as involving an "adjusted prejudice-horizon" informing the 
evaluative perception of the provision, and thereby ruling out the possibility of 
subsumption. 256) 
(4) VALUE-COMPETITION MAKING FOR DIFFICULTY IN 
HARMONIZING DESIGNS 
It was observed earlier257 that the harmonization of the "purpose" of a statute and 
the design of the Constitution should ordinarily present no serious difficulties. 
Imbued with a "new hermeneutical consciousness", the jurist would in the general 
run of things come up against few obstacles to accomplishing the harmonization of 
designs. It was observed, however, that circumstances could arise where the 
exercise would prove problematic.258 
Readily coming to mind in this regard is the sort of case where it has not yet been 
ascertained which of two or more competing constitutional values is to govern its 
disposition. For ex hypothesi one cannot harmonize designs if one is ignorant of 
one of them. Here the ignorance would pertain to the design of the Constitution. 
255 s th di . d ee e scuss10n un er 1.1.2, above. 
256 The evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying section 60(11) underwent 
adjustment to the extent that the word "charged" was to be given a specific meaning. 
257 See II (4)4.3 above. 
258 See, again, II (4)4.3 above. 
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Axiological performance presupposes the harmonization of designs. So here we 
have a real problem. It is not intractable, however. Assuming the pertinence of a 
particular statutory provision, "existential contexf' is to be deployed as a means of 
indicating the constitutional value to be accorded pre-eminence in the 
circumstances. One's task consists in identifying the value in the particular 
situation most clamant for protection in the light of its relative importance in the 
overall constitutional scheme. 259 
This having been done, the harmonization of designs becomes possible, and 
thereafter axiological performance. 
(5) AXIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE: SOME EXEMPLARY JUDGMENTS 
A critical appraisal of some relevant cases would make for an enhanced 
appreciation of the principles discussed under (2) - (4) above. We turn without 
more ado to consider some noteworthy judgments. 
HI th H . 260 a s wayo v. em 
This decision, as seen, provides an apt illustration of the harmonization of designs. 
Upon implementation of that methodology, it became possible to establish the 
"purpose" in the light of which section 33(1 )(t) of the Land Reform Act, pertaining 
to the question of costs, was required to be read in the circumstances of the case. 
259 See Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers 1996(6) BCLR 836(W) at 853 F-G, and 854 B-C, as cited 
in Concorde Plastics v. NUMSA at 1646 B-D. See also the headnote to the latter case at 16261-J: 
" ... [I]n [the] situation ... most clamant for protection in the light of its relative importance in the 
overall constitutional scheme" is how the headnote reads. 
260 s upra. 
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The ''purpose" in question (being threefold) embraced the "purposes" of the statute 
and the Constitution (as harmonized) and the "purpose" of servicingjustice. 261 
Such a threefold "purpose", together with the "existential context", made for 
axiological performance. The "existential context" embraced not only the 
"arrangement of facts", but also the broader "context of social realities" (of which 
the former concededly formed a part). Appreciation of the "context of social 
realities" implied attention to the social and economic inequalities pervading the 
society. In making the order it did as to costs, the court sought to give meaning to 
the notion of substantive equality (as opposed to equality in its mere formal 
conception). 262 
Van Zyl v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue263 
In this case, the applicant, a liquidator of a company, sought an order to the effect 
that interest earned on funds invested by him in terms of section 394(1)(b) of the 
Companies Act, 61 of 1973 (as amended) in the course of the winding-up of the 
company did not constitute a receipt or an accrual of that company and was 
therefore not taxable in the hands of the company in terms of the Income Tax Act, 
58of1962 (as amended).264 
In the case of the insolvency of an individual, the trustee is not under any duty to 
pay tax in respect of income accruing to the insolvent estate. It was contended on 
261 See discussion llllder 4.3.1, above. 
262 The decision was therefore sensitive to the hmnan, social and economic considerations relevant 
to the issue. 
263 1997 (3) BCLR 404 (C). 
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behalf of the applicant that the legislature deemed it meet that the consequences of 
the liquidation of a company should approximate as closely as possible to those of 
the sequestration of an insolvent individual, and therefore that a parallel regime 
should apply with regard to the former. 265 The court maintained that such a 
contention could not be sustained. The position of "liquidator" was not at all fully 
to be equated with that of "trustee". Whereas the liquidator merely assumes the 
management of the company in liquidation, the trustee is in law owner of the assets 
of the insolvent estate. Income earned during a liquidation vests in the company. 
By contrast, income earned during a sequestration vests in the trustee. The 
argument as to substantial equivalence of regime fell to be dismissed. 266 
It was further contended on behalf of the applicant that section 35(3) of the Interim 
Constitution, read with section 8 thereof (the "equality" clause), required that the 
consequences of sequestration and of winding-up should so far as possible be 
rendered harmonious. 267 The court did not accede to this argument either, pointing 
to the fact that the equality provision outlawed unfair discrimination (as, for 
instance, discrimination against certain categories of persons who had in the past 
been disadvantaged). Discrimination was indeed part of the design of the Income 
Tax Act, but such discrimination was not unfair. 268 In the result, the application 
was dismissed. 269 
264 s . d ee JU gment at 406 B-C. (See also headnote at 404 1-J.) 
265 At 407 F-1. (See also headnote at 405 A-B). 
266 See judgment at 407J-408C. (See also headnote 405 B-F.) 
26" 
'At 413 A-B. (See also headnote at 405 G-H.) 
268 At 413 H-1. 
269 See judgment at 414 (conclusion). 
245 
The metatheory gives us to understand the judgment as follows. The "purpose" of 
the statute or its sub-statutory components was to be established, using the 
methodologies of purposive-definition. The latter process would also involve the 
court in harmonizing that "purpose" with the design of the Constitution. The 
purpose of ''justice", being integrally a part of that design, was to be linked to the 
(harmonized) result. A single, composite threefold purpose would lend itself to 
apprehension in consequence. 
Axiological performance as mediated by "purpose" and "existential context" could 
now take its course. "Purpose" and the "context of social realities" - to which it 
subsumes a commitment - would give the evaluative dimension of the "narrative 
model" underlying the operative provisions to remain much as it had been 
previously. The "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" were therefore to organize 
themselves into the same stable configuration (Gestalt) as formerly they might 
have of "legal norm" and "legal facts". And the result is that the application would 
fall to be dismissed. 
(It may be important to notice that the court did not present its argument along the 
lines of this theoretical exposition. Its reasoning from the premises of the 
Constitution was very much a matter of incident. Nevertheless, the judge's 
manner of proceeding, as embodied in the judgment, is entirely compatible with 
the above scheme. Had he elected to undertake an analysis in keeping with the 
processual detail of the metatheory, however, he might have cast into sharper relief 
the demands of value-laden adjudication.) 
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S. v. Letaoana270 
The appellant was arrested at the scene of a motor vehicle accident, and charged 
with culpable homicide, in the alternative, reckless or negligent driving of a motor 
vehicle in contravention of section 120(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 29 of 1989. 271 
He was denied bail in the magistrate's court. Such refusal was prompted by the 
circumstance that he had no assets to speak of at all, as also by the fact that there 
were concerns for his own safety. 272 The judge held that the magistrate had 
misdirected himself, and released the appellant on bail ofRl 000.273 
In coming to this decision, the court had to deal with legislative amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977: section 60 was substituted in its entirety by 
section 3 of Act 75 of 1995.274 It is interesting that the judge proceeded with 
sub-statutory intra-textual contextualization; section 60(4)(b), it was held, was 
required to be read with section 60(6). The section as an entirety governs bail 
applications. The sort of intra-textual contextualization undertaken pointed to the 
"purpose" of the section. 
The judge then turned to section 35(1 )(f) of the (Final) Constitution, which 
provides for the right of a person arrested for allegedly having committed an 
offence to be released from detention "if the interests of justice permit, subject to 
270 1997 {I I) BCLR 1581 (W). 
271 See judgment at 1583 H-1. 
272 At 1594 B-J. 
273 At 1595 G-H. 
274 At 1586 E. 
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reasonable conditions". 275 Section 39(2) of the Constitution, he took occasion to 
observe, differs from its predecessor in that whereas "due regard" was previously 
mandated with respect to the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" in 
construing legislation, the current imperative is formulated in the word 
"promote".276 It means to "further" or "advance", and is more affirmative in its 
tenor.277 With this, it is to be considered that the judge understood the design of 
the Constitution to impact upon the matter at hand. 
It appears that the court undertook to harmonize the "purpose" of section 60 with 
the design of the Constitution. 278 (It appears, too, that such harmonization 
engendered the "attribution of purpose" to the section279 in the light of the 
Constitution.) 
Axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential context," 
could now take its course. Once again, "purpose" subsumes a commitment to the 
"context of social realities". In this case, the "context of social realities" pertained 
to the interests of accused persons in securing bail for one thing. For another, it 
conjured up the picture of people committing horrendous crimes upon their release 
on bail, and of public outrage in consequence. 
What happened in this case was that the evaluative dimension of the "narrative 
modeI" underlying section 60 underwent an adjustment (by reason of "purpose" 
275 At 1589 A. 
276 Seejudgmentat 1591 C. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Atl591D. 
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and the "context of social realities"), such that the "norm" and the "arrangement of 
facts" organized themselves into a novel stable configuration of "legal norm" and 
"legal facts". Subsumption proceeded accordingly. The court held that denying 
bail in deserving cases was no way to address problems attending its concession. 280 
Fedsure Life Assurance v. Greater Jhb. Transitional Metropolitan Council 281 
In this case, the question arose whether it was in order for a transitional 
metropolitan council to levy contributions from those of its substructures with 
surpluses of income over expenditure, and to make them over to those with 
deficits. 282 
Counsel for the applicants raised the contention that section 178(2) of the Interim 
Constitution, Act 200of1993, militated in its terms against the propriety of such a 
scheme. That section provided that any moneys levied by the council would 
require to be "based on a uniform structure for its area of jurisdiction". It would 
not be lawful, so proceeded the contention, for contributions to be levied along the 
lines described. 283 
Premier's Proclamation, 35 of 1995 set forth in an annexure the powers and duties 
of transitional metropolitan councils. Section 23( c) of the annexure allowed for 
the levying of an equitable contribution from any substructure.284 Goldstein J. 
---------------·---------------------.-·--------·-------------------------·------··-·--
279 Ibid. 
280 See judgment at 1595 G. 
281 1997 (5) BCLR 657(y./). 
282 s . d eeJu gment at 659 B-J. (See also headnote at 657 F-H.) 
283 See judgment at 662F-H. 
284 See judgment at 661 A, where section 23 ( c) is cited. 
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advanced that section 23(c) may well contemplate the type of redistribution 
entailed by the scheme, seeing that constituent parts of the area were 
interdependent, and bearing in mind the movement of people, goods and services 
within that area.285 The judge further noted section 35(3) of the (Interim) 
Constitution, and drew attention to the provisions of its section 8 (the "equality" 
clause).286 
In the result, the court concluded that the requirements of section 178(2) of the 
Constitution as to "uniform structure" did not render the scheme unlawful: 
uniformity of treatment at every level and in every respect was not required.287 
The judge seems to have been committed rather to a vision of substantive equality. 
The scheme was justified by reason of the disparity of resources and infrastructural 
development between substructures. 288 
Stated in terms of our model, it was sought in this case to harmonize the "purpose" 
of the Proclamation and the design of the Constitution. An astute reader of the 
judgment might further be tempted to read the court's argument as implying an 
"attribution of purpose" to section 23(c) of the Proclamation in the light of the 
supreme law. 
Axiological performance is mediated by "purpose" and "existential context." The 
"context of social realities" (to which "purpose" is committed) would engender an 
285 At 661 J - 662A. 
286 At 665D-F. 
287 66 At 6C-D. (See also headnote at 658 I.) 
288 At 666B. 
250 
advertence to the social and econorrnc inequalities as between the vanous 
substructures. 
This circumstan~e would entail an adjustment to the evaluative dimension of the 
"narrative model" underlying section 23( c ), such that the "norm" and the 
"arrangement of facts" would organize themselves into a new stable configuration 
of "legal norm" and "legal facts". And subsumption would occur where 
previously it might not have been possible. 
DTA of Namibia v. Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia: 289 
This judgment has been dealt with previously in passing. It is now broached in its 
detail. The facts of the case are not difficult of articulation. The applicant sought 
an order allowing the inspection of sealed election material on the grounds of 
alleged electoral irregularities. The majority of the court dismissed the application. 
The dissenting judgment expressed a view to the contrary. 290 
Hannah J. (with whom Mtambanengwe J. concurred) delivered the majority 
judgment. The provision at issue was section 93(4) of the Electoral Act, 42 of 
1992 (Namibia). In terms of the strict wording of the subsection, the court had the 
power to make the order requested only upon its being satisfied that the inspection 
was required for the purposes of instituting or maintaining a prosecution in respect 
of an electoral offence. 291 
289 1996(3) BCLR 310 (NmH). 
290 O'Linn J. 's dissenting judgment is to be fi.mnd on pages 321 ff of the report. 
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Hannah J. sought to give effect to the plain meaning of the provision. He cited 
with approval a dictum enunciated by a judge of repute in 1832: "Where the 
language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be 
the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the 
legislature."292 The court admitted that its approach might work injustice, but 
contended that it was for the legislature to correct the defect. 293 The applicant 
could not pray in aid the Constitution to buttress his case. The court simply did not 
have the power to make the order.294 
The positivist demeanour of the majority would be congenial to a dispensation of 
parliamentary supremacy. But it is misconceived within an order of constitution-
alism. It would be entirely inappropriate to base one's approach upon the dictum 
cited by the court in present-day South African circumstances. Much to be 
preferred is the reasoning of O'Linn J. in his dissenting judgment. 
O'Linn J. clearly sought to establish a threefold "purpose" upon which to base his 
reading of the provision at issue: the "purpose" of the statute, the design of the 
Constitution, and the "purpose" of justice. In elucidating the purpose of the 
statute, he undertook, as we have seen, the methodologies of intra-textual 
contextualization and statutory "historicization". 295 He then sought to harmonize 
the designs of the statute and the Constitution, and one may very well discern an 
291 See judgment at 3151. 
292 This proposition emanated from Tindal CJ. in Wartburton v. Loveland (1832) 2D & Cl (HL) 
480 at 489. It is cited in the decision at hand at 317B of the report. 
293 See 3 J 7B-C, and 3161-317 A. 
294 See 3 l 8H-I. 
295 See the discussions ooder these respective heads, in this chapter, ooder II ( 1) and II (3). 
252 
"attribution of purpose" to the statute m accordance with the tenets of 
constitutionalism. 
The "purpose" as thus established (which subsumes a commitment to the "context 
of social realities") lent a new evaluative dimension to the "narrative modeI" 
underlying subsection 93(4). The "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" 
concomitantly organized themselves into a new stable configuration (Gestalt) of 
"legal norm" and "legal facts". And, at the same time, this entailed the activation 
of the normative syllogism (where formerly subsumption would not have 
occurred). O'Linn J. maintained that the omission of the words "for the purpose of 
a petition questioning an election or return" (as they were embodied in a precursor 
enactment) from section 13(4) was probably a result of bad draftsmanship.296 
In the light of these findings, O'Linn J. was disposed, it seems, to supplement a 
casus omissus (a contingency not provided for by the legislature in so many 
words297) in the light of the Constitution. The usual rule is that the common law 
obtains in these circumstances,298 and so the judge's proclivity seems rather daring. 
However, it should be borne in mind that he did not propose to legislate -
precursor legislation provided the material upon which he considered himself in a 
position to draw. Indeed, had he intended to go very much further than this, he 
may well have misdirected himself. 
296 At 3278. 
"
97 See Hiemstra and Gonin op cit 166, whre a casus omissus is defined as a "contingency not 
provided for by the statute." 
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We should, however, remember that O'Linn J.'s was a minority judgment, and that 
his dispositions are therefore to be read as in the subjunctive mood. 
Molutsi v. Minister of Law and Order 299 
The plaintiff instituted an action for damages against the defendant in respect of 
the fatal shooting of her husband by a member of the South African Police.300 It 
was necessary for the court to determine whether the action had become time-
barred in terms of the relevant legislation,301 as the defendant contended. 
Section 32 of the Police Act, 7 of 1958, stipulated for a period of six months 
within which proceedings were required to be commenced subsequent to the cause 
of action. 302 A Presidential Proclamation issued in terms of section 237(3) of the 
Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, provided in its section 17 for a much more 
equitable and flexible approach to the matter of limitations. Subsections 17(1) and 
17(2) laid down certain requirements as to time, and subsection 17(5) granted the 
court the power to dispense with these requirements in the interests of justice. 303 
The judge held that the effect of the Proclamation was to repeal section 32 of the 
Police Act.304 In any case, a literal reading of that section (with its objectionable 
features) would not tally with the interpretive injunctions of section 35 of the 
298 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes (1986) 151. See also Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 
(1981) 16. 
299 1995 (12) BCLR 1658 (W). 
300 See judgment at l 660B-C. 
301 The statutory provision in question was section 32 of the Police Act, 7of1958. (See also flynote 
at 1658 C-D.) 
302 At l 660D. 
303 s . d ee JU gment at l 662A-C. (See also headnote at l 658F-H.) 
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Constitution.305 If section 32 of the Police Act were applicable (note the 
subjunctive character of the stipulation), it would necessitate a construction that 
would less severely curtail the rights guaranteed in terms of sections 8 and 22 of 
the Constitution. 306 
The sole prov1s1on of law govemmg the issue, then, was section 17 of the 
Proclamation.307 In the light of the facts of the case, the court was actuated to 
exercise its powers of dispensation with the requirements relative to time as 
conferred by section 17(5).308 In the result, the judge held in favour of the 
plaintiff. 309 
Subjecting the decision to analysis in terms of the metatheory, we may say the 
following. The judge looked to the structure of the Proclamation in order to 
ascertain its "purpose". One may read his reasons as attempting a harmonization 
of designs, too, as well as servicing the "purpose" of justice. And thus was a 
composite threefold "purpose" brought to light. 
This threefold "purpose" subsumes a commitment to the "context of social 
realities". The judge accounted for this context by adverting to the various 
exigencies that arise in relation to the institution of proceedings against the Police 
Service.310 The evaluative dimension of the "narrative modeI" underlying section 
304 At 16611. 
305 At 1670G. 
306 At 1670E. 
307 At l 668C-D. 
308 At l 669F-H. 
309 At 1671 B-C. 
310 At 1668H. 
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17 underwent an adjustment, such that the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" 
organized themselves into a new stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and 
"legal facts" - and this in a way that activated the normative syllogism. 
And thus was axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential 
context", exemplified in this judgment. 
Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd. v. NUMSA 311 
Under III ( 4) above,312 the issue of value-competition making for difficulty in the 
harmonization of designs was adumbrated. In the course of discussing this case, it 
will be endeavoured to demonstrate the modus operandi to be adopted in dealing 
with this type of problem. 
The facts of the case are these. The managing director of a private company, Mr 
Fellgiebel, was met with allegations that he had indulged in acts of sexual 
harassment and abusive language towards his employees.313 Clearly dismayed by 
these allegations, he sought to vindicate his reputation in a defamation suit - which 
the court in the end decided in his favour. 314 
Some two months prior to the determination of the defamation action by Stegmann 
J., Mr Fellgiebel dismissed seven employees on the grounds of disloyalty, in that 
311 1997 (11) BCLR 1624 (LAC). 
312 See III(4) above. 
313 See judgment at I 628B-H. 
314 See 1650C. 
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evidence had been tendered against him in the course of the trial.315 In fact, only 
two employees actually testified, the remaining five having done nothing more 
than obey the subpoena and present themselves at court.316 The Industrial Court 
ruled that the dismissals were substantively fair, though procedurally irregular.317 
In the Labour Appeal Court, Marcus A.J. found that the dismissals were 
substantively unfair, and ordered the reinstatement of the employees.318 The judge 
considered that the two witnesses who had been called upon to testify faced a 
thorny dilemma. They were required on pain of legal sanction to tell the truth, and 
this carried the risk of conflict with their employer.319 
In coming to his decision as to "substantive unfairness", Marcus A.J. was required 
to give meaning to the term "unfair labour practice" as defmed in the Labour 
Relations Act, 28 of 1956. In so doing, he was bound, in terms of section 35(3) of 
the Interim Constitution, to reckon with the values underpinning constitutionalism. 
In this case, the need arose to equilibrate conflicting rights. 
It was incumbent upon the court to balance the employees' rights (to fair labour 
practices and to access to court) and the employer's (to freedom of association and 
to engage freely in economic activity). 320 The Constitution itself gave no ready 
answer as to which of these rights should prevail in a conflict. It was necessary, 
315 See 1640D-E. 
316 Ibid. 
317 At !631D. 
318 See 1649C-D, 1650A, and 165 IC. 
319 At !640D. 
320 See 16451-J. Regard was also required to be had to the employer's right to fair labolll' practices 
(Ibid). 
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therefore, for the judge to formulate a basis for such ascertainment. Its purport 
was the identification of the value in the situation most clamant for protection in 
the light of its relative importance in the overall constitutional scheme.321 In the 
circumstances of this case, access to court answered to the description of the value 
in question.322 That value was foundational to the stability of the society and the 
amicable resolution of disputes.323 
It followed from this that, in dismissing the employees upon the grounds proferred, 
the employer had given his actions to be comprehended within the notion of an 
"unfair labour practice". 324 
Bringing the metatheory to bear upon this judgment, one appreciates immediately 
that the harmonization of designs, as a precondition to formulating the necessary 
threefold "purpose", could not take place automatically. It was not possible to 
accomplish this step in the abstract. (This was because it could not be known in 
advance which of the values taken up in the Constitution was to lend its force to 
the interpretation.) 
Here, as ever, axiological performance involved "purpose" and "existential con-
text". In this case, "purpose" was the unknown term. 
321 At ! 646B-C. In this, the court drew upon the observations of Cameron J. in Holomisa v. Argus 
Newspapers 1996(6) BCLR 836(W) at 853F-G and 854B-C. The wording is culled from the 
headnote at 16261-J. Seen 259, above. 
322 At 1644G. 
323 See 1644G-1645H. 
324 See I 64 7E. 
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"Existential context" refers to the broad "context of social realities" (of which the 
"arrangement of facts" serving for determination must be deemed a component). 
In looking to the "existential context", the court took account of the importance of 
the forensic arena to life in the modem polity, and of that of giving evidence in a 
litigious forum. The more narrowly defined "arrangements of facts" were such as 
point up the value of access to court as pre-eminent in the circumstances. (The 
judge was astute to note that if the "arrangement of facts" were otherwise, for 
example, should the employees have perjured themselves, the value to be accorded 
primacy might have been another.325) 
We see, then, that the "existential context" served as an instrument in coming by a 
composite, threefold "purpose". The evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" 
underlying the concept of an "unfair labour practice" underwent an adjustment in 
the light of this "purpose", such that the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" 
organized themselves into a new stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and 
"legal facts". Concomitantly with this, subsumption was to take its course. 
Bernstein v. Bester N.O. 326 
This case concerned the constitutionality of sections 417 and 418 of the 
Companies Act, 61 of 1973 (as amended).327 It was contended that these 
provisions were incompatible with a number of constitutionally entrenched rights; 
they stipulated for the interrogation of persons as to the affairs of a company in the 
325 See 1647F-G. 
326 1996(4) BCLR 449(CC). 
327 See judgment at 453G-454A. (See also headnote at 450E.) 
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event of its liquidation.328 In the result, the court held that they were not 
unconstitutional (except to the extent already decisively indicated in a previous 
judgment). 329 
Looming large in this instance was the right to privacy (as embodied in section 13 
of the Interim Constitution). In terms of section 418(5)(b)(iii)(aa) of the 
Companies Act, a person who, having been duly summoned under section 417 or 
418 to the examination, fails without sufficient cause to answer fully and 
satisfactorily any question laefully put to him in terms of section 417(2) or section 
418, shall be guilty of an offence.330 According to Ackermann J., sufficient cause 
for not responding in the manner required to a question posed is to be found in the 
fact that the answer thereto would threaten a fundamental right, unless such right 
was restricted in a manner in keeping with the limitations clause (section 33(1)).331 
One could, as the judge points out, rephrase this by saying that in such an event the 
question would not be one lawfully put,332 with the consequence that the examinee 
would not be obliged to answer. 
It is to be observed that these remarks bear the quality of high generality. In any 
specific case, "purpose" and "existential context" would mediate axiological 
performance. As regards "purpose", the above comments reflect the manner in 
which the harmonization of designs is to proceed, and concomitantly therewith an 
328 See the reproduction in their terms at 455E-457E of the judgment. 
329 See 504F. The judgment in point (rendering a finding of partial invalidity with respect to the 
provisions of section 417) was Ferreira v. Levin NO, Vryenhoek v. Powell NO (CCT 5/95). 
330 See 482D-E. 
331 See 482E-F. 
332 See 482F. 
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"attribution of purpose" to the statute. The "context of social realities" (to which 
"purpose" subsumes a commitment) would affect the evaluative dimension of the 
"narrative models" underlying the provisions in question. The result would be 
that the "norms" and the "arrangements of facts" may organize themselves into 
new stable configurations of "legal norms" and "legal facts". And the normative 
syllogism would be variously activated or inactivated. 
A case decided along these lines (that is, with the indicated sensitivity to "purpose 
and the "context of social realities"), would perhaps promote a reconsideration of 
pre-constitutional judicial decisions with respect to the law of "privacy" in this 
regard. A re-evaluation of the Wirkungsgeschichte ("effective history") of the 
provisions in question would be in the offing. 333 
Ackermann J. notices very significantly that the development of the law of 
"privacy" in relation to sections 417 and 418 requrres a case-by-case determi-
nation.334 Here we have a clear affrrmation of the crucial role of "existential 
context" in the interpretation of legislation. 
Ne! v. Le Roux NO. 335 
Substantially similar in its thrust to Bernstein v. Bester,336 is the judgment in Ne! v. 
Le Roux N. 0. In this case, it was the constitutionality of section 205 of the 
333 See the discussion mder III (3) above. 
334 At 483D. (See also headnote at 451J-452A.) 
335 1996(4) BCLR 592 (CC). 
336 Supra. 
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Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (as amended) that was in issue. 337 Section 205 
established what, on the fact of it, is a somewhat repressive mechanism for 
procuring information from a recalcitrant witness in respect of an alleged offence. 
Such a person may be required to appear before a judicial officer for an 
examination by a representative of the prosecuting authority.338 Section 189 is 
incorporated by reference in section 205.339 It provides for a sentence of up to two 
years' imprisonment in respect of a refusal to produce evidence in the absence of a 
'just excuse". 340 Ackermann J. upheld the constitutionality of section 205.341 
In the course of his reasons, Ackermann J. commented that if any of the 
examinee's fundamental rights were infringed, the latter would have a 'just 
excuse" for his or her refusal to answer a question, unless the section 189 
compulsion to do so was in the circumstances a justifiable limitation of the right at 
issue within the terms of the derogation clause (section 33(1)) of the (Interim) 
Constitution. 342 
The court noted that judgments concermng the proper application and 
interpretation of section 205, which were delivered m the pre-constitutional 
dispensation, would not of necessity reflect the meaning to be attached to the 
notion of a "just excuse" within the wording of the section. A considerable body 
of case law, then, may require emendation.343 
337 See judgment at 595E. 
338 See the terms of the section as reproduced in the judgment at 595F-596B. 
339 See judgment at 597 A. 
340 See 598C. 
341 At 607A. 
342 At 600B. 
343 At 603E-F. 
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The same observations as were noted in relation to the theoretical underpinnings of 
any practical implementation of the abstract formulations in Bernstein v. Bester 
NO are relevant to the "concretization" of Ackermann J.' s pronouncements in this 
case. It suffices to notice, once again, that what might be spoken of as a re-
evaluation of the "effective history" (or Wirkungsgeschichte) of the operative 
provisions may be necessitated. 
(6) "MITTELBARE DRITTWIRKUNG"344 IN STATUTORY INTERPRE-
TATION 
The observant reader will have noticed that the last three cases canvassed implicate 
open-ended, potentially value-laden, terms. Concorde Plastics was concerned 
with the meaning of ''unfair labour practice", Bernstein with that of "sufficient 
cause", and Nel with that of "just excuse". 
Stone (together with his fellow American realists) would speak of these terms as 
"categories of illusory reference". By that he would wish to have his point 
registered that the jurist is fundamentally free insofar as their construction is 
concerned, and that, armed with this knowledge, she should give full effect to 
considerations of justice and social realities. 345 
Goodrich, Bell and Griffith would maintain that these terms are the very things by 
way of which ideological distortions are most likely to enter into the fabric of the 
344 The reference here is to the "radiating effect" of constitutional values - concededly on an 
indirect basis - on the construction of statutes. See Chapter V of this study at 2.3.5. 
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law. Open-ended phrases like these, they would hold, are simply conduits through 
which predominant political values will find their juridical expression.346 
Stone's views are fundamentally wholesome. Pressed to the outer limit of their 
conception, however, they are liable to render the law altogether too "open" (in 
Nonet and Selznick's sense). On the other hand, the pessimism engendered by 
Goodrich and scholars of a like disposition does little to bolster the confidence of 
the jurist grappling with a practical problem. 
Our theoretical framework - harnessing the concepts of "purpose" and "existential 
context" - is geared both to the implementation of Stone's concern for social 
realities (without pressing his point too far) and to providing an antidote to any 
such defeatist sentiments as might attend the work of a jurist cognisant of the 
demeanour of critical legal scholarship. 
Axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential context" 
allows for mittelbare Drittwirkung in what, it is submitted, is the most appropriate 
fashion. 
(7) AXIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE AND LITERALISM: 
DEPARTURE FROM "PLAIN MEANING" 
The discussion under III (2)-(6), above, has surely made plain that literalism fails 
to account for the essential nerve of statutory interpretation. When the provisions 
345 See the discussion of Stone in Chapter II, at 2. 
335 See Chapter III of this study, at 2. 
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analysed along the five axes of the process of ingression, and the "arrangement of 
facts" to which they relate are revisited in the light of the threefold "purpose" 
noted (with its commitment to the "context of social realities"), they render 
themselves open to possible reconceptualisation.347 
The "plain meaning" approach is barren inasmuch as it blinkers itself to the 
possibility of the investment of the provisions at hand with a new semantic 
complexion. In a reversion to particularity this is all too likely to occur.348 
7.1 Restrictive Interpretation 
Let us turn initially to the device of restrictive interpretation as a means of 
statutory exegesis. Interpretation along these lines may well be to be applauded 
when penal and other onerous provisions are at issue, for instance. 
What is to be deprecated generally is a literalism which would insulate itself from 
violation in the constructive enterprise even to the extent of allowing an injustice. 
7.1.1 The "eiusdem generis" rule 349 
Restrictive interpretation is perhaps best exemplified in the application of the 
eiusdem generis rule. S. v. Kohle? 50 affords a neat illustration of its application. 
There the Heidelberg Town Council Poultry Regulations made it an offence to 
347 See the opening paragraphs of the discussion llllder II, above, the process of purposive-
definition. 
348 See Ibid. 
349 This, as has been seen in Chapter I, at 4.2.3, is a means of restrictive interpretation. literally 
translated, it means "of the same kind". 
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keep poultry within the jurisdiction of the council without the necessary permit. 
The appellant kept peacocks in defiance of the regulations. What had to be 
established was whether the peacocks were "poultry" within the meaning of 
section I of the Administrator's Notice I 64 of I I February I 996, in terms of which 
Notice the regulations in question were promulgated.351 Section 1 defined 
"poultry" as "any fowl, duck, goose, turkey, guinea fowl, partridge, pheasant, 
pigeon or the chickens thereof, or any other bird."352 
Hirsch, one remembers, would seek to define the "category" or "class" represented 
by the words "or any other bird" with reference to the type of birds enumerated in 
the definition. 353 And this is what the court did in invoking the eiusdem generis 
rule as a solvent of its difficulties. It held that as a "peacock" was either a fowl or 
a pheasant within the definition of "poultry" as noted, the appellant had been 
rightly convicted of a contravention of the relevant regulations.354 
Now, there is no basis in law or justice upon which this decision can be faulted. 
Problems could conceivably arise, however, upon a mechanical application of the 
rule in question. Hirsch would have us always determine the "class" with 
reference to its defining "instances". 355 Say, for example, that an enactment 
prohibits the possession of "guns, firearms, automatic pistols and other weapons" 
within a municipal precinct. Hirsch would say that the "class" represented by the 
350 1979(1) SA 861 (T). 
351 s th . d ee e JU gment at 862, generally. (See also headnote at 861.) 
352 Ibid. 
353 See the discussion in Chapter I of this study, at 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 in this regard. The exposition of 
the class-instance relationship and the type-trait model is particularly relevant in this context. 
354 See judgment 8630-F. (See also headnote at 861.) 
355 Once again, refer to the discussion of Hirsch in Chapter I of this study, at 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. 
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"instances" stipulated is that of "automated weaponry", and this would indeed be a 
legitimate inference. But a conclusion to this effect may conceivably be adequate 
only to the phase of ingression. Supposing certain "non-automated weaponry" to 
be as destructive as their automated equivalents, axiological performance as 
mediated by "purpose" and "existential context" may speculatively demand that 
these, too, should come within the meaning of the "class" of prohibited weapons. 
The eiusdem generis rule would in that event be deemed to be inapplicable. 
(Restrictive interpretation would frustrate axiological performance.) 
7.1.2 The "cessante" rule 356 
The cessante rule reads to the effect that if the rationale of a legal precept no 
longer subsists, that precept ceases to find application. Implementation of this 
rule is also a mode of restrictive interpretation. 357 Take a hypothetical provision: 
"If x occurs, steps shall be taken by the Court to equalize the position as between 
the parties." On the face of it, this provision means what it says; the phase of 
ingression would find as much. Suppose, however, that the parties had already 
made arrangements to even out the position as between themselves. Axiological 
performance as mediated by "purpose" and "existential context" would then 
obviate the need for the court to take any particular steps. In this instance, 
axiological performance would command a restrictive interpretation.358 
7.1.3 Axiological Performance requiring Restrictive lnterpreta6on 
356 The full rendering of the rule is cessante ratione /egis cessat et ipsa lex. It is to the effect that in 
the event of the lapsing of the rationale of a rule, such a rule ceases to be of application. 
357 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes ( 1986) 152. 
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(The Two Mistry-Judgments) 
The two judgments in Mistry v. Interim National Medical and Dental Council of 
South Africc/'59 also demonstrate restrictive interpretation as a means to axiological 
performance. Section 28( 1) of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, 
I 01 of 1965, in terms of which certain items in the possession of a medical 
practitioner (the applicant) had been seized in the course of an inspectorial 
investigation pursuant to allegations of misconduct, served as an important subject-
matter of construction in this case. 360 In the result, the court referred the question 
of the constitutionality of section 28(1) to the Constitutional Court, inasmuch as it 
impinged upon the right of privacy entrenched in section 13 of the (Interim) 
Constitution.361 But for purposes of disposing of the matter at hand, the subsection 
was required to be dealt with upon the assumption of its compatibility with the 
supreme law. 
The court conceived its task (as implied in section 35(3) of the Interim 
Constitution) as that of "reading down"362 section 28(1) in accordance with the 
provisions of section 232(3) of the Constitution, so as to import an objectively 
justiciable requirement of reasonableness. Such an interpretation meant that an 
item could be seized only if there were reasonable grounds that it would afford 
358 We see, then, that axiological performance may variously enjoin or counsel against restrictive 
interpretation. 
359 1997(7) BCLR 933(D) and 1997(10) BCLR I 460(D). 
360 See first judgment at 946G ff. 
361 See first judgment at 9641. 
362 There is no equivalent of the "reading down" provision in the Final Constitution. This does not 
in any way mean, however, that such a strategy will not prove of value in many cases. "Reading 
down" (even for want of its express stipulation in the Final Constitution) should be resorted to 
when this is deemed necessary to proper axiological performance. 
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evidence of a contravention of the Act.363 In consequence, the court ruled that 
several items that were seized were to be returned, on the basis that no such 
reasonable grounds could be said to exist in their regard.364 McLaren J. reached 
this conclusion upon a restrictive interpretation of the subsection (which, in 
essence, is what "reading down" in terms of section 232(3) of the [Interim] 
Constitution amounts to). 
This case calls for several comments. Firstly, the (Final) Constitution contains no 
equivalent of section 232(3). This in no way implies, however, that a restrictive 
interpretation along the lines undertaken by the judge in this matter would be 
inappropriate to present-day circumstances. The absence of a "reading down" 
provision most certainly does not signal that this sort of approach would not now 
be apposite in a fitting case. 
Secondly, our attention is drawn to counsel's contention, as noted in the second 
Mistry judgment, to the effect that it might have been better had the court read 
down section 28( 1) so as to import into it the element of "reasonableness in the 
constitutional sense" (and not merely an "objectively justifiable requirement of 
reasonableness").365 What "reasonableness in the constitutional sense" entails is 
that the power stipulated for in the subsection would have to be exercised so as not 
to infringe the fundamental right, or where it does so, that the derogation is 
363 See first judgment at 953H - 954C. 
364 See first judgment at 964F. 
365 See second judgment at 1467B. 
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permissible in terms of the limitation clause.366 This aspect is mentioned as an 
alternative approach to restrictive interpretation by way of "reading down". 
Thirdly, section 233 of the (Final) Constitution entrenches "reasonableness" (and 
consistency with international law) as a touchstone of statutory interpretation.367 
This section may be read as pointing, in suitable instances, to the restrictive 
interpretation of a provision where such would square it with this requirement. 
To conclude the subject of axiological performance necessitating restrictive 
interpretation, the reader is referred to the discussion of the Ramokhosi case, more 
particularly that part relating to the meaning to be attached to the word "charged" 
as used in section 60( 11) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (as 
amended). 368 It is reiterated as a concluding observation that the construction of 
provisions imposing burdens and penal provisions should generally proceed on a 
restrictive basis. 369 
7.2 Extensive Interpretation 
A discussion of extensive interpretation is also relevant to the matter of axiological 
performance. Extensive interpretation is of two principal varieties: analogical 
interpretation, and interpretation by implication. These are discussed seriatim. 
366 See second judgment at 14661-J. 
367 Section 233 reads: "When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer my reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law". 
368 See the discussion under 1.1.2, above. 
369 This was noted in introducing the matter of restrictive interpretation. 
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7.2.1. Analogical Interpretation 
This thesis has shown up the pervasiveness of reasoning by analogy in the law. 
Forensic argument is saturated through and through with efforts, very often quite 
strained, to indicate resemblances of aspects of the case at hand to precedent 
instances. In countenancing the "extension" of the "meaning" of words of a 
statutory provision to cover the circumstances of a given case, however, our law 
has been rather diffident. 
It is perhaps the "positivist" conception of the law that is in some measure to 
account for this general hesitance. There seems to be no reason, however, why 
interpretation on the basis of analogy should not be admissible in fitting 
circumstances where a statutory provision is at issue. Recall the example: "No 
dogs in the park".370 The process of ingression would yield an understanding of 
the by-law in its literal sense: a dog is a dog. Axiological performance, as 
mediated by "purpose" and "existential context", may, however, render the 
significance of the of the words of the by-law applicable as much to tame cheetahs 
as to dogs.371 The primordial values of human dignity, equality and freedom might 
conspire in their cumulative effect to produce such an interpretation, along with the 
right to life (section 11) and the right to freedom and security of the person 
(section 12). 
We may take another example: "Compensation shall be paid to victims of natural 
disasters." The process of ingression demonstrates the "meaning" of this provision 
370 See Chapter IV, at 3D, where this example was furnished. 
371 This is what was concluded in the course of the discussion of this hypothetical. 
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as unproblematic. A "natural disaster", after all, is a flood, drought, earthquake, or 
the like. If, however, from the scheme of the statute in its entirety, as read with the 
appropriate hermeneutical consciousness,372 a "purpose" may be inferred to 
compensate also those disadvantaged by acts of state, then, it is suggested, the 
latter category of persons is compensable as well. This would be a bold and 
enterprising construction, but one which, it is submitted, would be quite justified. 
Axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential context'', may 
dictate the legitimacy of such an interpretation. It goes without saying, however, 
that a conclusion as radical as this ought not to be drawn upon a facile basis. 
7.2.2. Interpretation by Implication 
Du Plessis discusses interpretation by implication as a mode of extensive 
interpretation. 373 To a large extent, this categorisation is defensible - for the 
activity denoted involves the elicitation of a "meaning" not immediately apparent 
from a literal reading of the words taken in themselves. The "meaning" at issue is 
nevertheless implicit in the words as strung together - at all events, in the sight of 
those who are members of the legal speech-community.374 For this reason, 
interpretation by implication is not "extensive" in the full sense of the term. 
One remembers that Hirsh said that an "implication" belongs to a "meaning'', as a 
"trait" belongs to a "type" (or, as a part belongs to the whole).375 By virtue of our 
familiarity with the "shared type" (the texts of the law), we are able to "generate" 
372 The reference here is to the "new henneneutical consciousness". 
373 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes ( 1986) 156. 
374 The insights of Wittgenstein and Fish, as broached in Chapter II of this study, at 4.1, are here of 
relevance. 
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implications without their being given to us directly. This is the principle of 
"learned convention". 376 The derivation of implications - the core issue of 
interpretation for Hirsch - proceeds on the basis of judgments of probability:377 
one says, " ... in this context, the words at issue probably mean thus and so, and we 
can say this by reason of our acquaintance with the character and structure of legal 
texts, which is our common stock of (juridical) knowledge."378 
Du Plessis enumerates the considerations that may give rise to interpretation by 
implication thus:379 
(i) Other provisions of the enactment; 
(ii) Ex contrariis, within which notion he is of a mind to include 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius; 
(iii) Ex consequentibus; 
(iv) Ex accessorio eius de quo verba loquuntur; 
(v) A natura ipsius rei; and 
(vz) Ex correlativis. 
(i) As to the derivation of implications from other provisions of an enactment, 
the reader is invited to revert to the discussion of intra-textual 
375 See Chapter I of this study, at 4.2.2. 
376 See Chapter I of this study, at 4.2.2. 
377 For Hirsch, it will be recalled, problems of interpretation resolve themselves into questions 
concerning the derivation of implications. And all this takes place within a framework of 
probabilism. (See Chapter I of this study, at 4.2.2.) 
378 This is my own formulation. 
379 Du Plessis op cit 156-7. 
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contextualization. The case of Ramokhosi as canvassed under that head is 
of particular relevance in this respect.380 
(ii) The idea that the negation of A would entail the negation of X where it is 
expressly stipulated in a statutory provision that A should entail X finds 
crisp formulation in the maxims ex contrariis and expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.381 Suppose that a statute provides that if A should occur, 
a compensatory fine shall be levied. It may be inferred that in the absence 
of the occurrence of A, no compensatory fine is to be levied. 
When all is said and done, it seems as if the import of the maxims at issue 
is not so much to "extend" the meaning of the words of the statute as to 
render homage to their full literal signification. The underlying principle 
accords well with the Hirschean programme in its fundamental conception. 
There are times, for all this, when a clear departure from literal meaning 
may be warranted, if not compelled, and extension in the true sense 
indicated or mandated. In such instances, Hirsch's framework would be 
inadequate as a source of guidance. Axiological performance, as mediated 
by "purpose" and "existential context", may demand, to elaborate on our 
example, that even in occurrences not assimilable to A in terms, the 
compensatory fine is to be levied. 
380 See the discussion under 1.1.2, above. 
381 Du Plessis renders the import of the ex contrariis principle as follows: "Where an enactment 
makes express provision for certain circumstances, it is inferred that for opposite circumstances the 
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(iii) The maxim ex consequentibus expresses the notion that where an end-
result is prohibited or allowed, all that may by implication conduce thereto 
is respectively proscribed or permitted.382 Say, for instance, that a statute 
prohibits the coining of money. Upon the assumption that "keeping a 
mint" is virtually always directed towards the prohibited end, Hirsch would 
agree that the latter "activity" is to be implied within the concept of 
"coining money". Let us assume, however, that a mint is kept as an 
investment, with the object someday of selling it. In this case, axiological 
performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential context", would 
compel a legal conclusion of a different tenor: the person keeping the mint 
would not be liable to conviction in respect of the named offence. 
(iv) What has been noted in relation to (iii) above is of equal relevance to the 
principle underpinning the maxim ex accessorio eius de quo verba 
loquuntur. Hiemstra and Gonin render it thus: "[If] the principal thing is 
forbidden (or permitted) the accessory thing, too, is forbidden (or 
permitted). "383 
(v) The principle conveyed by the maxim a natura ipsius rei (literally, "from 
the nature of the thing as such") is expressible as the inclusion within a 
matter of those things which by nature or custom are associated with it.384 
A statute empowering a board to make regulations in respect of one or 
contrary will obtain". (op cit 156). The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius conveys that 
the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other. (Ibid). 
382 Du Plessis op cit 157. 
383 See Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary (1981) 183. 
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other matter would for instance normally imply the grant of the power to 
withdraw them. 385 Hirsch, one thinks, would be disposed to read in this 
implication. It is, however, possible to envisage circumstances in which 
axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential 
context", would run counter to such an implication, for example, where the 
withdrawal of the regulations would mean an abrogation of vested rights. 
(vi) Implications may also be derived ex correlativis. Mutual or reciprocal 
relationship is here in point.386 Prohibition of purchase implies prohibition 
of sale; equally, if letting is prohibited, then so is hiring.387 Hirsch would 
agree with a reading along these lines. The legislature's "willed type" - a 
"shared type" that has been learned - seems to compel these implications. 
Yet, not a great deal of imagination is required to conceive of instances in 
which axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential 
context", might speak against pursuing one's construction in this 
"mechanical" way. One can think of circumstances in which it may be 
unjust to punish hiring simply because letting has been made punishable. 
7.3 Modificative Interpretation 
The process of ingression may be relied upon to elicit the "plain meaning" of a 
provision. Axiological performance, as mediated by "purpose" and "existential 
---~··~-~·-------
384 Ibid 153. 
385 See, in this regard, Du Plessis op cit 157. 
386 Du Plessis op cit 157. 
387 Ibid. 
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context" may, however, point up that "plain meaning" as a decided obstacle to its 
consummation. In that instance, one would be faced with an apparent impasse. 
I would suggest that in a case such as this, the jurist would be within her legitimate 
bounds in modifying the plain meaning of the provision to the extent that this is 
necessary to proper axiological performance. Our courts have in the past been 
reluctant to undertake anything of this order. But that was largely attributable to 
the then regnant juridical paradigm of parliamentary sovereignty. This paradigm 
having been supplanted by that of the constitutional state, objections to this mode 
of interpretation are considerably weakened. Concededly, the interpreter does not 
have carte blanche in this regard. It is only to the extent that it is essential to 
proper axiological peiformance, and no further, that modificative interpretation 
should be deemed to be admissible. And it is only to the case at hand that such 
modificative interpretation should be held to pertain. For within a different 
"existential context", axiological performance might perhaps not be frustrated by 
the "plain meaning" of the words of the provision at issue. 
If the qualifications noted in the above paragraph are borne in mind, the jurist 
should be able to undertake this type of interpretation where necessary, at the same 
time respecting the separation of powers and doing justice to the notion of fidelity 
to law. 
IV. THE PROCESS OF EFFECTUATION 
The process of effectuation consists, in essence, in the precise formulation of the 
results of one's interpretive efforts, whether such be in mental consciousness, in 
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speech, or in writing. It would involve the actual enunciation of those canons and 
maxims of statutory interpretation which are seen to be finally determinative of the 
issue. Throughout the preceding phases, certain maxims and canons will have 
come to consciousness as potentially applicable to the matter at hand. By now, 
those which are inappropriate to the case will have been filtered out, as Gadamer 
might say.388 So we see that the application of maxims and canons, so far from 
constituting a starting point in the interpretation of statutes, is to be seen as the 
end-point of the enterprise.389 There being no hierarchy with respect to these 
interpretive guidelines,390 and with so many of them arguing in opposite 
directions, 391 it seems that to look upon them along these lines renders the most 
faithful representation of their function. 
It is submitted that where a departure from precedent is necessitated in virtue of a 
re-evaluation of the Wirkungsgeschichte of the statutory provision(s), there may be 
much to be said for raising the possibility of "prospective overruling". 392 
Considering this possibility should form part of the formulation of one's 
interpretive results, and hence is integral to the process of effectuation. 
388 Gadamer does not use, so far as I am aware, the term "filtered out". But he would no doubt 
acquiesce in the propriety of its use in this context. 
389 Tills constitutes something of a departure from conventional doctrine. It is believed, however, 
that this conception provides a more faithful representation of the circumstances surrounding the 
application of the maxims in question. See Chapter I of this study, at SE( I), as also Chapter II, at 
6A(3). 
390 See Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 370: "There is no 
hierarchy of rules of statutory construction ... each judge may select that which he feels best suited 
to the statute before him." 
391 s c . 
· ee Mac orrmck Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory ( 1978) 207: "The trouble ... about such 
'rules' and 'canons' is that they tend to 'hunt in pairs'; for almost any one of them another can be 
found which in an appropriate context will point to a different result from that which it itself 
indicates". 
392 See, in this regard, Lloyd and Freeman Introduction to Jurispmdence ( 1979) 856-9. The authors 
express themselves against prospective ovenuling (in England). Their discussion is nonetheless 
instructive. 
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In this, the last, phase of statutory interpretation, it may be necessary in 
circumstances pointing to a "casus omissus" to register, in explicit terms, the 
applicability of the common law. In rare instances of this kind, a "casus omissus" 
is to be noted as requiring supplementation in the light of the new value-order 
itselr.393 
Here, too, one marks explicitly whether acts done contrary to statutory provisions 
are null and void. 394 In so recording, one appeals to the ethos of the constitutional 
order as an important basis of substantiation, together with the scheme of the 
enactment. 395 
The conclusive entry of the applicable statute as being in or out of line with the 
precepts of constitutionalism is part and parcel of this phase as well. This 
discussion has presupposed the constitutionality of the relevant legislation. But it 
is in the process of effectuation that the jurist undertakes to answer this question 
decisively - for so far as she is concerned. 
Effectuation establishes a certain fmality to the enterprise. Thereafter, the jurist no 
longer entertains any conscious intention to revisit the question. She harbours a 
reservation, however, to the extent that should subsequent knowledge engender a 
393 See the discussion of the case of DTA of Namibia, supra, without its cautionary remarks 
concerning the extend to which a court would be justified in going with a view to the 
supplementaticm of a casus omissus. 
394 See Du Plessis The Interpretation of Statutes ( 1986) 143-7. See also Steyn op cit l 92ff. 
384 It is submitted that it is no longer adequate to appeal only to the statute itself in so recording -
it is necessary to take the cue from the ethos of constitutionalism additicmally. 
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susp1c10n that the effectuation was misconceived, she would be prepared to 
examine the matter afresh. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter is set forth a theory of statutory interpretation. The inception of the 
enterprise is identifiable in the process of ingression. The following are the five 
axes of the process: 
( 1) Dictionary-meaning appropriation and legislative-definitional 
observance; 
(2) Idiomatic resolution; 
(3) Disambiguation; 
(4) Grammatical responsivity; and 
(5) Sentence-intrinsic structural analysis. 
Compliance with the import of these pointers should secure for the jurist a 
"gateway" into the meaning of the provision at issue. To stop at this juncture 
would be adequate to a literalist endeavour. But value-laden adjudication demands 
much more. Hence the process of purposive-definition. On the basis of the 
following four methodologies is "purpose" to be gathered in consonance with that 
process: 
( 1 ) Intra-textual contextualization; 
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(2) "Intentionalization"; 
(3) Statutory "historicization" (which methodology implicates two 
axes, to wit, the axis of effective history and the axis of statutory 
precursors); and 
( 4) Harmonization of designs. 
The harmonization of designs is indispensable to axiological performance. The 
"new hermeneutical awareness" the jurist brings to bear upon her efforts would 
normally ensure that the reconciliation implicit in the former notion (of statutory or 
sub-statutory and constitutional design) takes place in the absence of conscious 
appraisal. (Value-competition may make for an exception in this regard.) 
Axiological performance is committed to concrete-existentialization. It aims at an 
intuitive perception of the proper disposition of the matter at hand in line with 
constitutionalism. 
The process of effectuation, following immediately upon axiological performance, 
involves the registration in mental consciousness, in speech or in writing of the 
results of the constructive exercise. Provisional finality is thereby established. 
So much by way of summary. Something must now be said about the status of the 
interpretive processes as described. As an initial observation, they are decidedly 
not canons of construction. Rules and canons of interpretation, unlike the 
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processes in question, partake of a juridical character - constituting as they do a 
part of our legal tradition. (More on this presently.) 
On a more affirmative note, the model as comprised of these processes is to be 
conceived as serving two distinct, albeit related, functions. In the first place, it 
represents a way of seeing things which, if made known to the jurist and taken to 
heart, would enable her to carry out her tasks with greater proficiency. In many 
activities in daily living, one's performance is largely unreflective. Consciousness 
of what one is about would frequently improve such performance. The same is to 
be said for the interpretation of statutes. A knowledge of what the exercise entails 
(as supplied by way of the model) would allow the jurist to deploy her talents to 
better effect. 
In the second place, the model has a criteriological function. It may be used in 
order to analyze court decisions bearing upon the interpretation of statutes - with a 
view to the assessment of compliance with its processes. The model would then 
serve as a basis for pointing up deficiencies in statutory construction; and it would 
further suggest a means to their rectification. 
In the light of these remarks, the reader may be inclined to ask herself why it is 
not enough simply to abide by the traditional rules and canons of statutory 
interpretation. After all, these maxims and stipulations are suffused with legal 
significance. They are taught as part of the legal curriculum, and have been down 
through the generations of lawyers. The short answer to such perplexity is to be 
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found, as we have seen in expounding the process of effectuation, in the insight 
that the application of maxims and canons, far from constituting a point of 
departure in the interpretation of statutes , is to be seen rather as the end-point of 
the enterprise. Throughout the antecedently occurring processes, certain maxims 
and canons will have come to the jurist's awareness as of potential applicability to 
the matter at hand. But in the course of effectuation, those which are inapposite to 
the disposition will find their identification as such. 
It is not herewith intended to disparage the importance of the traditional rules and 
maxims of construction, but merely to mark a shift of emphasis. These canons 
should constitute as much part and parcel of the jurist's stock-in-trade as ever they 
were previously. But it is only at the end-point of the constructive enterprise that 
they are to find application. And this signifies a break with the former "lore", 
according to which these rules were to operate as incipient directives. 
Finally, it may occur to the reader to ask herself whether the processes expounded 
in the model are consecutive in point of time. The "hermeneutic arch" provides 
something in the way of a response. Such notion has been employed to 
demonstrate processual interrelatedness. There is probably much "intermeshing" 
in practice, such that it would be misconceived to look upon the processes 
described as "discrete". Further, aspects of one process may present anteriorly (in 
temporal terms) to those of a previously described process - depending upon the 
circumstances of the case. The "hermeneutic arch" brings this out fairly clearly. 
So, it may be said that the interpretive processes do not necessarily take their 
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course in a linear temporal sequence (reflecting the order suggested by the model). 
What is important, however, is that once the exercise of construing a statute has 
been completed (in a situation of its application), it should be possible to say that 
none of the processes has been passed over in dereliction. 
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I. A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR APPROACHING 
THE COMMON LAW 
In approaching the common law, one might take very much the same line as one 
does in interpreting statutes. It is possible to discern a number of similarities in the 
respective methodologies informing these activities. By the same token, however, 
there are some marked differences. 
Among these differences, the most obvious is the entire absence of the processes 
of ingression and purposive-definition from the methodologies appropriate to the 
common law. There is no need, as there is in the case of statutory construction, to 
go about the decipherment of complex legislative formulations in applying the 
common law. Nor is there any necessity to launch upon some sort of conscious 
teleological-definitional stratagem in the latter undertaking. Further, although the 
process of effectuation is common to both, there is nothing comparable to the 
application of the rules and maxims of statutory interpretation in giving effect to 
the common law. 
As with statutory interpretation, to note now the similarities, axiological 
performance is all-pervasive. The "new hermeneutical consciousness" is as much 
in point. It should be revitalized where necessary - by discoursing with fellow 
jurists, exchanging ideas at symposia, and taking cognisance of international 
public opinion. It should on no account be allowed to congeal. 
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Informing the "new hermeneutical consciousness" - here, as in the case of 
statutory interpretation - are the values underlying an "open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" (as understood with 
reference to the norms of public international law). Informing it, too, as being 
integrally a part of the Grundnorm-order, are the objectives of "justice". The latter 
notion is to be conceived as involving the "synchronization of interests". The 
discussion in the first three paragraphs and 1.1 - 1.4 of the previous chapter, 
bearing upon these issues, is equally ofrelevance in the present context. 
(1) THE COMMON LAW AND FIDELITY TO LAW 
Nonet and Selznick's view that "purposiveness" makes for fidelity to legal precept, 
while at the same time securing its responsiveness to social needs is as applicable 
to the common law as it is to the interpretation of statutes.1 Gadamer's thesis of 
the "openness of the text", hereby called to mind, is likewise equally pertinent to 
the handling of common-law materials. 2 And, with this, one is led to Hoy's 
hermeneutical pluralism, with its implicit injunction to strive for the most 
appropriate answer in the circumstances. 3 
In the common law, in seeking to implement the "most appropriate answer" in the 
circumstances, one is to work with a twofold purpose (in contrast to the threefold 
1 See the discussion under III (I) of the preceding chapter, above, on the "fusion of horizons" as a 
basis for fidelity to law. 
2 See the same discussion (under III (1) of the preceding chapter). 
3 See the same discussion (under III (1) of the preceding chapter). 
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purpose operative in the interpretation of statutes). 4 This twofold purpose relates 
to the constitutional design and the "purpose" of justice - with the latter effectively 
taken up in the former. 5 There is, of course, no "statutory purpose" to be serviced 
- and this makes the enterprise distinctive. Yet, as with the interpretation of 
statutes, the approach now under discussion should reckon with the (twofold) 
purpose as a single, composite purpose. 
(2) AXIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE IN HANDLING COMMON-LAW 
SOURCES: METATHEORY 
(1) Two terms are involved in the mediation of axiological performance: 
"purpose" and "existential context". 
(2) It is to be remembered that the constitutional scheme envisages the 
"synchronization of interests": public and private, as well as competing 
private, interests. This means that it is integrally a part of the constitu-
tional design that the purpose of "justice" should be serviced. From this 
it follows that (i) the constitutional design; and (ii) the purpose of 
"justice" constitute a single, composite, twofold "purpose". 
(3) "Existential context" refers to the inclusive "context of social realities" 
(of which the "arrangement of facts" presenting for determination are to 
be deemed a component). The "context of social realities" pertains most 
notably to such issues as: 
4 The discussion in Chapter V, at 4.1, should give the reader to perceive why this is so. 
) See the metatheory (below) as to why this is the case. 
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(i) the importance of transparency in the course of political and public 
activity; 
(ii) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the deter-
mination; 
(iii) a concern for the "community" or "communities" which constitute a 
source of "personhood"; 
(iv) the exigencies of life in, and the welfare of, the larger "society"; 
(v) a concern for human dignity and substantive equality; and 
·{vi) a concern for liberty (in its proper conception).6 
(4) "Purpose" subsumes a commitment to the broad "context of social 
realities". The issues enumerated as (3)(i)-(vi), above, are matters to 
which the design of the Constitution is committed in very emphatic 
terms. 
(5) Let us now suppose a common-law rule or principle to be in point. 
Underlying this rule or principle is a "narrative modeI" of typifications 
of action, loaded with tacit social evaluations.7 The model informs the 
jurist's perception of the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts", 
organizing them into a stable configuration (Gestalt) of legal norm and 
legal facts. Subsumption or non-subsumption proceeds on the basis of 
this Gestalt. 
(6) The twofold "purpose" - which is committed to the "context of social 
realities" - may make for an "adjusted prejudice-horizon", a new "pre-
understanding". Stated differently, the evaluative dimension of the 
6 See Chapter V at 4.1 in this regard. 
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"narrative model" may undergo adjustment. And, in this event, the 
"norm" and the "arrangement of facts" would organize themselves into a 
new stable configuration (Gestalt) of legal norm and legal facts. 
Subsumption may now be observed to take place where previously it did 
not- and conversely. 
(7) Since the "context of social realities" is one to which the twofold 
"purpose" is committed (see (6) above), it would lend its force to the 
activation, alternatively the inactivation, of the normative syllogism. 
The "context of social realities", then, may make for an adjustment to 
the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model". The "norm" and the 
"arrangement of facts" would then be organized into a novel stable 
configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal facts". And where 
formerly it did not occur, subsumption may now be seen to proceed -
and conversely. 
(8) It may happen that a rule or principle of the common law, by reason of 
its obduracy, its incompatibility with the new order, or otherwise, 
frustrates axiological peiformance (as mediated by "purpose" and 
"existential context"). In this event, a departure from the rule or 
principle would be required. And a substitute would need to be crafted 
in order to fill the lacuna. We deal with this matter in due course.8 
7 The same remarks as were applicable in this regard with reference to the interpretation of statutes 
are of relevance here. 
8 See the discussion of"dissonance", under (4), below. 
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(3) AXIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE IN HANDLING COMMON-LAW 
SOURCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE 
In what follows, it is attempted to demonstrate the workings of the model with 
reference to some noteworthy decisions. It is repeated that it does not diverge 
radically according as it operates in the context of statutory interpretation or with 
respect to the common law. Before setting out on the course identified, however, it 
is necessary to discuss an important issue, the more so for the ease with which it is 
liable to be overlooked. 
3.1 Rights-Applicability in the Context of Private Relationships apparently 
ungoverned by a Rule of Law. 
Woolman and Davis have underscored the significance of this matter.9 It seems 
that they identify themselves with the thrust of critical legal scholarship in 
speaking of relationships for which the law ostensibly does not make provision. 
Critical theorists would argue that in seeking to leave a domain of social life 
unregulated by a rule, the law signals its tacit approval of the prevailing 
dispensation. 10 There is therefore "law" governing the relationships in point, but it 
manifests itself only in its absence. 11 Woolman and Davis contend that the Consti-
tution may demand a re-evaluation of existing dispensations of this character, and 
9 See Woolman and Davis "The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v. De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole 
Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights 1.lllder the Interim and the Final 
Constitutions" 1996 12 SAJHR (3) 361 401-403 n 119. Consult Chapter V, at 2.3.4, in this regard. 
10 This seems to be a recurrent motif in the writings of many of those espousing critical legal 
scholarship. 
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reqmre the application of its fundamental-rights prov1s1ons to the end of 
ameliorating hardship. 12 
Despite there being no identifiable rule or principle of law governmg these 
situations, the formula of "axiological performance as mediated by purpose and 
existential context" is committed to their resolution. The examples furnished here 
show up "purpose" and the inclusive "context of social realities" as making for 
axiological performance along these lines. 
Regard being had to the facilities made available for the perpetuation of 
"apartheid" at a level as between legal subjects - a "privatized apartheid,"13 one 
should consider the right of "equality" as it operates as between citizens to be of 
outstanding importance. The subject-matter under this sub-title is therefore dis-
cussed with particular reference to this right. 
Three-Stage Analysis 
The jurist may do well in circumstances where these concerns are potentially at 
issue to undertake a three-stage analysis14 such as has been proposed by Woolman 
and Davis. The first stage of the analysis would relate to the question of 
11 Such a proposition is perllaps not llllcontroversial. 
12 See Woolman and Davis op cit 401-403 n 119. 
13 Woolman and Davis write: "The Constitution's commitment to the construction of a new society 
which emerges out of the ashes of Apartheid necessitates a thorough examination of the manner in 
which existing regimes of private power can subvert that commitment". (Woolman and Davis op 
cit 400) 
14 See Woolman and Davis op cit 401-403 n 119. 
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"application", the second to that of "rights", and the third to that of "limitations". 15 
As regards the question of application, section 8(2) is of relevance: "A provision 
of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it 
is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right." With respect to the question of rights, what is required to 
be established is whether the right at issue has been facially infringed, and with 
regard to that of limitations whether, supposing facial infringement of such right to 
have been demonstrated, the restriction is "reasonable" and 'justifiable" within the 
terms of the limitations clause, section 36. 16 
Two Hypotheticals 
Woolman and Davis discuss two "hypotheticals" illustrating the manner in which 
the analysis as outlined above may be given substantiality. The authors compare 
the case of a female chess-player excluded from an all-male chess club with that of 
a prospective employee excluded from membership of a firm exclusively by reason 
of her ethnicity. 17 In both instances, the right sought to be protected is manifestly 
that of "equality". Application analysis - in terms of section 8(2) as quoted above 
- would entail a reference to section 9(4): ''No person may unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection 
(3)." (Among the grounds catalogued in the latter subsection are "gender" and 
ethnicity. 18) In both cases, the authors point out, the right to "equality" would in 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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all probability be deemed to be of application. 19 Likewise, both the excluded 
female chess-player and the disappointed would-be employee would probably be 
in a position to make out a case that their right to "equality" has pn·ma facie been 
infringed. 20 This is what rights analysis would summon for inquiry. 21 As regards 
the question of limitations analysis, it may be conjectured that it would be found to 
be "reasonable" and "justifiable" within the terms of section 36 that the chess-
player in the example should be excluded as she has been, but that it would 
certainly not be found to be reasonable and justifiable that the job applicant should 
be discounted from eligibility on the grounds of her colour.22 It follows that 
"reasonableness" and "justifiability" in limitations analysis are to be ascertained in 
social context, and this consideration should allay fears of "indiscriminate" 
intrusion in the name of state power on relationships deemed to have the quality of 
being "private. "23 At the same time, limitations analysis would not permit the 
entrenchment of inequality and the practice of "privatized apartheid" by citadels of 
private power.24 
With this issue thus canvassed, it is turned immediately to some noteworthy 
judgments illustrative of the workings of the model with respect to common-law 
sources. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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3.2. Exemplary Common-Law Decisions 
Myburgh v. Voorsitter van die Schoemanpark Dissiplinere Verhoor25 
In this case, a recreation club took disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 
What the court had to decide was whether the applicant was entitled to legal 
representation at his hearing.26 Noting that at common law there was no right to 
legal representation except before courts of law in the strict sense, the judge cited 
authority to the effect that in the case of a tribunal created by contract, the rights of 
the person concerned are to be gathered from the contract itself. 27 In this instance, 
the contract provided for "representation". 28 On the authority of Lamprecht v. 
McNeillie, 29 the judge held that the word was not to be taken to mean "legal 
representation". 30 It remained to establish whether there was anything in the 
Constitution to gainsay these conclusions, and to afford the applicant relief in the 
form claimed. The court held in the negative, dismissing the application.31 
This case may be analysed along the lines of the model. Axiological performance 
is mediated by "purpose" (constitutional design and justice) and "existential 
context". The "context of social realities'', to which "purpose" subsumes a 
commitment, pertained in particular to the difference in character between 
criminal and other proceedings. The evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" 
25 1995(9) BCLR 11 45(0). 
26 See judgment t l l 46H. 
27 At 11461 - l 147F. See, in particular, the judge's citation of the case of Turner v. Jockey Club of 
South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633(A), at l 147D-F of the report being considered. (See also headnote at 
1145!.) 
28 AtI147G. 
29 c· d ite as case no. 492/92 (appeal court). 
30 Atl148C. (See also headnote at l 145J-l 146A.) 
31 At I !SOE and H. 
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underlying the common-law principle as stated did not undergo any adjustment. 
(Another way of putting this would be to say that the judge's pre-understanding 
remained as it had been -was not affected.) The "norm" and the "arrangement of 
facts" conformably organized themselves into the same stable configuration 
(Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal facts" as they had in the past. This is as much 
as to say that subsumption took its course quite as it had always done. 
Ryland v. Edros32 
Here the court had to determine as a threshold issue whether contractual 
relationships arising from a potentially (but not actually) polygamous union, 
solemnized by Muslim rites, were to recognized and enforced. 33 In Ismail v. 
lsmail,34 the highest court in the land held that such were void on the grounds of 
"public policy". 35 In the instant case, the judge said that the Ismail decision took 
into account the views (or presumed views) of only one group in the plural society 
in branding a contract as offensive to "public policy".36 
Bringing to bear upon the matter the value-system inaugurated by the Interim 
Constitution, the judge held that the principles of equality and tolerance of 
diversity (recognition of the plural nature of the society) were to ''radiate" or 
inform the concepts of "public policy" and bani mores. 37 In the result, he 
concluded that the threshold issue was to be decided affirmatively.38 He empha-
32 1997 (I) BCLR 77(C). 
33 See judgment at 85B-C. 
34 1983 (1) SA 1006(A). 
35 At 85B-C. 
36 At 90G. 
37 At 91I-J. 
38 At 94B. 
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sized that his finding was not necessarily applicable in respect of contractual terms 
of the type under discussion which are agreed to in the context of a marriage that is 
actually (as opposed to merely potentially) polygamous.39 
This decision is instructive for our purposes. The common-law rule at issue is that 
contracts which offend against public policy are void.40 Axiological performance 
is mediated by "purpose" and "existential context". "Purpose" (the design of the 
Constitution and "justice") which subsumes a commitment to the "context of social 
realities" (the latter speaking in this case to the diversity and heterogeneity of the 
South African society) gave the evaluative dimension of the narrative model 
underlying the rule to undergo adjustment. The "norm" and the "arrangement of 
facts" were to organize themselves into a new stable configuration (Gestalt) of 
"legal norm" and "legal facts" in a way that precluded subsumption - where 
previously the normative syllogism would have been activated. 
Rivett-Carnac v. Wiggins 41 
This was a defamation suit. The plaintiff, a professional valuer, alleged that the 
defendant's criticism of his report amounted to defamation.42 The court held that 
although it was robust in form, such criticism was not to be conceived as an attack 
on the plaintiffs professional reputation.43 The judge maintained that the boundary 
between actionable and non-actionable criticism was to be drawn with reference to 
the value attaching to public debate and deliberation in respect of matters of public 
39 See 92C-D of the judgment. 
40 Such is the proposition of law which one may affirm as relevant. 
41 1997 ( 4) BCLR 562 (C ). 
42 Sec, in this regard, judgment at 572D-H. See also 5671. 
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concern. 
44 The Constitution sought to promote openness and transparency. 45 In 
the result, the action could not succeed.46 
Analysing the decision with reference to the model, we may note that the judge 
reasserted the test to be applied in determining whether material is defamatory. It 
is so if it lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of reasonable persons generally.47 
Axiological performance is mediated by "purpose" and "existential context". 
"Purpose" subsumes a commitment to the "context of social realities". The latter 
context involved the circumstance that professionals often disagree (even robustly) 
and that dissensus is a feature of the enterprise of valuation.48 Insofar as it 
pertained to that context, "purpose" pointed up the values of transparency, 
deliberation and debate in matters of public concern as of particular importance. 
The evaluative dimension of the "narrative modeI" underlying the principle 
underwent adjustment, such that the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" 
organized themselves into a new stable configuration of "legal norm" and "legal 
facts". Subsumption did not proceed, then, where previously it might have. 
The result was the judge's holding that the conception of "reasonable persons" 
embodied in the principle is to be taken to refer to reasonable persons in a society 
placing emphasis on transparency, deliberation and debate in matters of public 
concern.
49 
43 See judgment at 574H-I. 
44 At 573C-D. 
45 At 571 J-572A. 
46 At 575B. 
47 At 571B. 
48 At 5741. 
49 See headnote at 563J-564A, and 571 C-572B, in this regard. 
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3.2.l Excursus: Mittelbare Drittwirkung 
The decisions (just discussed) in Ryland and Rivett-Camac provide very neat 
exemplifications of the process of mittelbare Drittwirkung at work. Whereas in 
Ryland, the concept of "public policy" was suffused with new meaning in the light 
of the constitutional ethos, in Rivett-Camac this was true in respect of the notion 
of the "reasonable person". Both decisions are obviously circumscribed in their 
effect, but the ambit of the principle they illustrate is potentially very broad. 
The principle of mittelbare Drittwirkung has important implications for the 
development of the common law. Van Aswegen notes with respect to the law of 
delict specifically that the values underlying fundamental rights may be deployed 
as policy considerations in the determination of "wrongfulness", "remoteness" and 
"negligence".50 Van der Walt agrees. Urging Burchell's point that the principles 
of our law of delict are expansive in their conception, he proposes that the open-
textured conceptions which govern delictual liability hold themselves out as 
amenable to development in the light of the values immanent in the Bill of 
Rights.51 
50 See Van Aswegen "The hnplications of a Bill of Rights for the Law of Contract and Delict" 1995 
11 SAJHR (1) 50 60. 
51 See Van der Walt "Justice Krigler's Disconcerting Judgment in Du Plessis v. De Klerk: Much 
Ado about Direct Horizontal Application (Read Nothing)" 1996 4 THRHR 732 740. 
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Goodrich would suggest that ideological preferences are the principal determinants 
of the meanings that are in the event attached to these open-textured conceptions.52 
I submit that while his point is perhaps not entirely without substance, it is unduly 
pessimistic. "Categories" and concepts of such wide connotation as "wrongful-
ness", "remoteness" and "negligence" lend themselves most eminently to catering 
for social realities. Stone has demonstrated as much. Stone can, however, be 
taken too far; if pressed beyond a certain point, his thesis threatens to subvert the 
notion of "fidelity to law". 53 There is no cause for despair, though, if we are 
prepared to invoke the concept of purposiveness (as instantiated in the values of 
the Constitution) as a means of surmounting the tension between the integrity of a 
legal rule or principle and its responsiveness to social needs. 54 And this is pre-
cisely what we do in allowing of mittelbare Drittwirkung in the process of 
axiological performance. 55 
Moeketsi v. Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana 56 
In this matter, the applicant sought a permanent stay of criminal proceedings 
against him on the grounds that his right to a fair trial had been breached, and more 
particularly his right to be tried within a reasonable time. 57 The court found that it 
was indisputable that there had been a delay, but, in view of the fact that the 
52 See the discussion of Goodrich in Chapter III of this study, at 2.1. 
53 See the parallel exposition in the previous chaptc'f under the head of "mittelbare Drittwirkung" in 
statutory interpretation (Chapter VI,IIl(6)). 
54 As Nonet and Selznick's observations proclaim. See the discussion, llllder III (I), in Chapter VI. 
55 See the exposition referred to inn 51, above. 
56 1996 (7) BCLR 947 (B). 
57 See judgment at 949D-H. 
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applicant had largely been responsible therefor, among other related reasons, 
concluded that the application fell to be dismissed. 58 
In commg to this conclusion, the judge examined the common law and the 
influence of the Constitution thereupon. He proposed, rather controversially,59 that 
the principle that an accused person is entitled to be tried expeditiously had 
become entrenched in our law prior to the advent of the Constitution. 60 In inter-
preting section 25(3)(a) of the Interim Constitution, which conferred a right to be 
tried within a reasonable time after having been charged, the court had 
comparative recourse to the legal position in several foreign jurisdictions, namely 
the United States, Canada and the European Community, as it was entitled to do by 
virtue of the permissive constitutional stipulation.61 
Bringing the model to bear upon this judgment, we may say that the judge 
understood the common law to lay down that an accused is entitled to a speedy 
tn·al, and. where it has been denied him or her (assuming exceptional 
circumstances) is entitled to a permanent stay of the prosecution.62 Axiological 
performance implicates "purpose"and "existential context". "Purpose" (the design 
of the Constitution, as illuminated by foreign authorities) was attuned to the 
consideration that guilty persons should be duly convicted and should not avert 
58 See 971 B-972C. 
59 The word "controversially" is used as signalling that the judge seems to have been alone in so 
proposing. The reader is invited, for purposes of comparison, to peruse the discussion of the 
decisions in Coetzee v. Attorney-General, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (8) BCLR 989 (d) and Wild v. 
Haffert NO I 997(7) BCLR 974 (N). 
60 At 959H. 
61 The pennissive constitutional stipulation, if this requires noticing here, is to be found in section 
39(l)(c). 
62 See judgment at 970G-H. 
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that fate by reason of an oversight or mistake capable of being remedied.63 The 
"context of social realities" embraced that consideration. The evaluative dimension 
of the "narrative mode['' underlying the principle at issue underwent no adjustment 
to speak ot~ such that the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" organized 
themselves into a "legal norm" and "legal facts" in quite the same way as they 
might have previously. And subsumption, as formerly, could not occur. 
Coetzee v. Attorney-General, KwaZulu-Natal 64 
In this case the question arose whether a permanent stay of the prosecution was the 
appropriate remedy in circumstances where there had been a very considerable 
delay in commencing the trial. 65 The applicants, indicted for the murder and 
robbery of one Mxenge,66 claimed that the answer was in the affirmative. 
In seeking to resolve the issue, the court took occasion to comment that the notion 
that an unreasonable delay in the commencement of a trial may undercut an 
accused's right to a fair trial was apparently not part of our pre-constitutional 
jurisprudence. 67 (Compare, in this regard, the observations of the court in 
Moeketsi. 68 ) The judge made it clear that an accused's right to a fair trial as such 
has long been recognized in our law, nonetheless.69 Section 35(3) of the Final 
Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial, with subsection 35(3)(d) thereof 
stipulating as included therein a requirement as to the commencement and 
63 See judgment at 970E. 
64 1997 (8) BCLR 989 (D). 
65 See judgment at 991 I-992A. 
66 At 991H. 
67 At I 000 H-1. 
68 Supra. 
69 At I OOOB. 
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conclusion of the trial "without unreasonable delay". 70 By reason of the silence of 
our common law on the question specifically to be determined, Thirion J. turned 
his attention to decisions of the English courts in point, adverting to their 
persuasive force and arguing that our own law would have developed along 
parallel lines. 71 The judge concluded that if on account of an umeasonable delay 
in bringing the accused to trial, the latter is prejudiced to the extent that he can no 
longer be fairly tried, the charge would require to be dismissed or the prosecution 
permanently stayed. 72 This was not so in the circumstances of the instant case, and 
the application was accordingly dismissed. 73 
Analysing this decision with reference to the model, we arrive at the following 
picture. Axiological performance is mediated by "purpose" and "existential 
context". "Purpose" (the design of the Constitution, as illuminated by foreign 
authorities) and the "context of social realities" (pertaining to the necessity for the 
prosecution of accused persons without hindrance upon an unworthy pretext) 
entailed that the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying the 
principle that an accused has a right to a fair trial remained much as it had been 
before. The "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" organized themselves into the 
same stable configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal facts" as formerly 
they might have, with the result that the operation of the normative syllogism was 
precluded (as it would have been previously). 
70 See section 35(3)(d) of the (Final) Constitution. 
71 At10031-J. 
72 At 1005 B. 
73 At 1008 I-J. 
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Wild v. Hoffert NO 74 
This case was similar in many respects to that of Coetzee (as just discussed). The 
applicants were charged with dealing in, alternatively possessing cocaine, and 
attempted murder. 75 (The last charge - that of attempted murder - was sub-
sequently dropped.)76 They sought an order permanently staying the prosecution, 
proffering in justification therefor the circumstance that their right to be tried 
within a reasonable time, as embodied in section 25(3)(a) of the Interim 
Constitution, had been violated.77 The court (per Booysen J., McCall J. con-
curring) found itself unable to accede to this request.78 It was held that there was 
little room for a finding that the applicants would be adversely affected as regards 
the quality of their defence by reason of the delay. 79 Though they had assuredly 
suffered prejudice on account thereof, the delay did not compromise their right to a 
fair trial. 80 
The court referred to the (as then unreported) case of Coetzee v. The Attorney-
General, KwaZulu. 81 As in that case, the judge seems to have approved the 
approach of the English courts on the matter.82 (And it appears, likewise, that he 
took as a point of departure the common-law principle that an accused is entitled to 
a fair trial.)83 
74 l 997 (7) BCLR 974 (N). 
75 See judgment at 9751. 
76 See 976C. 
77 See 976D-F. 
78 At 987H. 
79 At 987G-H. 
80 987E as read with 987G-H. 
81 Supra 
82 Sec 98lG. 
83 See 982A. 
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As regards the model, the same comments as were noted in analysing the case of 
Coetzee are applicable to an analysis of the decision in this case. 
(The reader is referred to the Moeketsi case for purposes of comparison.)84 
S. v. Nombewu 85 
The appellant in this case sought to overturn his conviction of robbery in the 
regional court, as well as the sentence imposed.86 The basis of his case was that 
certain evidence had been admitted against him which ought to have been 
excluded on the grounds ofunconstitutionality.87 Rejecting this claim, the court on 
appeal confirmed the conviction, varying the sentence in an upward direction. 88 
The evidence at issue consisted in the pointing-out of a motor vehicle.89 The 
defence argued that the reception of this evidence was unconstitutional because 
although the appellant had been given the customary warning in terms of the 
judges' rules that he was not obliged to say anything in answer to the charge, and 
that if he did so, it could be used against him in evidence, he had not been 
forewarned to the same effect with respect to the pointing-out.90 
The court engaged itself in an analysis of the common-law position with regard to 
the law of criminal procedure and the admission of evidence. I note that the gene-
84 Supra. 
85 1996 ( 12) BCLR 1635 (E). 
86 See judgment at 1639 C. 
87 At 1640 B. 
88 At 1647 E. 
89 At 1639 F-G. 
90 At 1641 B-E. (See also headnote at 1636 E.) 
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ral principle at common law seems to have been that all relevant evidence was 
admissible, irrespective of how it had been obtained. There does not appear to have 
been any consensual affirmation of the court's discretion to exclude such 
evidence.91 For all this, however, the court remarked that there had been of late 
some acknowf edgernent of a general discretion to exclude for reasons of public 
policy evidence admissible in terms of the rules of evidence.92 This represented 
Erasmus J. 's view of the common law as it obtained prior to the inauguration of 
the Constitution. He considered that this "general discretion", when filtered 
through section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution, vested the courts with the 
competence to exclude evidence to the end of ensuring that the accused have a 
"fair trial". 93 In this regard, value-judgments would be relevant to the assessment 
of "fairness", and hence to the public-policy rationale for the exclusion of 
otherwise admissible evidence in fitting circumstances. 94 In the present case, the 
court concluded that the exclusion of the pointing-out evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute, not so its inclusion.95 
The model displays the court's manner of proceeding as follows. Axiological 
performance is mediated by "purpose" and "existential context". "Purpose" sub-
sumes a commitment to the "context of social realities". The latter context relates 
in this case to the policy of the law to synthesize the conflicting interests of society 
in (i) maintaining pre-trial procedural safeguards as against (ii) having all relevant 
91 See in this regard the interesting discussion (albeit now dated) in Hoffinann and Zeffertt The 
South African Law of Evidence (1986) 223ff. 
92 At 1657 J - 1658 A. 
93 At 1658 D-E. 
94 At 1658 I - 1659 8. 
95 At1663F. 
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and admissible evidence brought in against an accused.96 In view of this, the 
evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" was largely unaffected, with the 
result that the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" organized themselves into 
the same stable configuration of "legal norm" and "legal facts" they previously 
assumed. And the narrative syllogism, as before, was not to be activated. 
Du Preez v. Truth and Reconciliation Commission 97 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34 of 1995 in its section 
30(2) provides for the right of a person implicated in the course of proceedings 
before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be heard as to his or her side of 
the story.98 The subsection does not, however, make provision for rights of those 
yet to be implicated to be adequately notified as to the time and place when 
evidence affecting them would be placed before the Commission and as to the 
allegations to be levelled against them.99 
Corbett C.J. held that these rights found their embodiment in principle in the 
common law, 100 and that their omission from section 30(2) was accordingly no 
reason for depriving the appellants of their benefit. The common-law rules of 
natural justice were here in point.IOI Embracing more than the audi alteram 
partem principle, these rules postulate that the body in question is required to act 
fairly, 102 and apply where, as here, the persons concerned have a "legitimate 
96 Seejudgmentat 1655 D. 
97 1997 (4) BCLR 531 (A). 
98 See judgment at 537H, where section 30(2) is reproduced. 
99 See 541D-E. (See flynote at 531E-F.) 
JOO A 5 t 41 F-G. (See also headnote at 532E-F.) 
IOI At 541F-G. 
102 At 542D. 
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expectation" to a fair hearing. In the circumstances of the present case, fairness 
imported reasonable and timeous notice of the time and place when evidence 
affecting them would be placed before the commission, as also information as to 
the substance of the allegations against them, in sufficient detail. 103 The court took 
these matters into account in reinstating in qualified terms the order of the court of 
first instance. 104 
For purposes of this discussion, let us assume that the common law at the time this 
judgment was delivered was as it had been prior to the decision in Administrator, 
Transvaal v. Traub 105 (in which the "legitimate expectation" test found its 
authoritative formulation). Let us assume, further, that it was a "legitimate 
expectation" to a fair hearing that was under threat in this case - and not any 
existing right, privilege or liberty. 
Upon these suppositions, the common-law rule requiring for the application of the 
rules of natural justice a threat to an existing right, privilege or liberty would not 
have comported with section 24(b) of the Interim Constitution, which expressly 
stipulated for the contingency of a "legitimate expectation". "Purpose" as a 
mediating conception in axiological performance, together with the "context of 
social realities", would under these circumstances have transformed the evaluative 
dimension of the "narrative model" underlying the common-law rule, so as to 
organize the "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" into a novel stable 
103 At 545E-F (See also headnote at 5321). 
104 At 546H-J. 
105 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
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configuration (Gestalt) of "legal norm" and "legal facts". The normative syllogism 
would correlatively have been activated, where previously this might not have 
occurred. 
These comments are naturally in the subjunctive mood. In the matter at hand, 
there was obviously no need to proceed in this way. 
S. v. Botha '06 
In this case, the accused was charged with fraud. 107 The question arose whether he 
would have a fair trial if the record of his bail application, at which in ignorance of 
the privilege against self-incrimination he furnished testimony tending to that 
result, were to be admitted in evidence at the main trial. 108 The court decided this 
question in the negative. 109 
The court held that an accused should not have to choose between his right to 
release on bail and his privilege against self-incrimination. 110 (The (Interim) Con-
stitution stipulates for both: for the former, in its section 25(2)( d), and for the 
latter in its section 25(3), which provides for the right to a fair trial.) There should 
be no spill over from the bail hearing into the trial; for, if there is spill over, the 
accused would fear giving evidence at his bail application, and this would prove 
106 1995 (11) BCLR 1489 (W). 
107 See judgment at 1491 G. 
108 See 1490 J - 1491 D. 
109 At 1496 D. 
110 At 1495 F. (See also headnote at 1490 G.) 
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detrimental to his chances of being released on bail. 111 The court held that an 
accused ought not to be confronted with such a dilemma. 112 
Invoking the model, "axiological performance" is mediated by "purpose" and 
"existential context". "Purpose" (the design of the Constitution and 'justice"), 
together with the "context of social realities", made for a transformation of the 
evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying the common-law 
privilege against self-incrimination. The "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" 
organized themselves into a novel stable configuration of "legal norm" and "legal 
faets", with the result that the narrative syllogism became activated. 
(Importantly, the "context of social realities" here pointed to the need for an 
accused person at his bail hearing to give evidence which - while going towards 
undermining the state's case at that stage - would tend to incriminate him if 
admitted in evidence at the trial.) 
3.3 Value-Competition in the Common Law: Its Resolution 
No exertions have been spared in bringing to the surface the "non-positivistic" 
character of the approach to be adopted in handling common-law sources. The 
evaluative dimension of one's perception of rules and principles of the common 
law has consistently been highlighted in the course of the preceding discussion. 
Furthermore, it has throughout been demonstrated that this dimension is amenable 
Ill At 1495 F. 
112 At 1495 F. 
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to qualitative alteration in the event of such being required in the light of the "new 
hermeneutical awareness". 
The internalization of this "awareness" as a perceptual framework would normally 
render relatively easy of application in the development of the common law the 
norms and values inhering in the constitutional compendium. Real difficulties do, 
however, arise in situations where values are "in competition", so to speak. It has 
been dealt with this problem in a different context, 113 and it would seem necessary 
at this point to enlarge upon its significance. By analogy with the approach to the 
parallel difficulty in the field of the interpretation of statutes, it appears that we are 
on safe ground in proposing that one is here to identify, with reference to the 
"existential context", that value the protection of which most closely illuminates 
the constitutional scheme. This is what was done in the Concorde Plastics case. 114 
Instructive as illustrating the manner of proceeding in common-law context is the 
case of Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd. 115 To introduce the matter, let us 
rehearse the thesis developed in Bell's and Griffith's studies. Bell contends that 
value-judgments of a distinctively political complexion inform the judicial 
interpretation of concepts such as "duty of care" and "public interest". 116 Griffith's 
contentions, as we have noted, are to similar effect, though much more 
vociferous. 117 We should take the point that where it is quite patent, as it seems to 
113 The issue of value-competition in the interpretation of statutes is canvassed in Chapter VI, III 
(4). 
114 1997 (11) BCLR 1624 (LAC). 
115 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W). 
116 See the exposition of Bell's point of view in Chapter III of this study, at 2.2. 
117 See the elaboration of Griffith's suggestions in Chapter III of this study, at 2.3. 
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have been in Holomisa, that apartheid (or colonialism) has given rise to distortion 
in the law, it may be necessary to jettison an established "principle", and to replace 
it with a substitute reflecting the values inherent in the constitutional ordering. 
Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd. 118 
In this case, the court fashioned a new rule of the common law. As to this, we shall 
have more to say in due course. 119 For the present, we may note that the case 
concerned the relative priority of the values of "freedom of speech" and "dignity" 
in the context of allegedly defamatory remarks made in the course of free and fair 
political activity. 120 
Axiological performance is mediated by "purpose" and "existential context". In 
this case "purpose" was the unknown term, its not having been possible to 
determine in advance which of the two values protected by the Constitution should 
enjoy precedence. "Existential context" implicates both the "arrangement of facts" 
and the wider "context of social realities". The "arrangement of facts" pertained to 
the entitlement (or disentitlement) of a public figure to damages for false 
defamatory statements made about him in the course of free and fair political 
activity. The broader "context of social realities" pertained to the circumstance 
118 Supra 
119 See the discussion of this case under 4.4 below. 
120 See judgment at 840F-84 l H. See also 852ff. 
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that the role of the media is especially important to a society based upon openness 
and accountability. 121 The "existential contexf' was therefore such as to point up 
the primacy of the value of "freedom of expression" over that of "dignity" in the 
circumstances. 122 (The judge implicitly conveyed that had the "facts" been 
otherwise-for example, had the issue involved non-political speech - matters 
might conceivably have been different). 123 
"Purpose" had now been ascertained ("freedom of expression" as a pre-eminent 
value in the circumstances). Such "purpose" imbued the judge with a novel 
"prejudice-horizon" with respect to the common-law rule before him. In this case, 
the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying such rule rvas not 
capable of assimilation to this novel "prejudice-horizon" .124 For this reason 
(axiological performance having been frustrated by reason of the obduracy of a 
common-law rule), it was necessary for the judge to fashion a new rule of the 
common law in order to dispose of the issue. This was in point of fact a case of 
"dissonance". In the event of "dissonance", novel rules require to be crafted in the 
121 At 855E. 
122 At 854C, Cameron J. writes as follows: "The determination of a right's constitutional 
importance in each situation mi.avoidably involves the evaluation of competing values. The value 
whose protection most closely illuminates the constitutional scheme to which we have committed 
ourselves should receive appropriate protection in that process". (Emphasis added. It seems to me 
that the words "in each situation" betoken an acknowledgment of the importance of the "existential 
context" in the exercise.) 
123 Cameron J. expresses himself thus: "The defence derived ... from the Constitution, applies in 
the first instance to defamatory untruths published in the sphere of political activity". (At 865A, 
emphasis mine). See also 865E-F of the judgment. 
124 One may say that the rule was not axiologically adequate. It gave the "upper hand" to the 
interest in reputation over that of freedom of speech and expression, with the (apparently 
acquiesced in) result of stifling the media. The rule found its formulation most illustratively in the 
case of Neethling v. Du Preez 1994 ( 1) SA 708 (A), as cited by Cameron J. at 849E-F. It betrayed, 
so far as the judge was concerned, a clear pejoratively political-ideological preference. 
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nature of things. And the manner of their crafting is something we deal with under 
that head ("dissonance"). 125 
P6 Shabala/av. Attorney-General of the Transvaal ~ 
This case decided definitively that the blanket docket privilege (the "Steyn" 
privilege) could not be sustained as constitutional, 127 and laid down guidelines as 
to the manner of conducting criminal proceedings with specific reference to this 
finding. 128 The values which vied for the status of primacy were, on the one hand, 
the right to access to information and the right to a fair trial, and on the other, the 
interest in upholding the proper ends of justice. 
In the course of its judgment, the court held that it was not possible to lay down 
hard and fast rules in the abstract. Its guidelines were to be understood as such. 
The "existential context" would in each instance give direction to the development 
of the law relative to docket privilege. In some matters, that context would point 
up as primary the right of access to information and the right to a fair trial, in 
others, the interest in upholding the proper ends of justice. Each case was to be 
considered on its own facts, and the law was to be developed conformably with 
this insight. 129 
Mandela v. Falati 130 
125 See the discus~ion llllder (4), below. 
126 1995 ( 12) BCLR 1593 (CC). 
127 See judgment at 1616E. 
128 At 1615A-1616E. (See also headnote at 1595 C-1596 C.) 
129 Mahomed D.P. writes as follows: "The details as to how the Court should exercise its discretion 
in all these matters must be developed by the Supreme Court [sic] from case to case .... " (At 
16 I 7E-F, empha~is added). 
130 1994 (4) BVLR I (W). 
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Here the plaintiff sought the extension of an interim interdict restraining the 
defendant from making public material allegedly defamatory of her. 131 Obviously 
in competition were the right to freedom of expression and the right to human 
dignity. In the event, the court, affirming the priority of the former right in the 
circumstances, approved a rule to the effect that any system of prior restraint bears 
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, and the party seeking to 
uphold such a restraint bears a heavy burden of establishing justification for its 
imposition. 132 The court concluded that the interim order was to be discharged. 133 
The judge substantiated his reasoning by reference to authorities asserting the 
primacy of the right to freedom of speech. He contended that it is the freedom 
without which the other freedoms would not long endure. 134 And thus his decision. 
Now, it is no doubt the case that the right to freedom of expression is of 
foundational importance. Even so, one is left to speculate whether anyone can say 
that it surpasses in significance the rights to human dignity and equality (for 
example), assessed upon an abstract, decontextualized basis. Yet this is what the 
court seems to suggest. 135 
Despite this suggestion, the judge appears to have adopted the correct approach. It 
was by recourse to the "existential context' that he held the right of free speech to 
131 See judgment at 3 C-F. 
132 At 8H. See also headnote at 21-J. 
133 At 9F. 
134 At 8E-F. 
135 At 8E: "Political philosophers are agreed about the primacy of the freedom of speech". 
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trump that of reputation. The "arrangement of facts" pointed up the former right as 
of overriding consequence in the matter. And the broader "context of social 
realities" reinforced this value-election. 
(4) DISSONANCE 
In instances of "dissonance", axiological performance is frustrated by reason of the 
obduracy of a rule or principle of the common law. Diagnostic of "dissonance" is 
the situation where the "new hermeneutical consciousness" the jurist brings to bear 
upon her perception of a particular rule or principle meets with opposition. Here 
there is malalignment of her renovated "sense of justice" - deprived of certain 
"prejudices" (expurgated) and incorporating other, novel ones - with the rule or 
principle she confronts. To put it in a nutshell, in the case of dissonance the 
evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" underlying the rule or principle is 
not capable of assimilation to the jurist's "novel prejudice-horizon" .136 
4.1 Overruling Precedent 
It is probable, in circumstances where a rule or principle is considered ineligible 
for further existence in its extant manifestation, that precedential authority may 
require to be overruled. Kentridge A.J. raises in this connection the possibility of 
prospective overruling. 137 It may be desirable, depending on the circumstances. 138 
136 This is another way of saying that the rule or principle is not axiologically adequate. See 
Chapter Ill, at 3, for an elaboration of the notion of "dissonance". See also 6A( 1) of the same 
chapter. 
137 See the judgment of Kentridge A.J. in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (5) 
BCLR 658 (CC) at 694F. 
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4.2. Filling the Lacuna: A Metatheory 
In undertaking to jettison an inappropriate rule or principle of the law, the jurist 
may have to reckon with a resultant lacuna, a space in the law for the provision of 
which specific strategies seem to be indicated. The material source upon which 
she may be counselled to draw for purposes of coming to grips with the problem 
has been dubbed "ready-made deviationist doctrine". 139 By this term is signified 
the entirety of our legal tradition, very broadly understood, to the extent to which it 
holds out the possibility of delivering up an appropriate substitute for the rule or 
principle deemed undesirable of perpetuation. 
"Ready-made deviationist doctrine" is sufficiently comprehensive in conception to 
include not only the explicit features of our legal tradition, but also those aspects 
thereof which are latent or immanent therein. It would accordingly embrace also 
the "potentiality" of our juridical heritage - what Cornell has called the "might 
have been" in our law. 14° Customary international law to the extent that it is 
applicable may be viewed as part of the "might have been" in our tradition. 141 
Also forming part of the "might have been" is foreign law142 insofar as cir-
cumspection gives reason to confide in its being apposite to the circumstances at 
hand. 
138 See Chapter III, at 6D, in this regard 
139 See Chapter III of this study, at 5.2, for an elaboration of om conception of "ready-made 
deviationist doctrine". 
140 See Cornell "Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for 
Transfonnative Legal Interpretatimi" 1988 136 Univ. of Pennsylvania LR 1135 1145 et seq. 
141 See section 232 of the Constitution: "Customary international law is law in the Republic unless 
it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament". (An untraceable somce speaks of 
it as an "alternative common law.") 
142 Which is to be treated with caution, inasmuch as it derives from a different setting. 
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Needless to say, "ready-made deviationist doctrine" would also embrace broad 
moral conceptions underpinning the law. 143 
4.2.1. Rational Forensic Deliberauon 
The "ideal speech situation" is far too elusive a metric for argumentation in the 
courtroom context. It would not serve as a standard for debating the merits of 
appropriating any particular feature of the "ready-made deviationist doctrine" in 
the forensic setting. The variant of the Habermasian programme which, it is 
submitted, may be harnessed to this end it is proposed to call "rational forensic 
argumentation". 144 
It is not denied that the ideal of communication free from domination bas merit to 
the degree that it sponsors a thorough contestation of the matter at hand, legal and 
factual. A transparent ventilation of the issues, bringing in as many legal and non-
legal factors (stringent and non-stringent elements) to bear upon the assessment of 
a dilemma, may well prove desirable. But this is a far cry from compliance with 
the imponderables of an "ideal speech situation". 145 It is submitted that the best 
approximation - the closest practicable analogue - to this hypothetical set-up (for 
legal purposes) is to be found in the model of courtroom argumentation itself. 
143 Here one thinks of the boni mores, the legal convictions of the community. It is necessary to 
r,oint out that these may bear a different construction in the customary-law milieu. 
44 Tiris is a reference to the model of courtroom adjudication, internalized by jurists, and serving as 
a frame of reference deployable in doctrinal assessment. See, in this connection, Chapter III at 
4.3.1. See, further, 6C(3) of the same chapter. 
145 The "ideal speech situation", as pointed out in Chapter III, at 4.1.3, is of a counterfactual 
character. 
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Since the lawyer is immersed in the tradition of courtroom argumentation, the 
standard of "rational forensic deliberation" commends itself as a criterion for 
evaluating the desirability of taking up an aspect of the "ready-made deviationist 
doctrine" with a view to catering for the concrete situation presenting for 
resolution. 
"Rational forensic deliberation" refers to the procedural rationality of the 
courtroom. It embodies standards and criteria of discourse to which, by reason of 
their having become "second-nature" to her, the jurist is able to appeal with the 
greatest of facility. As such, it is very much a "situated rationality". It is a part of 
the lawyerly instinct in undertaking to evaluate the appropriateness of doctrinal 
importation to entertain a notional appeal to this rationality. Even in the absence 
of any awareness of her so doing when confronted with this kind of problem and 
seeking its resolution, the jurist tends to transport herself notionally into the 
courtroom setting. And she is in the process equipped with a criteriological basis 
for appraising the pros and cons of taking up a potentially relevant doctrine. 
One might consider the appraisal in question to implicate the following steps: 
( 1) The new rule or principle to be appropriated must be adequate to 
axiological performance, and its mediating terms of "purpose" and 
"existential context". It is here, in order to ensure such adequacy, that 
the construct of "rational forensic deliberation" is particularly 
relevant. 
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(2) In catering for "purpose'', "rational forensic deliberation" would as a 
preliminary measure indicate a special sensitivity to the norms of 
public international law146 in searching for an appropriate "ready-
made deviationist doctrine". That doctrine should comport in all 
material respects with those norms. 147 
(3) In servicing the "twofold purpose" (the design of the Constitution and 
the purpose of justice), "rational forensic deliberation" would reckon 
with the particular provision(s) of the Bill of Rights at issue; the 
matter of "transparency"; the notion of the "open society" and the 
conception of "community" ("communities"); human dignity, 
substantive equality, and the liberty-equality dialectic; the notion of 
"freedom" (and interdependence); and the synchronization of 
interests (public and private, and private and private). 
(4) Since the "twofold purpose" subsumes a commitment to the inclusive 
"context of social realities", rational forensic deliberation" would in 
the nature of things take heed of that context in reckoning with the 
abovementioned issues. In particular, would it have regard to the 
human, social and economic aspects relevant to the decision. 
(5) "Rational forensic deliberation" is to be deployed in ensuring that the 
"narrative model" underlying the proposed choice of "ready-made 
deviationist doctrine" meets with sufficiency. This means that it is 
equal both to "purpose" (see (2) and (3) above) and to the inclusive 
"context of social realities" (see (4) above). 
146 Thi" . be s is cause our Gnmdnorm has to a considerable degree been defined with reference to the 
norms of public international law. 
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(6) The "narrative model", if meeting with sufficiency (see (5) above), 
should assure that the "arrangements of facts" in the matter are 
encoded in juridical consciousness as the "facts of the case" or "legal 
facts" in a way that would serve the mediating terms of "purpose" and 
"existential context". The "narrative mqdel" would then be adequate 
to axiological performance. 
(7) If the "narrative model" meets with adequacy in this respect, it is an 
indication that the proposed choice of "ready-made deviationist 
doctrine" is an appropriate one. 
N.B. The above guidelines specify in detail the issues to which the construct of 
"rational forensic deliberation" is to address its concerns in evaluating potentially 
relevant novel doctrine. But for practical objectives: 
(i) "purpose" (the design of the Constitution and ''justice"); and 
(ii) social realities (including the "facts") 
encapsulate the matters to which such doctrine is required to be equal when 
measured .by the yardstick of "rational forensic deliberation". One may thus 
simplify the stepwise procedure, as set out above, upon this basis for ordinary 
purposes. 
147 This involves an assessment of the doctrine in question as to adequacy. 
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4.3. Fidelity to Law and the Separation of Powers 
The above discussion would appear to give concern for the integrity of the iudicis 
est ius dicere sed non facere principle. But there should be no problem. For one 
thing, that principle has never been of absolute application. It cannot be denied 
that judges do legislate in some measure. And in some cases this may be for the 
good. 
For another thing, one might understand the principle of precedent and the doctrine 
of stare decisis as a specialized legal application of Perelman's principle of inertia, 
which reads to the effect that an opinion which has been accepted in the past may 
not be abandoned without sufficient reason. 148 It is submitted that the imple-
mentation of "ready-made deviationist doctrine" would not unduly perturb 
Perelman. For, after all, what it comprehends is already immanent in our legal 
tradition, even if it is unexpressed. One has to concede that it may not be as 
"immediately present" as conventional sources, however. 
From this it follows that Dworkin's notion of "fit" is meaningful as suggesting 
some sort of continuity with our legal tradition in deciding disputes. Even in the 
case of "dissonance" this is the case. Otherwise than Dworkin's hermeneutics 
would have it, however, there is much reason for dismissing the single-right-
148 See Chapter III of this study, at 3, where Perelman's formulation as here noted is remarked 
upon. See also 6C(2) of the same chapter. 
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answer thesis, and preferring instead Hoy's pluralism in terms of which the most 
appropn·ate answer in the particular circumstances should be the objective. 
4.4 Dissonance and the Development of the Common Law in Judicial Decisions: 
The Theory in Practice 
The cases discussed below illustrate some lines to be followed in giving a new 
formulation to the common law. The manner of selecting an apposite element of 
the "ready-made deviationist doctrine", as also that of appealing to the construct of 
"rational forensic deliberation" in doing so, is sought to be brought out in concrete 
terms. 
Foreign law - insofar as its appropriateness to the circumstances presenting for 
resolution is clear - is incontestably part and parcel of the "ready-made 
deviationist doctrine". But it must be approached with circumspection. This point 
was registered very clearly in Nortje v. Attorney-General of the Cape. 149 Equally 
manifest in taking the point was Tebbutt J. 's judgment in Part-Ross v. Director, 
Office for Serious Economic Offences. 150 In S. v. Majavu, 151 the court availed itself 
very liberally of foreign legal materials in seeking to throw light on the problem 
confronting it: Canadian law, the law of the United States of America, Australian 
law, European law, Irish law, the law of the United Kingdom, and the law of New 
Zealand. It is submitted that the jurisdictions to which recourse was had are not all 
149 1995 (2) BCLR 236 ( C ) at 2401 and 247D. 
150 1995 (2) BCLR 198 ( C) at 208D-E. See also Qozoloni v. Minister of Law and Order 1994 (1) 
BCLR 75E at 80C. 
151 1994 (2) BCLR 56 (CkGD). 
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fully comparable to the South African legal setting. Marais J. 's cautionary 
remarks in Nortje 152 (decided after Majavu) might well be taken to berate the sort 
of overzealous indiscriminate cosmopolitanism to which the jurist may tend in her 
less guarded moments. 
Mandela v. Falati 153 
This judgment has been discussed previously, with reference to the issue of value-
competition. 154 Here it is merely noted that the court took to a rule of American 
law, enunciated in New York Times Co. v. United States, 155 as an appropriate dis-
positive precept. That was the "ready-made deviationist doctrine" upon which it 
relied. 
Applying the metatheory, one might discern an appeal to the construct of "rational 
forensic deliberation" in the court's concern for ''transparency" ("purpose"), as 
also in its perception that concealment has led to the commission of appalling 
crimes ("context of social realities"). The "narrative model" underlying the 
proposed choice of "ready-made deviationist doctrine" proved equal both to 
"purpose" and to the inclusive "context of social realities". In addition, it allowed 
of the processing of the "arrangement of facts" into "legal facts", so as to make for 
proper axiological performance. The court's election of a "ready-made 
deviationist doctrine" was accordingly an appropriate one. 156 
152 See judgment at 240ff. 
153 1994 (4) BCLR I (W). 
154 See under 3.3., above 
155 403 US 713 (cited at 8H of the report) 
156 The court might conceivably have taken to another - equally appropriate - deviat:ionist 
doctrine. Appropriateness would find its ascertainment in terms of the metatheory. 
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Qozoleni v. Minister of Law and Order 1.57 
This case is instructive as illustrating the use of wisdom already immanent in the 
legal tradition, albeit partially submerged perhaps, as a "ready-made deviationist 
doctrine". 
The "arrangement of facts" was uncomplicated. The applicant, relying upon the 
right to information - and the right to equality - sought discovery of the contents 
of a police docket in order to pursue civil proceedings against the state for 
unlawful arrest and detention and an alleged assault. 158 The tenor of pre-
constitutional case law in respect of such matter was to uphold police docket 
privilege even in civil cases. 159 The court held that these cases were no longer 
binding, as the claim of privilege requires justification in terms of the limitation 
clause: the party seeking to withhold information must prove that such conduct 
complies therewith. 160 In the result, it was held that the applicant was entitled to be 
apprised of the contents of the police docket. 161 
Substantiation of this result was already to be found in our law - as a matter of 
qualified immanence. The observations of Jones J. in Mazele v. Minister of Law 
and Order, 162 a decision rendered prior to the commencement of the (Interim) 
Constitution, may be said to have been appropriated by the court in the case under 
discussion as a "ready-made deviationist doctrine". 
I 
57 1994 (I) BCLR 75 (E). 
158 See judgment at 78A-D. 
159 See judgment at 89G-H. (See also headnote at 77E-G.) 
160 At 89 1-J. 
161 At 91 H. 
162 1994 (I) SACR 406 (E), cited at 90H - 91 C of the report. 
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Applying the metatheory, one might discern an appeal to the construct of "rational 
forensic deliberation". Such deliberation would engage with the argument that not 
to allow a plaintiff recourse to the relevant materials, the defendant all the while 
being in possession thereof, would be manifestly unfair. (There were no longer 
any criminal proceedings pending against the applicant, which, if there were, 
might have justified some measure of violation of the principle of "equality of 
arms" - to the extent allowed by the limitation clause.) This sort of argumentation 
evinces a concern with substantive equality ("purpose") as well as with the 
"context of social realities" .163 
"Rational forensic deliberation'', further, would enquire whether the "narrative 
model" underlying the proposed choice of "ready-made deviationist doctrine" is 
commensurate with both "purpose" and the inclusive "context of social realities". 
(In addition, whether it allows of the processing of the "arrangement of facts" into 
"legal facts", so as to make for proper axiological performance.) If so, the court's 
election of the "ready-made deviationist doctrine" would be appropriate.164 
Fedics Group v. Matus 165 
This is another judgment evidencing a degree of reliance upon the immanent 
resources of our legal tradition. In short, the question to arise was whether 
163 See discussion llllder 4.2.1, above. 
164 s di . d ee scuss1on lID er 4.2.1, above. 
165 1997 (9) BCLR 1119 (C). 
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evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights was admissible - in this 
case, in the context of proceedings in respect of unlawful competition. 166 
In its survey of the South African law of evidence, the court observed that in terms 
of the traditional approach, evidence had been held to be admissible if relevant, 
regardless of the manner in which it had been obtained. 167 There was no longer 
any room for the application of this approach, with a new value-order inaugurated. 
The court recorded its having been invited to follow the leads provided by S. v. 
Motloutsi, 168 which laid down that in criminal proceedings, evidence obtained by 
deliberate and conscious violation of the constitutional rights of an accused should 
be excluded in the absence of extraordinary excusing circumstances. 169 
Attempting to formulate a principle to govern the situation at hand, Brand J. turned 
his attention to the legal position both in South Africa and in several foreign 
jurisdictions, the United States, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 170 It 
would appear that the judge took counsel's point that in the majority of countries 
the courts retain a discretion to allow evidence notwithstanding its having been 
obtained by way of a violation of constitutional rights. 171 What the court was not 
prepared to do, however, was to extend the principle enunciated in S. v. 
Motloutsi172 to cover civil proceedings, those now under discussion. 173 
166 See judgment at 1200G, 1200 I, 1221Dand1221 E-F. (See also headnote at 1119G-H.) 
167 See 1214 C-D. 
168 1996 (2) BCLR 220 (C), cited at 1218 G of the report. 
169
• At 1218G. (See also headnote, 11991.) 
170 See judgment at l 2 l 4ff 
171 See 1218 F. 
172 Supra. 
328 
Giving his reasons for refusing this extension, the judge drew pertinently upon the 
immanent potentiality of the South African legal tradition. Such pointed up the 
fundamental differences of principle between civil and criminal trials. In a criminal 
case, the accused enjoys the privilege against self-incrimination, and has the right 
to remain silent. Nor is he obliged to disclose documents bearing adversely on his 
case. In a word, the state is required to prove its case without the accused's 
assistance. 174 
Matters are otherwise in a civil case. A litigant is obliged to disclose his case. He 
is further required to discover all documents in their effect potentially detrimental 
to his chances of success. 175 Moreover, the courts have the power to grant Anton 
Piller orders - decrees of conceivably enormous consequence - upon a well-
founded apprehension of concealment or destruction of vital evidence. 176 
The immanent potentiality of our tradition thus militated against the applicability 
of a rule such as Motloutsi 's in a civil case. It suggested rather a principle to the 
following effect: if a litigant seeks to introduce evidence obtained by way of a 
deliberate violation of constitutional rights, he will be required to explain why he 
could not achieve justice through the ordinary procedure (including where 
appropriate, the Anton Piller procedure). 177 In exercising its discretion, the court 
will have regard to the type of evidence obtained. 178 Evidence which could never 
---------- - --------------------.---- ·-·----------------·--·------------
173 See 121 9 B ff. 
174 At 1219 D-F. (See also headnote at 1200 A-B.) 
175 At 1219 F. (See also headnote at 1200 B.) 
176 At 12 I 9 G - 1220 A. (See also headnote at 1200 B--C.) 
177 0 ( At 122 B. Consult, too, headnote at 1200 C-D.) 
178 At 1220 C. (Headnote at 1200 D.) 
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have been lawfully obtained is opposed to evidence which would eventually have 
been obtained through lawful means. With regard to the latter category of 
evidence, the court would be far more likely to exercise its discretion in favour of 
its admission. 179 
In casu, the court held, the violation of the constitutional rights of dignity and 
privacy was not conscious or deliberate. 18° Further, the evidence was such as 
would ultimately have been legitimately obtained. 181 For these reasons, the court 
exercised its discretion in favour of allowing the tainted documents in evidence. 182 
Upon application of the metatheory to this judgment, we see that the court took up 
a "ready-made deviationist doctrine" as indicated by the immanent potentiality of 
our legal heritage. In appealing to the construct of "rational forensic deliberation" 
as a basis for justifying the appropriation of the principle at hand, one may point to 
the various arguments from the respective distinguishing features of criminal and 
civil proceedings advanced by the court. The content of such arguments derived 
from the tradition, and went towards eliciting a dispositive principle. 
Protea Technology Ltd. v. Wainer 183 
This judgment may also be read as advancing resort to the immanent resources of 
our legal heritage in handling situations of "dissonance". It exemplifies a manner 
179 At 1220 C-E. (Headnote at 1200 D.) 
180 At 1221 G. (Headnote at 1199 H.) 
181 At 1222 G. 
182 A t 1223 F. (See also headnote at 1200 E.) 
183 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 \VY). 
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in which a balance may be achieved between continuity and development in the 
law. 
The facts of the case were that the first respondent had acted in violation of a 
restraint-of-trade agreement with the applicants, and that all respondents had 
brought themselves within the scope of the delict of unlawful competition. 184 The 
applicants sought a final interdict restraining these activities, which was granted in 
the result. 185 
The pnmary issue pertained to the admissibility of evidence adverse to the 
respondents' case obtained in contravention of the Interception and Monitoring 
Prohibition Act, 127 of 1992 (by way of telephone tapping). 186 In clearing this 
first hurdle, Heber J. pointed out that although the Act made provision for criminal 
consequences in respect of the manner in which the evidence had been obtained, 
this did not affect its admissibility. 187 
Now the court in point of fact doubted that the first respondent's right of privacy 
had been infringed. 188 It nevertheless proceeded from the premise that it had 
been. 189 On this assumption, it was necessary to decide whether evidence procured 
on these argumentatively illicit lines was to be deemed inadmissible. This con-
stituted the core issue for detennination in this case. 
184 s . d ee JU ginent at 1228 C. (See also headnote at 1225 1-1227 F.) 
185 At 1228 C and 1264 A- 1265 A. 
186 See 1233 B ff. 
187 See 1235 B-D and 1237 D-E. 
188 See 1241 G. 
189 See 1241 G. 
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Reher J. expressed the common-law rule as to admissibility as providing that all 
evidence - however obtained - is admissible, subject to the court's discretion to 
exclude it. 190 The Constitution warranted a departure from this formulation. It 
necessitated a balancing of interests; each case was to be considered on its own 
facts. 191 The judge maintained that evidence secured in breach of a fundamental 
right was eligible for admission only if section 36(1) - the limitation clause -
permitted of such. 192 Heher J. appears to have stipulated for the application of a 
bani mores test in this determination. 193 In applying the test, he proposed that 
"right-thinking members of society" would not censure the steps taken to the end 
of the applicants' self-preservation. 194 The evidence accordingly having been ad-
mitted, the applicants' case had to succeed. 195 
Analysis of the reasoning in terms the metatheory indicates the use of a "ready-
made deviationist doctrine" in the form of a bani mores test. This sort of criterion 
lends itself most eminently to accommodating development within a framework of 
continuity. This is so as the bani mores embody criteria of considerable flexibility. 
"Rational forensic deliberation" would be capable of harnessing these criteria to 
the best utility in the circumstances of any particular case. The standards of "right-
thinking members of society" provide a practicable compendium of starting points 
190 At 1241 J. 
191 See 1242 C-D. 
192 At 1242 B. 
193 See 1243 H. 
194 At 1243 H-1. 
195 See 1264 A- 1265 A. See also headnote at 1227 E-G. 
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- as well as evaluative measures in appraising conclusions - in an appeal to the 
construct of "rational forensic deliberation". 
The bani mores, furthermore, constitute part of the immanent resources of our 
legal tradition. 
S. v. Botha 196 
The "Steyn" privilege was at issue in this case. On the basis of constitutional 
imperative - and reflecting that the privilege was misconceived at its very 
inception, there having been no good reason to depart from the holding in R. v. 
H. 197 in the way the court did in R. v. Steyn198 - Le Roux J. held that it could no 
longer be sustained. 199 The judge saw fit to adopt the principles laid down in the 
Canadian case of R. v. Stinchcombe200 as a framework for replacing the blanket 
privilege. 201 
The "ready-made deviationist doctn·ne" upon which the court relied was South 
African precedent - R. v. H. and S. v. Van Rensburg202 - as well as foreign law - R. 
v. Stinchcombe.203 It is noteworthy that the judge deemed it fit to establish a 
measure of continuity with our tradition in seeking to dispose of the issue. As a 
196 1994 (3) BCLR 93 (W). 
197 1952 (4) SA 344 (T). 
198 1954 ( 1) SA 324 (A). 
199 See judgment at 120 B-C. 
200 1992 LRC 69. 
201 See headnote at 95 F-G. 
202 1963 (2) SA 343 (N). 
203 Supra. 
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matter of fact, the foreign authority relied upon subsumes the principle articulated 
in S. v. Van Rensburg.204 
One may discern an appeal to "rational forensic deliberation" in the judge's 
perception that foreign decisions are to be treated with circumspection. 205 The 
construct in question would mandate an enquiry after the appositeness of a foreign 
disposition to local conditions. Social realities would require to be taken into 
account in determining appropriateness. 
S. v. Melani 206 
One may note that this judgment was criticized in Nombewu, supra.207 This does 
not, however, detract from its value as illustrative of an appropriable modus 
operandi. 
The operative facts were these. The admissibility of certain pointing-out evidence 
was at issue. 208 The accused was informed that he was not required to point 
anything out.209 He was not warned, however, that any pointing-out evidence could 
be used subsequently at criminal proceedings.210 Having met with constitutional 
challenge, the evidence, the court held, should nonetheless be allowed. 211 
204 At l I 5B. This case is reported at 1963 (2) SA 343 (N). 
205 At I lOH. 
206 1995 (5) BCLR 632 (E). 
207 Supra. 
208 See judgment at 634 G-J. 
209 At 636 E. (See also headnote, 632 I) 
210 At 636 E-F. (See also heacmote, 632 I) 
211 See judgment at 644 G. 
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In reaching this decision, Froneman J. sought to establish continuity with parts of 
our own legal tradition. In this respect, his reference to the decisions in S. v. 
Forbes212 and S. v. Hammer2 13 is worthy of note. Having regard to foreign 
materials, the judge formulated what he called a "compro"mise approach", 214 which 
would cater for the legitimate interests of the accused as well as those of society at 
large. In terms of this approach, the court was to have a discretion to exclude 
evidence obtained in contravention of the Constitution, depending on the facts of 
the particular case. 215 The test to be adopted, the judge went on to proffer, is that 
embraced in the Canadian criterion of "bringing into disrepute the administration 
of justice".216 
Analysis of this reasoning upon the metatheory discloses that the court adopted a 
"ready-made deviationist doctrine" taking the form of leads from South African 
case law and materials emanating from foreign jurisdictions. 
"Rational forensic deliberation" as a construct enabled the court to select an 
appropriate principle. The judge contended with the approach that evidence ought 
to be admissible, provided that it is relevant (the old position in English law and 
our common law).217 The factor telling against its adoption was its incompatibility 
with value-systems premised upon written constitutions.218 
'I" . 
- - J 970 (2) SA 594 (C), cited at 642 G of the report. 
213 J 994 (2) SACR 496 (C), cited at 642 G of the report. 
214 See 642 B. 
215 At 642 B. 
216 See 643 C-D. 
217 See 642 A. 
218 See 642 D-E. 
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The court then turned to the general American approach that all evidence obtained 
in an unauthorized manner was to be excluded. 219 The circumstance that this line 
of proceeding does not offer adequate protection to society weighed heavily with 
the court in its refusal to sanction its adoption. 220 
These considerations pointed to the applicability of the "compromise approach" as 
above outlined. Parallel processes were to be found in English statutory law, the 
Canadian Charter, and the common law of Ireland and Australia.221 
We notice in the judgment, then, an appeal to "rational forensic deliberation" in 
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the different modes of 
proceeding, and in an-iving in the result at a conclusion supported by what the 
court found to be the best arguments of social policy. 
Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers 222 
This case has been broached earlier. 223 Here we are concerned with the manner of 
crafting a novel rule of the common law to supply the lacuna left by an elision of a 
rule found to be incompatible with our constitutional enterprise. 224 
Cameron J. endeavoured to establish some sort of continuity with our tradition in 
fashioning a new rule of the law of defamation. In this regard, he referred to 
219 At 642 B. 
220 At 642 E-F. 
221 See 642 B-C. 
222 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W). 
223 See discussion under 3.3. above, pertaining to the resolution of value-competiticm in the 
common law. 
224 See, especially, the judgment at 859 ff. 
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Nasionale Pers v. Long,225 Hassen v. Post Newspapers226 and the writings of 
Professor J.M. Burchel1227 in support of the negligence-based approach228 to 
defamation liability he was to adopt. (The judge, however, noted that these 
"authorities" spoke in a context quite different from that in which the judgment 
was being delivered, and expressly avowed his citation of them to have been 
primarily in the interests of historical "continuity".) 
The court's excursions into foreign materials are more interesting. Aspects of the 
law of the United States were dealt with, their import in the end having been 
discounted as inappropriate for implantation.229 Cameron J.'s treatment of the 
decision of the Australian High Court in Theophanous's case230 seems to have 
been far more favourable and sympathetic.231 That case laid down a 
"reasonableness" standard, which the judge claimed to provide a basis for 
protecting reputation and freedom of expression alike. 232 
On this basis, the judge came to the conclusion that "a defamatory statement which 
relates to free and fair political activity is constitutionally protected, even if false, 
unless the plaintiff shows that, in all the circumstances of its publication, it was 
unreasonably made."233(my emphasis) 
225 J 930 AD 87, cited at 863 C of the report. 
226 1965 (3) SA 562 (W), cited at 863 F of the report. 
227 See 863 H-I. 
228 See 863 C. 
229 See judgment at 659 D ff. 
230 Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 124 ALR I (HC). 
231 See 862 E- 863 A. 
232 See 862 G-H and 863 B. 
233 At 864 B. 
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The metatheory demonstrates the "ready-made deviationist doctrine" to have 
comprised elements of both South African and foreign law. The construct of 
"rational forensic deliberation" may be used to explain why, in overruling 
Neethling v. Du Pree:l-34 (which widened the common-law defamation action and 
correlatively narrowed the ambit of freedom of expression, in apparent sympathy 
with the reigning ideas of the day)235 Cameron J. was not prepared to go to the 
other extreme and approve the ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.236 The 
latter (American) decision very substantially underrates a public official's right to 
reputation by requiring the proof of "actual malice" for success in a defamation 
action. 237 
"Rational forensic deliberation" may also be discerned in the argument that the 
new defence the court proposed was limited to the context of political activity. 238 
A different dispensation may be appropriate in non-political discussion,239 for 
example. 
It is significant that in McNally v. M & G Media, supra,240 the case at hand was 
held to have been wrongly decided.241 However this may be, its modus operandi is 
superbly illustrative. 
234 1994 ( 1) SA 706 (A). 
235 See 849 E-H, and 848 D. See also 851 C-D. (Consult headnote at 838 E-F.) 
236 376 US 254 (1964), cited at 859 D of the report. 
237 See 859 D-E, and 861 A-B. 
238 See the discussion in the judgment at 864 ff on the ambit of fue constitutional protection. 
239 Such an inference may be garnered from a reading of the judgment at 865 D-H. 
240 1997 (6) BCLR 818 (W). 
241 At 825 I. 
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4.5 Departure from an Ostensibly Innocuous Rule or Principle 
Occasionally, axiological performance may require the amendment of a common-
law rule which is not "obdurate" on the face of it. 242 This sort of contingency is 
best illustrated by an example. 
v G · p . 243 n.otze en ems v. otgzeter 
In this case, the court was called upon to decide on the enforceability of a covenant 
in restraint of trade embodying restrictions on competition of duration and 
location. 244 It was urged by the respondents that the restrictions were unreasonable, 
contrary to public policy and the public interest, and opposed to the 
Constitution. 245 It was contended that there should be a return to the position in 
English law in terms of which a clause such as that at issue was pn·ma facie 
invalid, the onus resting on the party seeking to enforce it to demonstrate its 
reasonableness. 246 
The court refused to accede to this argument, following instead the decision in 
Magna Alloys and Research v. Ellis,247 where it had been held that such clauses are 
prima facie enforceable, the onus of proving otherwise resting on the party 
242 Consult, in this regard, Chapter III, 6A(2). 
243 1995 (3) BCLR 349 (C). 
244 See judgment at 350 G-H. (See also headnote at 349 F-G.) 
245 Sec 350 I. (See also headnote at 349 G.) 
246 See 352 A-B. 
247 1984 ( 4) SA 874 (A), cited at 350 1-J of the report. 
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contending that they should not be enforced. 248 In the result, the judge held that 
the covenant in restraint of trade at hand was in any event not unreasonable.249 
Several comments suggest themselves. Firstly, section 26(1) of the (Interim) 
Constitution, which provides for the protection of the right to engage freely in 
economic activity and to pursue a livelihood, might by virtue of section 35(3) have 
been permitted to prevail in its thrust over the argument from sanctity of contract. 
The classical-liberal premises of that argument, presupposing antecedently free 
and equal bargaining agents, are difficult to sustain. 250 
Next, the question of competing values may have been resolved by arguing that in 
the circumstances of the case, the value of substantive equality (and "social 
justice") was most clamant for protection in the light of the overall constitutional 
scheme.251 By giving meaning to the notion of "substantive equality", one might 
reverse the priority - so that "freedom of trade" may enjoy precedence over 
"sanctity of contract" in approaching restraint clauses.252 
Finally, on the application of the model to these issues, one may find the "ready-
made deviationist doctrine" in English law. The rule at issue has been stated 
248 At 350 I-J. 
249 See 353 A-B: "Ten slotte wil ek net opmerk dat al sou die bewyslas op die applikante gerus het, 
ek geen huiwering sou gehad het om te bevind dat hulle hul daarvan gekwyt het nie." (See also 
headnote at 350 D-E.) 
250 See Chapter V, 2.3.2, of this study- where the liberal-communitarian debate is given coverage -
for elaboration. 
251 Tills proposition, it will at once be appreciated, harks back to the discussion above of the 
Concorde Plastics and Holomisa cases. 
252 See in this regard Van Aswegen "The Implications of a Bill of Rights for the Law of Contract 
and Deli ct" I 99 5 11 SAJHR (I) 50 66-7, where the author considers this a possibility. Van 
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above. And its appositeness to current circumstances would require to be "proved" 
with reference to the notion of "rational forensic deliberation". 
II. A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR APPROACHING 
CUSTOMARY LAW 
In speaking of customary law, one should not lose sight of its pervasive 
significance in the lives of millions of South Africans. Justine White's comments 
in this context are of interest.253 So , too, are those of Albie Sachs (presently a 
Judge of the Constitutional Court), who has appealed for a "special tolerance" to 
be manifested towards customary law. 254 
Two edifying precepts should be noticed. Firstly, the jurist is to be on her guard 
against accepting the various black-letter versions of indigenous law255 as faithful 
representations of the true indigenous-law position. Secondly, she ought to 
consider that the issue clamant for resolution may possibly demand a disposition in 
terms of indigenous rather than western law, her more profound immersion in the 
latter tradition notwithstanding. With regard to the implementation of this second 
A~wegen records that participants in the market are rarely economic equals. She says that this is 
especially true as regards the position in contemporary South Afiica (Ibid 67). 
253 See White "Constitutional Litigation and Interpretation, and Ftmdamental Rights" 1994 Annual 
Survey of South Afi"ican /,aw 24 44: Justine White reflects that in the year tmder review ( 1994), the 
courts did not show themselves to be appropriately receptive to the values of the indigenous 
peoples. 
254 As cited in Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law: Under the South African 
Constitution ( 1995) 21. See also 21 n 82. 
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precept, the enactment of statutory provisions regulating internal-conflict-of-laws 
questions may prove of considerable assistance. 256 
(1) THE RELEVANCE OF THE MODEL 
Applied to the indigenous-law milieu, the model as purveyed requires adjustment 
in one or two important respects. In essentials, however, it retains the form it bears 
in its common-law applicability. 
1.1 The Appeal of Gadamer 
The pre-colonial law, according to Van Niekerk, represents the purest form of 
indigenous law. 257 The repressive agencies of colonialism and apartheid, as well 
as misunderstandings engendered by looking upon that law through western 
spectacles, made for its distortion.258 At grassroots-level, where development took 
place free from western influence, there was no substantial divergence from the 
fundamental jural postulates underlying the law.259 The "norms in action", the 
255 In this regard, one thinks of the law reports of the (erstwhile) Native Appeal Comt, for example. 
Also coming to mind are textbook versions of customary law, written by white officials earlier in 
this century. See, generally, in this regard, Chapter V, at 3.3.(5). 
256 See, in this regard, Van Niekerk The Interaction of Indigenous Law and Western Law in South 
Africa: A HistoriCal and Comparative Perspective (mipubhshed LLD. thesis) (1995) 327-8: 
"[C]ertain and detailed rules for the internal conflict between indigenous law and Western law 
should be legislated These rules should take cognisance of indigenous mechanisms to resolve 
internal conflicts. These mechanisms should not be ignored, regardless of whether they are legal 
rules or mere conflict sensitivities". 
m Van Nickerk op cit 52: "As far as can be determined, pre-colonial indigenous law is the purest 
possible form of indigenous law". 
258 S V N. k k' th . · ee an ie er s es1s passim. 
259 Ibid 325 
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"living law", reflected at each point the influence of novel social circumstances, 
while remaining faithful to the basic axioms of the system. 260 
Now, it would be considered by Gadamer that those "prejudices" which derive 
from the tradition as it developed naturally are "legitimate", while those which 
inform the jurist's point of view from the distortions are not.261 The Constitution 
presents an opportunity for a revision of the jurist's subliminal perceptions - for a 
re-appropriation of the tradition and of those "prejudices" it sponsors, and for a 
repudiation of those informed by the distortions. 262 This might be possible should 
the values the Bill of Rights entrenches be interpreted in their proper cultural 
perspective, and in accordance with the underlying jural postulates of indigenous 
law.263 
Gadamer may be appropriated as argumg for the potentiality of these jural 
postulates to cater for a diversity of novel social circumstances. And this is indeed 
what was demonstrated where indigenous law was allowed to develop naturally as 
a "living law" in harmony with its underlying postulates. Today, if a problem out 
of the ordinary were to arise, a "fusion of horizons" would allow for a proper 
determination in the particular circumstances. The "integrity" of the jural postu-
lates would remain uncompromised by their "responsiveness". 264 
260 lllis seems to be Van Niekcrk's general perception. Ibid passim. 
261 See discussion ofGadamer in Chapter II of this thesis, at 3.4. 
262 See in this regard the exposition of Gadamer in Chapter II, 3.4. See also Chapter V of this 
thesis, at 3, where the relationship between the Constitution and indigenous law is discussed. 
Further consult 4.2 of the same chapter. 
263 See Chapter V of this study at 3 and 4.2. 
264 lllis would be Gadamer' s standpoint. 
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1.2 The Appeal of Habermas 
In the context of the development of the common law, the variant on the 
Habermasian theme that was proposed is the construct of "rational forensic 
deliberation". In the case of "dissonance" in indigenous law, it is considered that 
there is no substitute for "actual deliberation"265 among community assessors and 
indigenous-law experts in the interests of eliciting the proper amalgam of "living 
law" and indigenous jural postulates266 for disposing of the matter. This is so 
because the context of the discussion may be alien to the "outsider" judge. Criteria 
of justification which she might invoke in appealing to the construct of "rational 
forensic deliberation" may be entirely irrelevant in that context. Needless to say, 
"actual deliberation" is a very situation-specific version of the Habermasian 
programme. 
1.2.J Access to "Living Law" and Indigenous Jura/ Postulates: Processua/Aspects 
How is "actual deliberation" along these lines to be secured? The following are 
ventured as proposals. First, the Bench should be appropriately constituted267 
(perhaps as a collegiate bench), with both indigenous-law experts and non-expert 
representatives of the community hearing the case, together with the presiding 
officer. The non-expert representation would modulate expert opinion with regard 
to the indigenous jural postulates, ensuring that such opinion is not subversive of 
061 s . th" d ~ · ee, m is rcg;u , ChapK"T III, at 4.3.2. furtht,"f consu116C(4) of the same chapter. 
266 The reader is referred in this regard to Chapter III at 6C(4). 
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wholesome general lifestyle-arrangements as expressed in the "living law". In 
their turn, the experts would undertake to secure that the non-expert portrayal of 
the "living law" is a faithful one. They would also seek to align that "living law" 
with the indigenous jural postulates. 
Second, the presiding ("outside") officer should assume the role of "referee" in 
securing proper input from both the indigenous-law experts and the non-expert 
representatives. She should seek to ensure that the conditions of dialogue are fair, 
and that each of the participants has an appropriate opportunity to advance and 
defend assertions. 268 
(2) METATHEORY OF CUSTOMARY-LAW APPLICATION 
(1) As elsewhere, axiological performance in customary law is mediated 
via the notions of "purpose" and "existential context". "Purpose" here 
entails, however, that (i) the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
should be interpreted in their proper cultural perspective (and with a 
view to bringing the law in step with its own jural postulates);269 and 
that (ii) the concerns of justice be addressed by laying emphasis on 
267 There has recently been talk on the television news of in~tituting "comm:cmity courts". It is 
unclear to me precisely what are the mandates of these institutions. If they are entrusted with the 
application of indigenous law, it is to be recommended that they be appropriately constituted. 
268 Section 180 ( c) stipulates that national legislation may provide for the participation of people 
other than judicial officers in court decisions. The enactment of appropriate statutory measures to 
the end of implementing the proposals in the text may be a recommendation. and may be 
undertaken in pursuance of this subsection. 
269 The diffuse postulate of the "harmony of the collectivity'' sponsors a concern with severdl 
specific jural postulates: status order; family idea; common-kin principle; hamlet spirit. These 
constitute important premises for legal reasoning in indigenous law. (See Van Niekerk 
(unpublished LLD. thesis) op cit 196.) 
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reconciliation, and the restoration of harmony270 in the community. 
(The "twofold purpose" of servicing the design of the Constitution and 
catering for the exigencies of "justice" speaks respectively to each of 
these entailments.)271 
These comments suggest a "new hermeneutical consciousness" of a 
somewhat different complexion from that operative in dealing with 
common-law materials (or statutes in general). It embodies appreciably 
distinctive perceptions of human rights, and of the notion of 'justice". 
In fact, it is only from within the framework of reference of the 
autochthonous world-view that the "new hermeneutical consciousness" 
is here capable of full realization. (Hence the recommendation of 
community participation in the taking of decisions.) 
The "pre-understandings" ("prejudices") deriving from this "conscious-
ness" make for a proper understanding of customary law and its 
processes. 
Further, with regard to "purpose", one should not forget that the norms 
of public international law272 should be harnessed in imparting a 
natural-law fragrance to the interpretation of customary law. But -
270 It has been said that the emphasis in dispute resolution in customary law is not so much on law 
and order in the western conception as on the resolution of the disturbed equilibrium in the 
cmmnunity. Justice in the indigenous-law context must therefore be taken up in a rather different 
sense from that suggested by the equilibration of conflicting rights. See David and Brierley Major 
Legal Systems in the World Todav (1978) 508 for the first proposition. 
271 Consult, generally, Chapter Vat 4.2, in this regard. 
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importantly - these norms should be construed within the indigenous 
cultural context.273 
(2) "Existential context" is a reference to the inclusive "context of social 
realities" (of which the "arrangement of facts" presenting for 
determination are to be deemed a component). The "context of social 
realities" in indigenous culture relates most notably to such issues as: 
(i) transparency in public dealings;274 
(ii) a concern for "community" ("ubuntu"); 
(iii) the human, social and economic aspects relevant to the 
determination; 
(iv) the high importance of human dignity (and substantive 
equality);275 and 
(v) liberty as it is understood in indigenous law.276 
(3) "Purpose" subsumes a commitment to the inclusive "context of social 
realities". The matters itemized as (2) (i)-(v), above, are issues to which 
the design of the Constitution is to be perceived as committed. 
(4) The "norm" and the "arrangement of facts" are more intimately 
interrelated than is the case with western law. A "narrative model" of 
272 This should ensure the compliance of indigenous law with internationally accepted norms and 
standards. 
273 The nonns should therefore receive a very context-~-pecific interpretati<m. 
274 Transparency was an important indigenous-law principle. (See Van Niekerk op cit 278, for 
instance.) 
275 Human dignity was very highly prized in indigenous law. 
276 Iibe rty must not here by understood in the western sense. 
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typifications of action, loaded with tacit social evaluations, links the 
two - making, if you will, for subsumption or non-subsumption, as the 
case may be. (The words "if you will" are used advisedly, because the 
autochthonous administration of justice does not conceive of the 
application of a rule known in advance to the facts of the case as 
typically a part of the enterprise.) 
(5) The "twofold purpose" (committed to the "context of social realities") 
may make for a new "pre-understanding" - a modification to the 
evaluative dimension of the "narrative model", in other words. And 
"subsumption" (if one is so inclined to speak of it) may possibly 
proceed where previously it did not - and conversely. (Because the 
"context of social realities" is one to which "purpose" subsumes a 
commitment, that "context" may effectuate quite the same thing.) 
( 6) When we speak of the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" 
("pre-understanding"), and the modification it may undergo (making 
for a new "pre-understanding"), we are alluding to conceptions intrinsic 
to the culture concerned. Homologues of such conceptions, if enter-
tained by the "outsider" judge, may prove misleading. The partici-
pation in the decision of experts and assessors drawn from the 
community accordingly seems to be essential. 277 278 
277 See the discussion mider 1.2.1., above. 
278 Chapter Vat 4.2 should be consulted on these matters in general. 
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(7) Finally, one has to do with the case where the formulation of an 
indigenous-law principle frustrates axiological performance. (Here one 
thinks of a textbook-formulation, for instance - one which embodies a 
"distorted" version of indigenous law.) This signals "dissonance". 279 
"Dissonance" suggests the appropriation of a "ready-made deviationist 
doctrine". The latter would consist in an amalgam of (i) indigenous 
jural postulates (to the degree that these are not disruptive of 
. who le some general lifestyle-arrangements as expressed in the "living 
law") and (ii) the "living law" itself Such a deviationist doctrine is to 
be identified by "actual deliberation" (among indigenous-law experts 
and community assessors) as discussed above.280 
(3) "MITTELBARE DRITTWIRKUNG" IN INDIGENOUS LAW 
Upon the assumption that the evaluative dimension of the "narrative model" 
underlying the customary-law principle is substantially assimilable to the "novel 
prejudice horizon" (as implicitly purveyed in the metatheory under points (1)- (6) 
above), "mittelbare Drittwirkung" would seem to be indicated as the manner of 
development of the norm. As a matter of fact, points (1) - (6), above, secure the 
effectuation of this indirect approach. 
279 See (4) below. 
280 It is submitted that both indigenous-law experts and non-expert community representatives 
should give their input in the identification of the amalgam in question. And this, I ~ubmit, should 
be done along the lines described llllder 1.2.1., above . 
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Sachs J. has proposed that the indirect approach to the development of customary 
law would enable courts closer to the ground to bring it into line with the 
Constitution on an incremental, case-by-case basis. 281 
According to Bennett, "living" customary law is pervaded by generalized norms, 
usually characterized by a requirement for reasonable behaviour.282 These norms 
provide a point of entry for the infusion of the values entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights - read in their proper cultural perspective.283 "Reasonableness" in 
indigenous law is not what the term signifies in the general South African law, and 
is therefore to be informed by these values as thus read.284 It is a concept informed 
by the public policy and boni mores of a culturally different community. 
All in all, it seems as if "mittelbare Drittwirkung" along these lines would best 
secure the objectives both of constitutionalism and of indigenous-cultural 
preservation. The approach would, it is suggested, enhance the legitimacy of our 
new value-compendium in the sight of those still living by traditional institutions. 
(4) SELECT CONCRETE INSTANTIATIONS OF PROCEEDING 
IN CASES OF "DISSONANCE" 
281 See the judgment of Sachs J. in Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 740 E-G. 
282 In the same judgment, Mokgoro J. cites Bennett as maintaining that customary law ''is pervaded 
by generalized norms, usually characterized by a requirement for reasonable behaviour, which 
provide a starting point for the introduction of fundamental rights". (Quotation from Bennett in 
judgment Ibid 735 I-J (n 9). Professor Bennett clarified this point for me, saying that the customary 
law in contemplation is that as it obtains in the community, not such as finds expression in written 
and codified form. See also Chapter V, n 143. 
283 Seen 282, above. Consult also Chapter V, 4.2 (iv) and (v). 
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4.1 General 
In interpreting indigenous law in line with the imperatives of the Constitution, the 
jurist should endeavour to conform that law to its own basic axioms. These 
axioms differ from their counterparts in western law. Whereas starting points for 
legal reasoning in systems subsumed by the latter category place emphasis on the 
maintenance of "law and order" and foster individualism to a degree that is 
sometimes conducive to alienation, the axioms of legal justification in indigenous 
law stress the aspirations of communal equilibrium. Ubuntu and concern for 
"community" is not the less solicitous for the interests of the individual, as a 
human being with inherent dignity, for its want of a conception of the person as a 
monadistic entity. 
Under this head we deal with "dissonance", as alluded to in terms of point (7) of 
the metatheory, above. In this instance, an extant version of indigenous law 
(usually "distorted") frustrates axiological performance. 
With this prelude, we turn immediately to some illustrative scenario-delineations. 
4.2 Specific Examples 
4.2.1 Van Niekerk instances the legal position as regards capacity to litigate as a 
case showing up the way in which misunderstandings became entrenched in the 
284 The values in the Bill of Rights require to be interpreted in their proper cultural perspective. 
They ought not to be deployed in their western appropriation. 
351 
law, and furnishes suggestions as to the manner in which the situation should have 
been handled. 
In the pre-colonial law (the most pristine form), all the members of a group were 
represented by the family head in legal and social matters. This did not mean that 
in so doing he acted in his own interests.285 White officialdom, however, 
misunderstood what was actually occurring. The enactment of the Black 
Administration Act, 38of1927, bears this out very amply. In seeking to codify in 
writing the indigenous law as they perceived it, they laid down that the women 
were perpetual minors, only the men having full legal capacity. 286 
Van Niekerk comments that had the indigenous jural postulates informed the line 
of development of the law, no distinction would have been drawn between men 
and women as regards capacity to litigate.287 Even in western terms, the law would 
have been non-discriminatory. 
4.2.2 There are some who contend that the institution of bridewealth (marriage 
goods) "objectifies" women.288 In the pre-colonial law, bridewealth served, among 
other things, as a symbol of the bond between the two families. 289 Today, 
however, the institution has taken on a commercial character; it contributes to the 
subordination of women, and jeopardises their financial security upon divorce.290 
285 Van Niekerk op cit 303. 
286 Ibid. See also 303 n 152. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid 299. 
zs9 Ibid. 
290 Ibid 300. 
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The solution to this problem, Van Niekerk argues, is to be found along the lines of 
the adaptation of the institution in accordance with its underlying indigenous-law 
principles. We would, then, retreat from the notion that the marriage goods are to 
satisfy the immediate economic needs of the woman's group. We would, further, 
move away from the idea that the institution justifies a husband's refusal to support 
his wife and children upon divorce. We would also retreat from the perception that 
it is no more than a purchase price for the woman. 291 In conformity with the pre-
colonial symbolic function of bridewealth noted above, the woman would no 
longer readily be looked upon as an economic commodity.292 Thus conceived, the 
institution would no longer be unfairly discriminatory. 
4.2.3 Pre-colonial indigenous law and its jural postulates argued in favour of the 
protection of the dignity of children, and their physical and emotional welfare. 
Van Niekerk urges that urbanization and altered social and economic 
circumstances require that the law once again be adapted so as to conform it to its 
jural postulates in this respect. 293 
4.2.4 The circumstance that the head of the family represents the group has 
conduced to the misconception that the husband is the owner of individual 
property, and accordingly that the wife has no proprietary capacity. 294 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid The am01mt of bridewealth to be paid "would again take on reasonable proportions". 
(Ibid). 
293 Ibid 292. 
294 Ibid 303. 
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In pre-colonial law, both men and women have a limited proprietary capacity.295 
(Concededly, the head of the family represents the family and administers its 
property for the family as a whole.)296 In practice, the courts granted men full 
proprietary capacity (not so, the women). 297 Van Niekerk proposes that this mis-
apprehension as judicially entrenched falls to be cured by extending women's 
proprietary capacity, in order to bring it on a par with that of men. 298 If this is 
done, the rule will be re-aligned with the indigenous jural postulates. 299 It would, 
further, be attuned to the prevailing market economy and changed 
circumstances. 300 It may be possible in this way to address the issue of discri-
mination on this score. 
4.2.5 Claims for maintenance within the same agnatic group are unknown in 
indigenous law. 301 The principle is that everything in the group belongs to all 
members communally; the group should provide for the needs of each of its 
members. 302 It was never intended that children should be destitute when their 
father died. 303 
In the light of changed circumstances - and, in particular, having regard to the 
development of individual ownership (at least for men) - the rule would indeed be 
295 Ibid319. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
z99 Ibid. 
JOO Ibid. 
30 
I Ibid 321. 
io2 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
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discriminatory against children.304 Van Niekerk proposes that a solution is to be 
found in changing the rule - so as to give the child an enforceable claim against 
his father's estate.305 Such a solution would bring the rule more in line with 
underlying indigenous-law principles.306 
4.2.6 As pointed out m 4.2.5 above, the notion of an enforceable right to 
maintenance within the same agnatic group was foreign to indigenous law.307 
With reference to the underlying jural postulate that the extended family should be 
continued through its members, and to the "family idea" that members should be 
physically and emotionally supported by the group,308 it may be decided that a son 
who has been adopted by a woman according to indigenous law has an action 
against the estate (in the western sense of the word) of the deceased adoptive 
parent.309 Such a holding would bring the indigenous law into re-alignment with 
its underlying jural postulates.310 
4.2. 7 In the pre-colonial law, widows and children cannot inherit. This is 
because of the principle of universal succession through the oldest male. The latter 
did not succeed in his personal capacity, but for the benefit of the family as a 
whole. Security for widows and children was thus afforded.311 
>o4 Ibid. 
305 !hid 
306 Ibid. 
307 See 4.2.5., alxwc. 
308 Ibid 290. 
309 Ibid 289. 
110 Ibid 290. In this regard, the reader is referred to Van Niekerk's discussion of the decision in 
Kewana v. Santam Insurance Co. Ltd. 1993 (4) SA 771 (Tk) at 289-90 of her thesis. 
311 Ibid301. 
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Over the years the concept of individual ownership by men evolved.312 (The 
concept of an estate belonging to an individual is foreign to the pre-colonial 
law.)313 By reason of the extended-family dimension, if the court in the event 
decides that a widow can indeed inherit, a specific amount should be indicated, 
taking into account the other dependants.314 (Alternatively, the court may rule that 
the widow and the other dependants have a claim for maintenance against the 
estate. )3 15 
Van Niekerk contends that if in a particular case, the widow and children are 
destitute, the court should intercede on their behalf as outlined above.316 It would 
be inappropriate to apply western law simply because individual property is at 
issue.317 The law should be developed in its proper cultural perspective, and in 
line with its underlying jural postulates.318 
It is agreed with Van Niekerk on these points ( 4 .2.1-7), subject to the reservation 
that the changes she recommends do not disrupt any wholesome general lifestyle-
arrangements (as expressed in the "living law"). 
The notion of "actual deliberation" is relevant in cases of "dissonance". 
Indigenous-law experts and community assessors (non-expert community 
representatives) would collaborate in the identification of a proper amalgam of (i) 
312 Ibid 302. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid. 
31s Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
31s Ibid. 
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indigenous jural postulates (to the degree that these are not disruptive of 
wholesome general lifestyle-arrangements as expressed in the "living law") and 
(ii) the "living law" itself, as the appropriate dispositive deviationist doctrine. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
( 1) The common law and customary law cannot be dealt with on an 
interchangeable basis. This is because the premises from which they derive 
are wholly divergent. 
(2) So far as the common law is concerned, the approach to be adopted 
(assuming the compatibility of the rule or principle at issue with 
constitutionalism) is very much the same as that applicable in respect of the 
interpretation of statutes. Of course, there is here no "statutory purpose" to 
be serviced. Furthermore, the processes of ingression and purposive-
definition, very important in legislative construction, do not find any place 
in the enterprise. But the process of effectuation is as applicable to the 
common-law, barring any concern with maxims or canons of construction. 
And axiological performance proceeds in virtually identical fashion. 
(3) Where a rule or principle of the common law for one or other reason 
frustrates axiological performance, a departure therefrom may be 
warranted. In order to fill the lacuna, the jurist should seize upon a "ready-
made deviationist doctrine". She should appeal to the construct of "rational 
forensic deliberation" as a yardstick for determining the adequacy of such 
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doctrine to "purpose" (the design of the Constitution and 'justice") and 
"social realities" (including the "facts"). Circumspection is required in a 
high degree. And prospective overruling, depending upon the circum-
stances, may be indicated. 
( 4) In the case of customary law, the assumptions the jurist brings to bear upon . 
her perceptions are informed by a "new hermeneutical consciousness" of a 
somewhat different complexion319 from that operative in dealing with 
common-law materials (or statutes in general). For this reason, proper 
axiological performance may here require input in the form of community 
participation in decision-making. 
(5) Where the formulation of an indigenous-law principle frustrates axiological 
performance (here one thinks of a textbook-formulation, for instance, 
which embodies a "distorted" version), one has to do with "dissonance". In 
this event, a "ready-made deviationist doctrine", consisting in an amalgam 
of indigenous jural postulates (to the extent that these are not disruptive of 
wholesome general lifestyle-arrangements as expressed in the "living law") 
and the "living law" itself, might be appropriated. Such a deviationist 
doctrine is to be identified by way of "actual deliberation" among 
indigenous-law experts and community assessors. 
As with the interpretation of statutes, the processes pertaining to the development 
of the common law and customary law as here outlined might be used both as an 
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ensemble of guidelines, and as a criteriological basis for the analysis of court 
decisions bearing on these matters. 
AN ENDNOTE 
This study has reached its conclusion. Its objectives having been to delineate a 
theoretical basis for the construction of statutes, and the handling of common-law 
and customary-law sources, it is hoped that it has succeeded to some extent in 
meeting them. 
One may conceive of a theory as a tool or instrument, a means of approach. 
Armed with such a means, the jurist is better able to execute her functions than she 
would be if she were content to proceed upon a casuistic, unco-ordinated basis. It 
has been said that nothing is quite so practical as a good theory. 
Instances have been furnished in the course of this chapter of the theory in its 
practical dimensions. Its utility as a tool has been demonstrated at several distinct 
points. This is not to say that it is without its shortcomings. Refinements as 
suggested by constructive criticisms would most certainly amplify its value. 
Indeed, among the indications for further research would be studies undertaken to 
the end of elaborating just such refinements. 
If this study has by some unfortunate turn not accomplished quite everything it was 
proposed at the outset to achieve, it is to be hoped that it has nevertheless 
succeeded in dispelling once and for all the misapprehension that the juridical 
---------------··-·----~·-··--··-· 
319 Refer, in this connection, to Chapter Vat 3.2 (and 3.1 ). 
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enterprise 1s a process from which value-considerations may be divorced. 
Unhappily, our pre-constitutional jurisprudence to a large extent misconceived its 
role on this score. The stage has now been set for perceptual correction. 
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